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Abstract 
One defining empirical trend across the advanced capitalist macroeconomies since 
1970, is a declining rate of private non-residential fixed capital accumulation (business 
fixed capital accumulation). Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain this 
decline: higher corporate dividend and interest payments; increasing share buybacks; 
the rising rentier behaviour of non-financial corporations, and declining corporate profit 
rates. Drawing on insights from the French Regulation School Literature, this thesis 
explores an alternative explanation centred on changes in institutional configuration.  
Scholars working within the intellectual tradition of the Regulation School have argued 
that a sustained period of growth in the rate of accumulation presupposes the existence 
of a set of enabling and mutually consistent political and economic conditions. When 
these enabling conditions weaken or dissolve, accumulation will be adversely affected; 
restoring growth when a “regime of accumulation” has fallen apart, then requires that 
institutional coherence be re-established. Regulation School economists have 
emphasized the prevailing international regime (with economic openness as a principal 
component) one of the key conditions; in the Post-War period, they argued that 
restrictions on openness – in the realms of trade and finance – helped to establish a high 
rate of capital accumulation. 
This thesis undertakes an empirical examination of the links between economic 
openness and the rate of national business fixed capital accumulation in advanced 
capitalist economies, since the 1970s (technically after the demise of Fordism). 
Following Glyn et al (1990), capital accumulation is defined herein as the growth rate 
of fixed capital stock. Statistical and econometric tests for a panel of 23 OECD 
countries for the period 1970-2014 are undertaken. The two fundamental components of 
economic openness – trade and finance , are investigated independently. In each case, 
we explore and test the channels through which each might influence the pace of capital 
accumulation. This investigation undertakes structural-break and dominance analyses, 
and uses panel data methods. Both static and dynamic panel data methods are 
undertaken, and several panel estimators adopted to minimise the impact of estimator 
biases on inferences made.  
Generally, the investigations undertaken here support the hypothesis that the 
accumulation rate for business fixed capital varies inversely with economic openness. 
This effect operates directly and indirectly; vis-à-vis the latter channel, we found that 
- v - 
shifts in real wage growth are a key channel through which the impact of changes in 
economic openness are felt. The investigations undertaken here conclude with an 
exploration of the problem of restoring another long wave of accumulation. A post-
Fordist regime of accumulation is also identified  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Business fixed capital is of great interest both within the academic and public 
policy-making circles (see Stockhammer, 2004). However, it has been observed that 
rates of business fixed capital accumulation have generally been on the decline since 
the end of the post-war golden age (controversially in the early 1970s), across 
advanced capitalist economies (Bhaskar and Glyn, 1995; Aglietta, 1998; Aglietta 
2000; Boyer, 2000; Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Stockhammer, 2004; van Treeck, 
2008). Throughout this extended period, the prevailing notion has been that the 
crucial determinant of the rate of fixed capital accumulation is business profit rate 
(Robinson, 1962). Arguably, for a freely operating profit-oriented capitalist firm, the 
rate of business accumulation depends critically upon the level of profitability 
associated with it. But then, statistical evidence has indicated that over the post-war 
decades, there has been increasing divergence between fixed capital accumulation 
trend and business profit rate trend across these advanced economies. While the 
former has been downward trending, the latter has been upward trending (van 
Treeck, 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 2011).  
 
The cause of this general decline in fixed capital accumulation has taken the centre 
stage of a hot ongoing academic debate related to fixed capital accumulation. Three 
broad strands of explanation have emerged in the literature. The first is the dividend 
and interest payments argument: that increases in dividend and interest pay-outs 
have progressively denuded the amount of retained profits available for fixed capital 
accumulation (Aglietta and Bretton, 2001; van Treeck, 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 
2011).  The second argument is the financial assets acquisitions argument: that non-
financial corporations have been substituting financial assets for fixed capital 
investments (Stockhammer, 2004). The third is the share buy-backs argument: that 
corporate share buybacks have increasingly reduced the funds available for 
businesses’ fixed capital accumulation (Duménil and Lévy, 2011). Although 
proponents of each of these three strands of explanation have simultaneously 
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claimed to have found some significant supporting empirical evidence, a critical 
analysis suggests that these arguments have weaknesses too significant to ignore.  
 
Regarding the increases in profit pay-outs in the form of dividends, interests and 
share buybacks by businesses arguments, if these explain the declining trend of 
capital accumulation, how then are they able to simultaneously bring about the 
associated upward-trending business profit rates observed in these advanced 
capitalist countries? A profile of profit pay-out ratios in the form of dividends for the 
S & P 500 group of companies in the US for each decade from the  1930s, to the 
2000s, were 90.10%, 59.4%, 54.6%, 56%, 45.5%, 48.6%, 47.6%, and 32.3%, 
respectively. These statistics indicate that profit pay-out ratios, as ratios of dividends 
to business profits, in decades of unprecedented growth rates of fixed capital 
accumulation of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, were higher than the pay-out ratios in 
the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, which were decades of  decreasing rates of 
fixed capital accumulation (see Glyn et al., 1992). If progressive paucity of retained 
earnings effectively constrained fixed capital accumulation, this should have been 
more severe in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, than in the 1970s to the 2000s. 
Moreover, the statistics indicate that profit pay-out ratios, as ratios of dividends to 
business profits, have been on the decline rather than on the increase. The 
decreasing trend in profit pay-outs as indicated by the statistics is not surprising, as 
the most popular dividend policy with domestic firms and multinationals is the 
stable dividend policy, whereby amounts paid out as dividends grow slowly but 
surely and lagging earnings growth rates, to ensure a ratchet pattern of dividend 
growth.  
 
To motivate our argument, consider the following food for thought: would business 
fixed capital accumulation really increase if managers were to reduce expenditure on 
share buybacks, dividends, and financial assets acquisitions? We have to be mindful 
that share buybacks have to be allowed for in the article of association and this, like 
dividend pay-outs, have to be approved in general corporate meetings. As argued by 
Aglietta and Breton (2001), the majority shareholders of corporations are more 
favourably disposed towards investments growth and the longevity of the firm, 
while the minority shareholders seek higher dividends and share buybacks. Under 
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the above premise,  the former could be expected to straitjacket (by their votes in 
general meetings) the ability of companies to increase dividend and interest 
payments, share buybacks, and financial assets acquisitions, if these are deemed to 
occasion the squeezing out of fixed capital accumulation and growth. Increase in 
shareholder wealth usually argued to be the motivation for the higher dividend pay-
outs, financial assets acquisitions, and corporate indulgence in share buybacks, 
could alternatively be increased by profitable real fixed capital investments. 
Actually, studies have shown that the highest correlate with shareholders wealth is 
the net present value (NPV) of underlying assets rather than simply profit pay-outs 
as dividends and share buybacks (Kaplan, 2016). On the fixed capital accumulation 
versus higher profit pay-outs decisions facing capitalist firms, corporate managers 
have to convince shareholders that some proposed business fixed capital 
accumulation will generate greater shareholder value more than immediately paying 
out these monies as dividends and share buybacks (Kaplan, 2016). Thus returns rates 
of fixed capital versus the required/desired rates of returns and shareholder value 
impacts may be critical issues regarding the explanadum, rather than funding 
straitjackets resulting from higher profit pay-outs.  
 
The potential roles played by required rates of return have often been ignored in the 
related literature (see Boyer, 2000). The three broad strands of explanation are 
deeply rooted in the financialisation that followed the widespread financial 
liberalisation of the 1980s and 1990s. One immediate concern therefore, is the 
apparent chronological inconsistencies, for given that business fixed capital 
accumulation have been on the decline since circa 1970, a juxtaposition of these 
proposed explanatory strands with observed data on fixed capital accumulation 
suggests that the explanandum significantly pre-existed the explanans. These 
proposed corporate factors have been theoretically acknowledged in the relevant 
works to be applicable only to the United States. Nevertheless, business fixed capital 
accumulation displays a sophisticated and tenaciously downward trend, with a 
remarkable synchronism across advanced capitalist economies. Therefore why has 
business fixed capital accumulation been declining across the advanced capitalist 
economies since circa 1970? This question  is still as relevant  at this point in time, 
as ever before and signals the need for further research. A common assumption in 
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the analyses across virtually all of the empirical and theoretical contributions to this 
heated debate is that of a closed economy.  But some of these contributors have 
expressed concerns over the robustness of these proposed explanations under the 
context of an open economy, as well as the knowledge deficit of how increased 
international economic openness has contributed to the observed trend of business 
fixed capital accumulation across advanced capitalist economies. Does economic 
openness bring about a decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation under 
the context of  advanced capitalist economies?  
 
1.2 Research Questions; Objectives; and Justification of the Study  
In spite of the extensive international economic openness that emerged in the 
macroeconomic scene circa 1970, the potential contributions of economic openness 
to the observed decline in business fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist 
economies have not been empirically investigated.  A principal objective of this 
research is to fill this knowledge gap of the role played by the increases in economic 
openness in the observed downward trending of corporate fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, by subjecting these two broad 
macroeconomic variables to rigorous empirical tests. The two principal components 
of (international) economic openness are trade openness and (international) financial 
openness. The central questions for this thesis therefore are: do increases in trade 
openness bring about decreases in rates of business fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies? Do increases in financial openness cause decreases 
in rates of business fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies? 
This research investigates the independent causative effects of both the trade 
openness, as well as that of financial openness on the observed dynamics of private 
non-residential fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. The 
objectives of this thesis include the determination of the primary mechanisms 
through which economic openness causes inverse changes in fixed capital 
accumulation, in these countries.  
 
This study is justified by the author’s desire to contribute to the debate on the cause 
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of the observed declining capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, 
given the significance of business fixed capital in these economies as an upstream 
and downstream determinant of economic growth. The intensity of the discussion on 
the cause of the decline of fixed capital accumulation in the midst of the severe 
knowledge gap existing in this literature is also a motivation for this thesis. 
Although related, this study is distinguished from the study of growth of business 
fixed capital investments, for the volume of work already done in the investment 
growth literature is unlimited. Furthermore, the study of the determinants of fixed 
capital formation has limited informational values, as it focuses merely on the 
increase from one period to the other, of real investments. Business fixed capital 
accumulation is instead a relative growth index and may therefore, be decreasing, to 
indicate the presence of a problem, even though fixed capital formation or 
investment  is shown to be growing. 
 
The findings of this research have potential policy implications. Commercial 
policies are one part of these public policy implications. The limitations of the 
currently proposed determinants of accumulation together with the role played by 
international economic relations, suggest that potentially misleading understanding 
has guided public policies on international economic openness. Therefore the 
findings of these research may facilitate the identification of the weaknesses of 
current public policies and ways to take corrective actions. The underdeveloped 
countries are transiting to the state currently enjoyed by developed nations. Thus the 
pattern of accumulation of these emerging economies may follow the same trend 
blazed by those of the industrialized economies, unless greater insights facilitate the 
development of pre-emptive policies to prevent the decline of capital accumulation 
characterising advanced economies. 
 
 1.3 Proposed Hypotheses 
Two central theses regarding advanced capitalist economies in the post-Fordist 
period are advanced: (1) “-that increases in trade openness cause decreases in rates 
of  business fixed capital accumulation-”; (2) “-that increases in financial openness 
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cause decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation-”. The above theses are 
rooted in the French Regulation School literature and some recent theoretical 
propositions in the post-Keynesian literature. The intellectual reference points lead 
us to focus special attention on the underlying conflictual relationships and power 
structures in capitalist production relations, on the role of historical forces and 
dominant institutional changes in the workings of economic relationships (in 
contrast to the predictions of orthodox economic theory) 
 
1.4 The Research Programme/Methodology 
The method of inquiry adopted by this research is the quantitative method. The data 
are secondary data readily available in databases.  The focus is on advanced 
capitalist economies. The justifications for the advanced capitalist economies as the 
focus of this research, include the spatial limit set by the debate in the relevant 
literature. The spatial breadth of the observed dynamic of business fixed capital 
accumulation in the literature is limited to advanced capitalist economies. 
Expectedly, the debate in the literature is focused on seeking explanation for the 
extensive decline in private non-residential fixed capital accumulation in the 
advanced capitalist economies as observed. This spatial limit in the relevant 
literature therefore set the limit for the spatial focus of this research on the advanced 
capitalist economies.  
 
These economies are expected to be among the OECD countries. They are alike in 
many respects, including similar institutional structures. The goal, therefore, is to 
include as many of the OECD countries for which data are available, as possible, in 
the sample.  Furthermore, regarding the temporal dimension of the focus of this 
research, the most extended sample period possible is adopted, because this makes it 
easier to bring to the fore, the explanatory factors that have been most active over 
the long term, thereby reducing the possibility that short term factors might be given 
undue weights and produce misleading inferences due to a small sample size. This is 
more so, as the causal relationship between the explained variable and the 
explanatory variable proposed in this thesis is expected to be valid across time. 
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Therefore the ability of the hypothesized relationship to hold across longer time 
period that stretches across different phases of capitalism within a country and 
different types of capitalism across capitalist countries would underpin  the 
robustness of the causal relationship being argued in this thesis. 
 
The intended method of estimation is the panel data method. Panel data involves the 
data sets in which the values of the respective variables are repeatedly measured for 
the same set of (panel) units, over time. The panel data method enhances the 
efficiency of estimation compared to individual time series method for each of the 
sample countries. By the provision of different intercepts but the same slope 
coefficient for the units set in a model estimate, panel data method is able to extract 
the potentially biasing influence of individual unit’s idiosyncrasies on the 
relationship of interest. A more unbiased or consistent relationship estimate is thus 
facilitated.   Moreover, we advocate the use of multiple panel data estimators where 
possible, to minimize inferential biases caused by the weaknesses of an estimator.  
 
1.5 The Structure of the Research 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents some stylised fact on profit 
investment nexus and highlight strategy changes in corporate  profit rate generation. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of relevant Regulation School theories and post- 
Keynesian theories. Chapter 4 presents a review and analysis of trade policy, 
particularly the processes of emergence of trade policy. Chapter 5 reviews and 
analyses capital account liberalisation policy and its potential processes of 
emergence. Chapter 6 presents an empirical investigation of the relationship 
between trade openness and fixed capital accumulation, and the contribution of the 
former to the observed dynamics of the latter, as observed in the advanced capitalist 
economies. Chapter 7 presents an empirical investigation of the relationship between 
financial openness and fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies 
and the impact of the changes in the former on the observed dynamics of the latter. 
In chapter 8, the question of a post-Fordist regime of development is investigated. 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2  Profit Rate,  Business Fixed capital Accumulation, 
Statistical Facts and Corporate Profit Rate Strategy Change: 
Evidence of a New Era of Capital Efficiency.  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Statistics suggest that while rates of business fixed capital accumulation had been 
rather upward trending in the decades from the end of the Second World War to the 
late 1960s (Golden years of Fordism) in advanced capitalist economies, these rates  
have been generally downward trending since the outset of the post-Fordist decades. 
The orthodoxy is that there is a close causative positive relationship between the rate 
of profit and the rate of business fixed capital accumulation (Robinson, 1962). While 
the statistics suggest that a strong positive correlation might have existed between 
these two variables in advanced capitalist economies during the golden years of 
Fordism, same could hardly be said for the post-Fordist decades. These latter 
decades have witnessed increasing divergence between the trends of profit rates and 
rates of business fixed capital accumulation. While rates of fixed capital 
accumulation have been downward trending in advanced capitalist economies, profit 
rates, in contrast, have been trending upward, in these economies. Some of the 
scholars who were foremost in drawing attention to this emerging divergence from 
the orthodoxy include Bhaskar and Glyn (1995).  
 
But why have the rates of fixed capital accumulation been declining in advanced 
capitalist economies since the outset of the post-Fordist years? How is it possible, 
that upward trending profit rates are coexisting with  declining rates of business 
fixed capital accumulation? While the answers to these questions are not easy to 
find, a hot academic debate has ensued with the intent to find credible explanations 
for this state of affairs, with the focus obviously biased towards the observed decline 
in rates of fixed capital accumulation. Some of the explanations put forward in the 
literature, while they are seemingly intuitive in explaining the declining rates of 
business fixed capital accumulation at the micro-level, have taken the rising rates of 
business profits for granted. They thus, fail to indicate an adequately strong 
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connection between the rising profit rates and the declining rates of business fixed 
capital accumulation. We argue that there have been major profit rate strategy 
changes by capitalists’ agents, between Fordism and post-Fordism. The main 
objectives of this chapter include to highlight the orthodox relationship between the 
two rates, and the increasing disconnection; suggesting the potential way(s) 
declining fixed capital accumulation rates could be coexistent with increasing profit 
rates, highlighting some relevant statistical trends and thus, pave the way for the 
direction of this research. The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 
reviews the importance of fixed capital accumulation. Session 2.3 presents some 
stylized facts. Section 2.4 re-examines the orthodox theorized relationship between 
profit rates and the dynamics of business fixed capital accumulation. Section 2.5 
presents potential reconciliation of the divergence in trends between these two rates, 
through an analysis of the composition of the rate of profit. Section 2.6 presents the 
summary to the chapter.  
2.2 The Relevance of Fixed Capital Accumulation 
Is the rate of fixed capital accumulation important? Rowthorn (1995) has argued that 
the rapid rise in unemployment in Europe has declining rates of business fixed 
capital accumulation as one of the explanatory factors. Across different schools of 
economic thought that include the Neoclassicals, Marxists and Keynesians, the 
relevance of the rate of business fixed capital accumulation for long-term economic 
growth could hardly be overemphasized. Comparing the advanced capitalist 
economies to the developing economies, it is arguable that differences in levels of 
fixed capital stocks have played significant  roles in the differentials between the 
aggregate outputs of these two national classes (De Long and Summers, 1991). 
These differences in levels of private non-residential fixed capital, are arguably the 
results of past differences in rates of business fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Observations would further suggest that globally hegemonic states that have 
emerged over the years, first enjoyed greater rates of fixed capital accumulation over 
their rivals to such international hegemony. A survey of international relations 
would suggest that differences in levels of fixed capital still matter for the amount of 
international political influence and power wielded among the nations. Moreover, 
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the level of fixed capital stock may have been crucial in the classification of nations 
into advanced and underdeveloped nations. Welfare differentials between advanced 
economies and developing economies are closely related to differences in business 
fixed capital stocks between these classes of nations. The influence of levels of 
business fixed capital may yet extend far into the sphere of productivity. To the 
extent that the elasticity of the average output of labour with respect to fixed capital 
is superior to that of capital with respect to labour, then the advanced economies, 
with greater stocks of fixed capital, are expected to enjoy higher labour productivity 
than poorer economies (Romer, 1987). Stockhammer (2004) has highlighted a 
potentially close relationship between skills accumulation and the rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, by arguing that the accumulation of fixed capital may well be 
a necessary condition that underpins “knowledge-based growth”. 
 
Perhaps the more readily digestible importance of the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation to the generality of the public, is its significance to the dynamics of 
GDP (see Fontana and Sawyer, 2013). An econometric test (Persyn and Westerlund, 
2008) indicates a strong positive long-run relationship between the rate of fixed 
capital accumulation and the rate of growth of GDP, so that they move together in 
positive tight proximity. This is in spite of the contributions of the growth rates of 
four other elements (household consumptions, exports, imports and government 
expenditures) to the rate of growth of GDP. Table 2.1 presents the result of the 
cointegration  test. 
 
Table 2.1: Cointegration of Capital Accumulation and GDP Growth 
Statistics Value Z-value P-value 
𝐺𝑡 -3.99 -9.74 0.000 
𝐺𝑎 -22.42 -7.58 0.000 
𝑃𝑡 -14.90 -5.55 0.000 
𝑃𝑎 -14.05 -4.088 0.000 
Note:  H0: No Cointegration 
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The test is executed for 23 countries of the OECD, for which data are readily 
available. The G statistics test whether cointegration exists between the rate of fixed 
capital accumulation and the growth rate of GDP in each country, individually. The 
P statistics test whether cointegration exists between the aforementioned two 
variables if these 23 countries are seen as forming one group or panel. The 
subscripts of a and t only distinguish differences in types of standard deviation used 
in the test. In every case, there is cointegration between capital accumulation rate 
and GDP growth rate, even at the 0.1% significant level. Therefore if advanced 
capitalist economies reduce their rates of  fixed capital accumulation, there would be 
commensurate falls in the growth rates of their GDP, to maintain the long-run 
relationship between the two variables. The inference therefore is that higher rates of 
fixed capital accumulation are crucial for higher rates of growth of GDP, in 
advanced capitalist economies. 
  
2.3 Stylized Facts for Fixed Capital Accumulation and Profit Rates 
Figure 2.1 presents smoothed series of rates of fixed capital accumulation for seven 
of the sample countries, that further enhance the vividness of the declining trends of 
capital growth rates since circa 1970. Business fixed capital here is represented by 
national stocks of net private non-residential fixed capital. 
Figure 2.1: Smoothed series (capital growth rate)   
 
(Source: Authors computation from AMECO Database).  
 
Capital growth rate could be measured as the ratio of real private non-residential 
investment to non-residential capital stock (Gordon et al, 1988; Bowles et al, 1989; 
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2004; van Treeck, 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 2011). Alternatively, the fixed capital 
growth/accumulation rate could be indexed as the percenatge change from one 
period to the other, of the stock of private non-residential fixed capital (Aglietta and 
Breton, 2001). Both series are very similar and the first measure is adopted in this 
research. Figure 2.1 shows clearly, the declining trends in capital accumulation and 
their synchronism across the 7 sampled very advanced capitalist economies. The 
decline and the synchronism are  particularly true for the 1970s, and the 1980s. 
Although the late 1990s project some semblance of increases in capital 
accumulation in Figure 2.1, the unsmoothed  series for the decades across the full 
sample put the seeming growth into proper perspective. In contrast to Figure 2.1, 
Figure 2.2  below, indicates a generally rising trend of the rate of profit in Germany 
(this typifies the trends for other advanced capitalist economies, although not shown 
here). Consistent with the literature, profit rate is here indexed as the ratio of net 
operating surplus to net capital stock. Following dips in rates in the early 1970s, 
profit rates show clear upward trends from the early/mid-1970s, albeit with 
fluctuations, as visible in the exemplifying Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Trend in Profit Rate in Germany 
(Source: Author’s Computation from AMECO Database) 
 
2.4 Orthodox Explanations for Fixed Capital Accumulation 
2.4.1 Profit Rate and Capital Accumulation: Some Post-Keynesian Views   
The determinant of profit rate is generally known as the rate of business fixed capital 
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rate of fixed capital accumulation? As at about 1960, there was no answer to this 
question, in the literature, argued Robinson (1962). She however argued that there 
exist a two sided relationship between profit rate and the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation. On the one hand, the rate of fixed capital accumulation determines the 
rate of profit. On the other hand, the expected rate of profit determines the rate of 
fixed capital accumulation. But the best estimation of expected profit rate, is the 
current profit rate. Therefore in the Cambridge model, the rate of capital 
accumulation determines the rate of profit while the current profit rate, through 
expected profit rate, in turn determines the rate of  capital accumulation. Profit rate, 
while being expressed as a positive function of the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation, is inversely related to the rate of consumption by capitalists (See 
Kaldor, 1956, 1957, 1961; Robinson, 1956, 1962; Pasinetti, 1974). 
 
If current rates of capital accumulation are too high in terms of the actual profit rates 
they are generating (relative to their expected profit rates), firms decrease their rates 
of capital accumulation, in the near future. On the other hand if rates of fixed capital 
accumulation are too low, in terms of the actual profit rates that they are generating, 
(relative to their expected profit rates), firms increase the rates of fixed capital 
accumulation. Robinson (1962, p.49) summarized that the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation depends on how profitable fixed capital accumulation appears to be. 
Therefore as values of the ratio of profit to capital stocks (profit rates) derivable 
from fixed capital accumulation decline relative to their past values or relative to 
alternative source(s) of profit rates, firms reduce future fixed capital accumulation. 
But as values of the ratio of profit to fixed capital stock increase relative to their 
previous values, capitalist firms increase the rates of fixed capital accumulation. The 
process defines an exclusive cointegrated relationship between profit rates or 
profitability and the rates of fixed capital accumulation, in that they both move 
together in tight proximity, in the same direction. In the Kaleckian model, under the 
assumptions of negligible expenditures and taxes by the government and with the 
economy closed, gross profit is the sum of gross investment and consumption by 
capitalists. Because investment and capitalist consumption fall under the purview of 
the capitalists’ decision making while profit earned is not, Kalecki argues that 
causation runs from fixed capital investment rates to profit rates (Kalecki, 1954, p. 
45). 
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2.4.2 Profit Rates and Capital Accumulation: Alternative Views.   
A strong relationship between the rate of profit and fixed capital accumulation rate  
is also suggested in alternative forms by other schools of thought. In mainstream 
economics, it is argued that a firm invests, if there is a sufficient gap between the 
cost of an investment and the present value of expected cash inflows from the 
investment (Fisher, 1906). Therefore as the gaps progressively narrow, so would the 
rates of business fixed capital accumulation progressively fall. In the Keynesian 
literature, there is also the proposition that investments are a function of the 
differential between the profit from investment and the cost of the investment. 
Therefore from these two perspectives, as long as the differential warrants it,  a 
capitalist/firm would undertake fixed capital accumulation, to earn the profit arising 
from the receipts – costs differentials. The Keynesian perspective continues that 
firms would accumulate fixed capital, until the cost of accumulation equate the 
profit from accumulation. The greater is the receipt-cost differential, the higher 
would be the rate of fixed capital accumulation. As the differential reduces, the rate 
of capital accumulation declines, even if still positive. Thus these perspectives also 
serve to reinforce the post-Keynesian perspective of the strong positive relationship 
between the rate of profit and the rate of fixed capital accumulation.  
 
During the golden years of about 1945 to about the late 1960s or a bit later ( The 
period of Fordism), profit rates of firms moved in close positive proximity to fixed 
capital accumulation rates. But do the observed progressive temporal divergences 
between corporate profit rates and corporate fixed capital accumulation rates across 
advanced capitalist economies in the years proceeding Fordism undermine the thrust 
of the cambridge model; Kaleckian model or the alternative explantions 
aforenmentioned? The anwer is an emphatic no, for these theories have highlighted 
that the rates of fixed capital accumulation are a function of the rates of profit these 
fixed capitals are able to generate, not necessarily the profit rates of the firms (or 
corporate profit rates).  
 
An important implication therefore is that if exploitable alternative sources of profits 
become available to capitalist firms, that are superior to profits arising from fixed 
capital, then expectedly, the rates of fixed capital accumulation are expected to 
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decline, in favour of  increases in profit accumulation from these  alternative sources 
of corporate profits. Where an alternative source of higher profits other than fixed 
capital investment is not available, as in Fordism, corporate profit rates move in 
tandem with (rates of) fixed capital accumulation, in the same direction. Where an 
alternative profit source exists, then a firm’s profit rate increases while its rate of  
fixed capital accumulation decreases and thus the divergence in trends of these two 
series,  after Fordism.  Therefore corporate fixed capital accumulation rates depend 
on the levels of profits they can generate according to the cambridge model; but also 
dependent on the profit levels from sources competitive with business fixed capitals.  
The foregoing theoretical argument therefore suggests the exitence of alternative 
source(s) of  corporate profit rates other than fixed capital accumulation, in post-
Fordism. This view point is further expantiated in section 2.5 below.     
 
2.5 How Could High Profit Rates Coexist with Declining Rates of 
Business Fixed Capital Accumulation? 
This question has constituted a significant challenge to traditional explanations (van 
Treeck, 2008). But we argue that the possibility of this unlikely coexistence could be 
found in the apparent changes in profit rates strategies across advanced capitalist 
economies, between the post war years of Fordism and the years proceeding 
Fordism. Profit rate could be decomposed as follows (Lavoie, 2014): 
 









Where (𝜋 𝑌⁄ ) defines the ratio profit level to aggregate output (profit share); (
𝑌
𝑌∗⁄ ) 
is the ratio of aggregate output to potential output (capacity utilisation) and (𝑌
∗
𝐾⁄ ) 
is the ratio of potential output to fixed capital stock (capital efficiency) (see Glyn et 
al, 1992), representing an underlying productive capital efficiency. A credible 
assumption is that (profit-oriented) capitalist firms strive for periodic (e.g. annual) 
profit rates to increase progressively. But as capital stocks increase, the levels of 
profits required to increase the rates of profit also increase. This make increasing 
profit rates over time rather difficult. As explained by Keynes, as fixed capital 
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stocks grow, the costs of further fixed capital acquisitions increase, while the 
increases in outputs from increasing stocks of fixed capital cause the prices of such 
outputs to fall, consequently reducing profit margins  progressively (See Lipietz, 
1986; Baddeley, 2003).  
 
In the post war years until about 1970 (period of Fordism), the ratio of potential 
output to capital stock as well as profit shares (and wage shares by implication) were 
more or less constant, even as capital accumulation proceeded at an unprecedentedly 
high rates. Increases in profit rates were facilitated through higher labour 
productivity and increases in  capacity utilization (see Glyn et al., 1992). In the post-
Fordist years, capitalist firms generated increases in profit rates through increases in 
profit shares (decreases in wage share), cutting down on capacity utilisation, 
increasing the ratio of potential output to fixed capital stock by cutting down on the 
rate of growth of capital stocks. This changes in strategy are evidenced by Figures 
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 2.3 presents the series of profit share, averaged across the 23 
advanced capitalist economies in the sample.  
 
Figure 2.3: Profit Share Series 
(Source: Author’s computation from AMECO Database) 
 
The series computed from data available from AMECO database, covers the period 
1960 to 2014. The 1960s is considered the last decade of Fordism. The average 
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from 1960 till about 1967 and more rapidly from then until about 1973, indicative of 
the popular profit squeeze in the literature (See Glyn et al., 1992; Marglin and 
Bhaduri, 1992). From about 1974 till the end point of the series in 2014, profit share 
assumed an upward trend, on average, across advanced capitalist economies. This 
implies about four decades of continuous growth in profit shares (and by implication 
squeeze in real wages shares.) across advanced capitalist economies. 
 
Figure 2.4 presents the average series of capacity utilisation through time, averaged  
across the same 23 advanced capitalist economies. Capacity utilisation is indexed as 
the ratio of actual output to potential output, computed from data available on the 
AMECO database.  
 
Figure 2.4: Capacity Utilisation Series 
(Source: Author’s computation from AMECO Database) 
 
The average series displays three clear regimes. From the 1960 till about 1973, 
capacity utilisation proceeded at a very steep rate, from 60% to nearly 120%.  This 
is consistent with the expressed view that in the post war period until the early 
1970s, the labour market was tight, with unemployment very low, as both 
underemployed and unemployed labour reserves were rapidly exhausted (Glyn et al, 
1992). As mass consumption gave rise to increasing effective demand during this 
era, firms met the needed increases in outputs, partly by ruthlessly exploiting 
installed capacities. Between 1973 and 1990, capacity utilisation increased, but at  
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After about 1990, capacity utilisation commenced a progressive decline in advanced 
capitalist economies, as is apparent from Figure 2.4. From a peak of about 130% in 
1990 or thereabout, capacity utilisation plunged progressively through the years to 
under 80% in 2014. This is an average rate of decline of 2.5% per annum. Thus over 
nearly 2.5 decades, businesses’ spare capacities increased at alarming rates, 
suggesting less willingness (less relative profitability) for capitalist firms to fully 
exploit their productive capacities. Equation 2.1 indicates that falling rates of 
capacity utilisation implies falling profit rates. Moreover, visual inspection of 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggests that capacity utilisation changed at faster rates than 
profit shares. Therefore growing profit rate according to equation 2.1 necessitates 
that the ratio of potential outputs to fixed capital stocks be upward trending at rather 
steeper rates  
 
Figure 2.5: Potential Output to Business Net Fixed Capital Stock 
(Source: Author’s computation from AMECO Database) 
 
Figure 2.5 expresses potential output as a proportion of capital stock and averaged 
across the 23 countries in the sample. It was also computed from the corresponding 
data available in the AMECO database. This average series suggests that the pattern 
of the ratio of potential output to fixed capital stock in the sampled economies have 
closely followed the inverse of that of capacity utilisation. In the 1960s, this ratio 
remained more or less the same, with sligth increases during this decade. Starting 
from the early 1970s there were massive increases in the ratio of potential output to 
the stock of business fixed capital, suggesting a structural break in the series of 
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its rapid increase until about 2007, when there was apparently further increase in 
steepness  of the upward trend of this ratio,  suggesting another regime break.  
 
An important interpretation of the ratio of potential output to business fixed capital 
stock, is the contribution of capital stocks to corresponding levels of potential 
output. To the extent that the 1960s is representative of the Fordist period, potential 
ouput is nearly conceptual with fixed capital stock (with tight labour market). In an 
apparent regime break, potential output rose from being one to one with fixed capital 
stocks in the 1960s, to 1.5 of capital stock by 1975. Following a persistent rise, by 
2007, potential output was 250% of capital stock. In the 7 years from 2007 to 2014, 
potential output rose from 250% of capital stock to just below 400% of capital stock.  
 
Because potential output is a fucntion of capital stock, labour and the prevailing 
technology, a declining ratio of potential output to fixed capital stock may suggest 
any of the following three secnarios. Advances in technology increasing the output 
capacities per unit of capital stocks. But the data series on the marginal efficiency of 
capital from the AMECO database indicate that this is unlikely the case. Marginal 
efficiency of capital is the change in real GDP due to a unit increase in fixed capital 
stock. While the marginal efficiency of capital series declined slightly in the 1960s, 
they have remained more or less the same since the early 1970s, till about 2007. 
Given the average constancy of marginal efficiency of fixed capital, the second 
scenario is increasing rates of fixed capital stocks but increasing at lower rates than 
labour. The third scenario is decreasing rates of fixed capital accumulation, with 
labour increasing at a greater rate. The third scenario suggests increasing labour to 
fixed capital ratio.  
 
The falling rates of fixed capital accumulation across the sampled countries would 
suggest that the third scenario is the most likely case. Since higher ratios of potential 
output to business fixed capital stocks, all other variables being the same, suggest 
higher profit rates, which is the desire of capitalist firms, the rising ratio as indicated 
by Figure 2.5 suggests that firms  effectively increased profit rates by cutting down 
rates of fixed capital accumulation and biasing actual and potential economic 
activities away from reliance on capital stocks. Firms became more dependent on 
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increasing exploitation of labour, to achieve their objective of higher profit rates. 
Thus through the configuration of higher profit shares, lower capacity utilization and 
higher ratios potential output to capital stock, capitalist firms apparently were able to 
regenerate a sustained increase in rates of corporate profits. Businesses were thus 
able to increase profits for the same level of  capital expenditures, or achieve the 
same levels of profits with lower fixed capital expenditures.  Yet there may be more 
to this than meet the eyes. It is noteworthy that the above Equation (2.1) could be 
decomposed further thus:  
 
                          𝜋 𝐾⁄ = (
𝜋
𝑌⁄ )(






Where C is aggregate household consumption, I is total real fixed capital formation, 
G is aggregate government expenditure, E is total export and M is total Import. C 
and G are not the decision variables of capital accumulating firms. The alternatives 
opened to firms would be to increase profit shares by redistributing income from 
wages to profits (decreasing wages shares), decreasing the growth rates of K by 
reducing the growth rates of I. Decreases in I growth rates increase the ratios of 
potential outputs to capital stocks and profit rates over time, but by such decreases 
reducing Y growth rates, also reduce rates of capacity utilisation and profit rates. 
There would, however, be compensating increases in profit shares, so that on a net 
basis, reducing the growth rates of investment increases profit rates, provided there 
is loose labour market. Respective changes in C or E cause compensating changes in 
profit shares and capacity utilisation and leave profit rates unchanged. By simply 
increasing other components of potential output such as technology or labour bring 
compensating changes in capacity utilisation and the ratio of potential outputs to 
fixed capital stocks and leave profit rate unchanged. But decreases in investment 
rates also reduce the ability to meet increases in C by households, G by the states 
and E by firms. Firms could meet increases in C, G and E through increases in 
aggregate import (M).  
 
Because M reduces Y, increases in imports reduce  rates of capacity utilization with 
compensating decreases in the denominator of profit shares and no net impact on 
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profit rates. Thus capitalists/firms grew profit rates by increasing the rates of 
capacity utilisation and capital accumulation, while keeping the ratios of potential 
output to fixed capital stock and profit share rather constant during Fordism. But 
they changed to growing profit rates during the post-Fordist years, by compensating 
increases in profit shares and decreases in capacity utilisation through reduction in 
fixed capital accumulation, but with consequent increases in the ratios of potential 
output to fixed capital stock that imply net increases in profit rates. Underpinning 
this strategic process, are increases exports and imports relative to GDP. 
  
To provide further evidence that the foregoing analysed changes regarding changes 
in profit rate generation strategies are the case, we make further appeal to the data. 
The data indicate that wage shares and unit real wages have been on the decrease 
over the post-Fordist years. In advanced capitalist economies, data from the 
AMECO database suggest that real wages have persistently maintained downward 
trends, so that at no point in the post-Fordist years was the least unit real wage or 
real unit labour cost of the 1960s  attained, on the average, across the advanced 
capitalist economies (see Ellis and Smith, 2007; Atkinson, 2009; Ryner, 2012). The 
ratio of fixed capital formation (i.e. is fixed investment) to total output across 
advanced capitalist economies, while they exhibited upward trends in the 1960s, 
have assumed decreasing trends in the post-Fordist decades, as a survey of databases 
would readily reveal. Figure 2.6 below presents a quick index of this ratio, averaged 
across the 23 advanced capitalist countries in the sample. While the values of this 
ratio increased visibly through the 1960s to a peak of 13%, they continue to trend 
downward thenceforth to a universal trough of just 2.7% in 2013. 
 
Because the series for each country in the sample is a ratio and not absolute values, 
the issues of a small country or big country is irrelevant in this case.  But a clear 
pattern as displayed by figure 2.6 even after averaging across heterogeneous 
countries, suggests that this observed pattern is indeed robust and typical of the 
advanced capitalist economies. The decreases in the values of the ratio of fixed 
investment to GDP imply increases in the ratio of at least one of the other 
components of GDP, to GDP. This may be house hold consumption, government 
expenditure or export. Assuming firms exclusively supply the outputs that meet 
- 22 - 
these increased expenditure, then decreases in investment growth and capacity 
utilization have to be met by commensurate increases in importation. More 
importantly, the progressive decline in the values of the ratio of investments to GDP 
suggests the increasing inferiority of fixed investments in terms of the generation of 
firms desired return to capital employed. To show that this declining relative 
profitability of  fixed capital stock explains the declining rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, values of the ratio of investment to GDP are compared to rates of 
fixed capital accumulation. Compare Figures 2.6 and 2.7. 
  
Figure 2.6: Annual Investment- GDP Ratio 
(Source: Author’s computation from AMECO Database) 
 
Figure 2.7: Annual Investment-Capital Stock Ratio 
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Figure 2.7 presents the values of the ratio of fixed investment to the stock of capital, 
averaged across the 23 advance capitalist economies. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 are 
juxtaposed, to highlight the near identity of these two series. The correlation 
coefficient between the two series is 0.994! This suggests that the decline in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation is likely associated with the declining ratio of fixed 
capital formations to total outputs, over the post Fordist decades. From a percentage 
decomposition of GDP across the sample countries, we may have a further clue 
regarding what components of GDP as percentages of GDP have increased as 
investment to GDP decreases. This may reduce the paradox of the coexistence of 
increasing profit rates and the declining capital accumulation rates.  
  
Data readily available at the World Bank database, indicate that government 
expenditures (G) as percentages of GDP have been rising all along, for the industrial 
economies. Household consumption expenditures (C) as percentages of GDP rose 
rapidly until the 1980s, when these values started a rather slow decline. The values 
of trades as a percentage of GDP that were rather constant in the 1960s till about 
1972, rose at alarming rates through the rest of the sample period. For the OECD 
countries as a group, this was about 23% in the 1960s but have progressively risen to 
about 60% as at 2014. This pattern is in contrast to Fordism, when investments as  
percentages of GDP were rising and trades as proportions of GDP were relatively 
negligible and  more or less constant, indicating a dramatic tergiversation in the 
activities that generate profits for capitalist firms.  
 
Figure 2.8: Average Percentage Composition of GDP 
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Figure 2.8 presents the percentage decomposition of GDP. Consumption to GDP 
ratio, through the stretch of the sample period, is averagely the same. Although 
government expenditure rose more rapidly from the 1960s to early 1970s, after mid-
1970, the rate of increase reduced. Looking at the series one could objectively 
assume that through the years, it has been more or less the same. At any rate, 
household consumptions (C) and government expenditures (G) are not the decision 
variables of the firm, but  investments, exports and imports are. From Figure 2.8, it 
is apparent that investment to GDP was higher than either export to GDP or import 
to GDP ratio until 1970 when these three series completely overlapped. Beyond that 
point, the divergences between exports or imports to GDP on the one hand and 
investments to GDP on the other hand have been increasing progressively through 
time and more particularly so after the mid-1980s, the period of greater capital 
account liberalisation. This may suggest that profit-oriented capitalist firms have 
come to see exports and imports as superior alternatives to fixed capital 
accumulation for domestic production, as sources of generating higher corporate 
profit rates.  
 
Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix: Average Percentage Composition of GDP 
(Source: Author’s computation) 
 
Table 2.2 presents the correlation among the percentage components of GDP. The 
correlation coefficients between either exports to GDP (X) or imports to GDP (M) 
and investments to GDP (I) are both negative and alarmingly high, suggesting 
highly systematic inverse movements between investments on the one hand, and 
exports and imports on the other hand. Firms decide on greater exports and imports 
relative to GDP and underpinning these phenomena is the desire by capitalist firms 
to increase profit rates.  The strong relationship between profit rates, ratios of the 
sum of exports and imports to output, and ratios of business fixed capital formations 
I C G X M
I 1
C 0.485131 1
G -0.71405 -0.76817 1
X -0.82494 -0.78898 0.771024 1
M -0.76496 -0.7917 0.772114 0.990687 1
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to capital stocks are further highlighted by the following table of correlation 
coefficients in table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3: Correlation Trade Openness, Profit Rate and Capital Accumulation   
(Source: Author computed) 
 
The high positive correlations between profit rates and ratios of the sum of exports 
and imports to GDP across the six sample countries speak volume once again, about 
exports and imports as sources of corporate profits, compared to fixed capital 
accumulation as revealed by the inverse correlation coefficients between profit rates 
and capital accumulation over the same period. The absolute values of the negative 
correlation coefficients between fixed capital accumulation and trade openness are 
even higher than those between trade openness and corporate profit rates.  
 
Table 2.4: Correlation: Financial Openness and Capital Accumulation                 
(Source: author computed from AMECO and World Bank databases)                                            
 
Trade integration Profit rate and Rate of capital accumulation
and profit rate rate of capital and international trade
Country accumulation integration
The US 0.773758 -0.48014 -0.86494
The UK 0.063151 -0.37919 -0.83651
Germany 0.806138 -0.57937 -0.84733
France 0.358853 -0.48115 -0.86075
The netherlands 0.674835 -0.34359 -0.792689
Austria 0.483321 -0.42689 -0.828511
Finland 0.767595 -0.37375 -0.67819
Correlation Coefficients
Financial integration Rate of capital accumulation
and profit rate and international financial
Country integration
The US 0.927479 -0.42526
The UK 0.84163 -0.20585
Germany 0.953193 -0.68251
France 0.728056 -0.37888
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The correlation are smoothened by taking five year moving average to present the 
semblance of the long-run relationship as much as possible. The table  indicate very 
strong positive correlation between profit rates and trade openness, strong negative 
correlation between trade integration and business fixed capital accumulation, and 
strong negative correlation between profit rates and fixed capital accumulation. The 
persistent rise in international integration through trade from circa 1970 was 
augmented by significant increase in the mid-1980s, of international financial 
integration, further to the extensive capital account liberalisation across the 
advanced capitalist economies. Table 2.3 features the correlation coefficients 
between ratios of the sum of aggregate financial outflows and inflows to GDP 
(financial openness) and profit rates and this is also significantly positive. The 
correlation coefficients are however negative between financial openness and capital 
accumulation.  
 
Because international trade openness as well as international financial openness 
cumulatively constitute international economic openness, the foregoing analyses 
suggest a strong positive correlation between international economic openness and 
the rate of profit, a strong negative correlation between international economic 
openness and business fixed capital accumulation and, a moderately strong negative 
correlation between the rate of profit and the rate of business fixed capital 
accumulation. Moreover, the presentation in this chapter regarding the strategies for 
profit rates recovery after Fordism goes beyond or extend the argument presented in 
Duménil and Lévy (2004). They have argued on page 36 to 37 that capitalist firms in 
advanced capitalist economies exclusively turn around falling profit rates by 
depressing wages rates and wages shares. The analyses in this chapter also indicate 
at this very early stage that the explanations for the decline of fixed capital 
accumulation in the advanced capitalist economies after Fordism, may be far deeper 
than the observations of higher profit pay-outs and financial assets acquisitions. 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this section, we juxtapose stylized facts that indicate that over a period when 
business fixed capital accumulation suffers persistent decline across advanced 
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capitalist economies, profit rates exhibit increasing trends, by contrast. The 
orthodoxy, however, suggests that both variables move strongly together in the same 
direction. According to the Cambridge model and other theoretical propositions, the 
rate of fixed capital accumulation is a positive function of the rate of returns 
expected to be generated by these fixed capital. Therefore if business profit rate rises 
as business fixed capital accumulation falls, then profit oriented firms apparently 
have alternative source(s) of profit, compared to fixed capital accumulation.  We 
derive analytically, potential strategies by which the trends in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation and profit rates could become divergent. These include increasing 
profit shares (reducing wages shares) of total output, increasing efficiency (ratio of 
potential output to capital stock), and reducing the rates of fixed capital 
accumulation while simultaneously increasing export and import. These theories and 
the analyses presented here reveal that at the heart of the observed decline in fixed 
capital accumulation is profit rate. If as the analyses suggest economic openness is a 
new and superior source of higher profit rates relative to fixed capital, could we 
therefore argue that changes in economic openness inversely cause changes in the 
rate of fixed capital accumulation? The quest for the answer to this question 
underpins the essence of this research and is pursued subsequently, in this study. 
The next chapter considers theoretical arguments that propose or imply causative 
relationship between economic openness and the rates of fixed capital accumulation 
in advance capitalist economies. 
 
  
- 28 - 
Chapter 3 A Review of Key Theories and Ideas 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the principal theories underpinning the major arguments  
developed in this research, as well as the empirical investigations. A political 
economy approach is adopted and this chapter draws mainly from some key 
propositions in the French Regulation School and in the post-Keynesian literature. 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to a review of the Regulation School 
literature, while the second part reviews the relevant propositions in the post-
Keynesian literature. This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 deals with the 
views of the French Regulation School on capital accumulation and the implied 
relationship with economic openness. Section 3.3 reviews the relevant post-
Keynesian theories relating to production relations and capital accumulation. Section 
3.4 considers some a-institutional post-Keynesian theories on capital accumulation. 
Section 3.5 deals with some alternative views on capital accumulation, based on 
more mainstream ideas. Section 3.6 re-presents the key research questions. Section 
3.7 presents a summary of the chapter and reaffirms the central theses that underpin 
this research. 
 
3.2. The French Regulation School and Capital Accumulation  
3.2.1 Introduction to the French Regulation School 
The French Regulation School is deeply rooted in Marxism (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 
1993) and in  Keynesian as well as Kaleckian economics (Jessop, 1990a, p.26; 
Brenner and Glick, 1991). The growth in those subscribing to the theses of the 
Regulation School has resulted in the emergence of several approaches or sub-
schools in the Regulation School, across various countries. At the time of this 
research, the current seven approaches in the Regulation School are: the West 
German School, the Grenoblois, the Parisian, the PCF-CME, the Amsterdam 
School, the Nordic Approach, and the Social Structure of Accumulation (Jessop, 
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1990a). Although the Regulation School is a research programme, the scholars tend 
to refer to its postulates as theories (Petit, 1999) and this research adopts this 
tendency.  
 
There is a disapproval of the a-historic, a-institutional causal relationship, or 
economic determinism, championed in conventional economic theories (Boyer, 
2013). An economic relation is not divorced from the socio-political environment, 
and there is, therefore, no pure economy. The sustenance of production and capital 
accumulation under capitalism essentially involves economic as well as extra- 
economic conditions (Jessop, 1990b, p.6, 1992a, p.233-4, 1992b, 1992c; Lipietz, 
1993; Benko and Lipietz, 1994; Aglietta, 1998, p.49; Boyer and Sailland, 2002). The 
validity of a causal relationship between two economic variables (e.g., between real 
interest rates and inflation) is a function of the overriding institutional settings 
(Aglietta 1974, 1998; Boyer, 2013).  
 
A cardinal proposition of the Regulation School in all approaches or sub-schools, is 
that a significant causal relationship exists between the prevailing institutional 
configuration and capital accumulation. Production relations in a capitalist economy 
are power configurations that are characterized by conflicts, class struggles, and 
various contradictions, which would ordinarily prevent the repetition of 
accumulation/production (Boyer, 2007). However, there exist five core institutions 
or social structures, whose configuration mediates the conflicts, reconciles the 
contradictions and, thus, enables an extended period of capital accumulation. Such 
extended period of accumulation is a regime of accumulation. The prevailing 
institutional configuration or social structure that mediates the contradictions and 
conflicts to enable a regime of accumulation, is a mode of regulation.  
 
The aforementioned five core institutions (social structures)  whose configuration 
sustains, regularizes, regulates or mediates the conflicts, contradictions and thus 
makes possible, the repetition of capital accumulation and production have been 
identified as: the wage relations (encompasses industrial relations based on 
collective bargaining, labour process as well as social security (Aglietta, 1974); 
wage bargaining effort), the state form (the form of state intervention, compromise 
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between capital and labour), the form of competition (ties among enterprises, the 
source of profit); the money form (its dominant form, the banking and credit 
system), and the international regime (the trade, investment, monetary settlements 
and political arrangements that link national economies and the world system) 
(Aglietta, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979; Benassy et al, 1977, vol 1:5; Lipietz, 1977, 1979, 
1986; Lipietz and Vale 1988; Boyer, 1987, 1990, 2005, 2008, 2013; Jessop, 1990a, 
1997; Petit, 1999; Guttmann, 2012/2015). The theory of a regime of accumulation in 
the Regulation School, is a theory of long wave of accumulation. The five core 
institutions that mediate/regulate accumulation, assume a configuration where one of 
the institutions is hegemonic or conditions all the other institutions, during any 
regime of accumulation (Lipietz and Vale, 1988; Jessop, 1990a, p.21; Petit, 1999, 
p.220- 221; Boyer and Saillard, 2002; Boyer, 2013).  
 
The Regulation School studies capitalist production and accumulation under the 
concepts of an accumulation regime,  a mode of regulation, a mode of development, 
and the crisis of a regime of accumulation or a mode of regulation (Aglietta, 1979, p. 
68; Lipietz, 1987; Jessop, 1990a; Brenner and Glick, 1991). An accumulation 
regime refers to the system of production, consumption, and distribution, which 
expands wealth in such a way that an economy is stabilised over time. A mode of 
regulation means the specific institutional configuration which sustains capital 
accumulation or growth in  capitalist production relations. A mode of development 
is the combination of a mode of regulation and its related regime of accumulation.   
 
A regularising configuration of the social institutions emerges through struggles, 
through  trial and error (Boyer, 2013) or in the fashion of a Gramscian inspiration 
(Boyer, 2013). At a point, the mode of regulation becomes exhausted (institutional 
exhaustion) and the regime of accumulation that is being regulated, collapses (in a 
structural crisis). The specific schema of the regulation process is institutional 
configuration → power configuration in production setting → capital 
accumulation/growth → crisis (see Hay, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1995). The specific 
institutional configuration determines the characteristics of a regime of 
accumulation. These characteristics include whether or not profit-seeking businesses 
would accumulate fixed capital intensively, and therefore, the rates of fixed capital 
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accumulation (see Petit, 1999, p.228). The differences in the institutional 
configurations, including the hegemonic institutions within a country, create 
different stages of capitalism in a country and variances of capitalism across 
countries (Amable et al., 1997; Petit, 1999; Palombarini, 2001; Amable, 2003; 
Amable and Palombarini, 2005; Amable et al., 2012).  
 
Recall that the characteristics of  an accumulation regime, which include the pattern 
of investment and growth of fixed capital stock (see department I & II in Lipietz, 
and Vale, 1988), are functions of the regulating ensemble of institutions (Petit, 1999, 
p.228).  On this basis, we go down the lane of history, in order to compare some 
characteristics of observed regimes of capital accumulation and the regulating 
institutional frameworks.  
 
Three stages of modern capitalism, over the years of capitalism in the advanced 
capitalist economies, have been identified (Lipietz and Vale, 1988, p.26-27). The 
first stage follows the crisis of the fundamentally agro-based ancien régime, in 
France between 1845 and 1848. Various extents of extensive accumulation  
characterised these first-stage regimes of accumulation across the advanced 
capitalist economies. An extensive accumulation describes a sort of horizontal 
expansion of the capitalist sector, and during this stage of capitalism, accumulation 
occurred predominantly in the heavy industries in the metal sector, as well as in the 
textile and construction sectors. The conditions of production stayed constant during 
these extensive accumulation: for example, the ratios of fixed capital to labour and 
labour productivity across these economies were low and rather constant (ibid). 
Extensive accumulation dominated unevenly, until about 1914.  
 
The regulating institutional forms in the first stage of modern capitalism included 
wage relations where wages adjusted according to the costs of living, and 
competitive labour markets where labour sales vary on a daily basis depending on 
changes in labour demands. The state forms were rather non-intervening, only 
stepping in to enforce regards for the legal structure of private (capitalist) properties. 
Firms tending to concentrate in a single sector, defined the forms of competition. 
The money forms were more or less in commodity forms (e.g., gold) and credits. 
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The goods and services markets were rather international, between imperial states 
and their protectorates.  These extensive accumulations suffered a crisis from limits 
to outlets and low productivities, in the 1890s (Mazier et al., 1999;). 
 
The second stage was characterised by intensive accumulation across these 
advanced capitalist economies, where in-depth analyses of labour processes 
involved  in production, were undertaken, and then increasingly mechanised, 
consequently increasing the ratios of capital to labour, across these economies. The 
period of intensive accumulation was a period of rapid growth in investments and 
fixed capital accumulation. Labour productivity, on the average, increased from  2% 
in the previous extensive accumulation regimes, to about 6%. However, purchasing 
power from stagnant real wages stayed the same. The gap in labour productivity and 
labour remuneration in each of the countries, brought about the crises of these 
intensive accumulation in these economies. These intensive regimes were 
consequently rather brief, lasting from the 1920s and ending in the collective or 
general crisis of the 1930s (Lipietz and Vale, 1988). The regulating ensembles of 
institutions were rather competitive as in the extensive regimes. According to Boyer 
(1982), there were suggestions by Henry Ford and John Maynard Keynes that real 
wages be increased, to match labour productivities in these countries. These 
recommendations were, however, resisted by the capitalists, whose priorities were 
the maintenance of the then ex ante profit rates, by keeping real wage rates low. 
Before long, These admixtures of intensive accumulation and competitive 
regulation, ran into crises of overproduction, culminating in  the pervasive structural 
crisis of the 1930s (Boyer 1982). 
 
Lessons were learned, and institutional changes targeted explicitly at preventing the  
re-emergence of structural crises, like those of the overproduction crises of the 
second stage of modern capitalism, evolved in these economies. The resultant 
regimes of accumulation across the advanced capitalist economies, constituted the 
third stage of modern capitalism, popularly styled as the regimes of Fordism. The 
new institutional configurations were combinations of intensive accumulation with 
monopolistic regulation (labour markets were no longer competitively regulated, but 
there emerged collective bargaining ensuring  higher minimum real wages to wage-
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labour, in that wages were indexed to the respective labour productivity and 
inflation; and labour employment contracts were multi-year employment contracts).  
 
There were  more active state forms, with states actively involved in wage relations 
to foster increases in real wages, and welfare transfer payments, in order to facilitate 
full employment. The levels of international integration across the advanced 
capitalist economies were rather low, and as a matter of fact, they (via trade 
openness) reached  historically low points in the mid-1960s (part-period of Fordism) 
(Lipietz and Vale, 1988; Glyn et al., 1992; Aglietta, 1998). The levels of 
international financial integration (financial openness) were low and regulated by 
the Bretton Woods system. The results were the virtuous economic cycles that 
typified the golden era of Fordism from the Second World War, to the late 1960s or 
early 1970s, in the advanced capitalist economies. Characterising Fordism, was 
mass production matched by mass consumption. Labour productivities tripled, along 
with rates of fixed capital accumulation (Lipietz and Vale, 1988).   
 
However, the problem of declining profit rates eventually ensued. Following  
effective pressure on states by capitalists seeking higher profit rates, states increased 
trade liberalisation, which in turn facilitated rapid international trades and dramatic 
increases in trade openness, across the advanced capitalist economies (Glyn et al, 
1992; Duménil and Lévy, 2011). But changes in trade and openness thereof, 
necessarily imply changes in trade and thus international regimes, across the 
advanced capitalist economies, contrasting the prevailing institutional configurations 
in Fordism (Boyer, 2013, p.5). The high rates of fixed capital accumulation 
ineluctably engendered by the institutional configurations of Fordism consequently 
went into crisis. Whatever controversial regimes of accumulation that ensued did not 
reverse declining trends in rates of fixed capital accumulation, as observed by 
Duménil and Lévy (2004) and supported by statistics. Relentless upward trends in 
de facto Trade openness existed in ruthless parallel with extensive declining rates in 
business fixed capital accumulation in the ensuing post-Fordist years, across the 
advanced capitalist economies. 
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Some characteristic observations seem to stand out from these historical stages of 
capitalism. Accumulation regimes have their characteristics, which include rates of 
fixed capital accumulation and the distribution of income between capitalists and 
wage labour (or wage labourers). Such characteristics of these regimes of 
accumulation as highlighted earlier  and as argued in Petit (1999) and Lipietz and 
Vale (1988), are determined by the peculiar institutional configurations that define 
and sustain these accumulation regimes. Historically, in the periods of extensive 
accumulation when fixed capital accumulation was low, the modes of regulation 
were rather competitive, with low growth in real wages. Secondly, there existed 
pervasive increases in economic openness as the consequence of higher levels of 
foreign trade. During the regimes of intensive accumulation that followed, increases 
in real wages were weak if at all, just as there existed pervasive economic openness 
and these intensive accumulation regimes were consequently unsustainable and 
short-lived.  
 
During the prolonged intensive rapid capital accumulation regime of Fordism, real 
wages grew rapidly in line with labour productivity, just as economic openness 
existed at historically low levels. Regrettably, in the French Regulation School 
literature,  much emphasis has been given almost exclusively to the role played by 
higher real wages, in the sustenance of such intensive regimes. It has also been 
highlighted in the Regulation School literature that the low rates of fixed capital 
accumulation subsequent to the demise of Fordism, were associated with declining 
real wage growth rates. However, the periods of extensive accumulation regimes, 
the short-lived regimes of intensive accumulation before Fordism and  post-Fordism 
were also periods of higher economic openness. The golden age of Fordism was, 
however, a period of historically low economic openness and historically high real 
wage growth rates.  
 
Historical analysis thus suggests that when real wage rates increased, and trade 
openness decreased, fixed capital accumulation rates increased and vice versa. 
Therefore if  ipso facto post-Fordist decreases in fixed capital is blamed on falling 
real wage growth, such decreases in fixed capital accumulation by analogy, could 
also be blamed on coextensive increases in economic openness. This analytical 
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connection between higher trade openness and decline in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation is one of the cardinal arguments pursued in this thesis. Furthermore, 
the movements in real wages and economic openness may not be unconnected for, 
as argued by Boyer (2013), economic openness was an instrument for keeping real 
wages growth down after the demise of Fordism. Another important observation is 
that there seems to be an alternation of extensive and intensive regimes of 
accumulation. 
 
As argued by Aglietta (1998, p.64) and Petit (1999, p.228), the institutions that 
regulated capital accumulation during Fordism could not adapt to the contradictions 
imposed by the emergent changes in international trade integration. It is argued that 
the increases in international trade relative to GDP, formed the initial strike that 
weakened the institutional configurations of Fordism, which were further worsened 
by increases in international financial openness (Boyer, 2013). International 
integration/openness, through dramatic changes in international trade, played a 
significant role in the demise of the golden era of Fordism by introducing 
contradictions in the prevailing institutional configurations that led to the crisis of 
accumulation in the late 1960s or early 1970s (See Jessop, 1990a, p.29). Stylised 
facts suggest that the immediate effect of higher international trade integration was 
the commencement of general decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation. Thus 
international integration destroyed institutional configurations in the advanced 
capitalist economies, that fostered higher fixed capital growth rates, therein. 
Moreover, the apparent alternation of extensive and intensive regimes may indicate 
that the post-Fordist period is expectedly, an extensive regime of accumulation (after 
intensive accumulation regime of Fordism), generally characterised by low rates of 
(fixed) capital accumulation, courtesy of institutional changes.  
 
3.2.2 A French Regulationist View: Firm and Fixed Capita Accumulation 
The assumption in Robinson (1962) that business fixed capital accumulation is 
undertaken by a firm is made. The firm is then characterised according to some 
arguments in the Regulation School literature. Production relations in the firm are 
fundamentally power relations among agents with conflicting interests. Three 
identified agents in the production relations are: wage earners, managers, and 
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capitalists (including shareholders). Wage-labourers/earners prefer higher real wages 
and employment securities (consistent with a higher rate of growth). Managers 
prefer higher rates of growth, while capitalists (including shareholders) are 
concerned more with higher profit rates (higher wealth accumulation rates) and less 
with rates of growth of fixed capital accumulation by the firm. Depending on the 
institutional configuration, wage-labour class or capitalists/shareholders class may 
be the dominant/hegemonic class in the production power relations. Managers are 
assumed to form an alliance with the dominant/hegemonic class (Boyer, 2005). This 
class hegemony subdues the effects of conflicts and contradictions (by the mediation 
of conflicting relationships among agents in capitalism) and fosters a prolonged and 
coherent period of capitalist wealth accumulation, otherwise called a regime of 
accumulation (Aglietta, 1998). Therefore while the preferences of wage-
labour/labourers are consistent with higher growth rates of fixed capital, those of the 
capitalists (including shareholders) are not necessarily so. An inference, therefore, is 
that the temporal dynamics of fixed capital accumulation may vary with the 
prevailing hegemonic class, which is itself a function of the prevailing hegemonic 
institution in the institutional configuration. 
 
In the golden era of Fordism, wage relations formed the hegemonic institution, 
which consequently empowered wage-labour/labourers as the dominant class in the 
power relations of Fordist production, with managers forming an alliance with 
wage-labour. Managers thus saw themselves as wage-earners, with wages  indexed 
to labour productivity and inflation. Over the Fordist period, international regimes 
across the advanced capitalist economies were of low economic openness, with trade 
and financial openness reaching historically low levels, in the mid-1960s (Aglietta, 
1998), so that wage earners/labourers were as a result, nearly identical with 
consumers. Increasing wages generated mass consumption and corporations, in 
confident anticipation of higher demand, invested to increase their stocks of fixed 
capital at growing rates. A combination of low economic openness and higher/ 
increasing real wage rates may suggest increasing/higher labour power, higher 
demand, and greater domestic corporate expansion through higher business fixed 
capital accumulation rates. Consequently, the prevailing institutional configuration 
via the inherent power relations, influences the way firms undertake fixed capital 
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accumulation and the observed dynamics of fixed capital accumulation at a macro 
level. 
 
Institutional configurations involving higher international openness, more 
competitive markets,  competitive wage relations, non-interventionist and non-
regulating state forms (free market bias state forms) would weaken the bargaining 
power of wage-labour/labourers and tend to bring about the hegemony of capitalists 
(and shareholders) and ex hypothesi, higher profit rates, but not necessarily higher 
corporate growth through higher fixed capital expansion. Below are different 
historical-cum-theoretical scenarios of configurations and the resulting patterns of 
capital accumulation (Boyer 2013). 
 
Scenario I    
Firms were in the three decades after WWII, in the advanced capitalist economies.   
Wage determination in production relations was by collective bargaining. States 
highly regulated financial markets. States intervened, in a Keynesian fashion, to 
ensure full or near full employment. Inter-firm competition was low, so that firms 
were mainly big oligopolistic firms. Capital markets were patient, subordinated to 
industrial productions and international openness was low. Under this configuration, 
wage-earners formed the hegemonic/dominant class, and managers saw themselves 
as wage earners. Managers in alliance with wage-earning labour formed the 
dominant bloc. Because wage earners were virtually identical with consumers, the 
higher their wages, the more they had to spend, and the more fixed capital 
accumulation firms had to undertake, in order to meet the growing demand. There 
existed consequently, virtuous relationships among higher real wages, mass 
consumption, mass production and higher rates of fixed capital accumulation. Profit 
rates were relatively satisfactory, as profits were  marked-up on labour costs. This 
configuration created the healthy wage-investment nexus prevailing in the advanced 
capitalist economies, during (the golden era of) Fordism and the ideal social 
structures or institutional configuration (Petit, 1999, p.228)   
 
Scenario II 
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Internationalisation through increases in trade openness with the rest of the world 
broke the near identity of wage earners as the customers. Wages labourers 
increasingly competed with labour in other countries, so that real wages were set 
internationally (no longer through collective bargaining). Wage labour thus lost its 
bargaining power in the production-power relations, while the capitalists class 
became more powerful. Managers affiliated themselves with the capitalists class and 
saw themselves as profit earners; revising down wages and employment, under a 
new argument of the need to achieve  competitive prices for exports. Cheaper 
importations increased under the justification of achieving lower commodity prices 
and higher levels of satisfaction for domestic consumers. However, these would by 
implication slow down domestic production and fixed capital accumulation in the  
import-competing industries. Trade integration in the late 1960s (or early 1970s) 
was the primary cause of the demise of the golden era of Fordism, the era of mass 
consumption and mass production, in the advanced capitalist economies (Glen et al., 
1992; Boyer, 2013). 
 
Scenario III 
Financial liberalisation (domestic and international) increased shareholders power 
and ability to allocate resources in pursuit of higher profits and wealth.  
Consequently, they could more easily deploy capital  abroad, or set financial targets 
informed by some international standards. These set targets could and have been met 
largely by trimming down wages; labour and fixed-capital. This scenario is the 
configuration furthest from the ideal of scenario I. Because a hegemony of the 
capitalists class may cause declining rates of fixed capital accumulation if fixed 
capital is becoming less profitable, institutional configurations including greater 
trade and financial openness that tend to empower capitalists  (including 
shareholders), may tend to generate declining trends in fixed capital accumulation. 
 
 It must be emphasised at this juncture, that the French Regulation School is not the 
only variant of the Regulation approach/theory that is interested in non-residential 
fixed capital accumulation, for as a generality, the determination of accumulation 
and profit rates are apparently the raison d etre of the Regulation theory (Brenner 
and Glick, 1991). In the Social Structure of Accumulation (an approach of the 
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Regulation school, see Jessop, 1990a) some scholars have endeavoured to explain 
the determinants of fixed capital accumulation as early as the 1980s (Bowles et al., 
1989). In the French Regulation School, the post-Keynesian, the Marxist literature 
and related empirical or theoretical works, the terms "rate of capital accumulation" 
and "capital accumulation" are occasionally used to refer to the concept described 
here respectively as (fixed) capital accumulation or growth of non-residential fixed 
capital. In the aforementioned literature, capital accumulation is popularly indexed 
as the ratio of  (net) real investments to (net) capital stock.  
 
The theoretical postulates of the SSA, however, is ex hypothesi, restricted to the 
United States of America. The mainstay of the SSA argument is that the institutional 
configuration in alliance with the state of the economy, determines capitalist power 
and profit rates. Profit rates and the state of the economy, in turn, determine the rates 
of fixed capital accumulation. Bowles et al (1989, p. 129) have styled this as the 
power → profitability → capital accumulation nexus (see Kotz, 2009, 2011). The 
social structure of accumulation (SSA) whose configuration  determines the power 
relations in capitalist productions, are the capitalist-labour accord, Pax Americana, 
the capital-citizen accord, and the moderation of inter-capitalist rivalry (Weisskopf 
et al., 1983; Bowles et al., 1986, 1989; Schor, 1987; Schor and Bowles, 1987; 
Gordon et al., 1988;). In these published works, Pax Americana and the moderation 
of inter-capitalist rivalry, respectively capture some of the elements of international 
regime and form of competition, in the French Regulation School approach.  
 
 In some econometric estimates by Bowles et al (1989, p.117), indices of 
international integration (captured in import penetration and trade power ) of the US, 
outperformed capacity utilisation (demand growth) as determinants of  profit rates. 
In their econometric estimates of the rates of accumulation of fixed capital, their 
closest proxy to international integration was profit rate. According to their 
estimates, profit rates, capacity utilization and others have a joint explanatory power 
of 91%, in the determination of rates of fixed capital accumulation.  In their 
argument, as the US international influence deteriorated, capitalists power in the US 
deteriorated and in turn caused profit rates to deteriorate, which in turn, explained 
the downward trend in the US fixed capital accumulation of the 1970s. This is 
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consistent with the argument of Glyn et al (1992) that the decline in rates of 
accumulation in the US was caused by profit squeeze. The data in these research 
works, overlapped considerably with the Fordist period, when trends in profit rates 
positively correlated with the trends in rates of fixed capital accumulation. In the 
new dispensation, there have been increasing divergences between the two rates, 
across advanced capitalist economies, highlighting significant limitations in the 
arguments of these aforementioned works.  
 
3.2.3 Potential Channels: From Economic Openness to Capital Growth 
Integration into the international economy by a country is primarily defined in terms 
of international trade flows and international capital flows (Jessop, 1990a; Aglietta, 
1998; Boyer, 2013) or as the extent to which a country is not living in autarky (Petit, 
1999). Although it has proposed that the rate of fixed capital accumulation depends 
on the prevailing institutional configuration, the French Regulation literature hardly 
contains explicit postulations of a causal relationship between trade openness and 
the rates of fixed capital accumulation between the end of Fordism and financial 
liberalisation in the advanced capitalist economies. The focus, apparently, has been 
on the adverse impacts of higher trade openness on labour bargaining power, real 
wages and demand.    
 
The impacts of economic openness in the form of trade openness on fixed capital 
accumulation could thus be inferred from the wage-demand-capital accumulation 
nexus. Following the extensive financial liberalisation of the mid-1980s, there have 
been some ambitious attempts at connecting financial liberalisation to the decline in 
businesses’ fixed  capital accumulation, particularly in the works of some scholars 
such as Aglietta and Boyer. But despite the almost simultaneous increases in capital 
accounts liberalisation and thus the possible complicity thereof in the decline of 
fixed capital accumulation, these works have refused to buck the trend of ignoring 
capital account liberalisation. However, by virtue of capital account liberalisation 
being part of an international regime, the former should by implication be 
significant. This subsection identifies inferred relationships between economic 
openness and the declining capital accumulation, and implied channels of impacts, 
in the Regulation School literature. 
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3.2.3.1 Institutional Re-configuration and Rates of Capital Growth.  
The period of managerial capitalism (Fordism) in advanced capitalist economies 
represented by the scenario I above, was characterised by powerless shareholders, 
who were widely scattered and unable to press for higher rates of profit (Aglietta, 
2000; van Treeck, 2008). Managers were therefore free to pursue growth; and 
usually embarked on diversifications that produced large conglomerates having 
rather little synergies with their main competences (Boyer, 2005). However, changes 
in international regimes (such as trade and later financial openness) introduced  
amendments in the institutional configurations, and consequently power 
configurations,  different to the previous configurations that promoted rapid fixed 
capital accumulation in the advanced capitalists economies. With financial 
liberalisation and the resultant financial openness, emerged informed institutional 
investors, able to enforce the pursuit of shareholders’ preferences. A new principle, 
shareholder value based corporate governance, governed production relations. 
Shareholders introduced extensive restructuring that brought about the trimming 
down of real wage growth rates, labour and fixed capital accumulation, thereby 
entrenching real wage, labour and fixed capital austerity thenceforth.  In the US, 
such restructuring restored higher profit rates via increasing capital productivity 
(higher potential output to fixed capital stock ratio), while in Europe, notably 
Germany and France, profit rates were enhanced through increasing profit shares 
(Aglietta, 2000). 
 
3.2.3.2 Higher Dividend and Interest Pay-outs 
Shareholder value maximisation is a function of the market value of shareholders’ 
equities, which in turn is a function of the periodic cash distributions to equities such 
as dividends (e.g., Gordon growth model). The value of a corporate debt depends on 
the present value of cash interest payments. Shareholders in alliance with managers 
have over the years, been distributing more profits to themselves as dividends and 
interest, and the consequences have included  limited internal funds for fixed capital 
accumulation (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). To the extent that greater financial 
openness through capital account liberalisation facilitated this process, we could 
infer that financial openness contributed to investments fund constraints. 
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A potential criticism of  the higher profit pay-outs argument, is that  capital 
accumulation could also be financed with corporate debts. As a matter of fact, 
corporate debts attained unprecedented levels, during the period over which the rates 
of fixed capital accumulation were observed to be declining in the advanced 
capitalist economies. Stockhammer (2004) has argued that higher profit pay-outs 
never constrained fixed capital accumulation. Stockhammer (2004) also failed to 
find that higher dividends and interests pay-outs robustly explained the observed 
cross-country declining growth rates of fixed capital. Growth and profits are 
positively related to some significant extent, so profit-minded shareholders would, 
therefore, be mindful of growth to such extent. Therefore over a period that spans 
nearly four decades, sustained increases in profit pay-outs to shareholders with fixed 
capital accumulation constraining effects, would have undermined the growth and 
profits of corporations, to point of seriously jeopardising the going concern status of 
the relevant corporations. Aglietta and Breton (2001) have argued that minority 
shareholders as against majority shareholders, tend to press for higher dividends to 
the point of constraining fixed capital accumulation. To the extent that increases in 
capital account liberalisation, swell the ranks of the minority shareholdings in 
corporations, greater financial openness arising from capital account liberalisation is 
implied to cause decreases in fixed capital accumulation.  
 
3.2.3.3 Share Buybacks and Rates of Fixed Capital Accumulation 
Share buybacks describe acquisitions by corporations, of their own shares. More  
among non-financial corporations in the US, share buybacks have been taking root 
in other capitalist countries. Corporations may buy back their shares to boost share 
prices under the corporate governance principle of shareholder value maximisation, 
or to reduce the threats of hostile take-overs (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). Whatever 
the reason, it is argued that share buybacks tend to reduce the funds available for 
fixed capital accumulation. However, is this argument able to robustly explain the 
general decline in the rates of fixed capital accumulation observed in advanced 
capitalist economies since about 1970? Statistics indicate that share buybacks have 
been rather  recent in the Euro area, compared with the US. Statistics have also 
indicated that share buybacks in the Euro area constitute  insignificant proportions of 
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the profit pay-outs, relative to dividends, when the Euro area is compared with the 
US. However, capital accumulation rates have been trending downward for many 
advanced capitalist European economies, in virtual synchronism with the US, since 
circa 1970. With this potential spatial weakness in the share buybacks argument, a 
potentially valid alternative argument may be that rather than serving as constraints 
to internal financing of real investments, share buybacks may be symptomatic of too 
few adequately profitable investment opportunities. It is argued that shareholders are 
able to enforce share buy backs through markets for corporate control, made 
possible through higher market liquidity (Aglietta and Brenton, 2001). To the extent 
that increases in financial openness from higher capital account liberalisation 
contribute to market liquidity and therefore the market for corporate control, 
financial openness, through increases in share buybacks  and higher market 
liquidity, is implied to reduce rates of fixed capital accumulation. 
 
3.2.3.4 CEO Remunerations and Rates of Fixed Capital Accumulation 
CEO remunerations have soared over the years since the demise of the golden era of 
Fordism (Boyer, 2005). The underlying reason is that having allied themselves with 
shareholders (the dominant group in contemporary power relations in capitalist 
production), they are incentivised, by the prospect of higher pay, to cut down on 
fixed capital accumulation and wages growth. These cuts are intended to facilitate 
the deliverance of set targets for corporate profit rates and market prices of 
shareholders’ equities. Managers (including CEOs) have consequently exploited 
these incentives even when performance could not justify them (Boyer, 2005, 2010). 
Stock options are often used as performance incentives for managers.  
 
Liquidating stock options that are in the money involves the firms paying the 
difference between the exercise prices and the prevailing market prices, to the 
managers. The foregoing is similar to profit pay-outs to shareholders, but in this 
case, managers are the recipients and these payments could, therefore, starve firms 
of internal funds for fixed capital accumulation (Boyer, 2005). This channel might 
have been reinforced by capital account liberalisation (through greater financial 
openness), if increases in financial openness enhanced managers’ performance 
incentives. The ranks of shareholders incentivising managers through higher 
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remunerations could be argued to have been increased by the influx of foreign 
shareholders, over the course of progressive increases in financial openness since the 
capital accounts liberalisation of the 1980s. In the literature, however, the higher 
managers’ remunerations argument has been limited to the US and therefore it may 
not robustly explain  observed declining rates of fixed capital accumulation across 
advanced capitalist countries. 
 
3.2.3.5 Distribution and the Rate of Fixed Capital Growth.  
A strand of argument in the French Regulation School literature, which also seeks to 
explain the declining rate of fixed capital accumulation, is the argument on the  
distribution of value-added. Value-added may be distributed more in favour of wage 
earners or shareholders/capitalists. How it is distributed matters, if the economic 
growth is wage-led (Bowles and Boyer, 1995). It is argued that the pillars of growth 
across the occidental world during Fordism, were the equitable functional 
distribution of income/wealth, high levels of investments, stable structures, and high 
levels of employment (Glyn et al., 1992; Aglietta 1998). Although costs of 
production, higher wages also tend to increase demand. In a closed economy, 
exogenous increases in wages tend to increase demand, employment, and growth 
and eventually increase the rates of fixed capital growth via demand for goods and 
services, as seen in the golden era of Fordism (see also Bowles and Boyer, 1988, 
1989). During Fordism, wages indexed to productivity and inflation, supported high 
investment and productivity growth via long-term growth in consumer demand 
(Aglietta, 1998, p.58). The high rates of return on a macroeconomic scale, offset 
falls in the marginal returns on investments caused by increases in productive capital 
stocks, thus preventing profit rates  from falling. 
 
 Although mainstream economists have argued that higher wages may increase costs 
and reduce current and expected future profits and consequently fixed capital growth 
rates, empirical estimates exist to suggest that the US, the UK, France, Japan and 
Germany are wage-led as closed economies, with the marginal propensity to save by 
the capitalist class significantly higher than for the lower wage-earning class 
(Bowles and Boyer, 1995). Bowles and Boyer (1995) have found that for these five 
countries, the ability of profits to explain  rates of growth in investment is rather 
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low, while expected future demand significantly explains rates of fixed capital 
accumulation (see also Bhaskar and Glyn, 1995; Gordon, 1995). 
 
However, the stable wage structures and equitable income distribution that 
underpinned the high actual and expected demand during Fordism, were attenuated 
initially by greater trade openness and later by increases in international financial 
openness (Boyer, 2013). Increases in trade and financial openness weakened labour 
bargaining power, consequently enhancing sustained production relations 
characterised by extensive redistribution of value-added away from wage-labour and 
towards capitalists/shareholders. Shareholder value mode of  corporate governance 
in the wake of greater financial and capital account liberalisation of the 1980s and 
thereafter, often caused wages growth to be reviewed downwards, in order to 
facilitate the realisation of higher shareholder value. This suppression of real wage 
growth adversely affected demand, and consequently rates of capital accumulation. 
The pervasive inequalities in income distribution have been further aggravated by 
higher incentive remunerations for managers (Boyer, 2005).  
 
The previous argument breaks down in the context of international integration via 
trade, as then, the distribution of value added in favour of wage-earners may be 
spent on cheaper imports, as appointed by Bowles and Boyer (1995). Of the five 
advanced capitalist economies that were wage-led in aggregate demand, 
employment and growth in Bowles and Boyer (1995), 60% ceased to be wage-led 
and became profit-led in aggregate demand and growth, under the context of 
significant international integration. Therefore, in these countries, redistribution of 
income in favour of wages would fail to support the argument that lower wages from 
the pursuit of higher shareholder value, contributed to the observed decline in post-
Fordist fixed capital growth rates, in the advanced capitalist countries. 
 
3.2.3.6 Importation and the rate of Capital Growth 
International trade integration offers the opportunity to increase profits through the  
importation of cheaper alternatives to costlier domestic production. As a sequel to 
the dramatic increases in trade integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
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corporations in advanced capitalist countries jumped on the import bandwagon, 
using the guise that cheaper imports made cheaper goods and services available to 
consumers, who could then consume more with given income and increase their 
welfare (Boyer 2005, 2013). A consequence has been the progressive contraction  
over time, of import-competing industries with the attendant decline in rates of fixed 
capital accumulation and employment in such import-competing industries. We 
emphasise that the potentially adverse impacts of increases in imports on the rates of 
fixed capital accumulation, highlight the weakness in the argument excessively 
fixated on higher wages-higher fixed capital accumulation nexus through higher 
demand. One reason is that as employment (and disposable income) increases, so 
too would the demand for imported goods and services (Bowles and Boyer, 1995) 
and by implication the decline of fixed capital accumulation both in import-
competing industries and at aggregate levels. Therefore increases in real wages with 
simultaneous economic openness would not necessarily generate higher fixed capital 
accumulation, emphasizing the positive contributions of the historically low 
economic openness in the unprecedented fixed capital accumulation rates, during the 
golden years of Fordism.   
 
3.2.3.7 Exportation and Rates of Fixed Capital Accumulation 
Exports may contribute to declining rates of capital accumulation, compared with  
similar levels of production in autarkic economies. High correlations between 
aggregate export and aggregate import series (an average of about 0.98 across the 
advanced capitalist economies) suggest the norm where exports generate imports, as 
components of exports are often imported, thus generating lower capital 
accumulation than if these components were domestically produced. Furthermore, 
exports present  higher profit opportunities for capitalists/shareholders, but expose 
domestic wage earners to higher international labour competition. Price 
competitiveness is a dominant competitive strategy, where foreign competition is 
significant. The wage cost per unit of product has been a cardinal measure of 
international competitiveness. As wage-labour in advanced capitalist countries faced 
lower cost wage-labour abroad following the increases in trade liberalisation, their 
bargaining powers were weakened, and they were forced to compromise by 
accepting lower wages imposed by firms, to facilitate price competitiveness (Lipietz 
and Vale, 1988). Profit-oriented firms could then economise more on capital than on 
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labour by increasing their labour to capital ratios or reducing their capital to labour 
ratios in production. Data in support of the foregoing changes in factors ratios can be 
found in the AMECO database. This fixed capital economy is exacerbated by 
increases in  the supply of labour caused by redundancies in import-competing 
industries. The foregoing was documented for the US, where empirical analyses 
revealed US exports to be apparently more labour-intensive (Södersten and Reed, 
1994).  
 
The very high positive correlation coefficients between increases in trade openness 
and increases in labour to capital ratios (Table 3.1) indicate that as international 
trade openness increases, labour is more increasingly used in place of fixed capital 
or  capital is less increasingly used in the place of labour, for any given level of 
output. For the seven advanced capitalist economies in Table 3.1, the average 
correlation coefficient between changes in trade openness and changes in labour to 
capital ratio over the decades following the end of Fordism is about 0.85. While 
consistent with the general synchronism in the decline in capital accumulation and 
increasing international openness, Figures A1 and A2 (Appendix A) show 
convergence in factor ratios, for 23 sample advanced capitalist countries. The 
synchronism in the series and the convergences suggest a common factor driving the 
declining rates of fixed capital accumulation for the sample countries and the high 
correlation coefficients in Tables 3.1 tend to lend credence to international 
integration as the possible driving factor.  
 
Table 3.1: Correlation: Trade Openness and Factor Substitution 
 
(Source: Author computed from database; factors substitution here means change in factors ratios) 
Trade integration Trade integration
Country Labour-capital substitution Capital-labour substitution
The US 0.93218 -0.94499
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3.2.3.8. International Competition and Fixed  Capital Growth Rate 
Increases in trade and financial openness have introduced stiff international 
competition among firms, relative to the years of Fordism. Industries including 
communications, public transport, television networks, information systems, 
financial services and energy distribution previously sheltered during  Fordism, have 
been subjected to stiff international competition (Aglietta, 1998) (see also Petit, 
1999). Aglietta (1998) emphasise is on the impact of international competition on 
domestic wage structure and implies indirect impact on fixed capital accumulation 
through demand. However, there exist apparently, some direct impacts of higher 
international competition on rates of growth of non-residential fixed capital: higher 
competition (international competition by implication) discourages investments 
because of the attendant increases in business risk, contrary to mainstream views 
(Brenner and Glick, 1991). Rising international competition may induce domestic 
corporate slimming down over time, as domestic corporations have their global 
market share eroded. 
 
International competition is often from newly industrialised economies with lower 
labour costs, where the emergence of new and expanding consumer markets has 
motivated the siting of industries similar to those in the advanced capitalist 
economies. Such competition has motivated corporations in the advanced economies 
to set up production plants in these new markets, in order to remain competitive 
(Aglietta, 1998). Such globalisation of production is, by implication, at the expense 
of  increases in rates of accumulation of home non-residential fixed capital. Thus, 
economic openness indexed by foreign stocks of assets/liabilities build-up could 
potentially be associated with declining fixed capital growth rates. The continuous 
spike in trade and financial flows relative to national GDP following the 
liberalisation of trade and capital accounts in the late 1960s and mid-1980s 
respectively across the advanced capitalist economies have increased international 
competition, and expectedly adversely affected the rates of capital accumulation in 
these countries. 
 
3.2.3.9 De-industrialisation and Rates of  Fixed Capital  Accumulation 
International integration has triggered de-industrialisation in advanced capitalist 
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economies (Boyer, 2013). De-industrialisation is a structural change that cuts down 
on industrial capacity, particularly in heavy industries and manufacturing industries, 
while encouraging tertiary production (services and financial institutions) in their 
stead. Greater economic openness has facilitated more intense international division 
of labour.  This division fostered increasing concentration on high skills tertiary 
production (such as information and communication, financial consultancy, design, 
and technical know-how) at the expense of growth in the production of capital 
goods,  manufacturing, and processing industries (Aglietta 1998, p.63).  
 
In contrast, some developing economies have intensified their production of capital 
goods and their processing industries. There are even claims in the literature that the 
free-trade agreements with the third-world economies of the 1980s and 1990s 
triggered a de-industrialisation crisis, that involved the massive relocation of 
production facilities to less developed economies. Whether these relocations and the 
intensification of capital goods production in third-world economies adequately 
compensated for the decline in fixed capital accumulation in the advanced capitalist 
economies to make it a zero-sum game is not the subject of the arguments of this 
chapter or this research. The primary sources of non-residential fixed capital 
accumulation during the golden age of Fordism were the big oligopolistic industrial 
firms, particularly in the manufacturing industries (Schumpeter, 1976; Chandler, 
1990; Crotty, 2005). But these primary sources of fixed capital accumulation have 
been the casualties of de-industrialisation. Statistics available in the World Bank 
Development Indicators database suggest that for the advanced capitalist economies, 
the values of service-sector output as a percentage of GDP have been increasing 
over the years, while those of industries and of manufacturing have been decreasing. 
But increasing  amount of products of these declining industries and manufacturing 
would still be in demand from consumers, in the de-industrialising countries and 
therefore have to be supplied through importation. This suggests that de-
industrialisation could only be conceived in the context of higher trade openness, 
since the goods not locally produced could then be imported.  
 
The deindustrialisation processes in the US and the UK were very dramatic in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, under President Ronald Reagan (US) and Margaret 
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Thatcher (UK). As opined by Petit (1999), since the 1970s, increases in international 
integration by the OECD countries have generated greater financial outflows 
including greater outward foreign direct investments, and exports of intangibles, 
while higher inflows of manufactured goods from non-OECD countries, have been 
experienced. Imports of manufactured goods and outflows of FDI would encourage 
less domestic fixed capital accumulation, and so is the concentration on the 
production and export of less capital intensive intangibles, by an advanced capitalist 
economies.  
 
3.2.3.10 Capital Account Openness and Business Fixed Capital Growth   
Post-Bretton Wood International financial regime is relatively recent vis-à-vis trade 
integration. Among the countries in the sample, financial integration significantly 
took off in the late 1980s (except in Austria, where it occur slightly later). 
Nevertheless, a high profit motive and potentially adverse correlation with rates of 
capital accumulation are suggested by the correlation coefficients mutatis mutandis 
in Table 2.3 (Chapter 2). Financial openness caused advanced capitalist nations to 
haemorrhage real investment funds, as foreign direct investments, portfolio 
investments, and ‘other investments’ outward, flowed massively out of the advanced 
capitalist economies, to countries where the risk-adjusted rates of returns were 
relatively higher. Although the advanced capitalist economies have also experienced 
massive capital inflows, these are not necessarily fixed capital accumulation 
friendly. Consequently, productive assets (fixed capital) that could have been 
accumulated at home have been accumulating abroad as FDI on a net basis.  
 
Using the US as an example, the net foreign asset positions from 1988 to 2014, were 
consistently negative, implying that US assets abroad were consistently less than the 
assets of foreigners located in the US over this period. However, the percentage 
composition projected a different picture. Statistics available on the BEA database, 
show that US net foreign direct investments abroad were consistently positive, 
except in 2001 and 2002 when they were negative. To the extent that more fixed 
capital is associated with direct investments, the preceding statistics imply that the 
US accumulated more productive capital abroad, on the basis of net outward FDI. 
These net outward foreign direct investments would likely have had some adverse 
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impacts on rates of domestic fixed capital accumulation in the US. Net portfolio 
assets and assets representing other components of capital flows abroad were 
however negative from 1976 until the 2007 global financial crisis, and for the rest of 
the sample period, they fluctuated between positive and negative values, although 
they mostly had negative values. These suggest  possible deleterious effects of 
international financial openness on rates of fixed capital accumulation, via both 
cross-border financial flows, and accumulation of fixed capital stocks or financial 
assets abroad. These flows and stocks have worsened since the privatisation of 
pensions, in the 1990s (Aglietta, 1998, p. 63)  
 
International financial integration gave unusual power to international financiers 
(Boyer, 2013). It exacerbated the problem of  high financial targets set for domestic 
corporations that motivated corporations to economise on labour and capital, in 
order to foster the realisation of these set financial targets. With little attachment to 
these corporations, the international financiers were keen on harvesting profits as 
dividends and interests (Boyer and Saillard, 2002). The increased portfolio flows 
drove up financial asset prices and returns that generated the incentive for non-
financial firms to accumulate financial assets and reduce the rates of accumulation 
of fixed capital, over the period of observation (This is expanded in Chapter 7).  
 
The foregoing review highlights the propositions of the Regulation School that  
accumulation takes place in a long wave of accumulation described as a regime of 
accumulation, and that this regime of accumulation and its characteristics, including 
the dynamics of fixed capital accumulation observed at the macroeconomic level, 
are determined by the configuration of five key institutions, that included an 
international regime. The review proceeded to a more microeconomic foundation 
level, where the Regulation School literature argues that the capitalist firm or 
production relations, which is the seat of fixed capital accumulation, is some social 
or power relations among the main classes of capitalism. These classes have 
contradictory or conflicting interests and objectives. The prevailing institutional 
configuration in which one of the institution is hegemonic, facilitates the emergence 
of a hegemonic class in the power relations that in turn determines the rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, due to differences, conflicts, and contradictions in classes’ 
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objectives. Thus the dynamics of fixed capital accumulation become the  product of 
power struggles, moderated by the overriding ensemble of the five institutions or 
social structures.   
 
3.3 The Post-Keynesian and Financialisation Framework 
Some key ideas and theories connected with the rate of fixed capital accumulation, 
from the perspective of power relations in capitalist firms, have also been presented 
by some post-Keynesian scholars. Corporations are assumed to have no inherent 
objectives, but to be made up of a number of social classes or groups, with distinct 
class interests. The two capitalist agents in the power relations are the managers and 
shareholders (capitalist/rentiers), with their distinct and conflicting class interests. 
Managers are interested in higher growth rates while shareholders are interested in 
higher profit rates (Lavoie, 2014). The owners (shareholders) are different from the 
managers (who control the firm). When shareholders are in power, they influence 
corporate strategy towards the pursuit of higher profit rates and potentially away 
from higher rates of fixed capital accumulation. When the manager class is the 
hegemonic class, corporate strategy is biased towards higher fixed capital growth, 
with profitability playing second fiddle to fixed capital expansion. The interest 
pursued by the firm thus become dominated by the interest of the dominant class. 
This situation may imply the possibility of a ‘growth-profit trade-off.’ 
 
It is argued that before the 1980s, shareholders were widely dispersed households 
and consequently were not able to press managers to pursue their interests (Lavoie 
1992; Galbraith, 1969). Managers, therefore, had the liberty to pursue higher rates of  
fixed capital accumulation and growth, while shareholders were content with 
satisficing profit rates. However some institutional changes brought on by 
financialisation in the 1980s, handed corporate power to shareholders. Shareholders, 
thence, became able to influence the orientation of corporate strategies, and to press 
for shareholder interest to be pursued by managers (Stockhammer, 2004; van 
Treeck, 2008; Dallery, 2009). Shareholders get managers to pursue shareholder 
value enhancement, either by incentivising managers (carrot) or by forcing the hands 
of managers by means of  ‘the market for corporate control’ (stick). 
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A post-Keynesian assumption, is that firms are wont to finance fixed capital 
accumulation using retained earnings. However, shareholder value maximisation, 
which entails higher profits rates, may also involve higher profit pay-outs via 
dividends and interests. Therefore the increases in shareholder power due to 
financialisation, generated the tendency of higher corporate profit rates, but also of 
higher corporate interest and dividend pay-outs, that reduced retained earnings and 
the funding for capital accumulation (Cordonnier, 2006; van Treeck, 2007; 2008; 
Dallery, 2009). Shareholder value maximisation thus, became a channel through 
which shareholders increased their lots, but consequently a cause of decline in the 
rates of capital accumulation.  
 
Augmenting a Kaleckian profit model with financialisation variables (dividend and 
profit payments), van Treeck (2008) found  significant inverse relationship between 
interest or dividend payments on the one hand, and the rates of fixed capital 
accumulation on the other hand, in the US. The sample period used by van Treeck 
(2008) were mostly post-Fordist years. Hein and van Treeck (2010) have argued that 
increases in shareholder power may negatively impact rates of growth, through the 
preference channel (invariably negative impact) or the finance channel (this may be 
negative or positive depending on the propensity to save by rentiers, and the 
elasticity of investment to distributed profit and capacity utilisation). The preference 
channel is the reduction in the willingness to invest by firms, even in the absence of 
higher profit pay-outs, while the financial channel is a constraint on investment 
funding generated by higher profit pay-outs (see also Hein and van Treeck, 2007).   
 
Stockhammer (2004) has argued that under the pressure of shareholder value 
maximisation, corporations have increasingly substituted financial assets for fixed 
investments, thus slowing the growth rates of corporate fixed capital. Using interest 
and dividend receipts as indices of financialisation and an ARDL model,  
Stockhammer (2004) found some evidence for his argument,  in the case of the US, 
UK, Germany and France(see also Orhangazi, 2008).  Because the findings were 
model-dependent, it could be argued that financial asset acquisitions as indexed by 
incomes therefrom, have not robustly accounted for the observed declining rates of 
capital accumulation in the respective capitalist countries (see also Dallery 2009 for 
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a similar argument). However, Cordonnier (2006) is of the view that interest and 
dividend payments to shareholders are actually the sources of corporate profits, but 
that dividend and interest payments could not sufficiently explain declining rates of 
non-residential fixed capital growth observed in France and the US, in post-Fordism.  
 
The pursuit of shareholder value maximisation by corporations (involving increasing 
profit rate and share market value) has resulted in  lower distribution of income to 
wage-labour, and potentially decreased aggregate demand and consequently reduced  
the rates of fixed capital growth (Lavoie 2009). Lavoie (2009) has argued that the 
effects of redistributing income away from wage-labour and in favour of 
shareholders and managers are contingent upon the state of an economy or on 
capacity utilisation. When there is stagnation (and rates of utilisation are lower than 
the standard rate), increasing managers income under a prevailing corporate pricing 
strategy of total cost and target return pricing, would increase prices. However, 
higher demand from managers would more than compensate for the fall in  demand 
by wage-labour, so that profit rates, capacity utilisation and rates of fixed capital 
growth would increase. Under an economic boom (when rates of capacity utilisation 
are higher than the standard rate), a similar redistribution of income from wage-
labour leads to lower aggregate demand, lower profit rates, and declining capital 
growth rates. However, if the firms pay out more profits and there is a higher 
propensity to consume out of capital income, then profit rates and capacity 
utilisation would increase, even though fixed capital growth rates would decrease, as 
observed since the 1990s (see also Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990).   
 
One highlight of these post-Keynesian perspectives is the recognition that corporate 
fixed capital accumulation rates are the results of corporate power configuration, 
which is, in turn, a function of broader, prevailing institutional changes. In the case 
of the post-Fordist years, these institutional changes are collectively described as 
financialisation (Stockhammer, 2005-6). But what is financialisation? As at the time 
of writing, the concept of financialisation remains controversial and unclear. 
Krippner (2005) defines financialisation as: 
 
     “Pattern of accumulation in which profit-making occurs increasingly through   
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      Financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production.” 
Epstein (2005) defines financialisation as:  
  “The increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and  
financial  Institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.” 
 
Financialisation may be seen as either part of a dual concept: first, it can be seen as 
the expansion of the financial sector, in which case, it could be argued that 
financialisation has always been around albeit in different forms. The second 
conceptualisation views financialisation as being epochal changes in the annals of 
capitalism in the advanced capitalist countries (Sawyer, 2014). On the epochal 
conceptualisation of financialisation, Sawyer (2014) has estimated the turning point 
as circa 1980; although about 1975 would be suggested by Epstein (2005) and over 
this period, there was shift in corporate attitude from “originate and retain” to 
“originate and distribute” (Sawyer, 2014), highlighting the tendency of corporations 
to increase distributions out of corporate profits to shareholders or rentiers. There 
has also been a marked deregulation during the 1980s, in association with 
financialisation (Fine, 2012). While the clear identities of these institutional changes 
remain yet unclear, a consensus regarding financialisation is that it is associated with 
the extensive financial liberalisations of the mid-1980s and afterwards. However, 
invoking financialisation or the associated deregulations of the mid-1980s and early 
1990s as the source of shareholder power and the cause of declining rates of fixed 
capital accumulation would ironically imply that the explanandum pre-dates the 
respective explanans.  
 
Duménil and Lévy (2005) have contributed to the financialisation literature, but 
from a Marxist perspective. They have posited that the lofty institutional 
configurations that regulated capital accumulation (including non-residential fixed 
capital accumulation) in advanced capitalist countries culminated and disappeared in 
the 1960s, well before the deregulations of the 1980s. Although the capitalists were 
highly regulated in the golden era of Fordism, they were persistently antagonising 
the social democratic (Keynesian) compromise. Capitalists clamoured for the 
restoration of their hegemony, particularly their international activities and  
consequently, the 1960s saw the emergence of a new international finance, the 
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Euromarkets, that facilitated the circumvention of regulations. International finance 
was then augmented by international production (Duménil and Lévy, 2005, p.24). 
This was further reinforced by the rise of interest rates (during the reign of 
monetarism) under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, in 1979, followed by 
more extensive deregulation and direct attacks on labour movements/unions, that 
fostered the emergence of shareholder value maximisation as the new principle of 
corporate governance. Thus the profit appropriation via corporate interest payment 
that had been prevalent in the 1980s, was superseded by dividends from the late 
1980s into the 1990s (see Duménil and Lévy, 2005, p.25).   
 
Crotty (2000, 2002,) argued that during the golden era of capitalism, big 
oligopolistic non-financial corporations accounted chiefly for the accumulation of 
fixed capital. However, later developments, such as: the globalisation of products 
and financial markets in 1970 and thence that facilitated declining global aggregate 
demand growth; and the emergence of impatient financial markets (dominant 
shareholders/creditors) that pressured firms into paying out more of their profits as 
interests and dividends, came on the scene. The combination of falling demand 
growth and higher profit pay-outs adversely affected the performance of these non-
financial corporations (ibid). Crotty (2000) also asserted that increased opening of 
national borders led to fierce competition, which induced the surviving firms in 
advanced markets to increase investments within the borders of emerging markets 
with higher expected future growth rates, implying reduction in rates of investments, 
in advanced capitalist countries (see Crotty, 1993; Aglietta, 1998). It would, 
therefore, be more consistent to cite the extensive deregulation  (e.g., neoliberalism) 
as the relevant institutional change associated with financialisation, and possibly as 
the source of financialisation (Kotz 2008a, p.2, 2008b) and shareholders’ power, 
which legitimised the pursuit of shareholder value maximisation. This new 
liberalism intended to restore the hegemony of the capitalists, is a summary term 
that embodies a paradigm shift from the status quo which  established the hegemon 
of wage labour during Fordism. Starting in about the late 1960s/early 1970s, this 
shift initially dominant in the form of extensive trade liberalisations and later 
assumed a complementary form, capital account liberalisation. 
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From the foregoing review of the Regulation School and post-Keynesian literatures, 
a robust inference is that capitalist dominance in corporate power relations tends to 
decrease fixed capital accumulation and tend to increase profit rates. However, 
capitalist hegemony depends on the institutional configuration of wage relation, 
competition form, money form, state form, and the international regime. A more 
liberal international regime tends to facilitates capitalists/shareholders hegemony. 
Since circa 1970, the emerged institutional configurations in the advanced capitalist 
economies have been dominated by the international regimes, first in the form of 
trade openness and later augmented by financial openness. Given the foregoing 
premises, a valid inference, therefore, is that the extensive economic openness that 
started about 1970 in the advanced capitalist economies significantly explains the 
decline in growth rates of business fixed capital observed in these countries in these 
years. This inference underpins the central thesis of this research. This dating is 
more consistent with the statistics, which clearly show that the declining trend of 
fixed capital accumulation or growth rates, which is the explanandum started circa 
1970 (even in the late-1960s, for some sample countries: See stylized facts in 
Gordon et al, 1987, p.43; Bowles et al, 1989, p.110; Stockhammer, 2004, p.730; van 
Treeck, 2008, p.374; Duménil and Lévy, 2011, p.152). 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the thesis of Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2005 and 
2011) as well as those of Lazonick and O’ Sullivan (2000) (also of Marxist bias); 
Aglietta (2000) Aglietta and Breton (2001); Boyer (2005); van Treeck (2008) is that 
higher distributions of profits to shareholders and rentiers (interest and dividend 
payments) explain the declining trends of fixed capital growth rates as observed. 
Assuming that all goods and services needed would be locally produced in autarky, 
then a reduction in output growth rates due to supply constraint occasioned by 
higher profit appropriations or financial assets acquisitions would generate higher 
prices of outputs from a sellers’ market and thus economic rents from fixed capital 
accumulation. These rents would entice new entrants and even the existing profit 
appropriating firms to increase the aggregate rates of fixed capital accumulation, as 
ex hypothesi, capital accumulation is positively related to the profit rates expected 
from such fixed capital (Cambridge model and other theories in chapter 2). Thus on 
the aggregate, capital accumulation rates would at least be maintained in the absence 
of international integration. Because profit rates would to a greater extent be 
- 58 - 
dependent on capital accumulation, it beggars belief that rational shareholders could 
afford to cause declining trends in fixed capital growth rates for nearly four decades, 
without this being counterproductive, in the absence of greater economic openness.  
 
A variant of the Regulation School (the Social Structure of Accumulation) that have 
looked into economic to some extent, was in connection with the investigation of the 
determination of profit rates. Existing literature is still miles away from rigorously 
investigating the causal relationship between international economic openness and 
the observed declining rates of fixed capital growth in advanced capitalist 
economies, and most particularly, from the institutional-power configuration 
approach of the French Regulation School. Institutional changes in the 1980s and 
1990 ushered in financialisation, resulting in existing empirical studies which are 
based on these financialisation and power relations in the firm but assumed closed 
economies in their investigations. These studies simply augmented fixed capital 
accumulation model with subjective financialisation variables, depending on the 
author’s conceptualisation of financialisation, as found in the above review. 
 
3.4 Non-Institutional Based Arguments for Capital Accumulation  
The earlier set of studies were based on the augmentation of the Kaleckian and 
Cambridge models with monetary variables, such as  interest rates. Lavoie (1995a) 
augments five variants of post-Keynesian models of capital accumulation with 
interest rates, yielding a number of theoretical results. Augmenting the Kaleckian 
model, he found that increases in interest rates generated decline in rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, while increasing the rates of interest generated  lower profit 
rates, and lower rates of capital accumulation in the Eichnerian and Cambridge 
models. The Neo-Ricardian model generated higher accumulation rates for higher 
interest rates as well as higher profit rates, while the Minsky-Steindl model 
suggested that higher interest rates may generate higher or lower rates of capital 
accumulation. Hein (2006), also augmented the Kaleckian profit model with a 
monetary variable (interest rate) as well as a leverage variable (debt-capital ratio) 
and found that interest rates have no unique effect on rates of capital accumulation. 
As in Lavoie (1995a), there were normal cases when higher interest rates acted as  
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constraints and generated  declining rates of accumulation, and puzzling cases when 
higher interest rates generated higher accumulation rates (see also Hein, 2007). 
These models are a-historic and a-institutional with multiple possible outcomes and 
indicating, ab initio, the multiple possibilities associated with interest rate changes.  
 
3.5 Other Views of Fixed Capital Growth 
There are other views on the determination of fixed capital growth rates. These 
include: the  relative cost argument (the ratio of interest and depreciation rates to 
wage rates in Jorgenson model); expected future profitability proxied by the growth 
rates of previous outputs argument (of accelerator models); Fisher’s internal rates of 
return model; and Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital model. While these are a-
historic and a-institutional, we intend to provide for these as control variables in our 
empirical models. For further details on these alternative views and some empirical 
estimations, see Baddeley (2003).   
 
3.6   Research Questions 
The principal theories have been reviewed. The central issue is what caused the 
observed decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation by firms in the advanced 
capitalist economies after Fordism. The critical point across the theories of the 
Regulation School, the post-Keynesian School, and the Marxist contributors, is that 
capitalist accumulation exists in the context of power configuration among capitalist 
classes with conflicting interests. Fixed capital accumulation depends on which class 
is dominant in the corporate power configuration. However, which class is dominant 
depends on the external institutional configuration. The French Regulation school 
theory has concisely posited the institutional configuration as the configuration of 
the state form, the money form, the form of competition, the wage relations, and the 
international regime, with one of these being dominant. The institutional 
configuration with dominant wage relations and the resultant power configuration 
that empowered labour and brought about unprecedented fixed capital accumulation 
in the golden post-war years till nearly 1970 have changed, together with a paradigm 
shift from the Keynesian consensus (or social democratic compromise) to 
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neoliberalist deregulations. The new institutional configurations in the advanced 
capitalist countries following the end of the golden post-war years are arguably 
dominated by their international regimes (in the form of higher economic openness), 
that have projected capitalist/shareholder hegemony, thus suggesting economic 
openness as the real cause of the decline in rates of business fixed capital 
accumulation observed in advanced capitalist economies.  
 
However, under a-historic and a-institutional perspectives of mainstream theories, 
greater economic openness should bring about a higher rate of business fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies or at worst be neutral (Bonfiglioli, 
2008; Gehringer, 2013). Furthermore, we have the preponderance of contributing 
scholars of institutional and historical perspectives, arguing that increases in profit 
pay-outs (as interest and dividends or as share buybacks), or increases in financial 
assets acquisition by non-financial firms created funding constraints that squeezed 
out business fixed capital accumulation. The central questions, therefore, are: 
 
Does institution matter in business fixed capital accumulation? 
Does greater economic openness bring about a decline in business fixed capital 
accumulation? 
Did the observed decline take place in the context of a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation? 
 
This research seeks to answer these central questions. Moreover, if institutions 
matter and economic openness matters,  this research also seeks to find through what  
channels they exert their inverse impacts on fixed capital accumulation. To the best 
of our knowledge, there does not exist any empirical investigation that seeks to 
answer the above research questions, thus indicating the originality of this proposed 
research. To the best of our knowledge, no other work has formally analysed or 
subjected to rigorous empirical investigation, the role of economic openness on the 
declining rates of capital accumulation, in the Regulation School literature. This is, 
therefore, a gap in the Regulation School approach, that this research seeks to fill. 
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3.7 Summary and Statements of Hypotheses 
Fligstein (2001) has argued that the pressures of labour unions and increases in 
international competition forced non-financial corporations into withdrawing from 
funding fixed assets accumulation, and towards financial assets acquisition. 
Assuming the political economy perspective, it is reviewed that capitalist production 
relations are social relations characterised by power configurations among agents 
with conflicting interests and contradictions. The realisation or maximisation of the 
interest of one class will significantly curtail the achievement of the interest of one 
or more class(es) of capitalism. Herein lies the conflict of interests in  production 
relations. With each class actively desirous of maximising the realisation of its 
interest there arise  inherent struggles and power relations, with a consequent 
dominant class emerging in the relationship. Corporate policies and strategies are 
consequently biased in pursuit of the interest of the dominant class. Each class of 
capitalist production relations pursues the emergence of institutions, exploits 
existing institutions, or is constrained by existing institutions in the active desire to 
be dominant and to realise to a greater extent, its interest. According to some post-
Keynesian scholars, the objective of the firm becomes the objective of the dominant 
class in the power relations in the firm. These scholars have argued that the workers 
interests are achieved with attendant increases in growth and fixed capital 
accumulation by firms, because these facilitate greater employment and the security 
thereof, as well as higher real wages.  But the capitalist/rentier class wants 
progressive increases in the returns to their capital expenditures and thus their 
wealth, and this is efficiency of the invested capital outlay, however it may be 
achieved. 
 
Given this conflictual relationship, the repetition of production becomes apparently 
impossible. Some form of compromise is therefore of the essence, to make repetition 
and long wave of production possible. The pursuits of empowering institutions by 
the classes and the constraints imposed by existing institutions on these classes, 
result in the emergence of a configuration of institutions that forces a compromise 
between these conflictual relata, where there emerges a dominant class, and thus 
facilitates the long wave of production with its characteristic pattern of distributions, 
called an accumulation regime. The configuration of institutions also has a 
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hegemonic/dominant institution. This configuration that forces the compromise is 
the mode of régulation. The mode of régulation and regime of accumulation form 
the mode of development. Eventually the mode of régulation is exhausted and the 
result is the a structural crisis of the regime of accumulation. The five main 
institutions whose configuration, studies in the French Regulation School literature  
have revealed to régulate accumulation regimes include: a money form, a wage 
relation (or wage form), a state form, a form of competition, and an international 
regime. 
 
The characteristics of the regime of accumulation and the  relationship between two 
economic variables depend on the institutional configuration and eventually on the 
hegemonic institution. These characteristics include rates of fixed capital 
accumulation. Some scholars have concurred that after Fordism, trade and later 
financial openness through extensive deregulation assumed dominance over an 
extended period characterised by decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation in  
advanced capitalist economies. The history of the phases of capitalism indicates that 
regimes of accumulation with higher rates of fixed capital accumulation are 
associated with conditions of low trade and financial openness, while regimes 
characterised  by long period of low rates of capital accumulation or short-lived 
rapid capital accumulation tend to be associated with greater trade and financial 
openness. Based on the foregoing premises of mode of régulation, regime of 
accumulation, and historical experience, three theses emerged: 
 
“Higher trade openness of the post-Fordist period explains the lower rates of 
business fixed capital accumulation observed in  the advanced capitalist economies” 
“Higher financial openness contributed to the observed decline in the rates of fixed 
capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies”. 
“The observed extended decline is a characteristic of post-Fordist regimes of 
accumulation where the mode of régulation is dominated by economic openness”.  
Economic openness, analysable into trade openness and financial openness, is the 
primary form of international regime. 
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Symbolically: 













Where II represents integration into the international economy; and RFCA are the 
rates of fixed capital accumulation. The ratios of trade flows to GDP and financial 
flows to GDP are the respective indices of trade and financial openness.  The power 
struggles between the classes of capitalism in the determination of trade policy and 
trade openness are considered.  The next two chapters assess the political processes 
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Chapter 4 :International Trade Policy: The Political Economy of its 
Emergence and Some Consequences 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Over time, national states alter their commercial or trade policies, allegedly to 
achieve some macroeconomic objectives. An examination of the advanced capitalist 
economies readily suggests a common pattern of commercial policies. Looking 
more intently at the 20th and 21st centuries, we can arguably classify the decades 
after 1970, as decades of significant liberal commercial policies and greater  
international trade openness for these economies. In contrast, from the end of the 
Second World War until the mid-1960s, trade policies were rather protectionist and 
economic openness in both de jure and de facto forms was at historically low levels, 
across advanced capitalist economies. As argued in the literature and reflected in the 
data, these Fordist decades of  protectionist trade policies and low trade openness 
were associated with the realisation of lofty macroeconomic objectives of near full 
employment, high and rapid growth in productivity, output and capital 
accumulation, as well as periods of lower inequality in income distribution. Why, 
and how, then did the capitalist states switch to the incredibly liberal commercial 
policies that opened the floodgate to  increases in trade and caused trade openness of 
epic proportions, over virtually four decades? This chapter reviews some trade 
policy theories. The objective is to identify the process that underpin the emergence 
of the extremely liberal post-Fordist trade policies and trade openness across the 
advanced capitalist economies. The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 
considers international trade policies  before the Fordist decades. Section 4.3 looks 
at trade policies in the period of Fordism, while Section 4.4 presents trade policies 
after Fordism. Section 4.5 presents some impacts of trade policy changes. Section 
4.6 is a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2  Trade Policies before the Golden Years of Fordism 
If the trade theories of mainstream economics, whose thrust is that free international  
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trade leads to maximum national benefits, were consistently the sole or even the 
critical guide of trade policies, then free trade policies would be prevalent across the 
advanced capitalist countries and across time. However, this has not been the case, 
as over the years, national trade policies have oscillated between protectionism and 
greater liberalism. As argued by Södersten and Reeds (1994), the drivers of trade 
policies or levels of protectionism include responses to political pressures, and the 
desire to reduce imports because of balance-of-payments problems. It has been 
demonstrated that free trade brings about the redistribution of benefits and outputs 
away from consumers and in favour of producers and capitalists in the case of 
exports. It has also be shown that increases in imports reduce the benefits to 
domestic producers in import-competing industries, through  lower prices and 
atrophy of import competing industries, but bring net gains to consumers (Södersten 
and Reeds, 1994, p.193). If, therefore, protectionism or free trade increases the 
benefits for some people and reduces the benefits of others, then at any point in 
time, the prevailing trade policies would have both their antagonists and their 
protagonists 
 
However, if a state increases protectionism, then local production would increase, 
and imports would be reduced (Södersten and Reed, 1994). If increases in imports 
make local production in import-competing industries less profitable, then local 
producers would stop or at least curtail local production and increase their profits by 
substituting importation for local production. The relative profitability of 
importation could potentially generate a massive wave of importation by erstwhile 
local producers, under the excuse of increasing the gains to consumers from lower 
prices (Boyer, 2013), just as the workers in these industries are made redundant. 
Thus in the long-run, the effective harm of increases in imports is to local 
production and employment of labour, as the local producers in an import-
competing sector could potentially maintain their profits or increase them, through 
switching to local importers.  
 
It has also been argued that increases in exports may reduce growth in real wages 
(Boyer, 2013), as increases in international competition may cause competitiveness 
on labour cost of exports. Regarding the classes of capitalism, we could therefore, 
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infer that free trade, either through exports or imports, has a higher likelihood of 
increasing the gains to capitalists at the expense of  workers or wage-labour. If the 
trade policies of a state tend to be responses to political pressures as posited by 
Södersten and Reeds (1994), then the political clamour against free trade would be 
louder among the wage-labour class than the capitalist class, and the political 
clamour in favour of free trade would be louder among the capitalist class than the 
wage-labour class (cf Marglin and Bhaduri, 1992; Duménil and Lévy, 2005, p.24, 
2011).  
 
A status quo of free trade (and international openness) that increases the wealth of 
capitalist class at the expense of wage-labour class, brings about greater re-
distribution of real income in favour of capitalists. Such redistribution generates 
class consciousness and dissatisfaction among exploited wage-labour class, who 
may increase political activism to change the status quo to one of greater 
protectionism. Such protectionism reduces the ability of the capitalist class to 
redistribute income in their favour, and eventually facilitate the redistribution of 
income in favour of wage-labour. The consequence is political activism by the 
capitalists to change the status quo, and if they succeed, the result is a new trade 
liberalism. The prevailing trade policy becomes the result of a dialectical process 
defined by a net balance of political power of the classes of capitalism, and 
facilitates the redistribution of income or exploitation of one capitalist class by the 
other.  
 
Before the rise of modern capitalism, the tendency was for the state to institute 
greater protectionism for the agricultural sector, and this included the institution of 
the Corn Laws in England. But as capitalism became more established, capitalists 
increased political activism against land-owners that culminated in the 1846 
abolition of the Corn Laws that had been very helpful to English agriculture. 
Consequently, until the onset of the First World War, England was practically a 
“free-trading nation” (Södersten and Reeds, 1994, p.189). The waves of trade 
liberalism in this period saw the institution of the Siamese-American Treaty of 1833, 
the Opium War of circa 1840 and, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 between the 
United Kingdom and France. Further waves of trade liberalism spread across 
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European capitalist economies, as these economies, including Germany, followed in 
the footsteps of the UK and entered into successive free trade agreements between 
themselves (IMF, 1997). In Japan, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 facilitated trade 
liberalism. The results were  dramatic increases in world trade. There was, however, 
a retreat from free trade in the ultimate quarter of the 19th Century. This was the 
period of the long depression, which was most severe among the advanced capitalist 
economies. Relative to the European states, the United States stood as a rather 
protectionist state, from 1816 to the Second World War (Södersten and Reed, 1994; 
Lind, 2003). 
 
A strong argument exists in the literature that the period between the First World 
War and the Second World War, especially the 1930s, experienced a remarkable 
level of deteriorating international economic relations (Södersten and Reed, 1994). 
Protectionism reached a head in the US, with the passing of the “Smoot-Hawley Act 
(1930), which ushered in dramatic increases in tariffs. Following the retaliation by 
other advanced capitalist economies, by 1933, the advanced capitalist economies 
where already firmly in the tentacles of severe trade, as well as currency conflicts 
(See Monroe, 1975; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). Protectionism attained a critical 
point during the great depression in the 1930s. It was against this background that 
the world entered the Second World War. Thus apart from trade or commercial 
policies being the results of dialectical processes, there appears to be the tendency of 
contagion of trade policies, across the advanced capitalist economies. 
 
 Frieden and Lake (2000, p.69-71) have argued that across the advanced capitalist 
economies in general, the first three decades of the 20th century were ones of de 
facto protectionism. This assertion is however inconsistent with the observation that 
until the beginning of the First World War, the prevailing trade policy was one of 
free trade. What therefore do the data say? Data available on trade and trade 
openness  indicate that on average following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, 
not just trade, but also the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, grew very 
rapidly from 1847 to 1880 across the advanced European economies. This series of 
the ratio of trade to GDP declined briefly from circa 1880 until early 1890 and 
picked up again, understandably, until the beginning of the First World War. The 
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series declined over the period of the First World War. However trade and trade 
openness started their upward trends from about 1919 until about 1929, declining 
after that until about 1939 (the period of the great depression). In most advanced 
European capitalist economies, the series continued their decline from 1939 until the 
end of the Second World War, except for a couple of countries, the UK and Sweden, 
where the series rose briefly from about 1933 till 1939. Across most of these 
advanced European capitalist economies, the increases in the ratio of the sum of 
exports and imports to GDP from the 1840s to 1913 were astronomical. Some 
spectacular cases included the Netherland, where the series rose from just 26% in 
1830 to 180% in 1913, just before the First World War, and Belgium, where it rose 
from just 19% in 1840 to 101% in 1913 (see Broadberry and O’Rourke, 2010; Ortiz-
Ospina and Roser, 2017).  
 
The data thus indicate that during the rise of modern capitalism after the crisis of the 
agro-based ancien régime circa 1840, there existed significant upward trends in free 
trade and trade openness until virtually the beginning of the first world war. It 
should be recalled that this is co-extensive with the first (extensive) regime of 
accumulation presented in Lipietz and Vale (1988), and recounted in Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. The period of falls in trade and trade openness was not only 
the period of the war but also that of the structural crisis of the first regime of 
accumulation. Following the end of the First World War and the crisis, trade and 
trade openness assumed upward trends once again, as indicated by the data, from 
circa 1920 until the late 1920s. These trends were also coextensive with the brief 
period of the intensive regimes of accumulation when there existed the 
unsustainable institution of intensive or rapid fixed capital accumulation in the 
context of increasing trade and trade openness (ibid). This ended in the structural 
crisis of the 1930s, which was also the period of the great depression, and the retreat 
to protectionism.  
 
4.3 International Trade Policies in the Fordist Decades 
Controversies over the nature of trade liberalisation and openness after the Second 
World War also exist in the literature. Some have argued in the Regulation School 
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literature, that trade openness reached historically low points in the 1960s (see 
Aglietta, 1998). Some, however, have argued that from the post-war period, trade 
policies have been very liberal. Some have also posited that formal and extensive 
trade liberalisation started after the 1960s. A study of the history of liberalisation 
suggests some deliberate trade liberalisation drives particularly by the US, even 
before the end of the Second World War. The urge for free trade policy was 
motivated by the objective of avoiding the commercial policies of protectionism (a 
commercial policy that is intended to strait-jacket free trade) of the Second World 
War. Under the leadership of the United States, the objective was the establishment 
of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) to regulate international trade, as a 
parallel to the World Bank and the IMF on international finance. The ITO was to 
midwife a liberal system that governs trade and brings about free trade in the long 
run. ITO, however, never materialised, as no country including the US, agreed to 
ratify the charter. Instead, a less ambitious General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATT) became the instituted framework guiding trading relations.  
 
GATT has, as its central guiding principle, the “most favoured nation” clause. This 
concept means that the most favourable tariff concessions granted by a country to 
another should be extended to all signatories of GATT. Some have argued that 
GATT has been successful in meeting two of its three objectives: successfully  
constituting a framework for the conduct of international trade and, constituting a 
framework for, and promoting, the gradual elimination of trade barriers. It has, 
however, failed in its third task of providing a set of rules to prevent countries taking 
unilateral action. Others, however, have levelled several criticisms at GATT. Some 
of these critical views include the charge that GATT reflects the mercantilist 
principle that exports are good; imports are bad and equal changes in exports and 
imports are good (Krugman, 1992). Moreover, GATT has too many exceptions, on 
various grounds. Although it prohibits the use of direct control of trade, such as 
quantitative restriction, it allows this, under the excuse of a balance-of-payments 
problem. A few grounds do exist for claiming exemptions from the tariff reduction 
requirements of GATT. Free trade areas and customs unions offer significant 
exceptions from the provisions of GATT. 
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The Geneva Round (1947) involving 23 countries achieved some concessions on  
tariffs, in that the US took the lead in cutting tariff on  European exports, but refused 
to press for the removal of the prevalent  quantitative restrictions on imports by 
European countries. Therefore, these restrictions more or less prevailed. The next 
four rounds: Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), and Dillon (1960-
1961) were rather unsuccessful and thus trade liberalisation remained constrained. 
The primary reason for the failure of these rounds to promote liberalisation rested on 
the protectionist tendencies of the advanced capitalist economies. For example, the 
US Congress was reluctant to grant the US administration the necessary power to 
pursue liberalisation; Britain and the Commonwealth of nations were exploiting the 
exceptions clauses of GATT and, therefore, unwilling to reduce the long list of 
preferences.  In 1947, the general tariff was 22%, and two decades later, in 1967, it 
had barely been reduced to just 15%. However, by the Uruguay Round in 1986, the 
general tariff was already below 5%. 
 
It is noteworthy that the period covered by these earlier four rounds of GATT,  as 
considered above was from 1947 to 1961, and this overlapped considerably with the 
period of Fordism. Since the advanced economies were in reality still stuck on 
protectionism despite the liberalisation crusades and GATT, we can argue that the 
period of Fordism was mainly that of de jure and de facto protectionism. The 
protectionist stance of the Great Depression and the Second World War continued 
into the golden era of Fordism. It took several decades after the Second World War 
for protectionism to begin to thaw (see Warnecke, 1978; Lind, 2003; Irwin, 2012).  
Some have argued that the success of the trade liberalisation efforts have triggered 
an increase in international trade by more than 290%  (Terborgh, 2003). If we use 
the ratio of aggregate global export to global GDP as an index, then we see that in 
1913, this ratio was 8% and about 5% during Fordism. The ratio, however, jumped 
to 11% just after 1973; and was 17% in 1998 (see World Trade Organization, 2013). 
We assume that the foregoing pattern of de jure and de facto trade liberalisation ran 
concurrently among the advanced capitalist economies. If Fordism was de jure and 
de facto protectionism, then why and how was there a rapid trade liberalisation  
post- Fordism? 
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4.4 International Trade Policies in Post-Fordist Decades 
The motivation for the rapid trade liberalisation of the post-Fordist period remains a 
matter of debate. The process, however, smacks of self-interest. It started  with the 
Kennedy Round which lasted until 1967. The objective was to reduce tariffs by as 
much as 50% on goods that mattered to the advanced capitalist economies only 
(primarily manufactured goods and their relevant raw materials). It has been argued 
that the initiative taken by the US to bring about a massive cut in trade barriers, was 
the fear and the potential protectionist impact of the rapidly emerging customs union 
in the then European Economic Community, and the possible enlargement thereof.  
 
The results were the Trade Expansion Act and the dominant-supplier authority, by 
the administration of Kennedy. The former empowers the administration to reduce 
tariff by up to 50% on all goods. The latter indicates a 100% tariff cut on goods 
(80% of which trade, the US and the then EEC are accountable for). The most 
substantial tariff cut would primarily affect manufactured goods, and the estimated 
cut in tariffs agreed during the Kennedy Round on these, was about 40%,  affecting 
about 75% of global trade. The remarkable trade flow facilitated by the Kennedy 
Round was bolstered by the Tokyo Round, in which industrial products enjoyed 
another 33% reduction in tariffs. During this round, the raw materials for these 
industrial outputs enjoyed a 52% reduction in tariffs, semi-manufactured goods 
received 30% tariff reduction, and finished manufactured goods, a 33% cut in tariffs 
(see Södersten and Reed, 1994). 
 
To complement the above reduction in trade barriers, the EEC’s customs union was 
formed in the late 1960s. This union saw the removal of trade barriers between 
members and identical external tariffs for non-members. The European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) served as an alternative trade bloc for Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, 
and Liechtenstein, and later for Austria, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal, 
and Sweden. By the late 1960s (1967), free trade untypical of the Fordist period 
among the advanced capitalist economies had started to increase, as EFTA 
facilitated an increase in trade among its members, from just US$3.5bn to US$8.2bn 
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(Wikipedia). Australia and New Zealand were not left out as they signed a Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) deal in the early 1980s, which triggered significant 
increases in international trade of these nations. 
 
Thus, from the de jure and de facto trade protectionism of the Fordist period, when 
politicians where biased towards industrial protection and the consequent low levels 
of international trade, the advanced capitalist economies (under pressure from 
capitalist firms) became impatient to jump on the bandwagon of free trade, either 
within free trade blocs, or outside such blocs, consequently triggering the 
proliferation of free trade areas in the late 1960s. A crucial question is why this 
change of heart took place.  Duménil and Lévy (2011) provide an answer in the 
following phrase: “…because capitalist firms are in the quest for higher profit rates.” 
Despite the mainstream arguments of the potential benefits associated with free 
trade, the prevailing commercial policies of a state reflect the power struggles 
between the chief capitalist agents, of wage-labour and capitalists/shareholders. The 
prevailing commercial policy is a reflection of the interest of the more politically 
powerful class, who can influence public policies, in favour of this interest 
(Anderson and Baldwin, 1987).  
 
Empirical studies, with the US as the focus, found that the major labour trade unions 
who were in favour of protectionism (trade closeness) did make significant 
monetary contributions to the campaign funds of members of Congress fighting 
against trade liberalism, signalling the willingness and capacity of organised labour 
to secure protectionism (Baldwin, 1976). More studies found that Republicans 
(generally assumed to be sympathetic towards the capitalist class) tended to vote in 
favour of higher trade openness concerning the US Trade Bill of 1973. The 
Democrats, in contrast, tended to vote for protectionism concerning the same bill. 
These studies also found that organised labour unions who were against trade 
openness primarily made monetary contributions to members of Congress who 
voted against the bill (Baldwin, 1986). Caves (1976), in the case of Canada, found 
that the national interest argument could not significantly explain the level of 
protectionism (and by implication, that of trade openness) and neither could the 
adding machine argument (the benefits of the highest number of voters possible 
argument). He found that the interest group argument explained more than 50% of 
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the variations in protectionism (For further details on the political market for 
protection, see Olson, 1965; Cheh, 1974; Stigler, 1974; Pincus, 1975; Baldwin, 




The foregoing paragraphs suggest, therefore, that the position of the advanced 
capitalist economies, being rather protectionists and then liberalists in spirit during 
Fordism and post-Fordism respectively, were the results of political struggles in 
which capitalist classes’ conflicts of interests and political activism made significant 
contributions. For wage labour, protectionism facilitates the security of real wages 
and employment (see Boyer, 2013). For the capitalist, trade liberalism tends to 
enhance the returns per unit of capital invested (capital efficiency) by 
capitalists/shareholders (see Duménil and Lévy, 2011).These conflicting positions 
stand in contrast to the elaborate logical national and a-institutional economic gains 
from trade arguments, found in neoclassical economics. Expectedly, the historic 
lows of trade openness, high real wage growth, and near full employment of labour 
in the golden age of Fordism indicate a period of labour power. The decades 
following Fordism with real wages at best growing very slowly, unemployment very 
high and upward trending profit rates across the advanced capitalist economies is 
indicative of decades of capitalists’ power.  What impacts then, do  these changes in 
international trade policies have on both international trade and international trade 
openness? 
 
4.5 The Impact of Trade Policy Changes 
In light of the changes in international trade policies, this section considers some of 
the impacts of these policy changes.  
 
4.5.1 The Impact of Trade Policy Changes on International Trade 
Consistent with the tendency for exports to beget commensurate levels of imports, 
there have been very high correlations between export and import of goods and 
services. Table 4.1 below, displays the very high positive correlation coefficients 
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between export and import of goods and services, for 23 advanced capitalist 
countries in the OECD. 
Table 4.1: Export-Import Correlation Coefficients     
 
  ( Source: author computed from data available in databases) 
 
These extraordinarily close correlation coefficients between export and import of 
goods and services make exports and imports almost identical concepts. Statistics 
indicate that over the period of Fordism, the values of exports and imports were 
rather negligible and  more or less the same year in year out. However, the increase 
in trade liberalisation of circa 1970 increased these values in  later years.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average Export and Imports of Goods and Services 
(Source: Author’s computation from data in World Bank database. Values on vertical axis in current 
local currency units) 
 
 Country           Australia  Austria  Belgium  Canada  Denmark  Finland  France  Germany   
 Coefficient        0.9974      0.9991     0.9993      0.9944      0.9983     0.9898    0.9963     0.9981 
 
 Country         Greece   Ireland   Iceland   Italy   Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand 
 Coefficient      0.9855   0.9988     0.9818   0.9953   0.9794     0.9998            0.9998        0.9979 
 
 Country          Norway Portugal   Spain  Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
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A rapid rise in de jure trade liberalisation, followed the Kennedy round. Figure 4.1 
displays line graphs for the series of total export and import of goods and services 
averaged across 23 advanced capitalist economies for which data are available, and 
for the period 1960 to 2013. The two series show the close movements between 
exports and imports. However, more importantly, Figure 4.1 indicates the breaks in 
the movement of these series. The period 1960 to about 1970 could arguably be 
classified as the last decade of Fordism, when the commercial policies of the 
advanced capitalist economies were de facto protectionist.  The period beyond 1972 
can be classified as Post Fordist period. Figure 4.1 indicates the relative 
insignificance and stability of international trade across advanced capitalist 
economies in the 1960s. Although data are not available for the 1950s, it would be 
logical, from the shape of the series, to infer that these were still relatively 
negligible, as in the 1960s. However, the first sign of an increase came in about 
1970. From visual inspection, while these increases were very significant until about 
1980, they were rather modest compared with the spike in exports and imports after 
1980, as can be seen in the massive spike in both series in Figure 4.1. The closeness 
between the patterns of movements and the changes in attitude towards   commercial 
policies of advanced capitalist economies should be noted, indicating that the 
movements of these series are the function of the commercial policies and therefore 
should be strictly exogenous in a causal economic relationship. 
 
The changes that accompanied the massive  trade liberalisation from the late 1960s 
onward were not  restricted to higher imports and exports. They have also been 
accompanied by structural changes in exports and imports. In Australia and Japan 
after the 1960s as liberalisation gained momentum, the proportion of services 
exported compared with total exports skyrocketed, while over the same period, the 
proportion of services imported compared with total imports declined. The 
proportion of  goods, particularly industrial goods, compared with total imports 
decreased during the 1960s, but trended upward after the 1960s.  The proportion  of 
goods exports compared with total exports took an extended plunge, from the early 
1970s.  
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For some countries, however, the proportions of services imports compared with 
total imports trended upward, while the ratio of services exports to total exports 
declined after the 1960s. For these, the proportion of goods imports compared with 
aggregate imports fell, while the ratio of goods exports to total exports rose. An 
example of such countries is Austria. For other countries such as  Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands, the proportion of services imports compared with total imports and the 
ratio of services exports to total exports declined and then rose simultaneously. In 
these countries, the ratio of goods imports to total imports and the ratio of goods 
exports to total exports rose initially and then declined afterwards. Norway saw 
increases in the ratio of services exports to total exports, while the  ratio of goods 
imports to total imports fell. For Norway, services imports as a percentage of total 
imports increased markedly, while the reverse was the case for services exports, as 
the ratio of services exports to total exports declined progressively, over the sample 
period. Goods exports as a percentage of GDP increased, just as goods exports as  a 
percentage of total exports increased significantly after the late 1960s, while goods 
imports, as a percentage of GDP declined.  
 
Portugal experienced progressive falls in services imports as a percentage of  total 
imports and services exports as a percentage of total exports. But goods exports and 
goods imports, as percentages of total exports and total imports respectively, 
experienced upward trends. Regarding Norway, both goods imports and goods 
exports as respective percentages of GDP enjoyed upward trends, with these two 
series closely mirroring one another (correlation coefficient of 0.89). However, 
goods imports as  percentages of GDP were far higher than goods exports as 
percentages of GDP. These observations for Norway could suggest that imports of 
goods, rather than domestic production, acted as the source of goods exports. The 
balance of goods imports over exports accounted for increases in household 
consumption. In Switzerland, services exports as a percentage of total exports were 
more or less the same, while the ratio of services imports to total imports trended 
upward, to converge with the former. Expectedly, the ratio of goods exports to total 
exports remained virtually the same, while the ratio of goods imports to total imports 
trended downward, to converge with the former. Services exports and imports as 
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well as goods exports and imports as respective percentages of GDP  trended 
upward after trade liberalisation. 
 
In the UK, export and import of services as percentages of total exports and total 
imports increased over time, while the export and import of goods as percentages of 
total exports and total imports declined progressively, over the same period. Unlike 
the rest of the sampled countries, the series indicated that for the UK, goods exports 
as  percentages of GDP trended downward after an initial spike in the very early 
1970s, while the ratio of goods imports to GDP, after an initial upward spike, 
continued on an upward trend. This contrast in movements created an increasing 
divergence between these two series, suggesting that imported goods were 
increasingly the source for exported goods, but more so for consumption goods. For 
the US, services exports and imports, as percentages of total exports and total 
imports, trended massively upward and downward respectively after liberalisation. 
Expectedly, the ratio of goods imports to total imports trended upward, while the 
ratio of goods exports to total exports trended downward, after liberalisation took 
effect. Yet all services and goods imports and exports as percentages of GDP, 
trended upward rapidly after liberalisation.  
 
For virtually all the countries, the percentage of real goods imported compared with  
GDP, as well as the ratio of goods exports to GDP, rose extensively, after the 1960s, 
except for Luxembourg where both fell; and Norway where the ratio of goods 
exports to GDP rose, and the ratio of goods imports to GDP fell. Trade openness for 
Luxembourg remained virtually unchanged until the mid-1990s, while for Norway, 
it was rather slightly downward sloping. Thus we can see that similar policy changes 
and directions trigger different structural changes in production and trade patterns, 
with the majority of the advanced capitalist economies increasing the percentage of 
goods exports as a ratio of total exports and decreasing the ratio of imported goods 
to total imports. The data analysed in this section are available on UK data services 
and on the AMECO database. 
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4.5.2 Trade Policy Changes and their Impact on Trade Openness 
Next, we observe the impact of commercial policies on trade openness. We recollect 
that trade openness is defined in the relevant literature, as the ratio of the sum of 
aggregate export and import of goods and services to GDP. Figure 4.2 below 
presents the series for trade openness, averaged across the 23 advanced capitalist 
economies, for which data are available. The series is from 1960 to 2014. Visual 
inspection once again reveals a striking synchronism in the movement of the series 
with that of aggregate trade presented in Figure 4.1 The horizontal phase of the  
trade openness series runs from 1960 to about 1968, after which a minor rise is 
indicated, because of increases in exports, as can be seen in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Trade Openness Series: Averaged Across Countries    
(Source: Author’s computation from database. Vertical axis in ratios) 
 
These minor increases in trade openness continued until about 1973 after which 
trade openness spiked, before increasing at higher rates until the mid-1980s. After 
the mid-1980s, rates of increase in trade openness in the advanced capitalist 
economies attained even greater heights. In the period of Fordism, trade openness 
was just above 40% of GDP on the average, across the advanced capitalist 
economies. More precisely, for 15 out of the 23 countries, it was 40% or less, with 
the US having 20% or less. By the mid-1980s, average trade openness across 
advanced capitalist economies was between 60% and 70%. By the second decade of 
the 21st century, trade openness had risen astronomically to intimidating proportions, 
approaching nearly 100%. It is therefore clear that the post-Fordist era represents a 
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through exports and imports,  played  more significant roles in the generation of  
GDP. The emphasis being made is on the role played by commercial policies, in 
these observed dynamics, as we find that the pattern of trade openness is entirely a 
function of commercial policies. Reconciling the trade statistics with the political 
market for protection argument, the period following the rapid increases in trade and 
trade openness suggest a period of growth in fulfilment of the interest of a 
pressure/interest group that canvassed for it politically. Exports and imports are 
virtually all undertaken by firms that have the motive to earn a surplus. Firms also 
have the option to abstain from external trades if it is more profitable to do so. The 
rapid increases in exports and imports as well as in trade openness following trade 
liberalisation, constitute evidence that such astronomical rises in exports and imports 
generated higher profits than did the status quo before trade liberalisation. This, 
therefore, accords further credence to the logical reasoning in Chapter 2, that firms, 
in their drive to boost profit rates, may choose to increase the proportion of Y (total 
output) constituted by exports and imports. 
 
4.6    Summary 
In this chapter, we consider commercial policies in the advanced capitalist 
economies and their changes over time. During the period of Fordism, commercial 
policies were protectionist. This was despite the efforts made to install a free trade 
system. The protectionist inclinations of that time, resulted from the absence of 
political will in Congress and in the parliaments across the advanced capitalist 
economies, that were the loci of ultimate political power. However, when the 
political will for trade liberalisation took root, under pressure from capitalist firms  
desirous of higher profit rates, many free trade areas, and organisations to facilitate 
international trade and trade openness emerged. Executives were, in this case, 
granted authority to negotiate extensive reductions in trade barriers and 
protectionism.  
 
The resultant extensive trade liberalisation that started in the late 1960s was 
ruthlessly exploited by capitalist firms, as it accorded them  opportunities to increase 
their profit rates. Consequently, exports and imports increased rapidly across the 
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decades of post-Fordism in advanced capitalist nations. Such historical increases in 
exports and imports by capitalist firms suggested that such ventures had greater 
potentials for increasing profit rates, as they had the choice of scaling down such 
external trade relations, were they found to be less profitable than autarkic 
production. The consequence of the increases in trade arising from the liberal 
commercial policy, was expansive increases in trade openness, defined as the ratio 
of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, as exports and imports began to play  
more significant roles in the generation of national GDP.  
 
Before this era of liberalisation, external trade and consequently trade openness, 
were rather low and constant, as commercial policies were protectionist. These 
historically low points in external trade and trade openness, reflected the will of 
interest groups representing wage-labour.  The inference is that power struggles 
among interest groups representing classes of capitalism influence the nature of 
commercial or trade policies, which in turn determine trends in trade and in trade 
openness. This explains why commercial policies may oscillate between 
protectionism and liberalism. Were commercial policies determined by the 
mainstream theories of trade, then free trade policies would prevail all the time. 
 
Trade openness is a function of the prevailing  commercial policies and is expected 
to be a robust exogenous variable, in an economic relationship. Rather than taking at 
face value the claim in the Regulation School literature that the emergence of the 
mode of regulation which include the international regime (and openness) is a 
dialectical process, we review the pattern of trade policies and the process of their 
emergence across the advanced capitalist economies. The review found, particularly 
under the perspective of the political market for protection, that an emergent policy 
is more likely, the result of conflict of interests and power struggles, consistent with  
the claim of a dialectical process. In the next chapter, similar consideration is given 
to the determination of capital account liberalisation policy 
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Chapter 5 Dejure and De facto Financial Openness: Political 
Economy and Historical Analyses 
5.1 Introduction 
There seems to be some historical parallelism between the dynamics of international 
trade relations and those of international financial relations since the post-war years.  
Following the end of the Second World War, under  Anglo-American leadership, the 
comity of nations pursued the establishment of not only the International Trade 
Organisation, but also, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The IMF was saddled with the 
task of facilitating short-term international liquidity and assisting member countries 
with their balance-of-payments difficulties. The IBRD was to assist with channelling 
long-term investments along the desired lines (Södersten and Reeds, 1994). In 1945, 
the Bretton wood article of agreement that instituted the Bretton Woods system 
came into effect. However, this system collapsed in 1971. With the demise of  
Bretton Wood, international finance became less co-ordinated but more subject to 
the decisions and actions of national states and private individuals.  
 
Orthodox economic theories have come up with some elaborate benefits 
optimisation that can potentially result from increased capital account liberalisation; 
such as that liberalisation would facilitate more efficient allocation of financial 
resources. Events have strongly suggested that capital account policies may actually 
result from power struggles and power configurations. In this chapter, we compare 
the temporal changes in the tide of international financial policies, with changes in 
actual financial flows and de facto financial openness. In line with the literature and 
in parallel with trade openness, we adopt the definition of international openness as 
the ratio of the sum of total financial inflows and outflows to GDP per period. 
Section 5.2 presents international financial policies during Fordism and Section 5.3 
presents same, after Fordism. Section 5.4 presents the impacts of capital account 
liberalisation. 5.5 presents some inferences. Section 5.6 presents the chapter 
summary. 
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5.2 International Financial Policies during Fordism 
Preceding the First World War, confidence and faith in the international financial 
system facilitated by the then existing international gold standard, encouraged rather 
high international flows of funds and trade. This system was dismantled during the 
First World War. Given the foregoing, and the inability of  Britain to launch a new 
international financial system similar to the gold standard, chaos ensued as multiple 
exchange rates and competitive devaluations by states intent on stimulating demand 
in their countries, gathered momentum. This chaos severely curtailed  international 
flows of both trade and finance. It was the desire to restore faith in the international 
financial system that motivated the IMF and the Bretton Woods system that lasted 
from 1945-1973. Remarkably, this period significantly overlapped with the period of 
Fordism. Cross-country capital account controls, prevented any significant flow of 
private capital, including foreign direct investments, but more particularly 
speculative private capital flows, such as portfolio flows, as well as bank 
borrowings, across national boundaries. Such private flows were highly regulated 
and often needed to pass through central banks. Various reasons were advanced to 
justify this curtailment of capital account flows. 
 
First, it serves to prevent crises associated with capital flows volatility. Second 
under the fixed exchange rate regime embodied in the Bretton Woods system, 
maintenance of capital account restrictions was of the essence, as uncontrolled 
capital account flows would have made it particularly challenging to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate system, and this particularly explains why the advanced 
capitalist economies maintained relatively closed capital accounts, under the Bretton 
Woods system (and under Fordism by implication) (Kose and Prasad, 2012). Kose 
and Prasad (2012) have advanced a few alternative reasons for capital account 
control: to prevent external haemorrhaging of domestic household savings in a 
country with a fragile banking system; to guide flows into desired lines (e.g. inward 
FDI); to discriminate between long-term and short-term flows, according to priority. 
Whatever reason was operational then, is still controversial.  
 
However it is apparent from these advanced reasons, that Fordism was a period of 
capital account control, which saw private capital flows and consequently financial 
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openness attain historically low levels (see also Södersten and Reeds, 1994:554). 
The reasons for control, were consistent with internal growth in employment, 
productivity and real capital investments, which would have significantly appealed 
to organised labour unions, who could potentially wield political power. After all, 
the Bretton Woods system emerged from the blueprints of John Maynard Keynes 
and Harry Dexter White, with the respective objectives of economic growth and 
price stability. But higher employment tends towards tighter labour markets and 
higher bargaining powers for wage labour, to the great displeasure of capitalists 
(firms). Organised wage-labour would therefore, wish that the status quo of capital 
account control be maintained.  
                    
In real-world investment appraisal, a profit-motivated capitalist firm evaluates the 
profitability of an investment, by assessing the present values of all future net free 
cash flows relative to current cash outlays, so that potential profits from the 
investment are already taken into account, at the inception of the project. For higher 
profits and growth in shareholder wealth, capitalist firms therefore need to generate 
new fixed capital projects or increase net cash inflows through greater efficiency. 
Under the context of strict capital account controls, a capitalist firm seeking to make 
more profits or to enjoy greater wealth is therefore constrained to invest in the home 
country, thus limiting capitalists’ choices. Theoretical inferences based on 
observations of business real investments and profit rates during periods of capital 
account control such as Fordism, would readily project a robust positive economic 
determinism between fixed capital accumulation and business profit rates. By no 
stretch of the imagination would capitalists who could also potentially wield 
political powers, particularly cherish constraints in profit-making abilities implied 
by a capital account control, compared with a more liberalised capital account.  
 
Capital account control is thus associated with some features potentially disliked by 
profit-making capitalist firms, such as tighter labour market and constraints on 
profit-making opportunities. Thus as capital account control or financial non-
liberalisation got underway as in Fordism, the stage was set for further struggles 
between organised wage labour wishing for the status quo, on the one hand and 
capitalists/shareholders who potentially disliked the status quo of capital account 
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control during Fordism, on the other hand. Political struggles to determine the nature 
of capital account policies and thus financial openness, therefore, ensued between 
the wage labour class and the capitalist class. Capital account liberalisation is a 
policy decision made by politician whose policy decisions tend to take into account, 
the locus of net balance of political power between wage labour and their 
representatives on the one hand, and capitalists and their representatives on the other 
hand. The prevailing capital account policy therefore becomes the result of a 
dialectical process (see also the social conflict theory). 
  
5.3 International Financial Policy Post-Fordism 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system removed the need for industrial 
economies to maintain capital accounts control. With pressure for higher profit rates 
mounting, the pressure for greater capital account liberalisation also increased. In 
conjunction with the theoretical argument that free capital account flows increase 
the efficiencies of capital allocations, such political pressure successfully influenced 
extensive financial liberalisation from about the mid-1980s (For details of how the 
quests for higher profit rates by capitalists/rentiers successfully pushed for a 
prolonged financial and capital account liberalisation in the years since the fall of 
Bretton Woods, see Wallerstein, 2007; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Orhangazi, 2014). 
How have the changes in international financial policies by the advanced capitalist 
economies played out in terms of actual capital account flows and financial 
openness? 
 
5.4 Capital Account Liberalisation: Impact on Financial Flows 
The elements of capital accounts are quite numerous and include inward foreign 
direct investment flows, outward foreign direct investment flows, inward portfolio 
flows, outward portfolio flows, ‘other investment’ flows (both outward and inward) 
and reserve flows. Before the capital accounts liberalisation of the mid-1980s, these 
flows had been rather low and constant. The sequel to the extensive financial 
liberalisation, were dramatic changes in the volumes and directions of flows. For 
example, inward FDIs and outward FDIs which on average, were rather negligible 
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and constant until about 1980, underwent dramatic increases until about 1990. These 
increases in the 1980s were however very modest by the standards of the 1990s. The 
upward spikes following the beginning of the 1990s were unprecedented and wound 
up in a crash between 2005 and 2007 before spiking up again.  
 
The flows of FDI have experienced some diversities across the advanced capitalist 
economies. For Australia, inward FDIs trended upward throughout the sample 
period, while outward FDIs declined continuously, after 2008. Furthermore, in 
Australia, inward FDI flows were consistently higher than outward FDI flows. For 
the other countries in the sample, FDI flows from the 1970s until the early 1990s 
were similar to Australia’s in that, after dramatic spikes post-1990, there were no 
downward trends until 2008. In Austria, outward FDI flows overtook inward FDI 
flows after 2000. In Canada, the rising series of outward FDI flows was higher than 
that of inward FDI flows. In summary, the statistics indicate that for all the advanced 
capitalist economies for which data are available, inward and outward FDI flows 
spiked after capital account liberalisation. For the following group of countries, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US, although 
both saw dramatic increases after capital account liberalisation, outward FDI flows 
trended higher than inward FDI flows.  
 
In Luxembourg, both inward and outward FDIs were virtually non-existent, until 
about 2000. In Switzerland, outward and inward FDIs were virtually nil, until 1982. 
In Iceland, Ireland and Greece, outward FDI flows were virtually nil, until 1983, 
1985, and 1986 respectively. In Belgium, Greece, New Zealand and Portugal,  
inward FDI flows were both upward trending and higher  than outward FDI flows.  
Out of the 23 industrialised capitalist economies for which data are available, the 
foregoing statistics indicate that 19 (83%) have outward FDIs higher both in trends 
and values than inward FDI flows. Because capital flows could enhance firms’ profit 
rates, the spikes in outward FDI flows suggest the high conviction of capitalist firms 
that undertaking such outward flows of direct investments as enabled by 
liberalisation, would increase their profit rates or their returns on capital employed. 
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Figure 5.1 presents the FDI flows in values, averaged across the 23 advanced 
economies in the sample. It is apparent that from 1970 until about 1984, the flows 
were rather insignificant. The average across the sample countries, of inward FDI 
flows was $US448 million in 1970 and $US1.7 billion in 1984. After 1985, the 
average values of inward FDI flows increased rapidly, peaking at $US50.8 billion in 
2007 before crashing during the global financial crisis. Similarly, outward FDI flows 
were rather insignificant from 1970 till 1984. The average values were 
$US881million in 1970 and $US2.6 billion in 1984. However, the average values of 
outward FDI flows, increased rapidly from $US3billion in 1985 to a peak of $US80 
billion in 2007 and crashed after then, due to the global financial crisis. Throughout 
the sample period, average values of outward FDI flows were distinctly higher than 
average values of inward FDI flows, just as the former was lagged by the latter.   
Figure 5.1: FDI Flows – Averaged Across Countries 
 
(Source: author computed from data in databases. Vertical axis is in US at current prices) 
 
Figure 5.2 presents FDI flows but in comparison to GDP. Once again, the average 
values across the advanced capitalist countries were not only relatively insignificant 
but were more or less the same until about 1984, particularly for inward FDI flows 
as percentages of GDP, with average values of 0.4% in 1970 and 0.45% in 1984. 
Average values of  inward FDIs as a proportion of GDP increased significantly only 
from about 1986 from 0.6%, to a peak of 4.5% in 2000 and fell in consecutive years 
to 1.1% in 2003. These averaged inward FDIs, increased after 2003 to 3% in 2007 
and declined continuously for the rest of the sample period, until 2014. Average 
values of outward FDI flows as proportions of GDP, declined slightly from 0.8% in 
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continuously to 1.6% in 2003, before rising to a peak of 4.7% in 2007 and declined 
over the subsequent years, until 2014. 
  
Figure 5.2: Ratio of FDI Flows to GDP – Averaged Across Countries 
 
(Source: author computed from data in databases) 
                   
By comparison, average outward FDI  flows both in value and as a proportion of 
GDP, were largely higher than inward FDI flows in corresponding measures.  
 
Portfolio flows considerably dominated FDI flows. A tendency with portfolio flows 
is for inflows to the industrialised nations to dominate portfolio outflows. In the case 
of Australia, by the mid-1980s, portfolio inflows were already spiking and trending 
higher than portfolio outflows. Portfolio flows into Austria also dominated portfolio 
outflows, and as in Australia, both inflows and outflows peaked at about 2007 and 
then crashed dramatically. A visual inspection of the series of inward and outward 
portfolio flows in all the sample countries, reveals some standard features. First, 
they all commenced  dramatic upward trends from the mid-1980s (about 1985/86) 
(except for Canada, where inflows started upward trend in the late 1970s).  Second, 
before the mid-1980s, these flows were negligible and constant. Third, these series 
declined steeply in around 2007. For some countries, these series resumed dramatic 
upward trends shortly after 2007, while in some other, the series' upward trend post-
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The synchronism in the timing of the upward spiking of the series suggests 
synchronism in the removal of the restrictions on the capital accounts of these 
economies. It also suggests similarity in the motives of the owners of these funds.  
While virtually all the countries witnessed spikes in portfolio inflows, which 
dominated outflows, there are some exceptions. The countries where inward 
portfolio flows dominated outward portfolio flows, include: Canada, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and 
the US. On the other hand, countries that had portfolio outflows dominating 
portfolio inflows include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway,  Sweden and, Switzerland.  
 
To facilitate a better projection of the flows of portfolios, Figure 5.3 below presents 
the values of portfolio flows, averaged across the 23 advanced capitalist economies 
in the sample. From 1970 to 1984, the figure suggests that portfolios inward were 
relatively insignificant. The average range was from $US541million in 1970 to 
$US3.3 billion in 1984. Following liberalisation in the mid-1980s, the series rose 
from its average 1984 value gradually at first, and then more rapidly in the early 
1990s to an average peak of $US154 billion in 2007 before crashing in the global 
financial crisis. The pattern of outward portfolio flows was identical to that of 
incoming portfolio flows, except that in terms of value, inward portfolio flows 
surpassed outward portfolio flows, while outward flows led inward flows. The 
average outward flows ranged from just $US272 million in 1970 to $US3.6 billion 
in 1984, then rose gradually at first, and then more rapidly in the early 1990s, to an 
average peak of $US122 billion in 2005, before crashing.                
Figure 5.3: Average Portfolio Flows 
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Figure 5.4 presents average values of portfolio flows relative to nominal GDP. From 
a modest 0.3% of GDP in 1974, average inward portfolio flows as proportions of 
GDP rose very gradually to 0.8% in 1984.  The average series rose more rapidly to a 
peak of 9.1% in 2007, before crashing during the financial crisis, to 2.9% the 
following year. Once again, the values of the ratio of inward portfolio flows to GDP 
surpassed those of outward portfolio flows in the corresponding measure, but with 
the latter leading the former.  
 
Figure 5.4: Average Portfolio Flows to GDP Ratio 
 
 ( Source: author computed) 
In Figure 5.4, the average outward portfolio flows as a percentage of GDP, rose 
slowly from 0.05% in 1974 to 0.9% in 1984. The average series continued its ascent 
more rapidly to a peak of 7.5% in 2005, and then crashed even before the onset of 
the global financial crisis, to a negative 0.5% in 2008. In terms of values, foreign 
direct investment flows were lower than portfolio flows. Similarly, the ratios of the 
sum of portfolio inflows and portfolio outflows to GDP dominated the ratios of the 
sum of inward foreign direct investments and outward foreign direct investments to 
GDP, averaged across the advanced capitalist economies in the sample period. 
 
The liberalisations of the 1980s also brought dramatic changes in the flows of other 
investments, both into and out of the industrialised capitalist nations. From 1970 to 
1979, both outflows and inflows were virtually negligible, according to a visual 
inspection of these series. There were, however, dramatic increases in inflows just 
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upward spikes in both series, with inflows rising from average values of US$14.8bn 
to US$62bn in 2008 and outflows from average values of US$5.8bn to US$57bn 
over the same period. By 2010, inflows had crashed to a negative average value of 
US$30bn and outflows to an average positive value of US$10bn. Both series spiked 
again, with outflows dominating inflows. Australia had about the same values of 
outflows and inflows until 1982, when there were slight increases in both series, 
with the series then remaining horizontal until 1998. Inflows increased from 
US$1.4bn in 1998 to US$51bn in 2006 and immediately crashed to a negative value 
of US$36bn in 2009.  
 
Over the same period, Australian outflows of other investments rose from US$6.9b 
to US$68bn, and then to a negative US$37bn. Both spiked again to US$20bn for 
inflows and US$33bn for outflows, before another dramatic crash. Over the period 
of the series, outflows dominated inflows, while there were dramatic falls on three 
occasions (2000, 2006, 2011).  The flows suggest that whatever were the benefits 
motivating these flows, Australia must have accommodated more of such benefits 
than did Austria. Canada was an apparent exception, as there were signs of 
significant increases in outflows and inflows as early as the late 1970s, with inflows 
of other investments reaching US$24bn in 1982 before, on average, descending 
gradually to US$6.7bn in 1993. Inflows rose after 1993 to a peak of US$60.3bn in 
2007, then fell and peaked again at nearly US$60bn in 2012 before undergoing 
another dramatic fall. Although outflows of other investments in Canada had a 
markedly similar pattern to the inflows, the latter peaked higher than the former, 
while the former apparently led the latter. Overall, inflows dominated outflows in 
terms of share size. 
  
For ease of analysis, we classify the rest of the 23 countries into two categories of 
net aggregate flows. Countries with apparent net total outflows from visual 
inspection of the series are: Belgium(2008-US$407bn, 2009-(-US$200bn)); 
Germany (2007-USD$453bn, 2013-(-US$246bn)); Japan (2007 – US$49bn, 1999-(-
US$270bn)); Luxembourg (2012–US$394bn, 2009–(-US$70bn)); Netherlands 
(2007 –US$275bn, 2009–(-US$140bn)). Countries with net total inflows include: 
Denmark (2008-US$57bn, 2009-(-US$21bn)); Finland (2011-US$118bn, 2013-(-
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US$36bn)); France (2007-US$483bn, 2009-(-US$222bn));  Greece (2012- 
US$109bn, 2013-(-US$26.1bn)); Ireland (2007-US$236bn, 2009–(-US$110bn)); 
Iceland (2007-  US$34bn, 2012–(-US$3.7bn)); Italy (2011-US$117bn, 2013-(-
US$62bn)); New Zealand (2006 - US$10.8bn, 2012–(-US$6.6bn)); Norway (2006 – 
US$79bn, 2009 –(-US$97.2bn)); Portugal (2010–US$34bn, 2013–(-US$19.2bn)); 
Spain (2008 – US$186bn, 2013–(-US$186bn)); Sweden (2008–US$41.2bn, 2009–(-
US$54bn)); Switzerland (2007–US$295bn, 2009–(-US$37bn)); the UK (2007– 
US$1.44tn, 2009–(-US$1.4tn)); and the US (2007 – US$700bn, 2013–(-
US$363bn)).  
 
For the countries with net outflows, figures in parenthesis indicate the years and 
values of global peaks, as well as years and values of global troughs of outflows in 
that order. For countries with net inflows, the figures relate to inflows 
correspondingly.  Finland and the UK have been shown to be two of the least 
volatile countries in other investments flows. From the foregoing statistics, Australia 
and 14 other countries, representing 65% of the sample countries, have net inflows 
of other investments during the sample period. Austria, Belgium, Canada and five 
other countries, representing 35% of the sample countries, have net outflows of 
other investments. Taking into cognisance that the majority of the countries in the 
sample are EEA countries, with identical levels of de jure capital accounts 
liberalisation, it could be inferred that a similar extent of de jure capital account 
liberalisation, led to divergent patterns of capital account flows. Once polices have 
been enacted, corporate objectives influence the patterns of flows at national levels. 
 
To facilitate a clearer overall picture of the flows of other investments across the 
advanced capitalist economies, the values of other investments flows, averaged 
across these countries, are presented as a series, in Figure 5.5. It can be seen from 
the figure that both inflows and outflows were relatively insignificant from the 
1970s until the early 1990s. The average values of other investment inflows were 
about US$1.5bn in 1970 and US$1.6 bn in 1991. Average inflows rose gradually to 
US$52bn in 1998, and thereafter, rose very rapidly to a peak of US$208bn in 2007 
before crashing to a negative US$60bn in 2008, and a negative US$76bn in 2009, 
following the global financial crisis. The average values of other investments 
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outflows were US$1.7billion in 1970 and US$562 million in 1991, rising gradually 
to US$52billion in 1998. The average values of other investments outflows 
continued more rapidly to a peak of US$219billion in 2007 and crashed to a 
negative US$51billion in 2008 and a negative US$87billion in 2009. Both variables 
were virtually the same in values, that the net values for each period would be 
approximately negligible. 
 
Figure 5.5:Average Flows of Other Investments 
 
   (Source: author computed) 
 
Figure 5.6 presents the values of other investments as proportions of GDP, averaged 
across the sample countries. From 1970 to 1991, the average values were 2.5% for 
inward flows and 2.2% for outward flows. From 1991, inflows rose to an average 
peak of 12.3% in 2007, before falling to negative average values in 2008 and 2009. 
Outward other investments flows as proportions of GDP, on the other hand, rose 
from 1991 to an average peak of 12.9% in 2007 before assuming negative average 
values in 2008 and 2009. 
 





















































































































Other Investments Flows: As Percentage of GDP
Other Investments (Inward)/GDP Other Investments (Outward)/GDP
- 93 - 
    (Source: author computed) 
Reserve flows represent inflows of funds from foreign central banks usually from 
emerging economies, in the acquisition of foreign exchanges and short-term 
financial assets in the advanced capitalist economies. In similar analyses, the 
average values across the advanced capitalist economies are presented in Figure 5.7 
below. The figure indicates that the average value of reserves across the advanced 
economies remained more or less the same from 1970 till the early 1980s. The 
average series commenced its apparent upward trend in about 1981 with plenty of 
fluctuations, peaking at $US11.1bn in 2010. Figure 5.8 presents the average ratios of 
reserves to nominal GDP of the advanced economies. This series, averaged across 
the sample of 23 countries, was declining in the 1970s and trending upward in the 
subsequent years till 2010.     
 
Figure 5.7 Average Reserves 
 
(Source: author computed) 
 
Figure 5.8: Reserve to GDP Ratio 
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The foregoing notwithstanding, there have been some structural changes regarding 
the ratios of the components of inflows/outflows to aggregate inflows/outflows. In 
Australia, portfolios inward, as proportions of total inflows, increased on the average 
over the length of the series after liberalisation. Australian inward FDI flows and 
other investments inflows as proportions of total inflows, trended downward, with 
other investments trending downward at higher rates than inward FDIs. However, 
for total outflows, outward FDIs as percentages of total outflows trended upward, 
while outward portfolios as percentages of total outflows trended downward, with 
the proportions of other investments outflows, and reserves to total outflows being 
more or less constant.  
 
In Austria, inward FDIs as proportions of total inflows, experienced  progressive 
decreases  after the mid-1980s when capital account liberalisation started to take 
root. Portfolios inward as proportions of total inflows increased continuously at very 
high rates after the liberalisation of capital accounts. The ratios of inward other 
investments to total inward flows decreased progressively after liberalisation. In 
terms of value, inward FDIs, as  percentages of total inward flows, were the least 
compared to the corresponding values of inward portfolios and inward other 
investment. Other investments inflows as proportions of total inflows were much 
higher than the corresponding measure with regards to portfolio inwards before the 
liberalisation, but the trend reversed after liberalisation. Outward FDIs as 
proportions of total outflows increased after liberalisation, as did outward portfolios 
as proportions of total outflows. Other investments flows as ratios of total outflows 
declined significantly  after capital account liberalisation. 
 
 In Canada, in terms of values, inward portfolios as  percentages of total inflows, had 
the highest values. The percentage compositions of these constituents of inflows to 
total inflows have been more or less constant over the sample period. Regarding 
outflows, the values of outward FDIs were the largest among the components of 
outflows. Furthermore, outward FDIs and outward portfolios, as respective 
proportions of total outflows, witnessed dramatic increases after financial 
liberalisation. The ratios of outward ‘other investments’ to total outward flows, 
however, experienced a dramatic downward trend after liberalisation. The ratios of 
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reserves to total outflows remained more or less constant. In terms of  size, outward 
FDIs and outward ‘other investments’ as percentages of total outward flows were 
the largest. Once again, more or less the same de jure financial liberalisation  
induced complex divergence, in the structures of total outflows and total inflows of  
advanced capitalist economies.  
 
5.5 Inferences from the Dramatic Increases in International 
Financial Flows 
What potential information could be gleaned from the statistics presented in this 
chapter? A review of the figures broadly suggests  two sections to each figure: a 
section where flows were more or less relatively insignificant and constant; and a 
section of rising/falling trends and more fluctuations. For all the figures, the first 
part was typical of the 1970s and early 1980s, while the second part was associated 
with subsequent years. With de jure capital account liberalisation, profit-oriented 
capitalist firms had choices that ranged from not undertaking international capital 
flows, to undertaking the maximum flows, depending on the expected profitability. 
Therefore under the axiom of revealed preference, the increases in such flows are  
prima facie evidence that lower flows or no flows were associated with less 
expected profits. Thus where firms are unconstrained, the international flows of 
funds of profit-seeking firms should be increasing, decreasing, or fluctuating over 
time, with expected profits from such flows. Therefore the 1970s with their rather 
unfluctuating flows are consisted with the years of policy constraints on 
international financial flows of private firms, while the later years of rapid rises, 
falls, or fluctuations, suggest fluctuations according to the expected profitability of 
such flows, in the mist of de jure financial openness. 
 
On average across the advanced capitalist economies in our sample, the most 
substantial cumulative flows, were portfolio flows, with inward flows higher than 
outward flows, which at their peaks were more than twice the highest peaks of FDI 
flows. Although other investments flows on the average reached a peak as high as 
12% of GDP, the years of the rapid rise were rather brief relative to portfolio flows, 
thus suggesting according to the principles of revealed preference that the purchases 
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of portfolio assets were more profitable than FDIs and other investments, with such 
tremendous amount of funds acquiring financial assets across international 
boundaries. Among the components of capital account, portfolio flows are most 
associated with speculative flows and speculative price changes. The dominance of 
portfolio flows into advanced capitalist economies after capital account 
liberalisation, therefore, underscores the significance of speculative asset price 
changes in these advanced economies, in the post liberalisation period. Firms were 
able to increase their profits and profit rates substantially by undertaking such 
astronomical flows of FDIs, portfolios and ‘other investments’ flows. 
 
Given the combinations of inward portfolio flows, inward other investments flows,  
were higher than the sums of outward portfolios and other investments flows, these 
combined with a net outward FDI flows and the observation that business real fixed 
capital formation as a proportion of GDP had been declining as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, indicate a scenario where increasing net liquidity inflows were chasing 
increasingly fewer assets. The consequences include increasing capital gains on 
existing assets and the potential of increasing wealth by (speculative) holding of 
more domestic financial assets. These prospects of speculative wealth accumulation 
were prospects that capitalists and their firms would apparently refused to pass up. 
Increasing wealth/profits by capital gains however, made the acquisitions of wealth 
and profits less dependent on labour, probably increasing unemployment and 
undermining the bargaining power of labour. This was a situation that organised 
labour would most probably fight against.  
 
Capital account liberalisation tremendously increased financial markets liquidity and 
financial openness in advanced capitalist economies. Greater financial openness 
produced higher numbers of shareholders of foreign origin. These were rather 
detached from the real business projects or firms associated with these fund flows, 
making the objective of (risk-adjusted) profits the major, if not the sole, aim 
underpinning such flows. Capital account liberalisation also increased the 
proportions of shareholders, who expected the prices and returns of their financial 
assets to maintain some fixed relationship with the financial market (informed 
investors), so that as assets prices in general rose with increased liquidity in the 
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financial markets, they expected the firms’ equities and thus their wealth to rise in 
tandem with the market, according to the ratio of asset risk to total market risk (see 
literature on assets pricing models and CAPM). Higher liquidity from liberalisation 
in turn, increased the market for corporate control that enhanced the ability of 
rentiers/shareholders to more easily force managers to pursue these market 
determined equities prices and returns. The overall result was  the advent of an era, 
when managers were under significant pressure to and constrained to pursue market-
determined prices and returns (see Boyer, 2000). 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we reviewed the history of capital account liberalisation in advanced 
capitalist economies, together with some theoretical propositions. Throughout 
Fordism, the orthodoxy represented de jure – de facto restrictions on capital account 
flows and therefore on financial openness. The theories put forward by proponents 
of capital account liberalisation border on increasing efficiencies in resource 
allocation, with more focus on flows to developing economies, were fixed capital 
investments are supposed to have higher returns, because of the low initial fixed 
capital stocks. Furthermore, the restrictions on fixed capital growth by the high costs 
of investments faced by developing economies would be alleviated, thus increasing 
the rates of investment growth in these emerging economies, just as it increases the 
rates of returns to owners of financial capital.  
 
Capital account liberalisation from the mid-1980s triggered spikes in the flows of 
FDIs, portfolios, other investments, and reserves, across national boundaries, with 
complex divergences among nations. While the theoretical basis underpinning 
liberalisation sounds plausible, there has been significant divergence between the 
results of capital account openness, and predictions of the efficiency of resources 
allocation theories. The massive spikes in the flows of elements of national capital 
account, constitute credible evidence that the benefits/profits expectations of these 
theories have been realised. However, the nature and net direction of the flows 
suggest that the validity of these efficiency (mainstream) theories underpinning 
liberalisation has been at least weakened. Massive increases in, and the 
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preponderance of flows pursuing financial markets assets, particularly in advanced 
capitalist economies, ensured that the net flows of financial capital went to the 
advanced capitalist economies rather than pursuing fixed capital accumulation in 
underdeveloped economies (Lucas Paradox). This paradox highlights the need for 
alternative explanations for capital account flows. 
 
Some of the results of capital account liberalisation were: the increases in asset 
prices; market determined return targets for managers; managers facing pressure to 
pursue such market-determined prices and return targets from capitalists who were 
more willing to seek recourse to the market for corporate control. Because of such 
easy wealth associated with capital account liberalisation, the latter is desirable to 
capitalists, and they would pull political strings to maintain it or to introduce capital 
account liberalisation in the absence thereof. On the other hand, the conflictual 
nature of the interests of capitalists and wage-labour implies that capital account 
liberalisation could be detrimental to the benefits of wage labour, as it reduces 
labour’s bargaining power. Therefore wage-labour would organise, to strive for 
greater capital account restrictions, or maintaining a status quo of capital account 
restrictions. Under these premises, capital accounts policies would be the results of 
dialectical processes.  
 
The operationality of the capital allocation efficiencies in actual capital account 
policies would imply constant and maximum de jure capital account liberalisation. 
On the other hand, the operationality of a dialectal process such as that espoused in 
the conflict theory would tend to result in fluctuations in capital account policies and 
the consequent financial openness. The actual trends of capital account policies and 
the consequent de jure and de facto financial openness, suggest that greater credence 
lies with the dialectical process argument, with underpinning in theories such as the 
Regulation School theory, the political market for protection and, Conflict theory. 
The actual fluctuations in de jure capital account policies have given rise to 
fluctuations in de facto capital account flows and financial openness, with other 
potential consequences. The next two chapters study some of these consequences, 
by undertake empirical investigations of the relationship between trade and financial 
openness and business fixed capital accumulation, in advanced capitalist economies. 
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Chapter 6 : An Empirical Investigation of Trade Openness and 
Non-Residential Fixed Capital Accumulation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that the dramatic increases in trade openness following the trade 
liberalisation of circa 1970 explain the sustained decline in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation across advanced capitalist economies since the early 1970s. But do 
increases in trade openness bring about decreases in business fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies? There does not exist in the 
literature, any explicit theoretical proposition that increases in trade openness cause 
decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist 
economies. Two broadly antithetic positions are, however, implied in the existing 
literature regarding this relationship. On the one hand, we have the suggestion by 
contributions of some French Regulation School scholars that the relationship is a 
negative causality or an inverse relationship. On the other hand, the current 
neoclassical orthodoxy on the relationship between international trade and economic 
growth suggests a positive (causal) relationship between the two variables, in 
advanced capitalist economies. It is the primary objective of this chapter to answer 
this question, by rigorously investigating the relationship between business fixed 
capital accumulation and trade openness in advanced capitalist economies. The 
chapter then extends the study to the investigation of how this causal relationship 
played-out in the decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation, observed 
across advanced capitalist economies. 
 
 This chapter is structured as follows:  Section 6.2 presents a review of some 
fundamental mainstream trade theories and their implications for capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. Section 6.3 examines the political 
economy based Régulation School implied perspective on the relationship between 
trade and fixed capital accumulation. Section 6.4 presents the theoretical analysis. 
Section 6.5 derives the model of interest. Section 6.6 discusses the variables as well 
as the sample countries and data. Section 6.7 presents some empirical evidence, 
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including the methodology employed and estimates. Section 6.8 presents the 
empirical analysis of the estimates. Section 6.9 presents comparison of findings with 
the literature. Section 6.10 summarises  the chapter. 
6.2 Mainstream Theories of Trade and Fixed Capital Accumulation 
The thrust of mainstream trade theories is that greater international economic 
openness increases the rate of growth of output at the national level. These theories 
also imply that greater trade openness would increase the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation, in advanced capitalist countries. The Smithian absolute advantage and 
Ricardian comparative advantage theories of trade assume that labour is the only 
factor of production. These theories predict the flows of capital-intensive goods 
from capital-rich advanced capitalist economies to capital-poor less advanced 
economies, if trade takes place. This direction of trade flows would happen because 
capital rich countries would specialise in the production and exportation of capital-
intensive goods. The abundance of labour skilled in the production of capital goods 
in advanced capitalist countries, enhance their abilities to produce fixed capital 
goods that aid in the production of capital-intensive goods, which are then traded 
with countries deficient in labour skilled in capital goods production. From the 
foregoing theories, therefore, increases in trade should trigger higher rates of 
business fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalists economies. A positive 
relationship between trade or trade openness and business fixed capital accumulation 
in advanced capitalist economies is thus implied. 
  
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, two factors of production labour and capital as well 
as two sectors are assumed, with both factors mobile between the two sectors. Trade 
among countries is caused by differences in relative factor endowments. The model 
postulates that countries which are rich in fixed capital would have comparative 
advantages in capital-intensive goods, while countries that are labour-rich would 
have comparative advantages in labour-intensive goods, with these comparative 
advantages determining the direction of flows of trade.  Therefore the advanced 
capitalist economies with large stocks of fixed capital relative to labour would 
export capital-intensive goods. Assuming a fixed technical-output coefficient, 
increases in trade openness as witnessed following the extensive liberalisation of 
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trade in the early 1970s would bring about higher rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, as the theorised specialisation of advanced capitalist economies in 
capital-intensive goods increases the production of such outputs and their flows to 
less developed economies. 
 
According to the Specific factor Model of trade, there are three factors of production 
and two sectors. Two of the factors (with at least one being capital) are each 
exclusively specific to a sector and therefore immobile. Labour is, however, mobile 
between the sectors. The technical assumptions are that there are constant returns to 
scale and  diminishing marginal productivity of a factor. For a country with a higher 
fixed capital stock, trade would bias production in favour of the sector to which that 
capital is specific. The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that if the 
volume of export causes output to double, the scale of production would double and 
so will be fixed capital stock. Even more significant for rates of fixed capital 
accumulation is the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity. If factory 
sizes expand at rates lower than a multiple of their respective scales of production, 
then diminishing marginal productivity of fixed capital sets in. The diminishing 
returns imply that as trade and output increase, the ratio of fixed capital to output 
increases because of fixed capital inefficiency. The increasing ratio, therefore, 
implies that the rate of fixed capital accumulation would tend to be higher than the 
rate of growth of output, as trade increases. Either way, the theory predicts a positive 
(causal) relationship between trade openness and the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation. 
 
Another trade theory that has similar implications for trade openness and capital 
accumulation relationship, is the “imitation-gap theory of trade”. Under this 
argument, trade develops because of some lags in imitation and demand (see Posner, 
1961). When a novel technology for a new or existing good is introduced in a 
country, A, a time lag arises before an adoption of the same technology in another 
country B (the imitation lag). Similarly, a time lag exists between the development 
of a new good in a country, A, and the demand for it in another country, B (the 
demand lag). Under this argument, even situations that would not typically induce 
trade in the absolute and comparative advantages models, nor even in the 
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Heckscher-Olin model such as countries of similar tastes and factor endowment, 
would do so under the imitation-gap theory. Trade is a function of the net effect of 
these gaps. When the demand gap outlives the imitation gap, producers in country B 
master the new technology, but the domestic demand lag implies that local imitation 
is unjustified. When the demand gap elapses, local producers would implement the 
new technology in production and satisfy the new demand. When the imitation lag 
outlives the demand lag, trade would take place, as foreign producers in country A 
would rise to fulfil the new foreign demand. This technological gap is a continuous 
process that underpins continuous trade and the pattern thereof. When trade takes 
place, the increase in output is expected to increase the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation in the country that originates the new technology/product, to facilitate 
the production of output to satisfy both the domestic demand and foreign demand. 
Once again, a positive causality from trade and trade openness to fixed capital 
accumulation is predicted. 
 
The Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin Model argues that intra-industry trade is explained by 
product differentiations associated with different factor endowments across 
countries, such that  countries which are rich in capital, export varieties/brands that 
embody a higher amount of their respective capital endowments, while countries 
less rich in capital produce and export varieties/brands that embody a lower amount 
of capital (see Falvey, 1981; Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987). Once again, the 
prediction is that advanced capitalist economies, ordinarily very rich in fixed capital, 
would export varieties of capital-intensive outputs and by implication, accumulate 
fixed capital at higher rates as trade increases, to facilitate the higher production 
needed to meet increases in exports. An alternative rendition is that increases in 
trade in capital-rich advanced capitalist economies imply ex hypothesi, the export of 
outputs embodying greater amounts of capital and therefore have higher rates of 
fixed capital accumulation.  
 
Models of intra-industry trade that fall under Neo-Chamberlinian Models, maintain 
the prediction that capital-intensive countries will specialise in capital-intensive 
varieties, and then trade these varieties with other nations. Therefore, as trade 
increases, so should the rate of fixed capital accumulation in these capital-rich 
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economies (see Krugman, 1979, 1992; Venables, 1984; Lawrence and Spiller, 
1986). Furthermore, variants of models grouped under  broad Neo-Hotelling models, 
theoretically imply that trade would increase the output of capital-intensive goods, 
particularly manufacturing, and by implication fixed capital accumulation in capital-
rich advanced capitalist economies (see Lancaster, 1980). 
 
Rybczynski theorem postulates that under the condition of full employment, an 
increase in factor endowments in a country, would increase the output of goods that 
are intensive in that factor, but cause a reduction in the output of goods that are not 
intensive in that factor (see Rybczynski, 1955). Increases in factor endowments 
become the push factors that generate trade, while increases in trade imply increases 
in factor endowments. In the context of fixed capital-rich advanced capitalist 
economies, increases in trade, therefore, imply increases in the underlying fixed 
capital endowments, or higher fixed capital accumulation. Thus we see that for 
virtually all mainstream trade theories, an implication is that increases in trade 
openness will cause increases in rates of fixed capital accumulation in  advanced 
capitalist economies. Therefore, rapid increases in foreign trade following trade 
liberalisation after circa 1970 should bring about commensurate rapid fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. But the observed trends have been 
the co-extensiveness of  progressive increases in trade openness and declining rates 
of fixed capital accumulation in normally capital-rich advanced capitalist 
economies. 
 
At least three lines of empirical evidence highlight some weaknesses in the 
understanding that increased trade openness will increase the rate of business fixed 
capital accumulation. The first is the observation  that the years of Fordism were 
years when trade openness attained  historically low levels, while business fixed 
capital attained unprecedented growth rates. The second is the observation that 
during the years after Fordism, when trade levels and relative to GDP assumed 
dramatic upward trends, business fixed capital accumulation trended downward in 
advanced capitalist economies. The third is the Leontief paradox (although the focus 
was on the USA). The Leontief paradox effectively suggests that the prediction of a 
positive causal relationship between trade openness and fixed capital accumulation 
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in advanced capitalist economies by classical/neoclassical trade theories is 
potentially incorrect. Leontief compared the factor intensity of US imports and 
exports, with the expectation that for the most abundantly endowed country in the 
world in terms of fixed capital, exports would be more capital intensive (as implied 
by mainstream trade theories). While Leontief was unable to determine conclusively 
whether imports to the US were labour intensive or capital intensive, he however 
determined the consequences for labour and capital used, of increasing import 
substitutes by $1million and compensatively decreasing exports by the same 
amount. Leontief found that both more capital and labour were needed to increase 
import-competing goods by $1million than to increase exports by $1million or that 
decreasing exports by $1million released less capital than required to produce the 
equivalent value of import-competing goods (Södersten and Reed, 1994, p.104).  
 
The implication of the Leontief paradox should be obvious. Production for home 
consumption when there is no trade employs more capital than labour, while 
production for exports when there is trade decreases the rate of use of capital relative 
to either itself or the use of labour (i.e. the tendency of trade towards labour into 
capital substitution and the tendency of closeness towards capital into labour 
substitution). This observation is the opposite of mainstream expectation and hence 
the paradox. If this Leontief paradox is generalised, then the reality becomes that 
increases in trade openness is associated with decreases in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, but increases in the ratio of labour to fixed capital in production. 
 
6.3 The Political Economy Approach: Insights from Changes in  
Institutions and History 
In contrast to the mainstream approach is the institutional and historical based 
argument of the political economy approach, which identifies the underlying 
processes of capitalist production and capital accumulation as power configurations 
and struggles among the classes of capitalism, with fundamentally conflicting class 
interests. There exist fundamental conflicts between the aspirations of wage-labour 
and the imperatives of profit generation for the capitalist class. The perceptions of 
the capitalists class include the primacy of profits, the necessity of the subjugation of 
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labour as well as the subordination of the aspirations of labour, for the imperative of 
higher profitability of capital. For more effective control of labour to the end of  
higher profit rates, capitalists tend to establish facilitating social reorganisation of 
labour. A social reorganisation (through decomposition and reconstitution) of the 
labour process that tends to reduce labour to a cog in the wheel of industrial 
production and facilitate a less hindered redistribution of value added or income to 
capitalists as higher profits.  
 
However, if the reorganisation and capitalists efforts in general are perceived by 
wage-earning labourers to be threat to the realisation of their aspirations, they 
display intransigent tendencies to capitalists’ demands and this state of affairs 
generate fundamentally permanent labour-capitalists struggles. The aspirations of 
wage labour include rising real wages, employment security, some desirable health, 
welfare and social security standards. But the realisation of these aspirations may 
reduce rates of returns to capitalists. The resistance of capitalists by labour in pursuit 
of labour's aspirations may be on an individual basis, or collectively through trade 
unionism. But the struggles may spill out of the production scene into broader 
political activism, with the emergence of class affiliated/sympathetic political parties 
(Clarke, 1990).  
 
Where labour could potentially wield enough power to press for the enhancement of 
its aspirations and economic benefits, either because of the scarcity of labour or the 
possession of vital skills that consequently increase costs and inconvenience to  the 
extent of threatening profitability, capitalists seek to break this power. Capitalists do 
this by trivialising the roles of individual labour through deskilling, making the 
contributions and relevance of individual labourer or group of labourers dependent 
on the contributions and relevance of every other individual or group of individuals, 
a process in which increased mechanisation of production has played enormous 
roles (Clarke, 1990). Capitalists may decompose skilful tasks into constituents and 
develop machines so that production could be less dependent on skills possession. 
Moreover, (Romer, 1987, p.166) has argued that as the cost/inconvenience of labour 
increases, there is the tendency to substitute capital for labour and vice versa. 
However, where it is cheaper to buy rather than produce, capitalists may opt to buy 
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wherever possible, including by importation (Boyer, 2013). Another contradiction in 
capitalist production is that the penetration of capital into production and 
commodification of labour (because of the transition from production by peasant 
and artisanal production), requires the availability of adequate market/demand for its 
outputs (Clarke, 1990).  
 
Such market/demand depends on wages. If wages are suppressed, demand may be 
adversely affected. However, if free trade exists, capitalists/firms will have access to 
external markets and rely less on labour buying power. Capitalists could 
consequently dictate lower growth rates of wages. Furthermore, capitalists/firms 
could earn more profit from imports rather than domestic production or could source 
exports by importing, if it is cheaper than production, all of which put the capitalists 
class in a dominant position over labour. The lack of bargaining power means wage 
labour has less power to influence corporate policies and strategies or to constrain 
capitalists in the ways that capitalists could generate profits. Therefore free trade 
may engender falling growth rates of wages and thus falling wage-costs, but may 
engender higher profits rates. 
 
The dominance of capitalists over wage-labour facilitated by increases in trade 
openness has implications for the rate of accumulation of business fixed capital, as 
such increases offer new ways to increase profits, that are less dependent on fixed 
capital accumulation. The possibilities of higher imports instead of domestic 
production imply less need for greater fixed capital accumulation. Increases in 
imports cause the atrophy of import-competing industries, together with capital 
accumulation in those industries, in ways not adequately compensated for by the 
expansion of exports industries. The increasing reliance on exportation introduces 
stiff international competition that increases the business risk associated with higher 
fixed capital accumulation. As argued by Clarke (1990), increases in competition 
may induce capitalist firms to reconfigure production runs and methods away from 
higher fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Greater competition from trade openness triggers competitiveness on prices and 
costs of production. The weak position of wage-labour implies that capitalists could 
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offer internationally competitive prices by revising down real wages or suppressing 
the growth rate of real wages. The increase in risk associated with greater capital 
accumulation because of higher competition, the relative cheapness of labour and 
the flexibility of real wages increase the cost of fixed capital relative to the real unit 
cost of labour or real wage. Under these conditions, profit-oriented capitalists or 
capitalist firms may increase profits by adopting methods of production that have  
higher biases towards labour intensity (see Koutsoyiannis, 1979), if local 
productions rather than importations are to be undertaken. The foregoing is 
consistent with the argument that trade openness reduces growth rates of real wages 
and aggregate demand, which in turn reduce both growth rates of production  and 
the need for greater fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Empirical evidence exists to support the argument that increases in real wages cause 
increases not only in productivity, but also economic growth and rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, while decline in growth rates of real wages has been 
associated with decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation. The “Five Dollar 
Day” covert profit sharing in the form of higher wages by Henry Ford in 1914 
effectively reduced workers’ absenteeism, increased capital accumulation and 
productivity so significantly that despite a twofold increase in wages and a fall in 
working hours, production costs actually fell (Clarke, 1990). There were also 
decades of Fordism, when rapid growth in real wages coexisted with rapid rates of 
capital accumulation. 
 
Empirical evidence also abounds in support of the claim that when the real cost of 
labour or inconvenience caused by wage-labour falls relative to the cost of capital, 
profit-oriented capitalist firms, increase the ratio of wage labour to fixed capital 
(substitute wage-labour for fixed capital), given a volume of output. When the costs 
of labour or inconvenience of wage-labour increases (as labours bargaining power 
increases) relative to capital cost, profit-oriented capitalist firms increase the ratio of 
fixed capital to wage labour (substitute capital for labour). However, greater trade 
openness reduces wage-labour bargaining power and growth rates of real wages or 
real unit costs of labour relative to the real cost of fixed capital (Boyer, 2013). 
Therefore, increases in trade and trade openness among other channels tend to 
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reduce the ratio of fixed capital to wage labour ( greater substitution of labour for 
capital) because of falling real wage growth rates or labour cost, relative to fixed 
capital cost. This changes in factor ratio from changes in relative factor costs caused 
by changes in trade and trade openness are consistent with or potentially explain the 
Leontief paradox that for advanced capital-rich economies, the ratio of labour to 
capital content of their export products are higher than those of domestic outputs for 
domestic consumption.  
 
Available data indicate that during the period of Fordism, the tendency was rather, 
increases in capital to labour ratios, while after Fordism, there have been upward 
trends in the substitution of labour for capital (greater labour to capital ratio) across 
the advanced capitalist nations. The series of factors substitution through the years 
for the advanced capitalist economies are easily obtainable on the AMECO 
database. There is a high positive correlation between higher labour to capital ratio 
and greater trade openness (see Table 3.1 of Chapter 3). The foregoing analyses 
indicate that from the perspective of mainstream trade theories, increases in trade 
openness should by implication increase the rates of fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies. However, under the institutional and historical 
perspectives of the Regulation School theory with capitalist productions taking place 
within the framework of power struggles, increases in trade openness should by 
logic and past experience decrease the rates of fixed capital accumulation. 
 
6.4 The Theoretical Analysis 
The theoretical implications of the two sets of antithetical theories regarding trade 
openness and fixed capital accumulation have been seen in the previous section to 
be fundamentally antithetical. A principal channel as implied in the French 
Regulation theory, through which trade openness adversely impact rates of fixed 
capital accumulation is the resultant redistribution of income away from labour and 
consequent decline in both mass demand and consumption. The redistributive effect 
of greater trade openness arose fundamentally from the loss of bargaining power by 
wage-labour, deriving from exposures to international labour competition. In the 
import-competing industries, labour is constrained to accept wages cut that enables 
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prices of its outputs to compete with foreign substitutes; otherwise, the capitalist 
producers could import rather than produce. If firms switch to importation, a 
possible consequence is labour redundancy that cause a loose (flexible) domestic 
labour market. In the export sector, domestic labour has to concede to compromised 
real wage growth rates, for the price of its output to be competitive in foreign 
markets, otherwise, exporters would source exports via cheaper imports. Thus even 
when the export sector faces stiff international competition, exporting 
firms/capitalists could maintain profit by competing on labour cost, as the grim 
prospects of loss of jobs and source of livelihood may make it easier for wage-
labour to accept lower real wage growth. With the resulting looseness/flexibility of 
the domestic labour market, all firms may, potentially, have access to cheaper 
labour, whether directly connected with the foreign market or not.   
 
Wage-labour thus ultimately bears the brunt of greater labour-labour as well as 
greater capital-capital competitions arising from increases in trade openness. 
Because of the need to survive and consume, labour accepts lower wages, and the 
conflictual relationship between capital and wage-labour is resolved or mediated by 
an ensemble of institutions in which greater trade openness is the hegemonic 
institution. With the cost of labour now lower than the cost of capital, a profit 
optimising firm will tend to increase profit by adopting a method of production with  
higher ratio of labour to fixed capital (see Arrow et el., 1961; Hicks 1963; Romer, 
1987; Duarte and Restuccia, 2010). This is the cost-optimising channel. Even though 
greater foreign competition and greater importation could directly reduce the rates of 
fixed capital accumulation by respectively causing firms to shy away from or reduce 
the need for accumulation of fixed capital, they together with increases in exports 
reduce fixed capital accumulation indirectly through profitable factors substitution. 
Since virtually all other channels have the indirect effect through the reduction in 
growth rates of real wages, and lower real wage growth is relevant whether, from the 
demand side perspective or supply-side perspective of cost optimisation, the impacts 
of trade openness on fixed capital accumulation could be modelled through the cost 
optimisation channel. This approach is adopted in the subsection 6.4.1 
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6.4.1 The cost Optimisation channel 
The division of production activities into those of department I and department II 
(See Lipietz and Vale, 1988) is adopted. Department I is involved with the 
production of fixed capital goods that are employed in department II. Department II 
is involved with the production of consumer goods. Assuming no power relations, 
we look at the firm as an economic institution that seeks to maximise profit. Given a 
particular cost constraint, the firm maximises profit by maximising output. 
Alternatively, given a particular output constraint, the firm maximises profits by 
minimising cost. There are two tools of analysis: an isoquant and an isocost. A profit 
oriented firm produces by combining labour and capital produced in departments I 
in department II. An isoquant (curve) is the locus (all sets) of possible combinations 
of capital and labour (production methods) that can efficiently produce a given 
output. An isocost is the locus (all sets) of labour and capital combinations that a 
capitalist firm can procure with a given cost constraint or budget. The objective is to 
maximise the revenue – cost differentials. We then analyse the decision process of 
the firm, when it is institutionally constrained in its ability to reduce the growth of 
real wage or reduce labour employment in a tight labour market such as in Fordism. 
 
 The objective equation is: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝜋 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐶). 
                Or: maximise Profit ( 𝜋) = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑋 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐶) 
                         The isocost line is given as: 𝐶 = 𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿 
       And the slope of the isoquant and isocost are given respectively as: 











 ;      
                   (Isocost)           
𝑤
𝑟
          
                                                    
Where r is the cost of capital, w is the real wage, 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿,𝐾  is the marginal rate of 
substitution of labour for capital, K is the amount of fixed capital employed, and L 
the amount of labour employed. 𝑀𝑃𝐿 is the marginal product of labour, 𝑀𝑃𝐾  is the 
marginal product of capital, X is total units of output. The rule of optimisation 
dictates in this case, that at the point of maximisation, the isocost would be 
tangential to the isoquant, so that the two slopes are equal:  
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Under the context of a cost constraint, we have a given isocost line. The profit 
maximisation point is the point at which the given isocost line is just tangential to 
the highest isoquant possible, in a family of isoquants (output maximisation). 
Similarly, given an isoquant, a profit optimising firm maximises profit at the point 
of tangent between the given isoquant and the lowest possible isocost, in a family of 
isocost lines (cost minimisation). Alternatively, the condition of equilibrium or 
objective optimization states that the rate of substitution of labour for capital is equal 
to the ratio of real wage to the cost of capital (see Koutsoyiannis, 1979) 
                                                    −
𝛿𝐾
𝛿𝐿
  = 
𝑀𝑃𝐿
𝑀𝑃𝐾
  = 
𝑤
𝑟
          
  
The above condition is that the rate of substitution of labour for fixed capital is equal 
to the ratio of the marginal product of labour to the marginal product of fixed capital 
and equal to the ratio of real wage to the cost of capital. When real wage (cost of 
labour) increases, the ratio of real wage to the cost of capital increases. This suggests 
that labour is paid a value larger than its marginal product and breaches the equality 
of the ratio of marginal products and the ratio of factors costs. The firm’s reaction is 
to prevent a fall in profit by reducing the level of labour employment relative to 
capital (i.e. increases the ratio of capital to labour), thus increasing the marginal 
output of labour and increasing the ratio of the marginal product of labour to that of 
capital to maintain the equilibrium condition. When real wage falls relative to the 
cost of capital, to maintain equality of the ratio of real wage to the cost of capital 
with that of the marginal products, more labour is employed relative to capital, 
which reduces the marginal output of labour relative to that of capital. Thus as the 
real wage (cost of labour) decreases relative to the cost of capital, profit maximising 
firms increase the ratio of labour to fixed capital employed. Similarly, as the real 
wage (cost of labour) increases relative to the cost of capital, profit maximising 
firms reduce the ratio of labour to capital employed. 
 
Where capitalists and wage labour are in a power relation, either K, L, or w is 
adjustable or not, depending on the dominant or hegemonic class. R, the cost of 
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capital is assumed to be set by the state (central bank). Where the institutional 
configuration constraints capitalists/firms (labour is the hegemonic class) as in  
Fordism, the ratio of real wages to cost of capital is given and capitalists/firms are 
not able to adjust it. Similarly, firms are not able to adjust the quantity of labour by 
reducing it, since capitalists are powerless ex hypothesi and the labour market is 
extremely (tight) inflexible. Thus both real wage and the level of labour employment 
L are rigid and have an upward bias. From a given equality of the two ratios, an 
increase in real wage, e.g. as a result of collective bargaining or increase in wage by 
the state, the rigidity of the level of labour implies that firms are not able to maintain 
equilibrium by cutting down on labour employment as illustrated earlier. To prevent 
a fall in profit and maintain the equality of the ratio of the marginal output of labour 
to that of the marginal output of capital with the ratio of real wage to the cost of 
capital, the firm would increase the employment of fixed capital, to reduce the 
marginal output of capital and maintain equilibrium and (increase) profit. 
 
When there is an exogenous increase in the level of labour employed, the marginal 
output of labour falls ceteris paribus. However, weaker capitalist firms are not able 
to maintain the equilibrium ratio by reducing real wages or reducing the cost of 
capital. The ratio of the real cost of labour (real wage) to that of capital remains as 
given. To maximise profit, therefore, given the equilibrium conditions, profit 
optimising firms increase rates of fixed capital accumulation, to reduce the marginal 
product of capital. Thus when labour is dominant, increases in real wages or labour 
employment (inputs) bring about increases in rates of fixed capital accumulation in 
departments I and II. During the golden age of post-war Fordism with wages 
indexed to inflation and productivity, trade openness was restricted so that wage 
labourers were more or less the consumers. Wage increases push up total cost and 
prices, as the pricing policy is assumed to be total cost pricing. The strong 
bargaining power of labour prevented firms from downsizing labour. Firms, 
therefore, adjust by increasing fixed capital accumulation to reduce the marginal 
productivity of capital, and thus increasing activities in department I. This can 
explain the virtuous circle between wage increases and fixed capital growth rates as 
well as the creeping inflation documented to be prevalent during the period of 
Fordism (Aglietta, 1978, p.59).  
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With trade openness (assuming no import), capitalists became the hegemonic class. 
They were therefore able to adjust not only capital stocks, but also wages and the 
quantities of labour. They could optimise profits by cutting down on wages. Such 
cutting down reduces the ratio of real wage to the cost of capital. For profit 
maximisation condition to be met, the ratio of the marginal product of labour  to that 
of capital had to fall, and was achievable by increasing the ratio of labour to capital. 
With increases in the possibility of importation, firms could maximise profit even 
further by importing finished products from countries with lower wages and higher 
labour to capital ratio, for domestic sales or re-exporting, if it is cheaper to do so 
than domestic production. Either way, there is greater ratio of labour to fixed capital. 
This is consistent with the Leontief paradox that production for export uses more 
labour relative to capital than local production for home consumption. Therefore 
increases in trade openness should be inversely related to rates of business fixed 
capital accumulation. These could also potentially explain the observed declining 
rates of fixed capital accumulation, the increasing substitution of labour for capital 
over the sample period, and the higher trade openness in advanced capitalist 
economies.   
 
6.5 The Model 
The general case of the Kaleckian profit relation (Kalecki, 1954, p.49) is adopted as 
the starting point for the purpose of deriving a suitable model. In the original model, 
the economy/system is assumed to be opened. There is the state, which undertakes 
expenditure (G) and raises revenue via taxes (T) and borrowing (B). It is assumed 
that exports are in excess of imports. Investment is private investment, and public 
investment is embedded in the public/state spending on goods and services. Gross 
national value added is distributed between wage labour, the capitalists or paid as 
taxes. The general case profit relation is given as: 
                     𝑃 = 𝐼 + 𝐷 + (𝑋 − 𝑀) + 𝐹𝐷 − 𝑆 ……………6.1 
 
Where 𝑃  is net profit, 𝐼  is real investment,  𝐷 is dividend,  (𝑋 − 𝑀) is foreign trade 
balance,  𝐹𝐷 is the fiscal deficit ( G-T) and 𝑆 represents employees’ savings. We 
make the following supplementary assumptions:    
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1)    Households and firms undertake savings. 
2)    Firms finance investments from retained earnings, while budget deficit is  
       financed by the government borrowing from households’ savings.    
3)    Profit-oriented firms undertake exports and imports. 
4)    Firms are rational and may import if it is more profitable to do so,  otherwise,  
       they may produce locally. Firms may export if it is more profitable than selling 
       in domestic markets.  
 
Given assumption 2, fiscal deficit and household savings net out to zero. Given 
assumption 4, the algebraic sign of import (m) becomes positive, as both export and 
import boost profit.  We re-write equation 6.1 and render it dynamic by dividing 
through by capital stock (K) and render it stochastic to obtain equation 6.2 
 








𝐾⁄ + 𝜖  …………….6.2 
 
We simplify the terms containing export (X) and import (M) by adding them; and 
rearranging to make 𝐼 𝐾⁄   the subject of the equation, to obtain equation 6.3 
          






𝐾⁄ − 𝜖      ……….6.3 
 
Furthermore, as capital stock builds-up relative to dividend, the term containing 
dividend would approach zero, so that in the long run, the ratio of dividend to capital 
stock disappears. Assuming this long-run relationship; substituting GDP for capital 
stock (K) in the case of the term containing (X+M) and we have: 
 




𝐺𝐷𝑃)⁄ − ∅ ………….6.4 
 
Equation 6.4 expresses capital accumulation (𝐼 𝐾⁄ ) as a function of the profit rate 
(consistent with the Cambridge model), the ratio of the sum of export and import to 
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GDP { 
(𝑋 + 𝑀)
𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄  } and a stochastic or residual term (∅). However,  the profit 
rate is a function (𝐹) of profit share (ℎ ), capacity utilisation (𝑢 ), and an efficiency 
term (𝑣 ). Where  ℎ = 𝑃 𝑌⁄ ;  𝑢 =
𝑌
𝑌∗⁄   and 𝑣 =
𝑌∗
𝐾⁄ . The foregoings express 
profit share as the ratio of aggregate net profit to aggregate income or value-added, 
capacity utilisation is expressed in terms of the ratio of actual output to potential 
output and efficiency as a ratio of potential output to actual capital stock. Assuming 
that 𝑣  has a fixed part and a stochastic part so that  𝑣 = 𝑌
∗
𝐾∗⁄ + 𝜗, where the first 
term on the right hand side is fixed and the second term is stochastic or residual. 
Assuming an additive relationship between the components of profit rate for 
simplicity, we express equation 6.4 as:              
           𝐼 𝐾⁄ =
𝑌∗
𝐾∗
+ 𝜗 + ℎ + 𝑢 −
(𝑋 + 𝑀)
𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄ + 𝜇 ………6.5 
 
Collecting the stochastic terms and assigning parameters to the non-stochastic terms 
imply that equation 6.5 could be represented as: 
    
       𝐼 𝐾⁄ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑢 − 𝛽3
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡+𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+   ……6.6 
       
                      Where  = (𝜗 + 𝜇)  and  ~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝛿 ) 
 
In equation 6.6,  𝛽0 =
𝑌∗
𝐾∗
 , PS (profit share) = ℎ ,  𝑢 is capacity  
Utilization,  and  
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄   =  
(𝑋 + 𝑀)
𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄  = trade openness.    
Equation 6.6 expresses capital accumulation as a function of profit share, capacity 
utilisation and trade openness, as the deterministic terms. To accommodate some 
theoretical arguments in the literature, we control for relative cost (𝑅𝐶 ), long-term 
interest rate (𝑖) and real unit labour cost (𝐿𝐶 ). The augmented expression of interest 
is, therefore, equation 6.7. 
    𝐼 𝐾⁄ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑢 + 𝛽3𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐶 − 𝛽6
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡+𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+  ……6.7 
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Equation 6.7 implies that the relationship between fixed capital accumulation and 
trade openness is negative in the long run, as the algebraic sign (partial coefficient) 
of the term is negative. This is consistent with our argument and testable hypothesis: 
    





⁄  < 0 
                        





⁄  ≥ 0 
 
Equation 6.7 is similar and comparable to an augmented Bhaduri and Marglin 
(1990) investment growth model, which expresses investment growth as a function 
of profit share and capacity utilisation. To reconcile equation 6.7 to the investment 
model of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), we start from the rendition of the canonical 
Kaleckian investment growth model (Lavoie, 2009) given as: 
                      𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝑎 + 𝑏
𝑢𝑈 + 𝑏𝑟𝑟          ………….6.8 
 
 Where  𝑎 is a constant which may be negative or positive, 𝑈  is current capacity 
utilisation,  𝑟 is current profit rate, 𝑏𝑢 and  𝑏𝑟   are the respective  parameters. 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) were critical of an investment model that renders 
investment growth as a function of profit rate (𝑟 ) because it ignores the constituent 
of profit rate. They argued that such investment function assumes the same 
consequent investment level with a given profit rate, irrespective of the 
contemporary level of capacity utilisation and profit margin. But Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990) are also critical of a model like equation 6.8, in that the mere 
inclusion of a term in capacity utilisation in addition to profit rate is not the solution.  
Assuming a stable/constant marginal cost as well as marginal cost pricing, the price 
relation would be such that price ( 𝑝 ) is a positive function of profit margin ( 𝑛 ) and 
money wage rate (𝑤 ) (assuming constant labour/unit output- ): i.e. 𝑝 = (1 + 𝑛)𝑐𝑤. 
Because profit share (𝑃𝑆 ) per unit of output is the ratio of profit margin to price, 
profit share is a positive function of profit margin (i.e. 
𝛿𝑃𝑆
𝛿𝑛
> 0 ).  
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The foregoing differential suggests a conflict of distribution, as higher profit shares 
imply lower wage shares. A wage rate increase that decreases profit margin and 
profit share necessarily depresses corporate savings (expressed as a fixed proportion 
of profit rate). Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) have however argued that this does not 
necessarily imply that higher wage shares/rates suggest lower investment and capital 
growth rates. The impacts of profit shares on aggregate demand/output depend on 
the effects of lower profit margin/share on investment. A lower impact on 
investment growth as in a stagnationist case (defined as growth despite a lower 
profit-share) implies that a higher profit share (lower wage share/rate) would reduce 
output/activity/capacity utilisation so that the rate of change of capacity utilisation 
with respect to profit share is negative (
𝛿𝑈
𝛿𝑃𝑆
< 0 ).  
 
If however investment responds strongly to profit shares as in an exhilarationist case 
(defined as a case of higher growth as a result of higher profit share), then a higher 
profit margin/share (lower wage rate) would generate a higher investment/output 
rate, to at least compensate the resultant fall in consumption, so that there would still 
be a higher level of activity and a higher capacity utilisation rate. Therefore in the 
exhilarationist case, it is intuitive that as profit shares fall, capitalists would be less 
inclined to invest so that the theoretical functional relationship between profit 
margin/share and investment is positive. However, because the relationship between 
capacity utilisation and investment may be positive or inverse, it is essential that 
profit rate, on its impact on investment growth, be analysed into its components 
rather than in a restrictive relationship  (consistent with the perspective of Bhaduri 
and Marglin, 1990). Therefore in investment growth context, profit rate would be 
analysed into additive components. Profit rate is defined as: 









) = (𝑃𝑆)(𝑈)(∝)     ……….6.9 
 
Where R is total net profit, K is total net capital stock, Y is actual total output, Y* is 
potential (full capacity) output. The ratio of aggregate net profit to aggregate net 
capital stock is profit rate (r ). The ratio of aggregate net profit to actual output is the 
profit share (PS), the ratio of actual aggregate output to full capacity output is the 
capacity utilization (U) (rate). The ratio of full capacity output to capital stock is the 
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full capacity output-capital ratio (∝) and  is assumed as given at least in the short 
run, so that according to Bhaduri and Marglin (1990): 
            𝐼 = 𝐼((𝑃𝑆), 𝑈); 𝑌∗ = 1; 𝛿𝐼 𝛿𝑃𝑆⁄ > 0; and 
𝛿𝐼
𝛿𝑈⁄ ≷ 0  …6.10 
 
Equation 6.10 is the Bhaduri and Marglin investment model (see Bhaduri and 
Marglin, 1990; Lavoie 1992, 2014; Marglin and Bhaduri, 1992). In an additive form 
(consistent with Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) argument that profit share and capacity 
utilisation be treated as independent and separate), equation 6.7 in its first three 
terms is identical to 6.10. Because capitalist predicts the future profitability of 
marginal investment from capacity utilisation, capacity utilisation is an accelerator 
effect. Profit share captures cost reduction or efficiency by the capitalist firm, which 
may reduce costs by trimming down wage shares (see Boyer, 2005, 2013). In 
equation 6.7, provision is made for the capital accumulation reduction effect of 
wage/cost reduction by the capitalist/firm, in that wage is a source of demand. 
Provision is also made for the effect of demand/profit expectations through the 
accelerator term, in capacity utilization. Provisions are also made for long-term 
interest rates as cost of capital, and finally, the relative cost of capital. The 
suggestion of an inverse relationship between the rate of fixed capital accumulation 
and trade openness by the derived model obtained through the analytical 
reconfiguration of the Kaleckian profit model gives further theoretical credence to a 
cardinal  argument of this thesis that there exist an inverse causal relationship that 
runs from trade openness to business fixed capital accumulation.   
 
6.6 The Variables, Sample Countries and Sample Years 
The period of interest is 1970 to 2007, argued to be outside the well-acknowledged 
Fordist regime, we observed data from 1960 till 2014, to facilitate a more vivid 
connection between trade openness and capital accumulation rates in advanced 
capitalist economies. Because we are interested in advanced capitalist economies 
only, we approximate these countries by including countries in the OECD and 
limiting our sample countries to those member countries for which data are 
available. These two criteria yield a sample of twenty three (23) OECD countries of: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
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Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United 
States (US). The particulars of the variables included in equation 6.7 are discussed 
below. 
 
(Fixed) capital accumulation: This describes the growth rate of private non-
residential fixed capital.  Private non-residential fixed capital  is assumed to refer to 
the tangible fixed man-made assets  owned by profit-oriented firms and enable these 
firms to undertake for-profit productive activities for which these firms were 
formed, without these fixed assets being consumed or changing forms in the cause 
of these productive activities.  These fixed capitals include tools, machineries, 
equipment, and housing acquired for the accommodation needs of these productive 
activities. The expression capital accumulation as extensively used in the relevant 
literature is quite ambiguous, as it does not exclusively refer to the net acquisition of 
private non-residential fixed capital. In Marxian rendition, capital accumulation 
often describes the dynamic process of committing some initial funds to some 
commercial activities, intended to create profits or gains, which increases the initial 
wealth or funds invested. The sources of increases in the committed funds or capital 
accumulation may be profits, capital gains, interests, rents and royalties. From this 
perspective, capital accumulation refers to the making or generation of profits/gains.  
 
A second perspective is increasing stocks of private non-residential fixed capital 
(growth in business tangible fixed capital) via net fixed capital acquisitions. Under 
this perspective, sources of capital accumulation may be retained earnings, 
conversion/realisation of initial/existing assets of firms, new fund from existing/new 
owner(s), and corporate debt. Contributions in the debate on capital accumulation 
across all schools of thought often fail to highlight this ambiguity. However, their 
indexations of capital accumulation often betray their conceptualisation of ‘capital 
accumulation’ as referring to the growth of business fixed capital, the second 
perspective. Capital accumulation is often indexed as the difference between 
business fixed capital stocks in a specified later period and a specified initial period, 
expressed as a percentage of the initial fixed capital stock, or indexed as the ratio of  
new fixed capital investment (I) in a given period to the stock of fixed capital at the 
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initial period (K). The latter index or ratio is adopted in this thesis, as it is the most 
popular in the literature. Moreover, observations have indicated that the series of 
both indices of capital accumulation tend to be very similar, if not identical.  
 
The major issue is arguably the actual (monetary) value assigned to fixed capital 
stocks. Depending on the database, fixed capital stocks may be measured in different 
ways. Three methods often used are the perpetual inventory method (PIM), the 
survey method, and balance of fixed assets method. Because the data span different 
countries, measurement types may vary from country to country, in the same 
database. Furthermore, the value of stocks may depend on accounting policies, 
which again vary from country to country. Whether values are in current price or 
fixed price is another issue, just as differences in the base year in case of fixed price 
is also problematic. Reclassification and lack of synchrony in reclassification may 
introduce variations that could affect results. In the light of the foregoing issues, this 
research makes all effort to obtain data on fixed capital stock and fixed capital 
investment from the same data base. Thus the same method of valuation would 
apparently be maintained for capital stock and investment.  Moreover, since capital 
accumulation is a ratio of investment to capital stock, issues in the measurement and 
data common to both variables would tend to cancel out. The source of the data for 
this variables (I and K) is AMECO Online. 
 
Profit Share: Profit share is often indexed as the ratio of a measure of profit to the 
sum of profit and a measure of employee compensation. One issue is that Corporate 
net profit is often contingent on corporate policies, which are variable from time to 
time, from firm to firm and country to country. In this thesis, profit share is indexed 
as the ratio of gross operating surplus to the sum of gross operating surplus and 
employee compensation, both readily available in AMECO online. Some scholars 
have used net operating surplus (van Treeck, 2008). The advantage of gross 
operating profit to net profit is that the former captures all payments to rentiers or 
shareholders, as against net profit that captures the share of income to shareholders 
only. Furthermore, gross operating surplus is affected less by corporate income 
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recognition policies than net (operating) surplus. The ratio of profit to GDP is also 
an alternative index. 
 
Capacity Utilisation: This is conceptualised as the degree of installed capacity 
actually used in production, by a firm or country. The most popular index 
particularly in the empirical Regulation School literature is the ratio of actual output 
to potential output (Bowles et al, 1986, 1989), where potential output is the possible 
output, if all the installed capacity in a firm or country is fully exploited. We adopt 
this index of the ratio of actual to potential output as it is the most popular in the 
Regulation School literature.  Major issues, however, are associated with this index. 
The most problematic is the measurement of potential output. Potential output is 
measured in different ways. The concept of potential output in engineering tends to 
be different to the concept in economics. We can’t observe potential output. 
Consequently, its measurement is often closely associated with capital stock and 
technological state, which may be hampered by the presence of multiple quasi-fixed 
factors and multiple products. There may be errors in measurement of capital stocks.  
 
A consolation is that some flaws may be common to measurements of  potential 
output and actual output measurement. With capacity utilisation being a ratio of 
actual output and potential output, these common flaws may cancel out. The index 
aptly captures the concept of capacity utilisation. Data on potential output and actual 
output are easily available from databases and therefore very feasible. Scholars have 
however used alternative indices for capacity utilisation. These include output gap, 
the rate of growth of business sector output, business sector capital productivity de-
trended. These have often performed badly in estimations, as they have often turned 
out to be frequently insignificant and of wrong expected signs in empirical 
estimations (See Stockhammer, 2004; van Treeck, 2008). We therefore stick to the 
most popular index, and for which data are more readily available. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rates: The measurement of interest rates was also problematic. 
There are different measures of interest rates: long-term, short-term, nominal, real, 
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and, risk-free rates on government bonds/bills. Researchers have used nearly all 
measures, as indices of the cost of capital. We did not find data on real long-term 
interest rates readily available from a single database. We had to compile data for 
this variable from different data sources. The major databases include AMECO 
online and UK data services.  
 
Real Unit Labour Cost: Real unit labour cost is indexed as the ratio of compensation 
per employee to nominal GDP per person employed. The real cost captures all cost 
of labour that would be relevant to capitalists’ decision making, rather than just real 
wage adopted by some researchers. Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) used  Real labour cost 
indexed as average wages and salaries per-head deflated by an investment goods 
price index and by a smoothed index of residual productivity calculated from 
conventional Cobb-Douglas growth accounting, using output, capital stock, 
employment, and the NPS to weight inputs, as the denominator in relative cost. In 
Stockhammer (2004) real labour cost was not controlled for. There is therefore, 
significant variability in measures or indices of real labour cost. However, we are of 
the opinion that our data from AMECO online quite capture the relevant 
components of the cost of labour, that matter in decision making by cost-conscious 
profit maximizing firms.  
 
Relative Cost (of Capital): Indices of relative cost of capital seem to vary among 
researchers. The variable performance of relative cost in past estimates, may sound a 
caveat to which index should be used. For example, Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) 
indexed it as a ratio of the sum of real interest rate and depreciation cost, to real 
wage that is adjusted for residual productivity. The resulting estimates were rather 
absurd both in their sizes and signs. They were too often statistically insignificant. 
Stockhammer (2004) used real interest rates and nominal interest rates as cost of 
capital and the parameter estimates were also insignificant both statistically and in 
size. The case of Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) may involve a numerator that contains a 
highly subject variable, the rate of depreciation. The use of absolute rather than the 
relative cost of fixed capital by Stockhammer (2004) does not adequately reflect the 
cost-comparing practice of profit-oriented firms. We rely on economic theory and, 
control for the absolute cost of capital using real long-term interest rate, control for 
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the real cost of labour using real unit labour cost, and control for the relative cost of 
capital as a ratio of the cost of capital to the real unit cost of labour. The real cost of 
labour captures all actual and imputed costs of using labour, including pension cost, 
but we expect the real unit cost of labour to also strongly positively correlate with 
real wage. The long-term interest rate captures the most objective cost of capital, 
devoid of the influence of subjective corporate policies. The data on real unit labour 
cost were obtained from AMECO online. However data on long term interest rates 
were very challenging to obtain. Consequently, we had to obtain them from sundry 
sources. 
 
Trade Openness: An index of trade openness suggested in Aglietta (1998), is a ratio 
of the sum of total export and total import to GDP. This ratio is also the most 
popular index of trade openness in the literature. This is a de facto measure, in that it 
measures the actual flows of trade openness. There are a few de jure measures of 
trade openness in the literature (Quinn, 1997; Hauner and Prati, 2008). But we prefer 
the de facto index, in that apart from being the most popular index in the literature, it 
lacks the weaknesses of de jure indices. The de factor index as a flow (real-time) 
variable, captures the actual fluctuations in openness as they occurred and also 
captures the level of openness by making reference to GDP. 
 
6.7 Empirical Evidence 
6.7.1 The Data 
Secondary annual data collected mainly from the AMECO and the UK Data Service 
(World Bank Development indicators) databases for the aforementioned twenty-
three advanced capitalist countries that are members of the OECD are used. The 
available data are for the year 1960 to 2014 (55 years). There were cases of missing 
data for some variables, in some of the countries. The most affected were interest 
rates and potential outputs. Unavailable data had to be obtained or missing data 
augmented from alternative databases or estimated by extrapolations.  
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6.7.2 Summary Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 6.1 below presents summary statistics in connection with the variables. Net 
fixed capital formation represents net newly produced non-residential fixed capital 
(net fixed investments) per annum for the respective countries and measured in 
billions of the respective national currency at 2010 price. The mean net capital  
 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics 
    Mean   Standard Deviation. 
Variable       Within   Between   Overall 


































































































































         Relative Cost 0.0725185  0.040055  0.022273  0.0455995 
          (Source: Author computed from sample data) 
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formation for the 23 countries over the period of 55 years is 1108.054 billion (in 
2010 constant price, in local currencies, mostly Euros). The variations are as given 
by the standard deviations and the table indicates that on the average, the dispersions 
or variations in fixed capital formation within  countries over the period of 55 years 
were less than the variations between the sample countries. Similarly for the 
variables, net capital stock, export, import, GDP, gross operating surplus, potential 
and actual GDP, variations between the countries dominated temporal variations 
within the countries on the average, as indicated by the respective “between” and 
“within” standard deviations. Net fixed capital formation and net capital stock are 
measured in identical units. 
 
However, for variables more conventionally associated with investments (long-term 
interest rate and real unit labour cost) within variations were more than the between 
variations, on the average. For trade openness and profit shares, the variations 
between countries were higher than within countries, while for rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, capacity utilisation and relative cost, variations within countries were 
higher than between country variations, on the average. It is noteworthy that rates of 
fixed capital accumulation experienced the least overall variation, while the next 
lowest were profit shares, as we can infer from Table 6.1. To facilitate comparison 
in variations among the variables, a coefficient of variation or relative standard 
deviation (the ratio of standard deviation to mean value) was computed for each 
variable. The coefficients of variation, on the average, are: 0.70, 0.67, 0.629, 0.628, 
0.53, 0.16 and 0.09,  for capacity utilization, trade openness, relative cost, long-term 
interest rate, fixed capital accumulation, profit share and real unit labour cost, 
respectively. Table 6.1 shows that there exist adequate within and between 
variations to facilitate econometric analyses, as it has been observed in some 
empirical literature that low within variations in a  panel data set could reduce the 
accuracy of parameter estimates of explanatory variables. 
 
Table 6.2 below presents a correlation matrix. Although the coefficients are 
relatively low compared to the time series cases presented in earlier chapters, this is 
because the coefficients were computed on the bases of variations within and 
between the panel units (the countries). The table shows that on the average, the 
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highest correlation coefficient of the dependent variable (capital accumulation) is a 
positive 0.43, with real unit labour cost. Its positivity suggests that real unit labour 
costs and rates of fixed capital accumulation tend to move closely in the same 
direction.  From the  perspectives of factor substitution elucidated in the session on 
“the theory” in this chapter, as well as the demand side argument (as argued in 
Boyer 2013, the stagnationist regime of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), and the wage-
led growth of Lavoie (Lavoie, 1995b, 1997, 2003, 2009)) higher real unit labour 
costs (higher wages) are associated with higher rates of fixed capital accumulation. 
The next highest correlation of fixed capital accumulation is about 0.18, with profit 
share. Increases in profit share on the average, tend to be closely associated with 
increases in rates of fixed capital accumulation. The next highest correlation (in 
absolute value) of capital accumulation is with trade openness.  Consistent with the 
central argument of this thesis, the correlation coefficient is negative, implying that 
increases in trade openness tend to be closely associated with decreases in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix – Main Variables 
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        Trade Openness -0.1529  0.0508   0.0832 -0.1259  -0.1512  -0.2801  1 
     
 
         (Source: Author ‘s computed from sample data) 
 
More controversially, the variations between fixed capital accumulation and long-
term interest rate moved in the same direction over the sample period. Interestingly, 
increases in trade openness were associated with decreases in unit real cost of 
labour. The highest correlation coefficient of trade openness, in absolute value, is 
with the real unit cost of labour (including wage), which in turn has the highest 
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correlation coefficient with rates of fixed capital accumulation. Implying that in the 
sample period and countries, dramatic increases in trade openness were most 
associated with decreases in real labour costs or wages, which in turn, were most 
associated with declining rates of fixed capital accumulation (the demand-side 
perspective). One of the highest absolute correlation coefficients in Table 6.2 is the 
inverse correlation coefficient between real labour cost or wage and profit share, 
consistent with the argument that as capitalist firms increase profit shares, it is 
apparently at the expense of  real wages. Therefore, increases in trade openness were 
most associated with decreases in real labour cost (real wages), which in turn were 
most associated with increases in profit share, after decreases in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, in the sample period and countries. 
 
The significant positive correlation between the cost of capital (long-term interest 
rate) and the cost of labour is consistent with a rational profit maximising capitalist 
firm that increases its demand for labour as capital cost becomes higher, causing the 
price/cost of labour to rise. This factor substitution is inverse with changes in 
relative costs. The highest correlation coefficient in Table 6.2 is between long-term 
interest rate and relative cost. The correlation coefficient between capital 
accumulation and capacity utilisation is rather weak and negative. This is 
inconsistent with the argument that higher capacity utilisation tends to signal the 
need for increase in fixed capital accumulation, but consistent with the argument 
that firms are more prone to increasing rates of capacity utilisation to meet higher 
demand, than increasing their capital stocks (see Stockhammer, 2004). 
 
 The correlation coefficient between relative cost and capital accumulation is 
surprisingly positive, but very weak, implying that in the sample period and 
countries, as  the cost of capital relative to real unit labour cost increased, rates of 
fixed capital accumulation increased, but weakly. This is against theoretical 
expectation, as it is expected that the higher are long-term interest rates relative to 
labour cost, the lower should be rates of fixed capital accumulation. On average, 
profit share was positively related to capacity utilisation and relative cost in the 
sample period and countries.  Profit share moved in the same direction as trade 
openness. It has been argued in the Regulation School literature that the increase in 
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trade openness, driven by the desires of capitalists, was meant to increase profit rates 
and profit shares. The inverse relationship between profit shares and wage shares 
implies that increases in trade openness, by positively correlating with profit shares, 
would negatively correlate with wage shares and growth rates of wages, but 
positively correlate with the relative costs of capital. The actual and implied 
correlations among profit shares, wage shares and relative costs, tend to make more 
sense, if labour was being increasingly substituted for more expensive capital, or 
labour was contributing less to profit generation, because of imports and exports, in 
the sample period and countries. Capacity utilisation was inversely correlated with 
long-term interest rate, relative cost, and real unit labour cost, while it was positively 
correlated with trade openness, in the sample period and countries. Long-term 
interest rate correlated negatively with trade openness, in the sample period. 
  
In an extension of the correlation analysis which turns out to be more revealing, 
Table 6.3 below presents correlations coefficients between capital accumulation 
rates and the contemporary as well as the first three lags of the respective 
explanatory variables in the model specification, in sample countries, during the 
sample period. The table shows consistently high positive correlation between 
capital accumulation and real unit labour cost up to at least the third lag of real unit 
labour cost. Capital accumulation persistently exhibited strong negative correlation 
with trade openness, up to the third lag of trade openness. Furthermore, capital 
accumulation rates were positively correlated with long-term interest rates, up to the 
third lag of long-term interest rates. However capital accumulation rates were  
 
Table 6.3: Correlation: Explanatory Variables (3 Lags) with Accumulation 
Capacity  Relative Long term Real Unit Trade 
  Utilization Cost Interest rate labour Cost openness 
-0.0296 0.0668 0.1238 0.4234 -0.1545 
-0.0133 0.0092 0.06 0.3851 -0.1384 
-0.0082 -0.0162 0.0289 0.3576 -0.1229 
0.0015 -0.0303 0.0102 0.3377 -0.1077 
   (Source: Author’s Computed from sample data)  
 
negatively correlated with capacity utilisation up to the second lag, then switched to  
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positive coefficient in the third lag. Fixed capital accumulation was positively 
correlated with relative cost up to the first and second lags of relative cost, but in the 
third and fourth lags, the correlation switched to negative.  
 
Table 6.4 presents an autocorrelation matrix that indicates the presence of high 
persistence up to the 3rd lag, in each of the included variables in the specified model, 
except capacity utilisation. These autocorrelations were positive. The highest 
persistence was displayed by trade openness. A high level of  trade openness in one 
period was followed by similarly high level of trade openness in the next period. For 
example, a unit increase in trade openness  in period 1 was followed on average, by 
0.9603 unit in period two, 0.9205 unit in period 3 and 0.885 unit in period 4. The 
next highest persistence in the sample period was exhibited by profit share. A unit 
increase in profit share in a period was followed on the average, by 0.9555 unit in 
the next period, 0.9061 unit in period 3 and 0.8675 unit in period 4. The high 
persistence displayed by fixed capital accumulation, highlights why in the period 
sequel to Fordism, fixed capital accumulation was persistently trending downward. 
The high autocorrelation associated with these variables may have significant 
implications for serial correlation and therefore be given significant consideration in 
the methods employed in the econometric analyses section. 
 
Table 6.4:Autocorrelation of Main Variables (Up to 3rd Lags) 




Profit  Capacity  Relative Long term Real Unit Trade 
    Accumulation   share Utilization Cost Interest rate Labour Cost Openness 
Lags 














0.9061 0.1294 0.877 0.88 0.8401 0.9205 
3   0.6233   0.8675 0.0775 0.8105 0.8157 0.7694 0.885 
(Source: Author computed from sample data) 
 
In a further insightful correlation analysis, correlation coefficients of a structural 
analysis of trade openness and business fixed capital accumulation are presented in 
Table 6.5 below. Table 6.5 indicates that among the components of commodities 
involved in trade, goods exports and imports had the highest inverse movements 
with fixed capital accumulation, compared to services exports and imports, in the 
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sample period. Moreover, increases in goods exports, more than increases in goods 
imports, were more associated with the decline in fixed capital accumulation. The 
highest correlation coefficient of averagely positive 0.97, was between services 
exports as  percentages of GDP and services imports as  percentages of GDP. 
 
Table 6.5: Structural Correlation Matrix - Trade Openness with Accumulation 
 
  (Source: Author’s computed from sample data) 
 
The average correlation coefficient between services exports as percentages of GDP 
and services exports as percentages of total exports is 0.71. The 0.71 coefficient 
implies that greater services exports were highly positively associated with greater 
proportion of GDP dedicated to the output of services designated for export. Such 
high dedication, in turn, was associated with massive importation of services, as 
collectively suggested by the average correlation coefficient of 0.97 aforementioned, 
the high correlation coefficient of positive 0.75 between services exports as 
proportions of GDP and services imports as proportions of total imports and, the 
high positive correlation coefficient of 0.82 between services imports as proportions 
of total imports and services imports as proportions of GDP. But high services 
exports as proportions of GDP were significantly but moderately correlated with 
goods exports/imports as  percentages of GDP, implying countries experiencing 
greater trade openness in services were more likely to experience increases in trade 
                         Capital         (Services     (Services     (Services   (Services    (Goods       (Goods        (Goods           (Goods 
                     Accumulation     Import)/     Export)/      Import)/    Export)/      Export)/     Import)/      Exports)/        Import)/ 
                                                 Import.     Export.           GDP         GDP.           GDP         GDP            Export.         Import. 
Capital                  1.000 
Accumulation 
Service Import/   -0.121          1.000 
 Total Import.   
Service Export/    0.031          0.535           1.000 
 Total export 
Service Import/    -0.050         0.815           0.611           1.000 
    GDP 
Service Export/   -0.028          0.747           0.705           0.970       1.000 
      GDP 
Goods Export/     -0.265         0.291            0.025           0.471       0.409         1.000 
     GDP 
Goods Import/     -0.175         0.164            0.264           0.479       0.493         0.896         1.000 
        GDP 
Goods Export/     -0.031        -0.535          -1.000          -0.611      -0.705        -0.025       -0.264             1.000  
   Total export 
Goods Import/      0.121         -1.000          -0.535          -0.815     -0.747        -0.291       -0.164              0.535           1.000 
   Total Import 
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openness with respect to goods. But the negative correlation of 1.00 between 
services exports to total exports and goods exports to total exports suggests that 
higher services exports frustrated growths in goods exports. Increases in services 
exports as percentages of GDP were highly inversely (-0.747) associated with goods 
imports as percentages of total imports.  
 
The correlation coefficient of positive 0.896 between goods exports as  percentages 
of GDP and goods imports as percentages of GDP indicates that in the sample 
period, as countries increased the amount of goods exports relative to GDP, they 
tended to increase the amount of goods imported relative to GDP, and by 
implication reduced fixed investments relative to both GDP and fixed capital stocks. 
But goods exports as  percentages of GDP had no significant correlation with goods 
exports as proportions of total exports, as the latter were more associated with 
movements in services exports as proportions of GDP as aforementioned. This 
insignificance suggests that growth in services on the average, apparently drove the 
structural changes in the pattern of trade openness. The inverse correlation between 
services exports/imports as respective percentages of GDP with fixed capital 
accumulation were overwhelmingly far less than those of goods exports/imports as 
percentages of GDP across the sample countries, as suggested by the average 
coefficients. This might be due to the fact that the monetary values of services on the 
average, across advanced capitalist economies, were still far less than those of goods 
and that fixed capital tend to be  more intensively associated with goods production 
than with services production (Ietto-Gillies, 1992). 
 
6.7.3 The Methodology and Econometric Analyses 
The subsequent sections further the study by investigating a causative relationship 
between trade openness and rates of fixed capital accumulation. The econometric 
method of investigation is the panel data method. Panel data have both cross-section 
and time series dimensions. The choice of this technique dwells on the advantages of 
this method. The critical argument/explanatory variable in this chapter is trade 
openness, while the dependent variable is the rate of capital accumulation. Panel 
data method enhances the inferential accuracy of the parameter estimates, relative to 
cross section method, as the former has more sample variability and higher degrees 
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of freedom.  Panel data method could also capture the more complex behaviours of 
cross-sectional units relative to cross section or time series method, because it can 
control for the effects of omitted variables. Omitted variables could significantly 
bias inferences, particularly if they correlate with included explanatory variable(s). 
Panel data method can capture complexities of cross-sectional units, because it can 
uncover dynamic relationships. 
 
Differences between individual panel units could help reduce the collinearity 
between lags and current variables, to facilitate the estimation of unrestricted time-
adjusting pattern and this is important for the included variables that have revealed 
significant persistence such as indicated in table 6.4. Panel data method simplifies 
statistical inferences and computation by enhancing the ability of a researcher to 
effect transformations to reduce measurement errors and help in situations where 
non-stationary time series are being analysed (see Hsiao, 2007). By comparing 
individuals both across intertemporal dimension and cross-sectional dimension, 
panel data method can offer more superior inferences compared to just cross-section 
or time series method (De Wachter and Tzavalis, 2004). These useful properties may 
be invaluable in the estimations. But a significant disadvantage of some panel data 
estimators is that they impose parameter homogeneity on the panel units. Panel data 
method may involve aggregating (MGE and PMGE), pooling (FE and RE) or 
averaging groups and estimating cross-section regression. In static analysis where 
the included explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, and parameters are 
independently and randomly distributed, all four approaches yield consistent and 
unbiased estimates of a coefficient mean. Otherwise, as argued by Pesaran and 
Smith (1995), only the aggregating estimators (MGE and PMGE) are consistent. 
Therefore to minimise misleading inferences arising from estimator biases as much 
as possible, a range of estimators from static estimators, dynamic estimators through 
pooling and aggregating estimators are used, to robustly test our argument.  
 
6.7.3.1 Pre-estimation Data Checks 
Given that the time dimension of each of the series is relatively long, it may be 
interesting to explore the stationarity conditions of the data.  
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6.7.3.1.1 Panel Unit Root Tests. 
The dependent variable is (fixed) capital accumulation, while the argument variable 
is trade openness as earlier defined. The control variables consist of profit share, 
capacity utilisation, the relative cost of capital, long-term interest rate, and the real 
unit cost of labour. Multiple techniques are used to test for stationarity in the data 
series. Tables 6.6 to 6.8 below display the results of  these tests of stationarity in the 
data series. 
Table 6.6: Panel Unit Root Test (Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit Root Test) 
 Capital 
Accumulation 









Test Statistics -4.3550 -2.134 -50.543 -4.164 5.737 -24.062 
P-value 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Initial Lag 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Average Lags 
Chosen by AIC 
2 1 1 1 2 1 
            Note:  (1) Test options used: demean; lags (2) H0: All panels contain unit roots 
                           (3) H1: Some panels are stationary 
 
                (Source: Author Computed from sample data) 
                                               
Table 6.7: Panel Unit Root Test (Fisher Type) 
  Capital 
Accumulation  
Profit Share Capacity Utilization 
  Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
Inverse Chi-sq. P 206.2752 0.0000 146.5561 0.0000 445.0122 0.0000 
Inverse normal Z -10.2858 0.0000 -8.1113 0.0000 -17.5890   0.0000 
Inverse Logit L* -11.7317 0.0000 -8.2691 0.0000 -25.6676 0.0000 
Modified inverse Chi-
sq. 
Pm 16.7098 0.0000 10.4837 0.0000 41.5999 0.0000 
  Relative Cost Trade Openness 1st Difference of  
 Trade Openness 
  Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
Inverse Chi-sq. P 168.1910 0.0000 85.6914 0.0003 454.4701 0.0000 
Inverse normal Z -9.1854 0.0000 -2.0378 0.0208 -18.5079 0.0000 
Inverse Logit L* -9.6044 0.0000 -2.0853 0.0196 -26.2338 0.0000 
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Modified inverse Chi-
sq. 
Pm 12.7393 0.0000 4.1381 0.0000 42.5860 0.0000 
    Note: (1) Test executed with options: dfuller; drift; and demean. (2) H0: All panels contain unit roots 
               (3) H1: At least one panel is stationary 
               ( Source: Author computed) 
 








































































(Source: Author computed from sample data) 
 
The null hypotheses for the Levin-Lin-Chu, Breitung, and Harris-Tzavalis tests are 
identical: that the panels contain unit roots, while the alternative is that the panels 
are stationary. This is rather restrictive, since the null would fail to be accepted even 
if just one panel includes a non-stationary variable. For the Hadri Lagrange 
multiplier stationarity test, the null hypothesis is ‘all panels are stationary’ versus the 
alternative hypothesis that ‘some panels contain unit roots’. The Im-Pesaran-Shin 
unit root test and the Fisher-type test have the null hypothesis that all panels contain 
unit roots, but the alternative hypotheses are that ‘some panels are stationary’, and 
‘at least one panel is stationary’ respectively. A significant limitation of  first 
generation panel unit root tests like the tests above, is that they assume the absence 
of cross-sectional dependence. Consequently, they may not be very useful in the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence (Baltagi, 2005). The LLC test assumes 
homogeneity of slope coefficients of the first lags of the panel units. Harris-Tzavalis 
test assumes that the time dimension (T) is fixed and work better with fixed and 
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smaller T. The IPS and LLC exhibit loss of power in the presence of individual-
specific trends and both also suffer from size distortions (Breitung, 2000; Choi, 
2001). In the presence of a time trend, all panel unit root tests decrease dramatically 
in terms of power (Choi, 2001).  
 
Karlsson and Löthgren (2000) have cautioned that panel unit root tests exhibit the 
potential risk of concluding that the whole panel is stationary when T is large, even 
if it is just a small fraction of the panel units that is stationary. But with small T, they 
tend to generate the inference that the entire panel is nonstationary, even though just 
a small fraction thereof is nonstationary. But Karlsson and Löthgren (2000)  failed to 
define with exactitude, what is small T and large T. Against the background of these 
various caveats with panel unit root tests, the tests reported in the foregoing tables 
have shown mixed results. While the tests have consistently suggested that fixed 
capital accumulation, profit share, capacity utilisation and the relative cost of fixed 
capital are stationary in at least some panels, only the Fisher-type and Hadri 
Lagrange multiplier tests suggest that trade openness is stationary in at least some 
panel units. 
 
Under the context of time series, the presence of a unit root has a high capacity to 
render a parameter estimate inconsistent. However, the adverse impacts of unit roots 
on parameter estimates in the context of panel data may be tempered by the 
inclusion of a cross-sectional dimension, as well as the differencing that is typical of 
panel data estimation of parameters. Furthermore, a dynamic panel data estimator is 
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based estimator, if lags of the explanatory 
variables (distributed lags) are included in addition to lag(s) of the dependent 
variable (autoregressive lag(s)), as explanatory variables. But with an ARDL-based 
estimator, the order of integration of the variables in the model is irrelevant, making 
prior testing for unit roots dispensable (van Treeck, 2008, p.372).  
 
Further insights into the effects of time are enhanced in dynamic panel analyses ( 
Arellano, 2003). Given the potential limitations of unit root tests, the reduced 
adverse impacts of unit roots on parameter estimates in panel data context and, the 
enhanced usefulness of dynamic panel estimators under the contexts of unit roots 
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and the effects of time, two approaches are used. First, a static approach is assumed, 
without much consideration to the effects of time. In the second approach in a later 
session, the dynamic panel data approach is used. These dual approaches would 
facilitate robust assessments of the impacts of trade openness on rates of private 
non-residential fixed capital accumulation, in advanced capitalist economies. 
 
6.7.3.1.2 Error-Correction-Based Cointegration Tests for Panel Data 
The main objective of a cointegration test is to assess the presence of a long-term 
relationship between two or more variables. The existence of cointegration between 
two variables indicates that the two variables are in a long-run relationship or band. 
Therefore, if at any time the two variables stray out of the long-run band or 
relationship, changes would occur to restore them to the long-run relationship. The 
Persyn and Westerlund (2008) test differs from alternative tests of cointegration. 
Most alternative tests are based on the residuals, but many studies have shown that 
such alternative tests may fail to reject the null of no cointegration, even where there 
is apparently cointegration (Persyn and Westerlund, 2008). The Persyn and 
Westerlund (2008) approach relies on the structural dynamics rather than the 
residual dynamics, with a speed of adjustment parameter playing a cardinal role in 
the test.  
 
In a cointegration relationship, there exists a speed of adjustment parameter that 
ensures that two cointegrated variables outside the equilibrium relationship return to 
the equilibrium (long-run) relationship and this speed of adjustment parameter 
determines the speed at which they do so.  Persyn and Westerlund (2008) test 
estimates this speed of adjustment (error correction) parameter and test if it is equal 
to zero or not. Under the null of “no cointegration”, four test statistics are developed. 
The alternative hypothesis is a function of the assumptions about the homogeneity of 
the error correction parameters of the panel units. Under the group mean test, it is 
assumed that the error correction parameters are heterogeneous, so that each panel 
unit has its separate parameter. The null is that all the error correction parameters are 
zero against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the error correction 
parameter is significantly less than  zero.  
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The assumption under the panel test, is that the error correction parameters are 
homogenous across all the cross-sectional (panel) units. The null is that the error 
correction parameter is zero, while the alternative hypothesis is that the error 
correction parameter is significantly less than zero. For the group mean test, the test 














𝑖=1 ; where 𝜑𝑖 is the error 
correction parameter, 𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑖) is the normal or conventional standard error of the 
parameter and ?̂?𝑖1 is the standard error derived from using the long-run variance 




; and 𝑃𝛼 = 𝑇?̂? (Persyn and Westerlund, 2008). The advantage 
of the Persyn and Westerlund test is that since it is not based on residuals, we could 
compute the test statistics for any pair of variables. The test is undertaken to assess 
and compare how the explanatory variables move with fixed capital accumulation. 
The results are juxtaposed in Table 6.9 below. The tests results in Table 6.9 suggest 
that profit share is strongly cointegrated with capital accumulation at both the group 
mean level and at the panel level tests, at the 1% significant level (using the 
conventional standard errors and the Newey and West long-run variance estimates). 
 
Table 6.9: Error-Correction-Based Cointegration Test 
 Capital Accumulation & Profit 
Share 
  Capital Accumulation & Capacity 
Utilization 
Statistic Value Z-value P-
value 
 Value Z-value P-value 
𝐺𝜏 -1.573 -2.749 0.003  -2.220 -5.733 0.000 
𝐺𝛼 -5.906 -2.219 0.013  -5.761 -2.065 0.019 
𝑃𝜏 -6.529 -3.496 0.000  -10.542 -6.857 0.000 
𝑃𝛼 -4.450 -5.671 0.000  -5.685 -7.717 0.000 
 Capital Accumulation & Long term 
interest rate 
  Capacity Utilization & Real Unit 
Labour Cost 
Statistics Value Z-value P-
value 
 Value Z-value P-value 
𝐺𝜏 -1.021 -0.205 0.419  -1.273 -1.366 0.086 
𝐺𝛼 -2.906 -0.945 0.828  -5.470 -1.758 0.039 
𝑃𝜏 -5.338 -2.476 0.007  -6.038 -3.075 0.001 
𝑃𝛼 -2.953 -3.191 0.001  -4.434 -5.645 0.000 
 Capital Accumulation & Relative 
Cost 
  Capital Accumulation & Trade 
Openness 
Statistics Value Z-value P-
value 
 Value Z-value P-value 
𝐺𝜏 -3.146 -4.601 0.000  -2.259 -4.017 0.000 
𝐺𝛼 -15.725 -2.619 0.004  -8.948 -2.740 0.003 
𝑃𝜏 -14.725 -5.253 0.000  -9.942 -4.100 0.000 
𝑃𝛼 -14.947 -4.704 0.000  -7.552 -4.945 0.000 
    (Source: Author estimated from sample data)                   
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The estimated results in Table 6.9 also suggest the presence of strong cointegration 
between capital accumulation and capacity utilisation at the group mean level and 
panel level at 1% significant level, using both types of standard errors. The 
suggested cointegration between capital accumulation and profit share, as well as 
between capital accumulation and capacity utilisation are therefore robust to the 
standard error used. Furthermore, there exists some evidence of cointegration 
between real unit labour cost and capital accumulation at both the group and panel 
levels, using both the conventionally computed standard errors, and the NW long-
run variance estimates, at the 10%  significant level. The results also suggest the 
existence of some cointegration between capital accumulation and long-term interest 
rate, at the panel but not group levels. Very strong cointegration has also been 
estimated between relative cost and fixed capital accumulation, at 0.1% significant 
level. Even more statistically significant cointegration is estimated between trade 
openness and fixed capital accumulation than that between relative cost and fixed 
capital accumulation. These cointegration results are consistent with the results in 
the correlation analyses section, where strong co-movements between trade 
openness on the one hand and long-term interest rate and real unit labour cost 
respectively on the other hand were indicated. Long-term interest rate and real unit 
labour cost in turn moved in close association with the relative cost of capital, in the 
sample period. 
 
 From the results, there exist comparable cointegration between trade openness and 
capital accumulation, in comparison to the control variables suggested by theories 
and are highly cointegrated with capital accumulation. On the basis of the tests, 
therefore, we conclude that under the same conditions and assumptions associated 
with the Persyn and Westerlund (2008) cointegration test, we can strongly reject the 
null of  “ no cointegration” for trade openness, relative cost, real unit labour cost, 
profit share and  capacity utilization respectively with fixed capital accumulation. 
But could not so confidently reject the same null between long-term interest rate and 
fixed capital accumulation. With this greater confidence in the ability of trade 
openness to negatively explain the declining trend in fixed capital accumulation, this 
study proceeds to the estimation of the models. 
 
- 139 - 
6.7.3.2 Static Panel Models Analyses (One-way Error) 
The static approach excludes lag(s) of the dependent variable as explanatory 
variable(s) in the model. Both the fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
provide for individual-specific effects (unobserved individual heterogeneity). The 
FE model assumes that the individual heterogeneity is fixed parameter(s|) for 
individual panel unit and refuse to rule out a relationship between the included 
explanatory variables and these individual-specific effects.  As argued by Baltagi 
(2005), if the set of the panel units (N) remains fixed, then the fixed effects model is 
more appropriate. The random effects model assumes that the individual-specific  
effects are be random (thus part of the error term) and that the included explanatory 
variables are independent of the individual-specific effects. Baltagi (2005) has also 
argued that the random effects model is more suitable if the N are randomly drawn 
from a large population. Under the assumption that the covariance between the 
unobserved heterogeneity and the included explanatory variables equal zero, the 
random effects model is both consistent and efficient, while the fixed effects model 
is consistent but inefficient. If this assumption is however violated, the RE is 
inconsistent, while the Fixed Effect is consistent and possibly efficient. It, therefore, 
matters a great deal which of the two static estimators is used.  The models are as 
presented below. 
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                                                                                                                                                                      …6.12 
                                                    ∩𝑖𝑡= 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡    and ∩𝑖𝑡 is 𝑖𝑖𝑑;  ~𝑁(0, 𝛿∩
2),  𝜇𝑖 is 𝑖𝑖𝑑; ~𝑁(0, 𝛿𝜇
2) 
  
Equation 6.11 is the specification of the fixed effects model, while equation 6.12 is 
the random effects model specification.  𝜇𝑖 captures the individual-specific effects 
for each panel unit. Do we expect the unobserved individual heterogeneity to 
significantly co-vary with trade openness? Recall that the gravity model postulates 
that external trade varies positively with the size of GDP. But GDP is aggregate 
national output and therefore a function of the prevailing national idiosyncratic 
ability (individual heterogeneity). Thus we expect ability to significantly co-vary 
with trade openness. This together with fixed N (panel units) suggests that the FE 
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model is more appropriate in our case.  Using AIC and BIC as the selection criteria, 
fixed effects and random effects models estimates are presented in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10: Model Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation (1960 
– 2014)  

































sigma_u .0092547  .0048219  
sigma_e .01375877  .01375877  
rho .31150566  .10938702  
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.7204  Assumed to be 
0 
 
(Source: Author Computed from sample data) 
 
In the estimated fixed/(random effects)  models, one percentage increase (decrease) 
in trade openness decreases (increases) the rate of fixed capital accumulation by 
0.02% (0.013%). In both model estimates, trade openness is the most robust to either 
of the estimators. Furthermore, trade openness is by far the most significant 
explanatory variable both statistically and economically. The fraction of the variance 
due to unobserved heterogeneities is about 31%. A Hausman test is executed to test 
the significance of the differences between the FE and RE estimates. The Hausman 
statistics is defined as: 




(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)……6.13 
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?̂?(?̂?𝐹𝐸) is the estimate of the variance of the FE parameter estimate ?̂?𝐹𝐸. ?̂?(?̂?𝑅𝐸) is 
the estimate of the variance of the RE parameter estimate ?̂?𝑅𝐸. Under the relevant 
null hypothesis, the test statistics has a chi-square distribution with a degree of 
freedom equal to the number of estimated parameter estimates. In this case, the 
Hausman test statistics of 34.19 with prob>chi2 = 0.000 rejects the null of no 
systematic differences between the fixed effects and random effects estimates, 
implying that the unobserved individual heterogeneity correlates significantly with 
the included explanatory variables. The correlation between the unobserved effects 
and the fitted variables is -0.7204. Therefore ignoring this high correlation produces 
significantly biased parameter estimates. Since the random effects model assumes 
this correlation to be nil, its estimates are expectedly biased. The fixed effects model 
(model 1) which is consistent in this context is therefore preferred to the random 
effects model.   
 
A combination of hierarchical estimation and the model selection criteria of AIC and 
BIC indicates that in the absence of trade openness in the model, the addition of any 
of relative cost, capacity utilisation or profit share contributes very marginally to the 
explanatory ability of the model. However the inclusion of trade openness 
significantly increases the explanatory ability of the model, suggesting that the 
ability of trade openness to explain the movements in fixed capital accumulation 
over the sample period was greater compared to any of relative cost, long-term 
interest rate, real unit labour cost and profit share. The statistical significance of the 
respective explanatory variable is indicated by their respective T statistics and p 
value. The economic significant is indicated by the size of respective coefficient 
estimates.  
 
For further robust and unbiased  inferences, the fixed effects model is re-estimated 
with robust standard errors and the estimates presented in Table 6.11. The robust 
standard errors are robust to the effects of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in 
the error terms. Once again the model selection criterion BIC was used in selecting 
the best model. The estimated model in Table 6.11 indicates that capacity utilisation, 
relative cost, long term interest rate and trade openness are statistically significant at 
the 10% significant level. One percentage change in trade openness on the average 
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causes an inverse change of about 0.02% (i.e. 0.0260573 – 0.0082138) in the rate of  
fixed capital accumulation. This was about the same estimate for trade openness 
without the robust standard errors. The estimate of trade openness is therefore 
apparently robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Trade openness 
squared indicates a diminishing effect of trade openness on the rate of growth of 
fixed capital. A percentage change in the relative cost of capital either through an 
increase in the cost of capital or a fall in real wage (real unit cost of labour) causes 
an inverse change of 0.38% in fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Table 6.11: Estimates with Robust Standard Errors: Dependent Variables: 
Capital Accumulation (1960 – 2014) 
         
































P-value 0.115 0. 0.061 0.084 0.076 0.238 0.095 0.009 0.299 
sigma_u .0056        
sigma_e .0106        
rho .216        
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.4302        
Heteroscedastic and serial correlation robust standard error used in this estimation. Time dummies    
included in this estimation. Within variation 0.4752; between variation 0.4746; overall variation 
0.4348 
(Source: Author’s estimated from sample data). 
 
Capacity utilisation is statistically significant, but the parameter estimate of 0.0007 
(≅ 0.001) suggests economic insignificance. A unit change in real wage (real unit 
cost of labour) causes a change of a mere 0.0003% in fixed capital accumulation, in 
the same direction. The explanatory power of wage or the real unit cost of labour 
may have been exhaustively subsumed by the relative cost of capital, leaving the 
real unit cost of labour with no residual significant impact. This may indicate that a 
channel of impact of real wage is through capital-labour substitution. Long-term 
interest rate however has statistically significant but economically weak residual 
marginal impact, estimated at 0.004. A percentage change in long-term interest rate 
causes a change of 0.004% in the rate of fixed capital accumulation, in the same 
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direction. The relative robustness of the parameter estimate of trade openness is 
further highlighted by the changes to economic insignificance, of the parameter 
estimates of capacity utilisation, long-term interest rate and real unit labour cost. The 
static econometric estimates indicate the long-run or overall impact of the 
explanatory variables at the margin. Panel data method commonly deals with large 
cross sectional units (large N) and small time dimensions (small T), with the usual 
assumption of cross sectional independence (independence of the cross sectional 
errors).  With large time (T) dimension, the possibilities of unobserved time-specific 
effects and cross sectional dependence biasing the parameter estimates of static 
estimates increase. The next section continues the investigation of the robust 
significance of the impacts of trade openness on rates of fixed capital accumulation, 
in advanced capitalist economies, where the effects of long time dimension are taken 
into consideration (see Arellano, 2003). 
 
6.7.3.3 Dynamic Panel Analysis 
The statistic panel model estimates offer significant support for the hypothesis that 
increases in trade openness cause significant decreases in fixed capital growth rates. 
Advances in panel data method have facilitated dynamic panel data modelling, to 
enable assessments of dynamic responses of economic variables and the estimation 
of long-run relationships, where coefficient(s) of lag(s) of dependent variables may 
govern speeds of adjustment . A dynamic panel data model includes lag(s) of the 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable. It may also include lag(s) of the 
exogenous variable(s) as explanatory variable(s) in the model. With data points 
spanning a period of 55 years (T = 55), there should be significant time series effects 
to justify the use of dynamic panel models and estimators. Different dynamic panel 
data estimators have their weaknesses and strengths, which are often highlighted by 
time series characteristics of macroeconomic and financial variables that tend to 
include high serial/autocorrelation and endogeneity. Consequently five dynamic 
panel data estimators: Pooled OLS; Dynamic Fixed Effects; Arellano-Bond; 
LSDVC; and MGE,  have been applied to the data, to enhance unbiased and robust 
inferences.  A re-specification of the model into a dynamic form is presented in 
equation 6.14 below. 
- 144 - 












𝑠=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑠
𝑅𝐶∞
𝑠=0 𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡−𝑠 +
                     ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑠
𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑡−𝑠
∞
𝑠=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑠
𝐿𝐶∞

























+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡…………………….6.14 
 
The estimated dynamic models are presented in Table 6.12. The dynamic fixed 
effect (DFE) model explains more than 86% of the variations within the countries 
(within variations) and about 92% of the variations between the countries (between 
variations). 87% of the total variations (overall variations) is explained by the DFE 
model estimate. This is far greater than the corresponding values for the static fixed 
effects model estimates, where the percentage of variations explained were in the 
40s. All the five dynamic estimators more clearly indicate that virtually all the 
included explanatory variables  granger cause fixed capital accumulation, in that lag 
values of trade openness and the others, significantly impact on contemporary rates 
of fixed capital accumulation. All five dynamic estimates except the mean group 
estimator (MGE) indicate that the first and second lags of fixed capital accumulation 
are significant. This is consistent with the high level of persistence exhibited by the 
variables, as discussed in an earlier section. It is particularly noteworthy that the 
estimates of these lags for the four aforementioned dynamic estimators fall within a 
rather narrow range. Moreover, apart from profit share in the MGE estimates and 
capacity utilisation in the DFE estimates, all the variables have been shown to 
significantly granger cause fixed capital accumulation. In line with the included lags 
of the dependent variable, all the lags of the explanatory variables displayed 
alternation in the signs of their parameter estimates. But how reliable are the 
estimates of the five panel estimators and the inferences therefrom?  
 
The estimated Pooled OLS was chosen on the basis of two model selection criteria, 
the AIC and BIC. Time dummies from 1960-2014 were included in the model and 
gradually narrowed down on the basis of the significance of their parameter 
estimates, to select the model with the higher selection criteria. Although the Pooled 
OLS has been consistent with the other panel data estimates, it has a severe flaw, in 
that it gives equal weightings to between and within variations, and ignores the  
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Table 6.12: Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation; Sample Period 1960-
2014 
         
    Pooled OLS   DFE   LSDVC   A-Bond   MGE 
Capital 
          Accumulation 
          L0 
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[0.0151451]** 
Trade Openness Squared 
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-0.0068218 
           [0.0048813]*         
           R-squared 





      Within 
   
0.8614 
      Between 
   
0.9168 
                 Wald Chi2 
     
2.91E+12 
    P-value 
     
0 
    Sargan (p-value) 
     
0.1466 
             Arellano-Bond 
        test for zero 
          autocorrelation 
        in FF errors 
          Order:1 (p-value) 
     
0.0017 
  Order:2 (p-value) 
     
0.5657 
  RMSE             0.0009 
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unobserved individual heterogeneity. This could bias the estimated parameters, and 
this is more so if there exists a significant correlation between the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and the observed explanatory variables. The static analyses 
section suggests the presence of such correlation between the individual 
heterogeneity and the observed explanatory variables. Including a lag of the 
dependent variable which is correlated with the individual-specific effects, renders 
biased, the estimated coefficient of the lag of the dependent variable, and possibly 
the other estimated coefficients. For this reason, the Pooled OLS estimates may 
likely be biased (see Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Baltagi, 2005; Nickell, 1981).                                   
 
The estimated dynamic fixed effects model corrects for the effect of unobserved 
individual-specific effects by regressing data transformed by demeaning. 
Furthermore, it does not assume that the individual fixed effects are uncorrelated 
with the included explanatory variables. However in the case of a dynamic panel 
data model, with the presence/absence of distributed lags, the transformation 
executed by the fixed effects model does not remove correlation between the 
transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. This 
potentially renders the transformed autoregressive lag endogenous and biases the 
estimated parameter associated with the autoregressive lag. The estimated 
coefficients of the exogenous variables may or may not be biased. This 
notwithstanding, for the dynamic fixed effects model, this bias is only severe for 
short panels for as T increases, the bias peters out. When T is large, the bias is 
negligible and often T is considered large, if it is greater than 30 (see Judson and 
Owen, 1999). With T equal to 55 in this case, significant confident could be reposed 
on this DFE estimates. 
 
To advance the degree of consistency of the  inferences, the dynamic fixed effects  
model was estimated with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors are robust to cross-sectional dependence (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which 
when present could severely bias the estimates. Cross-sectional dependence refers to 
correlations between the error terms of the cross-sectional units of panel data. The 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are also robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation (ibid). Although the tests of cross-sectional dependence using the Frees, 
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Pesaran and LM tests have been mixed, it is expected that with the spatial proximity 
among the sample countries and the fact that imports to one country imply exports 
from another, an assumption of the presence of cross-sectional dependence would be 
rather intuitive. Moreover like all other estimates, the dynamic fixed effects model 
was estimated with time dummies. Therefore the two way fixed effects were 
accommodated in the estimation. With these sundry measures to counter the 
potential biases that could have resulted from cross-sectional dependence, serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, we can repose significant 
confidence in the estimates of the dynamic fixed effect model. 
 
The Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) offsets some of the 
shortcomings (bias correction) of the dynamic Least Squares Dummy Variable 
model or the dynamic fixed effects model, by computing and compensating for the 
small sample bias. The LSDVC presented here was initialised with a consistent 
Anderson and Hsiao estimator, to initialise the bias correction. It has been found that 
for data sets that have features similar to macroeconomic and financial data, such as 
omitted variables and unbalanced panel lengths, the LSDVC is prominent as the 
most accurate among the advanced panel data estimators, just as research has found 
that it is about the best where there exist unbalanced panel, missing observations, 
dependent variable censoring/clustering, while LSDVC and dynamic fixed effects 
estimators are about the most accurate estimators, when there is serial correlation 
(and absence of endogeneity) (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). This notwithstanding, 
the LSDVC assumes the explanatory variables are exogenous.  
 
Arellano and Bond (GMM) estimator instruments the first differences of the lagged 
dependent variable, using level lagged dependent variable, thus exploiting the 
orthogonality that exists between the level lagged dependent variable and the 
differenced errors. It yields consistent estimates, even in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, unbalanced panel data, and endogenous variables. The Arellano and 
Bond estimator makes the assumption that the original error terms are not serially 
correlated and that the first difference of the error terms is, therefore, a moving 
average with a unit root. However, it does not work well in the presence of a second-
order serial correlation. We, therefore, test for the presence of a first-order serial 
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correlation and the absence of a second-order correlation in the differenced errors. 
For the estimated model in Table 6.12 using the full sample, the Arellano-Bond tests 
for zero autocorrelations in the first-differenced errors returned  p-values of 0.0017 
and 0.5628, for the first-order and second-order autocorrelations respectively, 
implying that for the null of “no autocorrelation” we reject the null in the case of the 
first order autocorrelation, at the 1% significant level and fail to reject the null in the 
case of the second-order autocorrelation.   
 
The over-identification condition for the Arellano and Bond estimator is assessed. 
The larger is the time dimension (T), the more are the moment conditions and 
efficiency, but at the cost of a greater bias. The ideal, therefore, is to use less than 
the full moment conditions, at the benefit of reducing biases, but also reducing 
efficiency. For this purpose, we restrict the autoregressive lag to 2 and execute a 
sargan test of overidentification. The sargan test for overidentification restriction 
returns a p-value of 0.1496, implying we cannot reject the null of “overidentification 
restrictions are valid” at the 10% significant level (see Baltagi et al., 2009, for 
further detail). On the basis of these test statistics, we conclude that the estimated 
Arellano and Bond model is well behaved. Apart from second-order serial 
correlation, the Arellano and Bond estimator produces appropriate estimates, even in 
the face of unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic panel bias, unbalanced panel and 
endogeneity. Given the foregoing, therefore, we can repose significant confidence in 
the Arellano and Bond estimates. 
 
The Pesaran Mean Group Estimator (MGE), unlike the rest estimators, assumes 
parameter heterogeneity, and averages parameter estimates across panel units after 
estimating a time series model for the panel units individually. Pesaran has argued 
that if the assumption of parameter heterogeneity is valid, the MGE is the most 
consistent estimate. It is, however, unclear if MGE provides for the impacts of  
individual fixed effects or heterogeneity among the cross-sectional units, which is 
one of the significant weaknesses of the time series method. A juxtaposition of the 
five estimated models suggests that even though there is overwhelming support for 
the argument that trade openness has a significant inverse causal relationship with 
fixed capital accumulation, the estimates of the Pooled OLS and MGE seem to be 
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outliers. Therefore if we winsorize both the Pooled OLS and MGE out of the 
estimated models, we have estimates from the DFE, LSDVC and Arellano-Bond 
that are closer in values. Once again the dynamic panel data estimators provide 
further robust evidence that trade openness is negatively (inversely) causally related 
with fixed capital accumulation. Given the novelty of this study and the objective of 
facilitating the robustness of the findings, the research is extended by seeking further 
support from the use of structural break analysis. 
 
6.7.3.4   Structural Break Analysis 
The structural break analysis is approached from two perspectives, a causality 
perspective and reliability of estimates perspective. The causality perspective is 
intended to assess if the tools of structural break could be exploited to obtain greater 
insight on which of the included explanatory variables potentially offers greater 
explanation to observed declining trends in rates of capital accumulation, the most. 
It involves comparing common breaks in the unconditional mean of each variable. 
The decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation from about 1970 should 
be evidenced by a break in the unconditional mean of fixed capital accumulation 
circa 1970. There should be similar breaks in means of theorised explanatory 
variables. In the spirit of Emerson and Kao (2006), a comparison of the temporal 
locations of these breaks in means of the explanatory variables should indicate the 
most likely explanatory variable that drove the dynamics of rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, as these rates assumed their  generally declining trends from about 
1970. The second perspective involves the adverse effects of  structural breaks on 
the parameter estimates of models and inferences drawn from these estimates. 
 
In the absence of a straightforward algorithm for the determination of common 
break-points in unconditional means in the context of panel data, reliance is made on 
the argument that even in the context of heterogeneous mean and breakpoints (where 
there are N series with N being equivalent to the cross-sectional units of a panel data 
set), the common break is computationally the mean of  the heterogeneous 
breakpoints (Im et al., 2003). But most, if not all structural break techniques adapted 
from time series for panel data, only have power when the break is located close to 
the middle of the sample. Moreover, the assumption is normally the presence of a 
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single break, with the objective being estimating breakpoints for the model 
parameters estimates, rather than the unconditional mean of a specific variable. 
Because the interest at this time are breakpoints in unconditional means, these 
methods applied in panel data are not very suitable both in objectives and methods 
of operation. To circumvent this obstacle and still achieve our goal, we use the 
Clement et al (1998) that allows for two structural breaks, as well as breaks in 
unconditional means and intercept. This allowance for  double breaks enhances the 
chances of detecting breaks further away from the sample margins or centre, such as  
the breaks in rates of fixed capital accumulation and trade openness suspected to 
have occurred in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Table 6.13 below presents the various 
measures of the average breakpoints for the respective series. 
 
Table 6.13: Average Break point Dates 


















Mean 1975.91 1970.7 1965.87 
1976.13 
 
1975.304 1976.13 1975.61 










(Source: Author estimated from sample data) 
 
Using the mean as a measure of the average, the common break point in fixed 
capital accumulation is 1976. The break points in profit share, capacity utilisation 
were in 1971 and 1966 respectively. Although temporally located before the break 
point in capital accumulation, their breaks in means occurred too early from 1976. 
While the theoretical relationship between capital accumulation and relative cost 
(and long-term interest rate) is inverse, the breakpoint for the mean of relative cost 
occurred in  1977, temporally located after the break in capital accumulation. The 
break in the mean of real unit labour cost (in 1976) occurred just before the break in 
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the mean of capital accumulation, this is less so compared to the time of the break in 
the mean of trade openness. The break in mean of long-term interest rates occurred 
after that of fixed capital accumulation. Break in trade openness occurred just before 
that of fixed capital accumulation. These leave real unit cost of labour (real wages) 
and trade openness as the most competitive determining variables, on the basis of 
the mean as a measure of average.  
 
Turning to the median as the measure of average, the common break date for capital 
accumulation in the 23 sample country was 1973. The median break dates in the 
means of profit share and capacity utilisation were 1969 and 1963 respectively. 
These are quite earlier than the break in the mean of capital accumulation. The 
median breakpoints in the mean of long-term interest rate was 1974, for unit labour 
cost, it was in 1973, and for the relative cost was in 1975. Once again, trade 
openness exhibited the median breakpoint in mean (in 1972) nearest to and 
preceding the median breakpoint in capital accumulation of 1973. The median 
breakpoints of the means offer even stronger evidence than the mean breakpoints, 
that trade openness was  most likely the active explanatory variable that determined 
the observed declining trends in rates of fixed capital accumulation in the sample 
period and countries. 
 
The third measure of the average break points of unconditional means is the mode. 
The modal common breakpoint in the mean of fixed capital accumulation was 1972. 
The modal breakpoints in the means of profit share, capacity utilisation and unit 
labour cost were in 1968; 1963; and 1968 respectively and were too early relative to 
the modal breakpoint of the means of capital accumulation. There is, however, ties 
among long-term interest rates, relative cost and trade openness, all three with the 
modal break date in their means of 1971. This is a marginal exception. Besides, this 
tie is easily resolved if we take into consideration that the ratios of modal panel units 
to total panel units were 8/23 for trade openness; 5/23 for long-term rates; and 2/23 
for relative cost. Trade openness have the highest modal ratio and on the basis of 
these ratios of the modes, we accord greater weight to trade openness over long-term 
interest rate and relative cost of capital in the tie. 1971 preceded the break date of 
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fixed capital accumulation yet close enough to make trade openness the most likely 
determinant of the observed decreases in rates of fixed capital accumulation.  
 
Structural break analysis in the context of panel data econometric often refers to the 
parameters of a model. A structural break is said to have taken place when  one or 
more of these parameters change(s). We seek to assess if our significant findings 
regarding the inverse relationship between trade openness and capital accumulation, 
so far, were misled by the effects of structural breaks on our parameter estimates. 
There are two fundamental justifications for this. First, under the context of 
parameter instability, our estimated significant negative coefficients for trade 
openness could be a chance occurrence in a kaleidoscope of the sizes and signs of 
the parameter estimates. The second justification is due to a weakness of most panel 
data estimators (The assumption of homogeneity of slope parameters across time 
and cross-sectional units see Hansen, 2001; De Watcher and Tzavalis, 2004); in the 
presence of structural breaks, inconsistent parameter estimates may turn up, with 
resulting misleading inferences (Baltagi et al, 2016). As an example, breaks in the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity correlated with the initial conditions or 
significant breaks in slope coefficients, would render the Arellano-Bond estimator 
inconsistent (De Watcher and Tzavalis, 2004). Yet Structural changes are quite 
pervasive in economic series of any meaningful length (Hansen, 2001).  
 
 Most of the possible impacts of a structural breaks on parameter estimates and 
inferences are associated with time series econometric studies (See Chow, 1960; 
Quandt, 1960; Peron, 1989; Andrew, 1993; Bai and Perron, 1998). So a critical 
issue, is the choice of technique for the determination of structural breaks in a panel 
data context, given the problematic of aridity of methods (De Watcher and Tzavalis, 
2004). This is further compounded by the possibilities of other complexities such as 
that structural breaks may affect different parameters,  may occur at given points in 
time or evolve over stretches of time (with a transitory period) or there may be 
multiple breaks over a given stretch of time or sample period.  Majority of the 
techniques for structural break analysis have their roots in methods proposed in 
Chow (1960) and later (Quandt, 1960). The Chow method involves estimating a 
model, using sub-samples for the sub-periods demarcated by some break dates. With 
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a null of “no structural break”, the Chow is an F statistics, which test the equality of 
the corresponding parameters of the estimates for the sub-periods defined by the 
break dates. A major limitation, however, is that an apriori knowledge of the break 
date is necessary to execute the test. While a prior knowledge is however rare, the 
arbitrary choices of dates based on the visual observance of the series may be too 
subjective and not necessarily coincide with the actual break dates.  This, therefore, 
underscores the need for a more scientific approach to the solution for the 
problematic of unknown break dates.  
 
One potential solution involves selecting several candidate break-dates, computing 
chow statistics for the estimated models for the respective sub-periods defined by 
these potential break dates. The largest chow statistics (the Quandt Statistics) is 
accepted as the best candidates for a structural break, and this is tested for 
significance (Quandt, 1960). A significant Quandt statistic suggests the presence of 
a structural break. Under the context of an unknown break date, however, the chi-
square distribution is inappropriate, and this includes chi-square critical values (see 
Andrew 1993; Hanson, 2001). The absence of critical values thus straitjacketed the 
practical values of the Quandt statistics. Hansen (1997) introduced some algorithm 
that enhances the computation of probability (p) values for the Quandt statistics. 
Andrew (1993), as well as Andrew and Ploberger (1994), offered tabular critical 
values. These together, greatly enhanced the practical values of the Quandt statistics. 
We can apparently use the Quandt statistic to establish a break date as the date that 
corresponds with the Quandt statistics. But the propriety of this approach to 
estimating a break date is limited to the singular context of linear regressions where 
homoscedastic covariance matrix is used to construct the Chow statistic/test. 
Furthermore, the Quandt approach may not be very useful in the context of multiple 
breakpoints, for the obvious reason that it relates to only one data-point.  
 
An apparently superior way to determine the break date involves the use of least 
squares errors. This approach splits the entire sample period into candidate break 
dates and after estimation for the resultant subsample periods, the sum of squared 
errors are computed at each potential break point. The potential break date where the 
sum of squared errors is the minimum, becomes the estimated break date. This 
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approach could also be used to estimate multiple break points sequentially: at each 
estimated break point (global minimum sum of squares of errors) divide the sample 
period into sub-periods and apply the same test to each sub-period until there is no 
more evidence of further break points. The points of divisions thus constitute the 
multiple break points or dates (see Chong, 1995; Bai, 1997; Bai and Perron, 1998). 
Further test statistics developed under the condition of unknown break dates are: 
                           Sup 𝑊𝑇 (𝜋);          S𝑢𝑝𝐿𝑀𝑇(𝜋);        and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝐿𝑅𝑇(𝜋) 
                             𝜋 ∈ 𝛱                   𝜋 ∈ 𝛱                     𝜋 ∈ 𝛱  
 
where 𝑊𝑇(𝜋)  is a test statistic for a Wald, 𝐿𝑀𝑇(𝜋) is a test statistic for  a Lagrange 
Multiplier test statistic and 𝐿𝑅𝑇(𝜋) a likelihood ratio test statistic, where a break 
date is known. Sup 𝑊𝑇 (𝜋), S𝑢𝑝𝐿𝑀𝑇(𝜋) and S𝑢𝑝𝐿𝑅𝑇(𝜋) are the corresponding test 
statistics where a break date is unknown. The sup, is the supremum function. Π is a 
time bound specified apriori, and a subset of [0, 1], where 0 is the lowest boundary 
and 1 the highest boundary of the total sample period.  𝜋 is a break date/point and 
𝜋 ∈ 𝛱  implies that the break date/point is located within the pre-specified time 
bound Π. According to Andrew (1993), these test statistics under unknown break 
dates are sufficiently powerful against the context of the unknown break date being 
within a very narrow bound or interval (e.g. consequence of known institutional 
changes), where an institutional change occurred within a narrow bound but the 
consequent structural change occurred after some time lag, and where the structural 
change spans a transition period rather than a dramatic/abrupt change. 
 
A few of the theoretical methods suggested for panel data involve the adaptation of 
techniques used in time series context by averaging either along the cross-sectional 
dimension or time dimension so that as size increases along the panel units or time 
dimension, the weight of any cross-sectional unit or time in the average becomes 
less relevant. Some methods are based on the detection of a structural break in the 
slope parameters as well as a shift in individual effects (Holtz-Ekin et al., 1988; 
Andrews, 1999; Andrews and Lu, 2001; De Watcher and Tzavalis, 2004). The 
assumption of asymptote is usually along the panel unit dimension (N), with time 
(T) typically fixed. This is contrary to our interest where the desire is an asymptote 
along the time (T) dimension, as the number of advanced capitalist countries cannot 
be infinite. Furthermore, operationality is a standard issue with the listed theoretical 
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studies. Moreover, these methods for estimating unknown structural breaks in panel 
data context have reduced power when the breaks are closed to the beginning/ending 
of the data series, but more powerful, if the breaks are located toward the middle of 
the series  (Chan et al., 2008). Furthermore, these methods suggest winsorizing  the 
series. The choice of the margin for winsorization is however subjective.  
 
A standard feature of all the theoretical articles that are favourably disposed to the 
application of structural break analysis in panel data context, is averaging either 
across time or panel units. Moreover, while operationality is apparently an issue 
with the various methods suggested, the models used in these articles are simple 
models, and it is highly likely that in the context of multiple regression, 
operationality of the suggested methods would even be more problematic.  Based on 
these considerations, we adopt two approaches around these problems: we assume 
1986 as a theoretical break date, been a popular date for a well acclaimed 
institutional change: de jure international financial liberalisation; and secondly, we 
use the estat sbsingle function of Stata for unknown break dates and average the 
break dates across all panel units (N). The average break date interestingly turns out 
to be 1990.  
 
1990 is an alternative start date popular with some scholars in the literature, as the 
year in which de facto financial liberalisation took hold in advanced capitalist 
economies. Therefore on approximately this date, economic integration assumed a 
turning point. Trade integration thenceforth became just half of the concept of 
international economic openness or integration. Invoking these dates as the 
breakpoints, we re-estimate the model for the four sub-samples on either sides of the 
suggested  break dates of 1986 and 1990, using all the five dynamic panel data 
estimators. In all four subsample sets of model estimates, overwhelming support for 
our thesis that greater trade openness significantly slows down rates of business 
fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies is maintained or 
reinforced. Once again, the justification for the five panel data estimators employed, 
is the minimisation of impacts of estimator biases on the findings. Tables 6.14 and 
6.15 present the estimates on either side of the theoretical break date of 1986.  
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Table 6.14 Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation (1960-1985) 
    Pooled OLS   DFE   LSDVC   A-Bond   MGE 
Capital Accumulation 
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   [0.0079055]        [0.0310015]   [0.167562]** 
R-squared 
          overall 
 
0.8494 
        Within 
          Between 
          Wald Chi2 
          P-value 
                     Sargan (p-value) 
        Arellano-Bond 
         test for zero 
          autocorrelation 
        in FF errors 
          Order:1 (p-value) 
        Order:2 (p-value) 
        RMSE   0.00588        0.0008 
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Table 6.15 Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation (1985-2014) 
    Pooled OLS   DFE   LSDVC   A-Bond   MGE   
Capital Accumulation 
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    [0.0050126]  [0.0169459]    [0.0114132]   [0.1272565]**** 
R-squared 
           overall 
 
0.886 
         Within 
           Between 
           Wald Chi2 
           P-value 
           Sargan (p-value) 
                      Arellano-Bond 
          test for zero 
           autocorrelation 
          in FF errors 
           Order:1 (p-value) 
         Order:2 (p-value) 
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Table 6.16 Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation (1960-1989) 
         
      Pooled OLS DFE   LSDVC A-Bond MGE 
          Capital Accumulation 
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Table 6.17 Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation (1991-2014) 
                          Pooled OLS DFE  LSDVC   A-Bond  MGE 
Capital Accumulation 
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          R-sq: 
    
0.8912 
          within 
              Wald Chi-sq 
       
5.33e^10**** 70.01**** 
             RMSE 
  
0.0047 
       
0.0007 
  No of Obs  562  548    548  542 
             
Tables 6.16 and 6.17 present model estimates on either side of the computed break 
date of 1990. All of the twenty model estimates strongly support the thesis that 
increases in  trade openness cause decreases in rates of business fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. Thus, the findings are not chance 
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occurrence caused by a structural break. Time dummies were included in all of the 
twenty model estimates, to provide for individual and time-based heterogeneities. 
One very interesting observation is that the greatest support for the thesis argument 
of an inverse causal relationship between trade openness and business fixed capital 
accumulation came from the Mean Group Estimates. Pesaran has greatly 
emphasised the power of the of the mean group estimator for consistent estimates.  
 
6.8 Empirical Analyses and Discussion 
The argument of this thesis is that increases in economic openness, following the 
increases in trade and later in international financial flows after these were 
liberalised,  dominantly caused the decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation 
since circa 1970, as observed in advanced capitalist economies. The validity of this 
argument however, is dependent on whether there exist an inverse relationship 
between economic openness and rates of fixed capital accumulation in advanced 
capitalist economies. But there is no explicit proposition of such inverse relationship 
in the literature.  
 
From premises based on theoretical propositions in the Regulation School literature, 
we reached the logical conclusion that for advanced capitalist economies, increases 
in economic openness cause decreases in rates of business fixed capital 
accumulation at the macro/aggregate level. The two main components of economic 
openness are trade openness and financial openness. This chapter is focused on 
investigating  and obtaining  evidence to back the claim that increases in trade 
openness, as a form of economic openness, since about 1970, played a great role in 
the observed decline in fixed capital accumulation. One of the cardinal task is to 
obtain convincing evidence that there is an inverse relationship between trade 
openness and rates of fixed capital accumulation. This is however an uphill task, as 
the orthodoxy has been that the relationship should be positive, based on inferences 
from neoclassical trade theories.  
 
The help of a  host of analytical tools have been enlisted to achieve this uphill task. 
Panel data estimators were used, to increase the validity and robustness of the 
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findings. Panel data has the great advantage over using time series method 
individually for the countries in the sample. This is because individual country’s 
ability or factors exclusively peculiar to each country  (called individual 
heterogeneity) may be part of the explanatory factors but cannot be seen and 
included in a model estimation. This could potentially lead to false findings and 
inferences. Panel data method is able to deal with this unseen factors, unlike time 
series method.   
 
Further steps intent on deriving valid and reliable results and inferences, include 
executing cointegration tests, executing static and dynamic analyses, as well using 
different estimators and structural break analyses. The objective is to minimise 
potential undue influence from one approach, tool or estimator that could bias the 
results to the point of been misleading. In all cases, we find overwhelming evidence 
that increases in trade openness cause decreases in rates of growth of business fixed 
capital. In this section, we narrate or discuss the findings or results, under the 
contexts of the effects of the explanatory variables on rates of fixed capital 
accumulation in the short-run and then in the long-run. The focus would be on the 
dynamic estimators. 
 
6.8.1 Short Run Analysis 
The estimated models all have autoregressive lags and distributed lags. An 
autoregressive lag refers to a lag of the dependent variable (fixed capital 
accumulation rates in this case) included as an explanatory variable in a model. The 
inclusion of autoregressive lags implies that the estimated slope parameters of the 
other explanatory variables are representations of the short-run effects of the 
respective explanatory variables on the dependent variable (Baltagi et al., 2009). The 
estimated slope parameters for the contemporary and lag terms of each explanatory 
variable were found to have alternating signs. This is because the estimated 
coefficients of the autoregressive lags govern the pattern of the lag distribution and 
in this case, they have alternating signs themselves, except for the mean group 
estimator. The distributed lags are those of the exogenous variables. The statistical 
significance of parameter estimates of the distributed lags indicate that the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable  live beyond a single period. The 
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coefficients of the distributed lags are the respective lag weights and for an 
explanatory variable constitute the lag distribution. The lag distributions indicate the 
pattern of the impacts of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. For the 
purpose of interpretation of the findings in this section, the estimates involving the 
full sample in Table 6.12 is used. 
 
Profit share: Pooled OLS; DFE; LSDVC; A-Bond and the MGE estimators 
unanimously indicate that profit share is positively related with the rate of capital 
accumulation. The Pooled OLS estimates indicate that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in profit share increases/(decreases) the rate of capital 
accumulation by 0.1% in the current period at the 1% significant level, but 
decreases/(increases) the rate of capital accumulation in the next period by 0.09%, at 
the 1% significant level. For an increase/(decrease) in profit share, the net effect on 
capital accumulation is positive/(negative). For the DFE, a percentage  
increase/(decrease) in profit share increases/(decreases) the rate of capital 
accumulation by .11%, at the 1% significant level in the current period, but 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.08% at the 1% significant level, in the next period.  
Similarly, the net effect is an increase/(decrease) or a net direct effect. However, 
according to the LSDVC estimates, a percentage increase/(decrease)  in profit share 
decreases/(increases) the rate of capital accumulation in the current period by 0.05% 
at the 1% significant level, but increase/(decrease) it by 0.08% in the next period, at 
the 1% significant level. Again, the net effect is increase/(decrease).  
 
The Arellano-Bond estimates show that an increase/(decrease) in profit share of one 
percent, decreases/(increases) the rate of capital accumulation by 0.05% at the 20% 
significant level in the current period, but increases/(decreases) it in the next period 
by 0.04% at the 20% significant level, and the next period by 0.05% at the 20% 
significant level, indicating a net positive/(negative) impact. The MGE estimates 
indicate that a percentage  increase/(decrease) in profit share increases/(decreases) 
the rate of fixed capital accumulation by 0.14% at the 10% significant level in the 
current period, but does not impact the rate of capital accumulation in lags (no 
granger causality). Inference supported by all five estimates is that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in profit share would have a net increase/(decrease)  on the rate 
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of fixed capital accumulation. This inference is consistent with various theories 
across the literature (See Kalecki, 1954; Bowles et al., 1989; Bowles and Boyer, 
1995). 
 
Capacity Utilisation: Capacity utilisation, like demand growth, is an accelerator 
term. For the Pooled OLS, LSDVC, and Arellano-Bond, capacity utilisation has 
quite an extended impact on the rate of capital accumulation. For the Pooled OLS, a 
percentage increase/(decrease) in capacity utilisation increases/(decreases) the rate 
of fixed capital accumulation by 0.018% at the 1% significant level in the current 
period, decreases/(increases) it by 0.015% at the 5% significant level in the second 
period, decreases/(increases) it by 0.006%  at the 10% significant level in the third 
period and increases/(decreases) it by 0.11% at the 1% significant level in the fourth 
period (a net increase/(decrease)). According to the LSDVC model estimates, a 
percentage increase/(decrease)  in capacity utilisation  increases/(decreases) the rate 
of capital accumulation by 0.032% at the 1% significant level in the current period, 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.029% at the 1% significant level in the second period, 
but increases/(decreases) it by 0.003% at the 1% significant level in the third period, 
and increases/(decreases) it by 0.0006% at the 5% significant level, in the fourth 
period (a net increase/(decrease)).  
 
The Arellano-Bond estimates indicate that a percentage increase/(decrease) in 
capacity utilisation increases/(decreases) the rate of capital accumulation by 0.033% 
at the 1% significant level in the current period, decreases/(increases) it by 0.029% 
at the 5% significant level second period, but increases/(decreases) it by 0.002% at 
the 10% significant level in the third period (a net increase/(decrease)). The MGE 
estimates however indicate that a percentage increase/(decrease) in the rate of 
capacity utilisation increases/(decreases) the rate of capital accumulation by 0.1% at 
the 1% significant level, in the current period, but decreases/(increases) it by 0.03% 
at the 20% significant level in the 4th period, a net increase/(decrease). The DFE 
estimates in Table 6.12 indicate that the rate of capacity utilisation has no significant 
impact on the rate of capital accumulation. But in all the four DFE estimates using 
four sub-sample periods presented in Table 6.14 to Table 6.17 changes in capacity 
utilisation cause significant changes in the rate of capital accumulation at the 1% 
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significant level, spread over more than one period. In these four estimates, a 
percentage increase/(decrease) in the rate of capacity utilisation causes a net 
increase/(decrease) in the rate of capital accumulation.  Given these robust evidence, 
we therefore infer that changes in capacity utilisation bring about significant net 
changes in capital accumulation in the same direction. 
 
 Long-term Interest rate: Although all five model estimates unanimously indicate 
that long-term interest rate granger causes the rate of capital accumulation, such 
unanimity disappears as regard the net impacts of long-term interest rate on the rate 
of capital accumulation. The Pooled OLS estimates indicate that a percentage  
increase/(decrease) in long-term interest rate does not significantly affect the rate of 
capital accumulation in the current period, but in the second period, causes a 
decrease/(increase) of 0.0006% at the 1% significant level, in the rate of capital 
accumulation, but brings about an increase/(decrease) in the rate of capital 
accumulation of 0.002% at the 5% significant level in the third period, and a 
decrease/(increase) of 0.001% at the 20% significant level in the fourth period (a net 
positive/(negative) impact). The DFE estimates indicate that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in long-term interest rate increases/(decreases) the rate of capital 
accumulation by 0.00177% at the 5% significant level in the current period, 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.0019% at the 5% significant level in the second period, 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.0015% at the 5% significant level in the third period, 
and decreases/(increases) it by 0.0015% at the 5% significant level in the fourth 
period (a net negative/(positive) impact).  
 
The LSDVC estimates indicate that 1% increase/(decrease) in long-term interest rate 
increases/(decreases) the rate of fixed capital accumulation in the current period by 
0.0017% at the 5% significant level, decreases/(increases)  it in the second period by 
0.0021% at the 5% significant level, increases/(decreases) it by 0.0016% at the 1% 
significant level in third period, and a decrease/(increase) of 0.0009% at the 20% 
significant level in the fourth period (a positive/(negative) net impact). In a similar 
vein, the Arellano-Bond estimates indicate that a percentage increase/(decrease) in 
long-term interest rate increases/(decreases) the rate of capital accumulation by 
0.0015% at the 1% significant level in the current period, a decrease/(increase) of 
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0.003% at the 1% significant level in the second period, an increase/(decrease) of 
0.003% at the 5% significant level in the third period, and a decrease/(increase) of 
0.0014% at the 1% significant level in the fourth period (a net positive/(negative) 
effect). This net of about 0.000005% is apparently economically insignificant.  
 
 Lastly, the MGE estimates  indicate that a percentage increase/(decrease) in the 
long-run interest rate decreases/(increases) fixed capital accumulation rate only in 
the third lag (fourth period) by 0.021% at the 1% significant level (a net 
negative/(positive)). All five estimators, except the MGE, suggest a positive 
contemporary impact of long-term interest rate on fixed capital accumulation rate. 
Out of all five model estimates, only two suggest a net inverse impact. A visual 
inspection of the time series shows that like capital accumulation rates, long-term 
interest rates trended downward generally, over the sample period. As pointed out 
earlier, the estimates are rather economically insignificant, even though they are 
highly statistically significant. The inconsistencies in the signs (directions) and sizes 
of the net impact of  marginal changes in long-term interest rates on capital 
accumulation, suggest  real long-term rates may be estimator sensitive. Moreover, 
this inconsistencies are consistent with the controversies in the literature, regarding 
the impacts of long-term rates on capital accumulation.  
 
Real Unit Labour Cost: The Pooled OLS estimates indicate that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in real unit labour cost would increase/(decrease) the rate of 
fixed capital accumulation in the current period by 0.0007% at the 5% significant 
level, decrease/(increase) it by 0.0007% at the 1% significant level in the second 
period and increase/(decrease) it by 0.00012% at the 5% significant level in the 
fourth period (a net increase /(decrease)). The DFE estimates indicate that a 
percentage increase/(decrease) in real unit labour cost increases/(decreases) capital 
accumulation rate by 0.0005% at the 1% significant level in the current period, but 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.0005% at the 1% significant level in the second period,  
increases/(decreases) it by 0.00017% at the 1% significant level in the fourth period 
(a net increase/(decrease)). 
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 For the LSDVC estimates, a percentage increase/(decrease) in real unit labour cost 
decreases/(increases) capital accumulation rate by 0.0004% at the 1% significant 
level in the current period, but increases/(decreases) it in the second period by 
0.0003% at the 1% significant level, and increases/(decreases) it by 0.0001% at the 
5% significant level in the fourth period (a net positive/(negative) impact). The 
Arellano-Bond model estimate indicates that a percentage increase/(decrease) in real 
unit labour cost decreases/(increases) capital accumulation rate by 0.0004% at the 
1% significant level in the current period, but increases/(decreases) it by 0.0003% at 
the 5% significant level in the second period, increases/(decreases) it by 0.0002% at 
the 1% significant level in fourth period (net increase/(decrease)). The MGE 
estimates suggests that a percentage increase/(decrease) in real unit labour cost has 
an impact on capital accumulation rate only in the third lag (fourth period), by an 
increase/(decrease) of 0.002%. at the 5% significant level.  
 
All the five estimated models unanimously attribute net positive/(negative)  impacts 
of a marginal increase/(decrease) in real unit labour cost, on the rate of capital 
accumulation. Similar to the impacts of a marginal change in long-term interest rate, 
the impacts of a marginal change in unit real labour costs on capital accumulation  
are highly statistically significant and extending to the third lag (fourth period) in all 
five cases, but rather economically insignificant. The significant positive and 
extensive impacts of real wages or real unit labour costs on the rate of capital 
accumulation give empirical support to the sundry theories that wage occupy the 
centre stage in the determination of fixed capital accumulation. The rather weak 
economic significance of long-term interest rates and real unit labour costs on fixed 
capital accumulation are likely explained by the relative costs of capital subsuming a 
significant part of the explanatory powers of long-term interest rates and real unit 
labour costs on capital accumulation.  
 
Relative Cost: Because relative cost is defined as the ratio of the cost of fixed capital 
(long-term interest rate) to the cost of labour (real unit labour cost), the expectation 
is that as it increases, the rate of fixed capital accumulation decreases as a 
consequence, ceteris paribus. But an increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of 
capital may result from an increase/(decrease) in the cost of capital (real long-term 
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interest rates) or a decrease/(increase) in real wage (real unit cost of labour). 
Therefore as the cost of capital (real long-term interest rates) increases capital 
accumulation should decrease and vice versa, ceteris paribus. Similarly, as real 
wages (real unit cost of labour) increase/(fall) the rate of capital accumulation by 
profit-oriented businesses should increase/(fall), ceteris paribus.  
 
The Pooled OLS estimates indicate that in the current period, a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of fixed capital decreases/(increases) the rate 
of fixed capital accumulation in the third period, by 0.127% at the 10% significant 
level, but causes an increase/(decrease) of 0.109% at the 20% significant level,  in 
the fourth period ( a net negative/(positive) effect of .018%). For the DFE, a 
percentage increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of capital decreases/(increases) the 
rate of fixed capital accumulation by 0.179% at the 5% significant level in the 
current period, increases/(decreases) it by 0.125% at the 20% significant level in the 
second period, decreases/(increases) it by 0.085% at the 20% significant level in the 
third period, but increases/(decreases) it by 0.14% in the fourth period (a net 
positive/(negative) impact of .004%). The LSDVC estimates indicate that  a 
percentage increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of capital decreases/(increases) the 
rate of fixed capital growth by 0.18% at the 5% significant level in the current 
period, increases/(decreases) it by 0.166% at the 10% significant level in the second 
period, decreases/(increases) it  by 0.126% at the 10% significant level in the third 
period, and increases/(decreases) it by 0.089% at the 20% significant level in the 
third lag (net negative/(positive) impact of .05%).  
 
Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond estimates indicate that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of capital decreases/(increases) the rate of 
capital accumulation by 0.164% at the 1% significant level in the current period, 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.309% at the 1% significant level in the second period, 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.295% at the 5% significant level in the third period and 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.139% at the 5% significant level in the fourth period ( a 
net negative/(positive) impact of 0.012%). Lastly, the MGE estimates indicate that 
the relative cost of capital has a statistically significant impact on the rate of fixed 
capital accumulation only in the fourth period (third lag), so that a percentage  
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increase/(decrease) in the relative cost of capital increases/(decreases) the rate of 
fixed capital accumulation by 2.26% (net positive/(negative) effect)). This parameter 
estimate would most probably be an outlier. Since three out of the five model 
estimates indicate that a percentage change in the relative cost of capital produces a 
net inverse change in the rate of capital accumulation, we infer that this is generally 
the case. A remarkable insight is that while long-term interest rate and real unit 
labour cost are very statistically significant but hardly economically significant, it is 
in their relative values (the relative cost of capital) that they exert both significant 
statistical and economic impacts on rates of fixed capital accumulation. 
 
 Trade-Openness: The five estimators have consistently shown that trade openness 
significantly granger causes capital accumulation, in that the lags have significant 
coefficients. Pooled OLS estimates indicate that a percentage increase/(decrease) in 
trade openness decreases/(increases) fixed capital accumulation by 0.0068% (i.e. 
0.0075-0.0006879*2) (where 0.0006879 is the estimated coefficient for trade 
openness squared) at the 10% significant level in the current period, 
increases(decreases) it by 0.0069% at the 20% significant level in the second period, 
decreases(increases) it by 0.0034% at the 20% significant level in the third period, 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.0025% in the third lag (fourth period) (a net 
negative/(positive) impact of .0008%). The DFE estimates indicate that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in trade openness decreases/(increases) the rate of fixed capital 
growth by 0.0117% (i.e. 0.0133-0.0016005*2) at the 1% significant level in the 
current period and increases/(decreases) it by 0.009%  at the 1% significant level in 
the second period (a net negative(positive)  impact of .003%).  
 
LSDVC estimates, indicate that a  percentage increase/(decrease) in trade openness 
decreases/(increases) the rate of fixed capital accumulation by 0.0075% (i.e. 
0.0099% - 0.0012279%*2) at the 1% significant level in the current period, 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.0084% at the 5% significant level in the second period, 
decreases/(increases) it by 0.0018% at the 10% significant level in the third period (a 
net negative/(positive) impact of .002%). The Arellano-Bond estimates indicate that 
a percentage increase/(decrease) in trade openness decreases/(increases) fixed 
capital accumulation by 0.007% (i.e. -0.0093811+0.0012058*2) at the 5% 
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significant level in the current period, increases/(decreases) it by 0.0064% at the 5% 
significant level in the second period (a net negative/(positive) marginal impact of 
.001%). By the second lag, the marginal effect will have been exhausted. The MGE 
estimates offer some complexities. They indicates that a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in trade integration increases/(decreases) capital accumulation 
rate by 0.021% at the 5% significant level in the second period. It 
decreases/(increases) accumulation by 0.025% at the 20% significant level in the 
third period. It increases/(decreases) accumulation by 0.027% at the 10% significant 
level, in the fourth period (a net positive/(negative) impact of .023%). The square of 
trade openness has the effect of dampening the immediate impact of trade openness 
on fixed capital accumulation. Hence the opposite sign to the parameter estimate of 
trade openness squared, at lag zero.  
 
The complexities in the MGE estimates in Table 6.12 include the suggestion that the 
net relationship between trade openness and capital accumulation is positive. We 
have suggested earlier that the MGE estimates and Pooled OLS in Table 6.12 might 
be outliers. Moreover, the four MGE model estimates using sub-samples data,  in 
Tables 6.14 to 6.17 have given strong indications that the relationship is 
significantly negative, with the net values for the estimated coefficients being -0.3%; 
-0.24%; -0.02%; and -0.03% at the 10% significant level on the average, for the 
MGE estimates in Table 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 respectively. Since the sub-
samples were derived under the assumption of the presence of structural breaks, a 
potential explanation may be that the unexpected MGE estimates for trade openness 
in table 6.12 might be slightly under the influence of structural break. We therefore 
infer that overall, the data and all the five estimators have provided highly 
significant support for an inverse causal relationship between trade openness and 
fixed capital accumulation in the short-run.  
 
6.8.2 Long-Run Analysis 
In Table 6.9 in an earlier subsection, cointegration tests indicated that long-run 
equilibrium relationships exist between fixed capital accumulation and the 
explanatory variables in the model. Values of the test statistics and p-values 
indicated that the strongest long-run co-movements with fixed capital accumulation 
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are the relative cost of capital and trade openness, probably in that order. This is 
consistent with our argument that as trade openness changes, it affects fixed capital 
accumulation through changes in the relative cost of capital. But Table 6.9 did not 
state the signs of the long-run relationships. But we could derive the coefficients and 
their respective signs. In the dynamic models, lags of the dependent variable were 
included as explanatory variables. An implication of such dynamic models is that if 
the lags are significant, then the effects of a marginal change in an explanatory 
variable may run far longer through time than explicitly indicated by the estimated 
coefficients. The cumulative effect is the long run effect. For the determination of 
the long-run effects for the estimators, we rely on Pesaran and Smith (1995). For the 
simple rational lag model with one autoregressive lag: 
                        𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜋0𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡………………..6.15 
                       (1 − 𝛿𝐿)𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜋0𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡………………...6.16 
                        𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
𝛼
(1−𝛿𝐿)
+ 𝜋0 ∑ 𝛿
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 𝑥𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 𝑖𝑡−𝑘 …....6.17                            
                                                    => 
                        Long-run aggregate impact of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is : 





   …………………………………6.18                      
                         If 0 <  𝛿 < 1. 
 
Equation 6.18, by the same analogy, implies that the long-term cumulative impact of 
a unit  change in trade openness on the rate of fixed capital accumulation is the ratio 
of the sum of the parameter estimates relating to trade openness and square thereof, 
divided by  unity (i.e. one) minus the sum of the parameter estimates of the 
autoregressive lag(s). In the case of the LSDVC model (Table 6.12), the cumulative 
effect of trade openness is the sum of the parameter estimates of trade openness and 
the square thereof divided by one minus the sum of the two lags of fixed capital 
accumulation. Furthermore on the estimated LSDVC model, a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in trade openness at time t would generate a cumulative or long-
run impact of (-0.009902 + 0.0083891+ -0.0017871 + 0.0012279)/ (1 – (1.03064+-
0.143032)) = 0.018% decrease/(increase) in fixed capital accumulation in the long-
run.  By similar algorithm, the cumulative long-term effects of the respective 
exogenous regressors could be computed and these are presented in Table 6.18 
below, for the five model estimates from Table 6.12. 
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Table 6.18: Long-run Model Estimates of Capital Accumulation (1960-2014) 
 Variable                        Pooled OLS             DFE           LSDVC       Arellano and Bond          MGE 
Profit share                       0.080****        0.205****        0.253****         0.239*                      0.110** 
Capacity utilization          0.737****                                 0.051****         0.040****                0.140**** 
Relative Cost                  -0.122**            0.023***         -0.447***          -0.075****                5.071**** 
Long term Rate                0.0006****     -0.0006***        0.003****         0.00003****            -0.048**** 
Unit labour Cost              0.0005****      0.0008****       0.0004****      0.0007****              0.004*** 
Trade Openness              -0.005**          -0.015****        -0.018****        -0.012***                 -0.145*** 
 ****; ***; **; and * represents 1%; 5%; 10% and 20% significant level, respectively 
 
Table 6.18 suggests that long-run estimates of the MGE and Pooled OLS are 
apparently outliers. The estimates of the DFE, LSDVC and Arellano-Bond are more 
similar and will be the focus of our interpretations. The long-run effects of marginal 
percentage increases/decreases in profit share, capacity utilisation and the real unit 
labour cost (real wage) on capital accumulation are direct or in the same direction. 
For long-term interest rate, the marginal effect on capital accumulation is on average 
positive. While being very statistically significant, the economic significance (sizes) 
of real unit labour cost and long-term interest rate are not significantly different 
from zero. It is in their ratio as the relative cost of capital that they exert significant 
economic impacts on capital accumulation. Relative cost is on the average negative 
and is both statistically and economically significant, suggesting that in the long-run, 
capitalists actively substitute labour for capital as the cost of capital increases 
relative to real unit labour cost and substitute capital for labour as labour cost 
increases relative to the cost of capital. This is consistent with the statistics readily 
available, that over the years, from 1960 to 2014, there was upward trending of  the 
ratio of labour to capital, in production methods. 
 
We interpret the long-run LSDVC estimates, in exemplification of the interpretation 
of Table 6.18. A percentage increase/(decrease) in profit share, increases/(decreases) 
capital accumulation by 0.25% at the 1% significant level, in the long-run. A 
percentage increase/(decrease) in capacity utilisation increases/(decreases) capital 
accumulation by 0.051% at the 1% significant level, in the long-run. A percentage 
change in long-term rate or real unit labour cost on its own causes no meaningful 
changes in capital accumulation. But a percentage increase/(decrease) in the relative   
cost of capital as a ratio of long-term rate to real unit labour cost 
decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 0.45% at the 5% significant level, in 
the long-run. A percentage increase/(decrease) in trade openness 
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decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 0.018% at the 1% significant level, in 
the long-run. Among the explanatory variables and statistical consistency, trade 
openness, real unit labour cost (real wage) and profit share have been the most 
consistent across all five estimators. 
 
The significant causality from trade openness to fixed capital accumulation rate does 
not necessarily imply that the upward trending trade openness was responsible for 
the observed decline in the rates of fixed capital accumulation, particularly as the 
long-run model estimates suggest that of all the six exogenous explanatory variables, 
the marginal impact of profit share, capacity utilisation, and relative cost dominate 
that of trade openness. The clue lies, among others, in the causative relationship 
between profit share and capital accumulation as well as capacity utilisation and 
capital accumulation. While profit share is positively related with capital 
accumulation, profit share was rather increasing during the sample period. Similarly, 
even though the long-run estimates of the parameter of capacity utilisation is 
positive, the trend in capacity utilisation over the period (Figure 2.4) makes it 
unlikely that it was the dominant driver of fixed capital accumulation since circa 
1970.  
 
The long-run coefficient estimate of the relative cost of capital is negative and 
greater than that of trade openness in absolute value. But the Regulation School 
theory, by arguing that over the observed period, increases in trade openness 
decreased real unit cost of labour and thus increased the relative cost of capital, trade 
openness must dominate the relative cost of capital. Furthermore, the standard 
volatility of trade openness was 0.454, while that of relative cost was just 0.046. 
From these cumulative evidence we therefore infer that trade openness dominated 
profit shares, capacity utilisation, long-term interest rates, real unit labour cost and 
the relative cost of capital in explaining the observed decline in business fixed 
capital accumulation of the post-Fordism years, in advanced capitalist economies. 
How therefore do these findings compare with the literature? 
 
6.9  Comparison with the Literature 
The findings that changes in trade openness cause inverse changes in fixed capital  
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accumulation, lend empirical support to the argument in the Regulation school 
literature that the international regime of a country is a major determinant of the 
pattern of capital accumulation (Brenner and Glick, 1991). The emphasis of the 
Regulation Theory is however on the inverse relationship between trade openness 
and real wages, with fall in real wages growth and consequently demand, implying 
fall in rates of capital accumulation. This is a demand-side perspective. This chapter 
extends this theoretical proposition in multiple ways. First, it augments it by 
introducing the supply-side based channel of trade openness through changes in 
relative cost and the consequent factors substitution. Second, it argues and supplies 
empirical evidence that increases in trade openness cause decreases in rates of fixed 
capital accumulation by businesses collectively, in advanced capitalist economies. 
Third, this chapter argues and supplies empirical evidence that the increases in 
economic openness through trade openness dominated, in the explanation of the 
observed decline in fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies 
after Fordism. These findings also complement the findings of Bhaskar and Glyn 
(1995) that profit rates alone no longer explain capital accumulation rates. 
Moreover, it highlights the weaknesses in empirical studies of the determinants of  
the rate of fixed capital accumulation that assume a closed economy. 
 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter has as its main objective, the investigation of the contributions of the 
increases in trade openness since the late 1960s or early 1970s to the decline in rates 
of fixed capital accumulation, as observed in advanced capitalist economies, after 
Fordism or since circa 1970. Theoretical propositions exist in the French Regulation 
School literature, that production in capitalism is a power relation and that capital 
accumulation is a function of the prevailing social structures or institutional 
configuration. Relying on these propositions, this chapter argues that there exist an 
inverse relationship between trade openness and fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capital economies, and that increases in trade openness dominated in 
explaining the post-Fordist decline in rates of capital accumulation as observed in 
these economies. Secondary annual data, as well as panel data methods were used, 
to enhance more robust findings. To minimise biases resulting from the weaknesses 
of a single panel data estimator, we adopted five panel data estimators and augment 
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these with panel data cointegration and structural breaks tests. Each estimator has 
some theoretical differences in assumptions, relative to alternative estimators. We 
initially adopted static analysis, to suppress the complications associated with 
dynamic panels. Pre-estimation assessments of a long-run relationship 
(cointegration) between trade openness and rates of fixed capital accumulation 
indicated that trade openness is highly cointegrated with the rate of capital 
accumulation. The structural break analyses were augment the evaluate of our claim 
that trade openness accounted more significantly for the observed declining rates of 
fixed capital accumulation. Given that the existence of structural break could bias 
the estimates of econometric models away from consistency, we estimated unknown 
breakpoints in the structural relationship and re-estimated the models on either sides 
of these breakpoints. Yet again, our argument receive overwhelming support from 
the data.  
 
Our findings also support the theoretical claim that profit shares/rates are positively 
causally related with rates of capital accumulation. We did not find much evidence 
of wages and the cost of capital being economically significant in their own right, 
but that the ratio of both as the relative cost of capital, is highly statistically and 
economically significant in the determination of the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation. Capacity utilisation was also found to positively and significantly 
granger cause the rate of fixed capital accumulation. We extend the regulation 
school focus on demand side by showing that the argument of the Regulation School 
is still valid from a supply-side, using a cost/profit optimisation argument that 
underpins factors substitution by profit-oriented capitalist firms.   
 
The range of tools of empirical analyses employed in this chapter provides strong 
empirical evidence that for advanced capitalist economies, trade openness is 
inversely related to fixed capital accumulation by profit-oriented businesses. That 
the increases in trade openness dominated in explaining the observed declining 
trends in rates of business fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist 
economies. In the next chapter, we empirically investigate the relationship between 
financial openness as a form of economic openness or international regime, and the 
rates of fixed capital accumulation by profit-oriented businesses, in advanced 
capitalist economies. 
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Chapter 7 : An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Capital 




This chapter argues that the capital account liberalisation from the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s, significantly contributed to the observed decline in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. Adverse effects of financial 
liberalisation on fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies are not 
new in the debate on the cause of the declining trends in fixed capital accumulation, 
since the demise of Fordism, as observed in advanced capitalist economies. In fact 
financial liberalisation underpins most of the causes proposed in the literature before 
now. But empirical studies by scholars in this debate, have so far overlooked  the 
possible deleterious effects of the increases in financial openness resulting from  
extensive capital account liberalisation that started in the mid-1980s, across 
advanced capitalist economies.  
 
It has been argued in the French Regulation School literature that capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, is a function of the configuration of 
social structures or institutions. The five fundamental social structures or institutions 
in such configuration are the form of competition, the wage relations, the state form, 
the money form, and the international regime (Jessop, 1990a). However, an 
international regime includes the state of financial openness and capital account 
liberalisation, just as it consists of the state of trade liberalisation and trade 
openness. The data have furnished significant evidence that the change in 
international regime through increases in trade openness, subsequent to the trade 
liberalisation of circa 1970, significantly explained the observed post-Fordist decline 
in fixed capital accumulation. Therefore the financial openness from the mid-1980s 
by the same analogy, should have also contributed to the observed decline in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation, in advanced capitalist economies. 
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 But do increases in financial openness cause decreases in fixed capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies? If they do then through what 
channels do they exert their inverse effects on the rate of fixed capital accumulation?  
This chapter seeks to answer these questions and investigate the contributions of 
financial openness to observed decline in fixed capital accumulation.  The structure 
of this chapter is as follows: section 7.2 reviews theoretical literature. Section 7.3 
reviews relevant empirical literature. Section 7.4 develops a theoretical framework. 
Section 7.5 specifies the model. Section 7.6 highlights the variables. Section 7.7 
highlights the sample and data. Section 7.8 presents the empirical results and 
findings. Section 7.9 compares the findings of the chapter with existing literature. 
Section 7.10 presents a summary of the chapter.  
 
7.2 A Review of Theoretical Literature 
The concept of financial openness refers to how opened a country is, in terms of 
international financial flows. It is a rather complex one in that quite a few 
components make up international financial flows: foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows, portfolio investment flows; reserve flows; and ‘other investments’ flows. 
Moreover, FDI flows, ‘other investments’  flows and portfolio investment flows, 
have both inward and outward flows. It is, therefore, a veritable food for thought 
whether the conglomeration of these heterogeneous financial flows could have 
systematically affect rates of fixed capital accumulation, let alone played any 
significant role in the observed decline in rates of fixed capital accumulation of 
advanced capitalist economies. 
 
In the Empirical literature on the debate on the cause of declining rates of fixed 
capital in advanced capitalist economies, the buck seems to stop with the extensive 
domestic financial liberalisation of the mid-1980s and thence, whose de facto form 
became very apparent in the early 1990s. The assumption is usually the existence of 
some power structures in capitalist firms that are usually the loci of capital 
accumulation (Boyer, 2007). Within the firm, the dominant classes of capitalism 
(wage labour, managers and owners of capital) are locked in fundamental and 
eternal struggles, arising from conflicts of class-centric interests. Each of these 
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classes strives to influence corporate strategic and tactical decision processes, in 
pursuit of class-centric aggrandisements. On one hand, wage-labour tends to strive 
for corporate activities and decisions that could promote greater employment 
security, higher real wages, shorter working hours and other wage-labour-friendly 
benefits. The uncontrolled realisation of these aspirations of wage-labour would 
progressively denude the economic benefits that could accrue to owners of capital, 
in form of higher profit rates, (Clarke, 1990).  The owners of capital, on the other 
hand, tend to strive for corporate resources to be used in such a way that generates 
higher corporate profit rates (efficiency) over the long-term. Which way the firm 
sways is therefore contingent upon the locus of net balance in power between these 
classes, which in turn depends on the outer social/institutional framework, as argued 
in the Regulation School theory. This corporate power structure background is not 
however unique to the Regulation School, as many scholars in both Marxist 
literature and Post-Keynesian literature also share this view (Stockhammer, 2004, 
2005-6; Dallery and Van Treeck, 2008, 2009; Duménil and Lévy, 2011).  
 
A leitmotif  among  relevant scholars from across these schools of thought is that the 
wave of financial liberalisation that cut across  advanced capitalist economies from 
the mid-1980s to the ultimate decades of the 20th century, shifted the net balance of 
power in favour of owners of capital. Consequently, new principle of corporate 
governance emerged, that is exclusively geared towards shareholder value 
maximisation (Ellsworth, 1985). Empowered by the aforementioned financial 
neoliberalism and justified by the principle of shareholder value maximisation 
otherwise known as shareholder value orientation, capitalist firms have 
progressively indulged in corporate practices aimed at shareholder aggrandisement. 
These often involve the deployment of corporate resources or the distribution of 
corporate value-added in logical permutations that have the greatest prospects of 
enriching the capitalists class and their agents, but often at the expense of wage 
labour and rates of corporate fixed capital accumulation (Boyer, 2013; Alvarez, 
2015). Below, are practices underpinned by shareholder value orientation and 
argued to have caused the decline in rates of  fixed capital accumulation. 
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7.2.1 Increases in Profit Pay-outs: Interest Charges and Dividends 
One shareholder value orientation-based corporate governance practice argued to 
have caused the observed decline in rates of business fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies, is the dramatic increase in corporate profit pay-outs 
to owners of funds, in forms of interest charges and higher dividends (Aglietta and 
Breton, 2001; Van Treeck, 2009; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Lazonick, 2014). 
According to this strand of argument, capitalist firms tend to finance corporate fixed 
capital accumulation with retained earnings. Consequently, increases in these pay-
outs have over the years, squeezed out fixed capital accumulation, by eroding 
retained earnings that could potentially fund higher fixed capital accumulation.  One 
mechanism through which the newly empowered fund owners (particularly 
shareholders) enforce this increases in pay-outs, is commonly argued to be the 
market for corporate control (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). According to some 
contributors of post-Keynesian provenance, shareholders inherently want higher 
profitability, at the expense of corporate growth through capital accumulation, while 
corporate managers, prefer corporate growth and accumulation, as this is the source 
of managers’ power and prestige. Shareholders may get managers to indulge in 
shareholder value maximisation from payments of higher dividends and interests 
through the new market for corporate control that developed in the wake of financial 
liberalisation. But managers may also be enticed by the offer of lucrative 
remunerations (carrot), if they succumb to shareholders’ biddings of increases in 
payments of interests and dividends.  
 
Recalcitrant managers are forced to yield to shareholders biddings for higher profit 
appropriations, through the market for corporate control. This involves the threat 
(stick) of a hostile corporate takeover from undervaluation of corporate equities in 
the financial market, if disgruntled shareholders were to dump sufficient volume of 
their holdings of the firm’s equity in the secondary capital market. Hostile takeovers 
have the grim prospect of managers losing their jobs, due to the change in 
ownership. But can increases in profit pay-outs actually reduce rates of fixed capital 
accumulation? Recollect the Kaleckian profit determination model in which gross 
profit (P) is expressed as the sum of gross investment (I), export surplus (X-M), 
capitalist consumption (D), the budget deficit (G-T), less workers savings (S) (i.e. P 
= I + D + (X-M) + (G-T) - S) (Kalecki, 1954:49). Capitalist consumption (D), is 
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assumed by Cordonnier (2006) to be identical to dividends. If we assume that 
household savings finance budget deficits, the profit determination becomes P = I + 
D + (X-M). Re-arranging to make I the subject of the equation and dividing through 















 is the ratio of 
corporate dividend to fixed capital stock. The foregoing capital accumulation 
equation suggests that if dividend payments to capitalists are sufficiently high 
relative to stocks of capital, then dividend payments could potentially reduce rates of 
fixed capital accumulation (
𝐼
𝐾
). This seems to give some theoretical credence to the 
increases in dividend and interest payments argument. But this increases in pay-outs 
argument has its flaws, from standpoints of both the shareholder value orientation 
theory and economic theory. 
 
A recommended corporate practice that co-emerged with the shareholder value 
orientation, is the classification of business units according to their growth and profit 
potentials. For business units that are classified as having high growth and high 
returns prospects, the policy prescription is heavy investments or higher capital 
accumulation, if shareholders wealth is to be maximised. Business units with high 
market shares and low growth and profitability improvement prospects are often 
milked through higher profit distributions to shareholders, as increasing capital 
accumulation in these units may be at some disservice to shareholder value 
maximisation. Therefore in line with the Cambridge model, an important 
determinant of rates of capital accumulation is its profitability prospect. If it is high, 
capital accumulation increases, if it is low, more funds are distributed to 
shareholders. Poor profit rates prospects may be a potential reason for the observed 
increase in profit pay-outs (see the Boston Consulting Group Matrix for more 
details). 
 
At the core of shareholder value orientation principle of corporate governance is 
equity market price (see Froud et al., 2000a, p.99). Studies have found empirical 
support for a strong positive relationship between equities market prices and 
valuation of equities using the Gordon dividend model (Kaplan, 2016). The Gordon 
dividend model estimates the market value/price of a corporate equity as the present 
value of the future dividend cash flows, so that the higher the dividend cash 
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payments, the higher the equity’s value and thus shareholder wealth. However, an 
essential component of the model, is the growth rate of dividend cash flows. The 
higher the growth rate, the higher the evaluation of the equity by the model and the 
market and thus shareholder wealth. Underlying a robust growth rate is significant 
underlying capital accumulation or its substitute. Otherwise, informed investors 
would see through and the value of the equity may be adversely affected.  
 
Furthermore, there is a tendency toward a strong positive association between 
capital accumulation and the free cash flows to equity, which is the source of cash 
available for dividends (ability to pay dividends). Where capital accumulation is 
declining without alternative cash-yielding assets to compensate the decline, then 
long-term free cash flows, dividends and the growth thereof, would be jeopardised. 
Informed shareholders would therefore, factor in the rate of growth of fixed capital 
or alternative cash-yielding assets so that if rates of accumulation is found to be 
jeopardised, higher dividends will reduce the market value of such equities and 
shareholders wealth rather than increase it. Owing to asymmetric information, 
investors may rely on actual dividend flows and observed growth rates thereof to 
value equities. Where capital accumulation is falling in a case  of misleading growth 
in profit pay-outs, informed investors would realise before long, that the going 
concern prospect of such firm is poor. Thus higher profit pay-outs would not be to 
the benefits of shareholders. Consequently, managers would not pay out profits to 
the detriments of capital accumulation. Therefore rapid fixed capital accumulation 
may still matters, unless profit rate prospect is too low to justify it. Aglietta and 
Breton (2001) have argued that there are two sets of shareholders: majority 
shareholders who have as their collective objectives, higher corporate growth and 
lower corporate financial leverage. There also exist a set of minor shareholders that 
are bent on higher dividend payments and they get managers to do their biddings 
through the market for corporate control. Majority shareholder should be able to 
constrain, through their voting power, the ability of minority shareholders to induce 
capital accumulation retarding profit distributions that would also harm the interest 
of the majority shareholders. 
 
From some economic theory perspectives, it is an issue whether the theory of  higher 
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profit pay-outs as a microeconomic behaviour could actually transform into the 
macroeconomic process of declining fixed capital accumulation.  Assuming demand 
is not affected and all other factors remain constant, then falls in supply growth from 
lagging productive capacities through not accumulating enough capital, would 
increase output prices and create sellers’ markets that yield economic rents. Such 
rents would encourage new entrants, who would accumulate new fixed capital at 
rates that could potentially compensate declining rates of capital accumulation of 
existing higher dividends firms. Such compensating capital accumulation would 
shield the dynamics of macroeconomic capital accumulation from the impact of 
increases in microeconomic dividends. Moreover, there exists the counter 
macroeconomic argument that increases in profit pay-outs as higher dividends and 
interests to capitalists may be spent on consumption that stimulates market demand, 
which in turn,  increases rates of capital accumulation at the macroeconomic level. 
 
Would the capitalist firms necessarily increase rates of capital accumulation if they 
could reduce the level of dividend cash payments? A critical weakness of the higher 
profit pay-outs argument derives from the assumption that profits of firms not paid 
out as dividend are necessarily funnelled into fixed capital accumulation. This is 
apparent from the rendition of fixed capital accumulation identity by Aglietta and 
Breton (2001:456) as 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝐾𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾𝑡; where 𝐾𝑡+1 −
𝐾𝑡 is the incremental fixed capital stock,  𝐼𝑡 is  the contemporary gross fixed 
investment,  𝛿𝐾𝑡 is the amount of fixed capital depreciation,  𝑆𝑡 is the contemporary 
savings by firms (post-distributions earnings), and 𝐷𝑡+1 − 𝐷𝑡 is the incremental 
borrowing. Furthermore  𝑆𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑟𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡, which expresses retained earnings 
of firms as corporate earnings (𝑃𝑡) before finance costs (𝑟𝐷𝑡 ) and dividends (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 ), 
less finance costs and dividends.  
 
But corporate savings (retained earnings) may assume alternative investments forms 
or cash balances, so that retained earnings may not necessarily be channelled into 
real fixed capital accumulation. In  recent decades, many firms have been saddled 
with free cash balances on their balance sheets, begging for profitable investment 
outlets. Observations have indicated that one of the factors that explain the high 
rates of post-Fordist hostile corporate take-overs (particularly leveraged buy-outs) is 
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the amount of idle cash on the corporate balance sheets. This has created the slogan 
of ‘buy or be bought’ (Kaplan, 2016). Therefore a possible issue that this theory has 
failed to look at, is whether there are really profitable capital accumulation 
opportunities if retained profit is not paid out to shareholders. Besides, Aglietta and 
Breton (2001) have just suggested that retained profits could be augmented by 
corporate debts in the financing of capital accumulation. Observations have 
indicated that by far the most popular dividend policy (by the number of adopting 
enterprises) is the stable dividend, whereby firms pay  stable amounts that increase 
at  lower rates than rates of growth of profits, and these include big multinationals 
(Kaplan, 2016). Dividend decisions are often the decision of management. Although 
shareholders may arm-twist management into increasing dividend payments through 
the market for corporate control, it is the responsibility of management to 
convincingly prove that net earnings could be more profitably invested in enhancing 
shareholder value than being paid out as dividends. 
 
 Data on dividend pay-outs presented in chapter one of this thesis, suggest that 
increases in dividends might unlikely have decreased fixed capital accumulation. In 
the case of the  US, from 2003-2012, out of the 500 companies of the S&P 500, 449 
companies spent US$1.64 trillion (37% of their profit) on dividend. Translated into 
pay-out ratios, the average pay-out ratios in the US were 47.9% in the 1950s; 42.2% 
in the 1960s and 42.3 in the 1970s; this ratio jumped to 49.3 in the 1980s; and 49.6 
in the 1990s (see Lazonick and  O’Sullivan, 2000). Going by these statistics, the 
pay-out ratios in the 1950s and 1960s are high compared to other decades, but the 
1950s and 1960s were documented to be decades of higher rates of capital 
accumulation. Although the ratio increased by 7.1% from 1970 to 1980 when 
extensive de jure financial liberalisation occurred, rates of capital accumulation 
were already in decline in the 1970s, before this jump in pay-out ratios. The increase 
in pay-out ratios from the 1980s to 1990s is only 0.3. This 0.3% increase is likely 
less than the increase in corporate debts over the same period, which could have 
financed business fixed capital accumulation.  The argument of higher dividend pay-
out as proposed in the likes of Aglietta and Breton (2001), van Treeck (2008) and 
Duménil and Lévy (2011), under the context of domestic financial liberalisation in 
closed economies, upon closer analyses would, therefore, appear to be rather 
problematic. 
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7.2.2 Increases in Managers Incentive Pay/Remuneration 
A variant of the increased earning pay-outs argument, is the proposition that pay-
outs that are actually at the root of the capital accumulation squeeze, are increases in 
managers’ remunerations by shareholders (Boyer, 2005). Higher incentive payments 
to managers often assume the form of corporate share options, running to values 
significant enough to potentially reduce rates of capital accumulation. These 
increases in managers pay, adversely impact capital accumulation potentially 
through three means. Managers are incentivised to subordinate fixed capital 
accumulation to meeting shareholders financial targets. Second, managers tend to 
meet financial targets through the rationalisation of labour employment and real 
wage growth, consequently reducing demands that could induce greater capital 
accumulation, if growth is wage-led. Finally, the level of financial outlays to 
managers if such share options are “in the money” are often enough to reduce the 
rates of capital accumulation, through reduction in capital accumulation funding. 
But there are so many firms in which the owners and managers are identical. 
 
7.2.3 Increases in Share Buybacks Argument 
Increases in share buybacks have often been associated with the new principle of 
corporate governance and are being argued to explain the observed decline in fixed 
capital accumulation. In the US, the volume of share buybacks was estimated at 
US$5 billion in 1980. This rose to US$349 billion in 2005 (Wikipedia on share 
buybacks). These were 1% (US$5bn/US$439.079bn) and 33% 
(US$349bn/US$1069.178bn) of domestic net business real fixed investments in the 
United States. This was quite a considerable increase. It could be argued that share 
buybacks are effectively ways of returning money to shareholders/rentiers, just like 
dividends. The derivation in section 7.2.1 from the Kaleckian profit model suggests 
that if the ratio D/K increases significantly, it could significantly reduce fixed capital 
accumulation. The increase from 1% to 33% is arguably a significant change and 
thus over the years could seemingly have caused a significant decline in fixed 
capital accumulation across the advanced capitalist economies, if share buybacks are 
widespread. 
 
 Over  years of active share buybacks, from 2003-2012, 449/500 of the S & P  
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companies bought back their shares worth US$2.4 Trillion (54% of their profits) 
(Lazonick, 2014). Share buy-back has increasingly been popular in the US, but has 
also begun to take root in the UK, other European countries and even Japan 
(Lazonick and O’ Sullivan, 2000). But why should domestic financial liberalisation 
of the mid-1980s to 1990s suddenly wreak this dangerous spell of share buybacks on 
the corporate world? The observation that from 2003 to 2013, corporate 
organisations in the S & P 500 group spent over US$2 trillion on share buybacks, 
which have raised the S & P 500 index by up to 70% over this period (see Chisholm, 
2013, 2016) may provide a clue: to increase shareholder value or increase equity 
market prices (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). Shareholder value maximisation is 
closely associated with  increases in market valuation and according to Chisholm 
(2016), share buybacks alone increased market equity prices by about 70% from 
2003 to 2013 in the US. But as pointed out in the subsection under increased 
dividends, Studies have shown that the most crucial determinant of equity prices and 
thus shareholder value is the total free cash flows of a firm. This, in turn, depends on 
acquisition of some underlying cash yielding assets, including fixed capital 
accumulation, depending on the rate of return of such assets (Kaplan, 2016). A firm 
could therefore as well increase shareholder value by undertaking fixed capital 
accumulation with sufficient rates of return and cash flows as share buybacks.  
 
Managers have to objectively satisfy the condition that there exists no superior 
alternative deployment of such cash, e.g. in adequately profitable fixed capital 
investment, to be able to justify and document that such share buybacks are in the 
best interest of corporate owners (Atkins et al., 2013);(see also Froud et al, 2000a; 
2000b) for the example of Unilever and ICI).  Consequently, by opting for share 
buybacks rather than fixed capital accumulation, a valid inference is that returns and 
cash flows from candidate fixed capital investments may not be sufficient to 
increase shareholder value to desired level. Therefore, while share buyback is 
actually becoming a global practice and increasing in volume, very often the 
distribution of cash in share buybacks may result from the dearth of re-investment 
opportunities that could generate the target level of returns. A rationale for share 
buybacks, some have argued, is to ward off hostile corporate takeover (Aglietta and 
Breton, 2001). Yet it may have been motivated by incentive remuneration schemes 
offered to managers (Boyer, 2005; Lazonick, 2014). There exist a host of alternative 
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methods that could be employed by managers to reduce the threat of hostile 
takeovers, apart from share buybacks that allegedly curtail fixed capital 
accumulation. One of such alternative methods is the ability to prove that existing 
capital stock and future capital accumulation could actually be sufficiently high 
enough to increase shareholders value more than the value on offer by the predator 
firm (see Kaplan, 2016). So share buy-backs as  means of reducing the threats of 
hostile corporate takeovers are less likely to be so extensively used to the point of 
significantly straitjacketing fixed capital accumulation, if fixed capital accumulation 
were adequately profitable.  
 
It cannot be overemphasised that share prices in capital markets, earnings per share, 
ROE (return on capital employed) could be more easily met by ploughing back 
profits into profitable investments opportunities, if such opportunities exist. 
Managers have to consider the possible consequences of such buybacks on corporate 
cash positions. Therefore even if there exist some shareholders more keen on cash 
distribution than have the firm funnel cash into profitable investments that are 
usually cash guzzlers, to the extent that the absence of target return investment 
opportunities induce cash dividends or share buybacks, then the argument that share 
buybacks have been financially constraining fixed capital accumulation is 
weakened. 
 
7.2.4 Investments in Financial Assets by Non-financial Firms 
The observations that non-financial firms have been increasing their accumulation of 
financial market assets, over the decades since financial liberalisation have moved 
some scholars to argue that these financial assets have been squeezing out fixed 
capital accumulation (Stockhammer, 2004). Over the years since financial 
liberalisation until the global financial crisis of 2007, acceleration in rates of 
accumulation of financial assets on the balance sheets of non-financial corporations 
has been the norm, particularly in advanced capitalist economies (IMF, 2006). It is 
intuitive that financial assets accumulation could be a credible alternative to fixed 
capital accumulation, in terms of the use of resources of profit-oriented firms to 
generate profits. Both classes of assets could be sources of periodic cash inflows as 
income, and both could also be sources of capital gains. Either of them could 
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underpin cash dividend payments and growth in dividend payments. Both could also 
underpin increases in shareholder value 
 
But why did increases in firms’ preferences for financial assets over fixed capital 
accumulation occur later rather than earlier, say in the Fordist years? During 
Fordism, the preferred asset class to accumulate by non-financial corporations was  
fixed capital rather than financial assets. If firms have turned to the accumulation of 
financial assets instead of fixed capital accumulation, the inference is that such 
financial assets accumulation more easily fulfil the goals of higher returns and 
higher shareholder value than fixed asset accumulation. This is particularly true for 
large non-financial corporations (Vickers, 1987; Kaplan et al., 2006). Why were 
there changes in profitability fortunes of fixed capital versus financial assets? There 
is a consensus that firms could invest in fixed capital or financial assets as 
substitutes, depending on prevailing macroeconomic conditions. The ultimate reason 
why fixed capital  accumulation is sacrificed at the altar of financial asset 
accumulation remains controversial. Firms tend to accumulate financial assets in 
place of fixed assets for speculative and for liquidity purposes (Woodford, 1990; 
Holmstorm and Tirole, 1998). But speculative and liquidity drives are both 
symptoms of increased market liquidity. Changes in macroeconomic conditions 
have led to periods of rapid increases in financial market liquidity and growth. 
Empirical evidence exist to suggest that when financial market returns are 
excessively high, financial assets tend to become substitutes for real fixed capital 
accumulation.  
 
But changes in macroeconomic conditions may be underpinned by changes in 
institutions or social structures. The institutional changes some scholars have 
identified were the extensive financial liberalisation of the late 1980s and thereafter, 
particularly the privatisation of pensions. These scholars have argued that this 
financial liberalisation is the source of the new increases in market liquidity, that 
raised progressively, prices of assets in financial markets. Yet in the relevant 
political economy literature, closed economy and domestic liberalisations are often 
assumed and capital account liberalisation ignored. If sources of financial market 
liquidity were only internal, inflows of such liquid resources into the financial 
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market would have been unsustainable over decades. The unsustainability derives 
from the fact that financial assets demand-based capital gains may be fictitious, if a 
gain by one agent implies a loss of another agent. As internal source liquidity 
progressively pushes up financial assets prices,  the resulting  price increases imply 
fewer assets out of the total available financial assets could be bought with new 
liquidity of domestic source. The implied fall in demand would, before long, create 
asset glut that would crash prices and returns of financial assets. Internal source 
increases in liquidity, therefore, has limited ability to cause progressive increases in 
financial asset returns. The prolonged growth in financial market liquidity and 
returns since the late 1980s until the global financial crisis of 2007, would suggest a 
wider, foreign source of liquidity, made possible by capital account liberalisation. 
The massive liquidity flows of foreign funds to domestic financial markets, by 
analogy, could also have driven up prices and returns of financial assets relative to 
those of fixed capital, in the same manner as local source liquidity. These foreign 
flows reversed abruptly around 2007, when financial assets markets returns crashed.  
 
In closed economies,  widespread accumulation of financial assets at the expense of 
fixed capital accumulation would reduce productive capacities. Assuming 
consumption demand is not adversely affected, then reduction in productive 
capacities will cause commodity prices to increase. Such increases in prices will in 
turn increase profits and cash flows from fixed capital accumulation and the appeal 
of financial assets will then be reduced, as a consequence. The increases in profits 
and cash flows from fixed capital will increase rates of fixed capital accumulation, 
according to the Cambridge model, as new entrants and even existing firms increase 
their rates of fixed capital accumulation. It is an argument of this thesis, that 
increases in financial openness cause decreases in fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies. The extensive capital account liberalisation across 
advanced capitalist economies after Fordism, increased financial openness, which in 
turn, reinforced trade openness in explaining observed progressive decline in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, after Fordism. Greater 
financial openness is relevant, either in the way of driving up financial assets prices 
(assets returns requirements, see Boyer, 2000) or empowering capitalists in ways 
that ultimately result in financial assets accumulation. Financial openness dominated 
both liquidity of domestic source and trade openness, in depressing the rate of fixed 
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capital accumulation, for it is argued that Financial openness, as a variant of the new 
international regime, through international competition was by far more than trade 
openness, responsible for the change in macroeconomic conditions observed after 
Fordism (Brender, 1996; Aglietta, 1998). How can and, how have increases in 
financial openness contributed to observed decline in fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies?  
 
7.2.5 Channels of Impacts of Financial Openness 
There are a few channels through which increases in financial openness due to  
capital account liberalisation from the 1980s could and have reduced rates of fixed 
capital accumulation by profit-oriented businesses. 
 
7.2.5.1 Impact on Equitable Distribution of Income 
There appears to be some overlaps between trade openness and financial openness 
with regards to channels of impacts on fixed capital accumulation. Increases in 
financial openness tend to depress real wage growth. A potential explanation is that 
alternative derivation of corporate earnings from financial assets facilitated by 
increases in financial openness, reduce the importance of labour in corporate income 
generation, the bargaining power of wage-labour and consequently reduce growth 
rates of real wage and the distribution of income to wage-labour (Alvarez, 2015). 
The depression of real wage growth depresses the rate of fixed capital accumulation. 
This is because a cardinal condition for greater accumulation of capital, is equitable 
distribution of income and greater financial openness upsets this distributive equity 
(see Boyer, 1993, 2013; Aglietta, 1998; Petit, 2010). Inequitable distributions at the 
expense of wage labour, may hamper the growth rate of consumption demand, and 
therefore capital accumulation. During the period of negligible financial openness of  
Fordism, fixed capital accumulation was observed to be at historically high levels. 
When the former was increasing dramatically, real wage growth was declining, as in 
post-Fordism (Glyn et al., 1992; Aglietta, 1998, p.60). Threats of relocating 
production facilities and employment abroad, have often been used effectively to 
weaken labour bargaining power and induce compromise in wage growth (Boyer, 
2013).   
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7.2.5.2 Accumulation of Fixed Capital Abroad 
Capitalist firms have the option of accumulating fixed capital abroad, instead of 
doing same locally. This option has been extensively exercised, as shown by the 
large outflows in foreign direct investments by multinational companies. If foreign 
direct investments flow out, there should be similar inflows to counteract the 
adverse fixed capital accumulation impact of FDI outflows, some may argue. 
Statistics have however indicated that FDI outflows (which intuitively have greater 
accumulation impacts) far outweigh FDI inflows to advanced capitalist economies. 
The motives for such relocation are usually higher profit rates and higher 
shareholder value prospects (or in search of cheaper labour and divided labour force, 
according to Cowling and Sugden (1987)). Thus through financial openness, 
corporations hitherto constrained by regulating institutional configurations were able 
to expand their quests for higher profits to foreign countries, by globalising 
production (see Aglietta 1998, p.65-66). Studies have found that firms that maximise 
shareholder value, in descending orders are: multinationals with foreign production, 
firms engaging in international trade but not foreign production, and lastly, firms 
engaging in neither foreign trade nor international production (Fillat and Garetto, 
2015). Accumulation of production facilities abroad, may have fixed capital 
accumulation at home as an opportunity cost. 
 
7.2.5.3 Impact through Greater Competition and Business Risk 
Increases in financial openness increase international competition, as new entrants 
(firms) from foreign countries into an industry become more likely, or domestic 
firms encounter greater substitutes for their products. The impact of competition on 
fixed capital accumulation is however controversial. On the one hand, we have the 
Smithian view that increases in competition increase innovations and capital 
accumulation (Bain, 1956; Porter, 1992). On the other hand, we have the 
Schumpeterian view that competition hinders capital accumulation (Schumpeter, 
1939). Some contributors have argued that the impact is industry dependent (Mathis 
and Sand-Zantman, 2014). Brenner and Glick (1991) have argued that most Marxist 
and non-Marxist thinkers perceive that competition promotes rapid investments in 
fixed capital, as the need for survival encourages investments in fixed capital to 
facilitate the reduction in production cost, by cutting down the cost of labour; and 
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that the profit potential associated with such strategy outweighs the disincentive 
from the increase in investment risks under competition (for a comprehensive 
rejoinder to Brenner and Glick, see Aglietta, 2008). 
 
Going down historical lane, Fordism was a period of low inter-firm competition but 
high fixed capital accumulation. The post-Fordist years have been those of rat-race 
inter-firm competition. The vertiginous increases in the cross-country flows of 
financial resources following capital account liberalisation have hiked international 
inter-firm competition (capital-capital competition), compared to the period of 
Fordism when competition and risks were rather low for the large Fordist 
corporations (Aglietta, 1998). Petit (1999) has argued that stiff competition from 
increased economic openness during post-Fordism has been the most dominant 
institution during neoliberalism; the institutional nexus of the post-Fordist 
institutional configuration. However, the post-Fordist years have been years of 
extensive decline in fixed capital accumulation. These empirical observations 
therefore fail to support the view that increases in competition increase fixed capital 
accumulation by firms.  
 
Increases in competition raise business risk, in that they increase the volatility and 
uncertainty of cash flows used for investments valuation. Competition reduces 
expected cash flows and increases business risk, which in turn increases the discount 
factor used in capital accumulation appraisal. These generate the tendency for  fixed 
capital accumulation projects to be deemed as unviable. Consequently, Firms are  
more interested in harvesting profits, buy rather than produce, or where production 
is necessary, the production method is biased towards labour intensity. It is the view 
of the Regulation School that higher inter-firm competition constrains fixed capital 
accumulation, as firms are more inclined towards profit pursuits, through methods 
that embody absolute value, thus biasing the system away from intensive 
accumulation (see Boyer, 1987; Aglietta, 1998). This risk-accumulation perspective 
of the Regulation school was further proclaimed in Brenner and Glick (1991):  
  “It is undoubtedly true, as the Regulationists argue, that capitalists have found the 
risk of investing in fixed capital under fiercely competitive conditions to pose 
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significant problems for capital accumulation and thus technical change” (Brenner 
and Glick, 1991, p.55). 
Fixed capital formation is quite expensive in terms of resources, and it takes a long 
time to recoup costs of investments. Under intense competition, there exist high 
chances that similar investments could be executed by rival firms, so that the 
strategic advantage from such investments would be eroded before long, and the 
anticipated financial flows that could recoup the costs of investments may never be 
fully realised. Therefore the willingness to invest is an inverse function of the ease 
and time  involved for rival firms to undertake similar investments to undercut the 
anticipated advantage. The higher the competition, the shorter is this time and the 
easier it is for the advantage to be undercut. Therefore, the Regulationist perception 
of the relationship between competition and capital accumulation apparently has 
more logic. Some Marxists have posited adverse impacts of the increased risks of 
neoliberal competition on accumulation (Crotty, 2003). Higher risks tend toward a 
smaller firm size (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Herranz et al., 2015). Across the 
Advanced capitalist economies, the manufacturing sector has encountered the most 
intense international competition as well as having fared worst in terms of capital 
accumulation (Glyn, 1995).  
 
7.2.5.4 Effect through International Portfolio and Other Investments Flows 
International portfolio flows form a further channel via which international financial 
openness adversely impacts rates of fixed capital accumulation, in advanced 
capitalist economies. One difference between foreign direct investments and 
portfolio investments is that foreign direct investments represent some significant 
equity interests in  investees; while portfolio flows are not. Furthermore, foreign 
direct investments embody higher liquidity risk relative to portfolio investments. 
Therefore for firms whose interest is the liquidity of their investments, foreign 
portfolio investments would be more likely. The consequence, however, is that 
domestic firms convert fund that could have increased home fixed capital 
accumulation into foreign portfolio holdings. Statistics indicate that portfolio 
inflows to advanced capitalist economies have been higher than either of portfolio 
outflows or FDI inflows. Some impacts of such vast inflows of portfolio 
investments, would include a progressive upward pressure on financial assets prices 
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or returns, and the tendency to substitute financial assets for fixed capital 
accumulation. Portfolio flows may be in the form of equity flows, or debt flows. By 
analogy, the same could be said about ‘other investments’ flows and even reserve 
flows.  
 
7.2.5.5 Impact through Financial Market 
Another channel through which greater financial openness causes decline in 
business fixed capital accumulation is found in the financial market. It relies 
strongly on the power relations argument. In the golden years of Fordism 
shareholders/rentiers (capitalists class) were not in the position to press for the 
pursuit of their wish. Either because capitalists were constrained in their ability to 
act by then existing institutions (Boyer, 2013) or shareholders were too few, 
uninformed and scattered, to present any unified activism (van Treeck, 2008). Then 
the banks dominated finance just as there was tight regulation of finance. There was 
the subordination of equity market to the industrial sector. There was high positive 
elasticity of fund ( as bank credit) to change in corporate fixed capital formation 
(Aglietta and Breton, 2001, p.434). Then financial markets were majorly relevant 
only during episodic financing needs of real investment of firms. 
 
Then extensive financial and capital accounts liberalisations  started from the mid-
1980s, which proved to be the connecting points of the new economy, occupying the 
centre stage among the institutional drivers of observed macroeconomic patterns 
since their onsets in the mid-1980s, modifying the connection between financial 
variables and fixed capital accumulation, through changes in corporate strategies 
and financial innovations (Aglietta and Breton, 2001, p.435-437). Financial and 
capital account liberalisations severed the strong connection between financial 
market dynamics and the rest of the economy, including fixed capital formation 
rates. It made the financial system a Frankenstein monster, with  highly liquid 
markets and new brands of dominant and aggressive shareholders empowered by the 
market for corporate control, who influence corporate policies in their favour and 
often at the expense of wage labour. These are mainly pension funds, mutual funds, 
life assurance companies and other money managers of domestic and foreign 
origins. Shareholders, aided by financial markets, set required financial targets for 
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their firms (Boyer, 2000). Capital account liberalisation produced the influx of 
foreign shareholders who reinforced, if not dominated the new brands of 
shareholders. These wealth maximising shareholders, prescribe return targets based 
on the global financial market, e.g. returns as high as 15% (Aglietta, 1998, p.81). To 
meet these high financial targets, companies investments shifted primarily to 
information technology (ibid) and arguably financial assets investments.    
 
Boyer (2000) gave only a schematic depiction, not a detailed mechanism, of how  
financial markets and shareholders generate financial targets for their firms. The 
literature on financial market practice suggests that this process may find a practical 
expression in the concept of capital assets pricing model (see Kaplan, 2016). Under 
this model, the required return of a firm, is set in relation to the financial (asset) 
market return. The required return (r) is determined as:  
                                𝑟 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑒(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚) …….7.1   
𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑒  is equity beta of the firm and market premium is the 
difference between the financial market return and the risk-free rate. Equity beta is 
an index of how risky the firm is relative to the financial asset market. The financial 
asset market is the universal set of this type of financial asset. The equity beta varies 
positively with the level of financial leverage (financial risk) of the firm and how 
risky the fixed assets (capital) of the firm are, relative to the market (business risk) 
indexed by the asset beta. When asset risk (asset beta) increases, e.g. from higher 
economic openness, or debt to equity ratio (financial risk) increases, equity beta 
increases through the asset beta or leverage respectively, so that the required 
financial return target for the firm by shareholders with the aid of the financial 
market (r) increases. If for some reasons asset prices increase, e.g. through greater 
market liquidity(demand) or increases in assets fundamental, financial assets prices 
and the market premium increase and consequently, the required rate of return for 
the firm also increases, assuming the risk-free rate and equity beta remain constant.  
 
 If the number of firms meeting their target returns is sufficiently high, their good 
financial performances  increase market assets prices and market premium, which in 
turn increase the required return expected of the firm. Such good performances 
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attract further financial inflows/outflows to domestic and foreign asset markets, 
mutatis mutandis. Such increases in financial flows/liquidity in turn, increase asset 
prices (see Minsky, 1975), market premium and the required return sets for the firm, 
in the next period. If the firm fails to meet expected required return, increases in 
market liquidity enables shareholders to enforce it through the market for corporate 
control. With financial openness dominating and sufficiently protracting this 
process, there thus emerges a protracted vicious cycle from de facto financial 
openness to required returns and back to de facto financial openness, until the 
process exhaust itself in a crisis.  
 
An option open to firms as returns of financial market assets as well as their required 
returns go up in a spiral, is to increase their holdings of financial assets, to facilitate 
the achievement of  their required returns. Increases in financial assets holdings may 
aid the realisation of required returns, through superior returns of these financial 
assets, or expand the asset portfolios of firms, in mimicry of the asset market, with 
the view to decreasing their risks and thus their equity betas and consequently their 
required returns. Moreover, firms may extend these acquisitions to share buybacks, 
to reduce the ability of shareholders to enforce these targets or to enable managers 
realised their incentive remuneration schemes of share options. Whatever the reason, 
financial assets acquisitions become at the expense of greater fixed capital 
accumulation, in that fixed capital accumulation is becoming less effective in the 
achievement of shareholders objectives, and those of managers now in alliance with 
shareholders. However, the increases in demand/liquidity as firms acquire more 
financial assets, reinforce the vicious cycle. The result of this vicious cycle, was the 
rapid rise in financial assets value on balance sheets of non-financial corporations, 
from the period of capital account liberalisation to the 2007 global financial crisis. 
For evidence of how the astronomical acquisition of financial market assets have 
pervaded the activities of non-financial corporations in advanced capitalist 
economies since the financial and capital account liberalisations, see Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000); Aglietta and Breton ( 2001, p.437); and  Stockhammer (2004)  
 
Increases in returns from financial assets holdings reduce the significance of wage-
labour in generating income of non-financial corporations, and consequently reduce 
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their bargaining power and the growth rate of real wages (Alvarez, 2015). In the 
spirit of maximising shareholder value, non-financial corporations tend to substitute 
these cheaper labour for fixed capital, in production (see Froud et al, 2000b; Boyer 
2013; Fiebiger, 2016). Thus non-financial corporations increased their holdings of 
domestic and foreign financial assets that facilitated the achievement of their 
financial targets (Froud et al, 2000b). FDIs, foreign portfolio and other investments,  
domestic  portfolio and similar domestic financial assets increasingly appeared on 
the balance sheets of domestic firms, as financial assets investments in the section 
also occupied by fixed capital accumulation. Share buybacks may also appear in this 
section as treasury shares. The surge in share buybacks in the US was facilitated by 
the spikes in cheap loanable funds in the US (Chisholm, 2016) and Europe (Zega, 
2016). The significant role of financial openness in the cost and availability of funds 
is well covered in the relevant literature.  In 1980, the gross influx of foreign funds 
into the US was US$63.05 billion (about 5% of stock market capitalisation) and 
US$1.2395 trillion (higher than 7% of stock market capitalisation) in 2005, an 
increase of about 1900%. Financial outflows other than FDI in search of investment 
opportunities from the US were an aggregate US$68.81 billion in 1980, and together 
with net FDI, totalled  US$71.06bn in 1980 and US$439.079bn 2005 respectively.  
 
With heavy demand and liquidity of financial market assets by pension schemes, 
managers of pooled household savings, of both domestic and foreign origins, 
financial engineers in a bid to supply these assets and unconstrained by 
liberalisation, restructured and re-bundled assets risks into different categories of 
risks to suit different risk appetites. These structured financial products were  
important to non-financial firms that wish to spread their risks, following spikes in 
business risk introduced by international competition from greater financial 
openness. But often, these assets are not backed by new productive fixed capital 
investments (Dymski 2010). Financial assets consequently grew independently of 
fixed capital accumulation. These financial innovations by financial engineers 
resulted in vertiginous increases in traded volumes and liquidity of financial 
securities associated with derivatives. The argument here is distinguished from 
previous works on how the acquisition of financial assets squeezed out fixed capital 
accumulation, by expressly introducing the role of capital account liberalisation, as 
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consistent with the argument in Boyer (2000) that the foreign sector actually 
aggravated the domestic dynamics.  
 
7.2.6 Financial Openness and Capital Accumulation: Alternative Views 
Alternative views on financial openness and fixed capital accumulation exist in the 
mainstream literature. One strand has its root in the Solow growth model and 
advocates from the perspective of international allocative efficiency. It posits that 
higher capital account liberalisation induces capital flows from capital-rich to 
capital-poor economies, owing to differentials in returns to capital. This is, 
therefore, returns differential perspective. The capital-rich countries are arguably 
advanced capitalist economies. The capital-poor countries tend to be the 
underdeveloped economies. Thus financial openness implies higher capital 
accumulation in developing countries. It does not necessarily imply a fall in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies. What then is the 
implication for advanced economies? The neoclassical theory is rather silent on this. 
But the implication that it could cause decreases in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation in capital-rich countries was acknowledged by Henry (2007). 
 
Another view is that net inflows to developing economies depresses the cost of 
capital and increases access to fixed capital finances, thus triggering a temporary 
increase in rates of  fixed capital accumulation in developing countries (Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti, 1997; Fischer, 1998, 2003; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 
2000; Acemoglu et al., 2006; Henry, 2007). Actual series of capital flows, however, 
bears little resemblance to this theoretical propositions of mainstream economics, as 
flows to capital-rich nations are greater than flows to capital-poor nations (Lucas 
Paradox). Another argument is that increased financial openness causes financial 
instability, and financial instability is bad for physical capital investments (Rodrik, 
1998; Stiglitz, 2000).  This view does not discriminate between advanced and 
underdeveloped countries.    
7.3 A Review of  Empirical Literature 
Some studies in the 1990s failed to find empirical evidence of a significant causal 
relationship between financial openness and the rate of fixed capital growth (see 
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Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Dooley, 1996; Kraay 1998; Rodrik, 1998). Other 
studies such as Henry (1997), Quinn (1997) alleged to have found a positive 
relationship. Bonfiglioli (2008) estimated fixed capital accumulation and 
productivity separately, using different measures of financial openness and using 
cross-sectional econometrics, both for developed and developing economies. He 
assessed both direct and indirect impacts (through financial instability (as suggested 
by Stiglitz, 2000 and Rodrik, 1998) and financial development effect (in the spirit of 
Klein and Olivei, 1999)) of financial openness on capital accumulation and 
productivity, using data from 1975-1999. The findings include a negligible direct 
causal relationship between rates of fixed capital accumulation and financial 
openness. The findings also include some adverse effects of financial instability 
(banking crisis and currency crisis) on capital accumulation and productivity, and 
that financial integration causes instability (only banking instability) in developed 
economies and increases the probability of occurrence of the crises in developed 
economies.  
 
In all cases, the alternatives of de jure and de facto measures of financial openness 
were used. The de jure measures include dummy indicators by IMF, ranging from 1- 
0, and an index by Quinn. The distortionary effects/potentials of using this kind of 
de jure measures are highlighted in Henry (2007): because they originate from 
binary measures of capital control, where all countries are treated utterly 
closed/opened, there are no allowances for factual variations in intensities, both 
across time and countries. Aside cross-section regression, non-overlapping 5-year 
observations dynamic panel estimates over 1975-1999 were also executed. This 
thesis is distinguished from Bonfiglioli (2008). The focus of this thesis is advanced 
capitalist economies, their focus are all countries. While theirs is underpinned by a 
neoclassical perspective, this thesis is underpinned by the institutional perspective of 
the Regulation school, where financial openness represents a social institution. An 
argument also exists that the channel of causation between financial openness and 
fixed capital accumulation is rather a tenuous one, in that financial openness affects 
physical capital accumulation indirectly, via financial development (see King and 
Levine, 1993; and Beck et al., 2000). 
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A strong positive causal relationship between rates of capital accumulation and 
financial openness was found by Gehringer (2013). Gehringer used financial 
liberalisation, financial openness, and financial integration as synonymous. The 
focus, in this case, was on the European economy. The methodology was similar to 
Bonfiglioli (2008): there were 3-year non-overlapping averages of annual data from 
1990 to 2007; and 18-year averages to produce a cross-section estimation. Similarly, 
in their measure of financial openness, de jure and de facto measures were 
employed. The de jure measure was the Chinn and Ito (2008) de jure indicator; 
while the de facto measure is the ratio of the sum of annual stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities to GDP, in the spirits of Kose et al, (2009), Masten et al, (2008) and 
Prasad et al, (2003). Gehringer (2013) found a positive significant relationship 
between capital accumulation and financial openness/integration, using the de jure 
measure. Note once again that her indexes of financial openness and of capital 
accumulation differ to the ones in this thesis. Gehringer (2013) specified capital 
accumulation as the logarithmic growth rates of fixed capital stock (an inverse of 
exponential growth rate). The index of capital accumulation in this thesis, is the ratio 
of fixed capital formation/investment to fixed capital stock, identical to the index 
used by Aglietta and Breton (2001), van Treeck (2008), Duménil and Lévy (2011) 
and Glyn et al. (1992) and others. Furthermore, the index of financial openness is 
different to the one in this thesis. Her de facto measure is the ratio of the sum of 
foreign assets and liabilities stocks to GDP while the one in this thesis is the ratio of 
the sum of financial flows to GDP. Her focus is European countries and therefore 
makes no distinction between advanced and emerging economies. Moreover, this 
thesis is investigating the empirical implication of the Regulation School theory. 
Thus on the bases of underpinning theoretical frameworks and the definition of the 
dependent variables and the argument variables, Gehringer (2013) and this thesis are 
conceptually different. 
 
Why higher financial openness cannot have a significant impact on real 
macroeconomic variables in general and on rates of capital accumulation in 
particular remains paradoxical to Henry (2007). According to Him, most of the 
empirical neoclassical studies that failed to find real effects of financial openness, 
did not really test the theoretical propositions of the neoclassical school of thought. 
It has been observed that the tendency in the empirical literature on financial 
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integration and capital accumulation underpinned by neoclassical theories, is to 
focus on developing countries or failure to distinguish between advanced and 
underdeveloped economies. These studies have so far refrained from directing the 
research searchlight on the potential implications of financial openness for fixed 
capital accumulation, exclusively in advanced capitalist countries. This may perhaps 
be explained by the presence of a theoretical lacuna in neoclassical economics, 
regarding the relationship between financial openness and fixed capital 
accumulation in  advanced capitalist economies. 
 
There are also studies that investigating the causative relationship between financial 
openness and output (GDP) growth, but this is not our focus. A few existing 
empirical articles have also looked into the positive causal relationship between 
financial openness and financial development (Levine, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 
2003; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Baltagi et al., 2009). We distinguish these studies from 
this thesis. Whereas the rate of fixed capital accumulation is an important 
macroeconomic variable, and financial openness has been a topical issue in recent 
times, there has not been any rigorous empirical analysis of any causal relationship 
between financial openness and rates of growth of fixed capital accumulation 
particularly from the perspective of the Regulation school theory.  
 
Relevant empirical studies in the political economy literature include those that have 
found some significant relationship between an increase in corporate profit pay-outs 
and corporate capital accumulation (van Treeck, 2008). They also include those that 
have found a significant relationship between corporate accumulation of financial 
assets and fixed capital accumulation of corporations (Stockhammer, 2004, 2005-6). 
Studies that have also found a significant relationship between share buybacks and 
fixed capital accumulation are relevant (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Duménil and 
Lévy, 2011). The relevance mostly stems from the assumption of some underlying 
power relations in the capital accumulation setting and identical specifications of 
capital accumulation. But they have not looked at the relationship between capital 
accumulation and financial openness. Others include empirical investigations in the 
Social Structure of Accumulation theory, whose focus is on the relationship between 
capital accumulation and power, with focus on the US. To the best of our 
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knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate the contributions of financial 
openness to fixed capital accumulation and the observed decline in rates of capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, under the Regulation School theory 
and this is a source of our originality.  
 
The two most relevant studies to the investigation in this chapter of the thesis, are 
Boyer (2000) and Aglietta and Breton (2001). While the former is similarly based on 
the French Regulation School theory, it invokes the role played by the new power of 
shareholders and market for corporate control in reducing fixed capital accumulation 
through higher dividend payments and share buybacks. It, however, assumed a 
closed economy. Boyer (2000) argues the new practice of financial markets setting 
financial returns targets for corporations, and the significant negative relationship 
between these set targets and rates of fixed capital accumulation. The theoretical 
framework developed in this chapter among others extends this view of Boyer 
(2000) by providing a more specific form to the process of financial targets setting 
and the channel through which these set targets potentially reduce fixed capital 
accumulation (increased financial assets accumulation and capital-labour 
substitutions) that implicated a crucial role of the relative cost of capital with respect 
to the cost of labour. It also extends the argument in Boyer (2000) by extending the 
roles of  financial openness in the new practice of  financial market targets setting, 
and the relative cost of capital. By these framework and extensions, this chapter 
develops a specific form to the argument in the Regulation School literature that 
capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies is a function of the 
configuration of the international regime, money form, competition form, state form 
and wage relations, as argued in Jessop (1990a) and others. Thus a connection is 
explicitly made between financial openness and corporate fixed capital 
accumulation of advanced capitalist economies. 
  
7.4 The Development of a Theoretical Framework 
This section relies on the combination of a few theoretical propositions, to develop 
an algebraic reasoning that seeks to link financial openness to rates of fixed capital 
accumulation. 
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Assumptions: the relationship between the firm and capitalists. 
1 There is a fundamental struggle between the capitalist classes, regarding the 
distribution of value created between wage and profit. 
 
2 Business earnings generating properties belong to firms, while capitalists own the 
firms, as represented by documents such as equities. A capitalist has one or more 
varieties of such documentary wealth in a collection called portfolio. The total value 
of the portfolio is the wealth of the capitalist. Documentary assets are valued by 
financial markets. The value of a financial asset as well as the market is a function 
of two components: the value of the underlying assets and the state of 
liquidity/demand in the market.  A financial asset stands in a defined relationship 
with the market, in terms of relative risk, as given in equation 7.1.  
 
3 The basis for choosing documentary assets (financial assets) to include in the 
portfolio is the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviations of  the 
returns of an asset to the mean of their returns). If the coefficient of variation of an 
asset is higher than that of the market, capitalists reduce their holdings of the asset, 
and increase their wealth or prevent their wealth from falling by holding more of an 
asset that has at least the same coefficient of variation as the market. Otherwise, they 
bias their portfolio in favour of an asset with a lower coefficient of variation than the 
market, at the expense of an asset that has a coefficient of variation equal to or 
greater than that of the market. When an asset falls out of favour with the capitalist, 
it could have adverse consequences for a firm and the managers. Therefore a firm 
and its managers dislike it when capitalists reduce their holdings of the financial 
assets of the firm. 
 
4 The fundamental values of  financial assets and the market are the respective net 
present values of the cash flows of their underlying assets, that would flow  from the 
firms to the owners over some specified period either as dividends, share buybacks 
or other forms of (partial) capital liquidation. The increases in shareholders wealth 
from the increases in demand or market liquidity are the present values of the 
differences between cash sales of the assets and the fundamental values of the assets 
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or market. If the fundamental value falls or remain constant, shareholder wealth 
could still be increased from increases in demand or liquidity (thus increase in 
market liquidity tends to increase market values and shareholders wealth. See 
Minsky, 1975; Bergin, 2011). Higher liquidity facilitates disciplinary disposal of 
financial assets   
 
Increases in financial openness give the capitalists power over their firms, in that, 
firstly greater financial openness reduces the limits of the geographical (spatial) 
constraints on portfolio value optimisation, and reduces the dependence of 
capitalists on the fortunes of one firm. Secondly, it increases total liquidity or 
demand for assets in general (the market) and thus the returns to financial assets of 
capitalists, as implies by equation 7.1 (and Minsky 1975) and ultimately capitalist 
wealth. Thirdly, capitalists could more easily punish  firms and managers through 
(disciplinary) sales of the assets (the market for corporate control), from increase in 
market liquidity. Firms and managers, therefore, seek to increase the returns to or 
value of their equities, to yield the required returns as set by the markets in equation 
7.1, by increasing the present value of the cash flows of assets of the firms. They 
could increase the present value by suppressing cost and thus increasing net cash 
flows or reducing the discount factors that divide into net cash flows to obtain 
present values, by reducing risks relative to the market (equity betas). This includes 
reducing competition or mimicking the market by increasing holdings of more 
varieties of  financial assets, like the market. 
 
The relation within the firm (Firm versus labour) 
Firms/managers could increase the present value of physical assets by suppressing 
real wage growth. Firms or managers have the option of meeting shareholders value 
requirements by acquiring more of such fixed capital with more cash flows from 
suppressed real wage or turning to the financial markets for help, i.e. increasing 
holdings of financial assets that hold promises of higher cash flows than its fixed 
capital over time. Either or both thus helps to discourage the capitalists from 
punitively dispensing with  assets of such firms from their assets portfolios. 
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Lastly, between the firms/managers on the one hand and wage labour, on the other 
hand, greater financial openness gives greater credence to threats by  firms/managers 
to labour, of unemployment prospects (increasing financial assets abroad through 
FDI and foreign portfolio holdings) and therefore able to hold-down real wage 
growth. Firms now have alternatives offered by greater financial openness, to meet 
shareholders returns requirements and make themselves valuable to capitalists, while 
labour becomes less relevant. |Labour thus compromises in accepting suppressed 
real wages and or working longer hours with the same pay, so that firms can 
increase net cash flows from their fixed capital and, even more so  through greater 
substitution of labour for fixed capital (see Hicks, 1963; Romer, 1987; Alvarez, 
2015; Fiebiger, 2016). 
 
Because liquidity increases market returns and thus the expected returns of each 
financial asset, if initial financial openness is sufficiently high, then an initial 
increase in market liquidity may be sufficient to jumpstart the process elucidated 
above. Increases in financial openness give capitalists power over firms, which in 
turn have recourse to the market for help by acquiring more profitable financial 
assets, and as a source of  leverage over labour. To the extent that labour has no 
holdings of financial market assets, and more labour or financial assets is substituted 
for fixed capital, labour and domestic fixed capital accumulation become the 
ultimate losers in the power relations, as greater financial openness subjects both the 
firm and labour to capitalists and labour to the firm. Even with the increased cash 
flows from fixed capital due to suppressed real wage growth, firms could still 
substitute more financial assets for fixed capital, if returns from the former exceed 
that of the latter because of increases in market liquidity. 
 
The Consequence 
-Firms increase financial assets acquisition as their returns increase from greater 
market liquidity.  
-Labour becomes less indispensable, has wages growth suppressed and increasingly 
used in place of capital, to increase fixed capital net cash flows.  
The fixed capital – financial assets trade off could be algebraically presented thus:  
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                                       𝑇𝑅 = 𝑅𝑘𝐾 + 𝑅𝑓𝐹……………….(a) 
                                      𝑑𝑇𝑅 = ∆𝑅𝑘𝑑𝐾 + ∆𝑅𝑓𝑑𝐹 = 0…...(b) 
                                      ∆𝑅𝑘𝑑𝐾 = −∆𝑅𝑓𝑑𝐹……………....(c) 



















𝑇𝑅 is an expected or required return sets by the market. 𝐾 is fixed capital stock. 𝑅𝑘 
is expected returns on fixed capital. 𝐹 is the stock of financial assets held by a firm. 
𝑅𝑓 is expected returns on financial assets portfolio. Because 𝑇𝑅 is set by the market, 
we assume that firms are not able to adjust it in the nearest future, so that change in 
(𝑑𝑇𝑅) is 0. ∆𝑅𝑘 is change in expected return of fixed capital stock. ∆𝑅𝑓 is change in 
expected return of financial assets. The total differential equation of the second line 
(b) above, suggests that a given change in the required returns set by the market 
could be met by changes in the returns of fixed capital and financial assets, or 
changes in the stocks of fixed and financial assets, or both. 
 
Equation (d) suggests that the rate at which capital stock changes with respect to the 
stock of financial assets is the negative of the ratio of  change in returns to fixed 
capital and change in financial assets. Equation (f) suggests that 
increases/(decreases) in financial assets stock of a firm is associated with 
decreases/(increases) in fixed capital stock, at the rate of the ratio of the change in 
returns to capital stock to the change in returns to financial assets. Therefore as 
expected returns on financial assets increase relative to those of fixed capital  in a 
liberalised financial market, firms tend to substitute financial assets for fixed assets 
at higher rates, so that rates of fixed capital accumulation decline, assuming firms 
are constrained by the market to optimise risk adjusted returns.  Because increases in 
financial openness tend to increase the liquidity and therefore returns in financial 
market/assets, by the above analogy, increases in financial openness tend to reduce 
the rates of fixed capital accumulation.  
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The increases in returns of financial assets in general,  increased the volumes and 
values of financial assets on domestic corporate balance sheets in post-Fordism, 
across the OECD countries (see Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2005; Jayadev and 
Epstein, 2007; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Alvarez, 2015). To buttress the 
above algebraic process with a balance sheet approach and bring in international 
financial openness, we assume a typical corporate balance sheet is as in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 A Representative  Structural Corporate Balance Sheet 
(Source: Produced by author) 
 
Where items B, C, D, E, F and G have been on the average increasing progressively 
with the dominantly upward financial markets of post-Fordism. From the above 
balance sheet, with C and R representing cash balances and Reserve respectively, we 
develop the algebraic reasoning in Table 7.2. The partial differentials in equations 
13, 14 and equation 15 in the table, suggest rates of fixed capital accumulation vary 
inversely with financial openness. The constraint 𝛽 < 𝛾 in equation 10 and equation 
11 suggest that the marginal impact of gross capital outflows on fixed capital growth 
                   Capital & Liabilities                                                    Assets 
                                                                     £                                                                                    £ 
                      Capital                                   X                         (A) Goodwill (GW)                          X 
 
 
              Long Term liabilities                     X                         (B) Fixed Capital (K)                        X                    
                                                                                                      Financial Assets:               
                                                                                                 (C) FDI (outward) (FDIO)       X 
              Short Liabilities                            X                          (D) Foreign Portfolio (PO)       X 
                                                                                                 (E) Other Investment (OIO)     X 
                                                                                                     (Outward) 
 
                                                                                                  (F) Domestic Portfolio (PD)    X 
                                                                                                  (G)  Reserve                             X      X 
                                                                                                  (H) Cash                                            X 
              (I)  Total Fund                           XX                           (I) Total Assets (TA)                       XX 
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Table 7.2: Financial Openness and Assets Substitution: An Algebraic Modelling 
            𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝐺𝑊𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 + 𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 …………………………1 
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(Source: Author derived) 
is higher than that of gross capital inflow. This is intuitive, because while gross 
outflow affects fixed capital accumulation directly, gross capital inflow affects the 
- 207 - 
rate of fixed capital accumulation through its impact on prices and returns of 
domestic financial assets. The first term (ratio of total assets to GDP) in 6/7 fairly 
accounts for the neoclassical argument that the initial stock of capital matters. 
 
The balance sheet (assets portfolio) approach highlights the direct effect of  financial 
market as a channel of impact of financial openness on fixed capital accumulation. 
A second effect, an indirect effect, is potentially through the method of production.  
As labour loses bargaining power there is a negative distributional impact on real 
wages (see Froud et al., 2000b; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Alvarez, 2015). 
Firms would, therefore, be incentivised to use more labour instead of capital, to 
reduce the cost of production (i.e. biasing production methods toward labour 
intensity). These increases in the ratio of labour to capital would tend to exert 
downward pressures on rates of fixed capital accumulation, across the advanced 
capitalist economies.  
 
In the seminal work of Lavoie (1992), extended by Stockhammer (2004) (see also 
Dallery, 2008; van Treeck, 2008; Dallery and van Treeck, 2008; 2009) in the post-
Keynesian literature, a model is developed, where over a certain phase, there exist 
an inverse relationship between the pursuit of shareholder’s (capitalists’) goal of 
higher profitability and the objective of growth. It is assumed that there exist  power 
structures in capitalist firms, so that institutional changes could alter the locus of 
influence in these power structures. In the political economy argument, as 
shareholder power increases, e.g. because of  financialisation, and impose higher 
profit targets on firms, activities of firms shift toward pursuits of higher profit rates 
and may cause lower growth rates.  Dallery and van Treeck (2009), lamented the 
knowledge gap in the outworking of this process in the presence of greater 
international economic openness. This chapter, therefore, by explicating a 
relationship between financial openness and fixed capital accumulation through 
changes in shareholder power, this lacuna in knowledge acknowledged by Dallery 
and van Treeck (2009) is filled. If increases in financial openness, representing 
changes in an international regime, enhance the power of shareholders, then this new 
post-Keynesian model of capitalist firms suggests that decreases in rates of fixed 
capital accumulation could result from increases in financial openness. By assuming 
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a closed economy, scholars might have overlooked the ultimate driver of the 
dynamics they seek to explain, in the debate on the cause of observed decline in 
advanced capitalist economies’ rates of capital accumulation. Managers, driven by 
targets set by financial markets with international boundaries, may intentionally 
increase the volumes of financial assets of local and foreign origins or share 
buybacks on their balance sheets, and accumulate at lower rates, fixed capital, to 
meet these set targets.  
 
The dynamic force that underpins deliberate assets substitutions by managers, are 
the assets returns differentials. Managers now desire financial assets more than fixed 
capital, as markets that set financial targets for managers, seemingly offer managers 
ways of pursuing the attainment of these targets. It is, therefore, less likely the case 
that higher dividends, share buybacks financially constrained fixed capital 
accumulation. If shareholders want higher profit pay-outs, and fixed capital returns 
are no issues, shareholders would be incentivised  to tolerate managers’  increase of  
corporate debts for greater capital accumulation that would facilitate higher profit 
pay-outs. Corporate debts and leverage increased rapidly, but significant portions 
thereof were spent on dividends, financial assets acquisitions and share buy-backs, 
in spite of the displeasure of majority shareholders for greater financial leverage 
argued by Aglietta and Breton (2001). 
 
7.5  The Model Specification 
A number of models have been suggested in the literature. For example, Boyer 
(2000) expressed capital accumulation as a function of profitability-financial norm 
differentials and changes in demand. Aglietta and Breton (2001) expressed the rate 
of capital accumulation as a function of profit rate, debt ratio, and dividend payment. 
However, there need not be some corresponding co-movements between capital 
accumulation and debt ratio (see Lavoie, 1995a). We, however, prefer the most 
adopted model (the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) investment growth model) by 
similar empirical papers in the political economy literature. The Bhaduri and 
Marglin investment growth function expresses capital accumulation as a function of 
profit share and capacity utilisation. It modifies the capital accumulation- profit rate 
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relationship, with the objective of making the role and importance of capacity 
utilisation in capital accumulation dynamics more obvious. The model, augmented 
with  real long-term interest rate, real unit cost of labour, the relative cost of capital, 
trade openness and financial openness is given in equation 16 below, were apart 
from financial openness, all other included variables are control variables. The 












                                       𝜕~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝛿𝜕) 
 
                             𝐻0: 𝛽7 < 0       𝐻1: 𝛽7 ≥ 0 
 
7.6  The variables 
The model has been used widely in the both the post-Keynesian and Regulation 
empirical literature, and we elucidate the model and the included variables in this 
section. See Chapter 6 for further details on the variables.  
 
Profit share: The impact of profit share, while expected to be significant, may have 
signs dependent on the underlying theory. Under the exhilarationist model of growth 
and distribution in the post-Keynesian literature, it is expected to be positive, in that 
profit rate could be analysed into profit share and capacity utilisation. Under the 
exhilarationist model, higher profit share brings about higher capital accumulation. 
Where capacity utilisation is assumed to be exogenous as in the Cambridge model, 
higher profit rate brings about higher capital accumulation, and higher profit rate 
may imply higher profit share, ceteris paribus. Lavoie (1995) has argued that under 
the Cambridge model where capacity utilisation is assumed to be normal in the long 
run, the rate of fixed capital accumulation varies positively with profit share. Some 
authors in the Regulation School literature do not necessarily share this view. These 
authors have argued that wage rate determines capital growth rate and since a higher 
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profit share implies a lower wage share/rate, profit share should be inversely related 
to fixed capital accumulation. Some SSA scholars, however, argued a positive 
relationship. Based on this contrasting views, therefore, profit share may be + or -. 
Profit share is the ratio of gross operation profit to the sum of this profit and 
employee compensation. Data were obtained from AMECO online. 
 
Capacity Utilisation: In the Kaleckian growth model, capacity utilisation is 
supposed to have a significant direct effect on capital accumulation (Lavoie, 1995b). 
While it may be assumed endogenous in the Kaleckian model, it is assumed to be 
exogenous in the Cambridge model. We index capacity utilisation as the ratio of 
actual output to potential output, in the spirit of Weisskopf (1987, p.139). Data were 
obtained from AMECO online.  
 
Long term interest rate: Under a simplified Kaleckian model, Lavoie (1995) argues 
that an increase in real interest rate shifts down the investment function and by 
implication capital accumulation. This is because in that model, capital 
accumulation increases with the positive difference between expected profit rate and 
real interest rate. However, the Cambridge and Eichnerian models imply that a 
reduction in interest rate generates a lower rate of fixed capital accumulation. Thus 
in the same school of thought, the apriori sign of interest rate with respect to capital 
accumulation, may be positive or negative. Lavoie (1995, p.157) has argued that 
even the Neo-Ricardian strand of the post-Keynesian model of growth and 
distribution suggests a “direct positive” relationship between the real rate of interest 
and profit share/rate, implying indirectly, a positive relationship between real 
interest rate and fixed capital accumulation. Lavoie (1995a) however suggested that 
even if capital accumulation declines in response to interest rate, it would be limited. 
Pivetti (1985) is however of the view that whether real interest rate would exact a 
negative or positive impact on total demand and by implication capital accumulation  
could not be predicted on apriori basis.   
 
The Minsky-Steindl model, incorporating debt ratio and interest rate into the 
traditional Kaleckian model, suggests three possibilities. The short run puzzling 
case, when a higher interest rate increases the rate of fixed capital accumulation. The 
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stable long-run case, when a higher interest rate causes a higher effective demand, a 
higher leverage and a higher rate of fixed capital accumulation. The unstable long 
run, when a higher interest rate increases leverage but reduces the rate of fixed 
capital accumulation. The neoclassical literature has however argued that through 
higher costs of capital, higher interest rates would decrease both profit rates and  
rates of fixed capital accumulation. Thus once again, a lot of theoretical 
controversies surround the apriori sign of the interest rate parameter on fixed capital 
accumulation. The sign may be + or -. 
 
Real Unit Labour Cost: It has been argued in the French Regulation School 
literature that the cardinal basis for a sustained increasing capital accumulation is an 
equitable distribution of income in favour of labour wages. Expectedly, the higher 
are real wages, the higher are rates of fixed capital accumulation. This is consistent 
with the stagnationist case of the Kaleckian model, where growth increases when 
wage increases. On the other hand, as argued by Lavoie (1995b, p.154), the 
Cambridge model particularly, in the spirits of Robison (1956), Wood (1975) and 
Eichner (1976), suggests that a higher rate of capital accumulation implies a higher 
profit share but a lower real wage rate. From this latter theoretical viewpoint, the 
expected sign of the parameter is negative. The data was obtained from AMECO 
online. 
 
Relative Cost: this refers to the relative cost of capital. Many empirical studies in the 
political economy literature associated on causes of  fixed capital accumulation 
decline, have included this variable in their models. In most cases, the estimates of 
relative cost of capital were found to be insignificant. But in the argument developed 
in this chapter, it should be relevant and negative. From a supply-side viewpoint, 
higher real wages imply higher labour costs to firms. In a monopolistic labour 
market regulation, where firms are restrained from labour retrenchment, and demand 
is high because of higher wages, the tendency would be for managers to increase 
fixed capital accumulation, in order to cushion the impacts of rising wages on 
performance. As real wages fall relative to capital, the opposite happens. Thus the 
apriori sign for the parameter of relative cost should be significant and  (-). 
 
- 212 - 
Trade Openness: neoclassical economics trade-growth arguments imply that greater 
trade openness would increase fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist 
countries that normally have fixed capital in abundance. This would imply a positive 
sign for the parameter of trade openness. However, the French Regulation School 
has argued that the impact is negative, implying a negative sign. Moreover, the 
empirical analysis in this thesis found a significant negative causal relationship. We 
thus expect the sign to be negative. A popular index of trade openness in the 
literature, is the ratio of the sum of total exports and total imports to GDP. 
 
Financial Openness:  Financial Openness has been indexed in at least three ways: de 
facto measures of the ratio of the sum of total financial inflows (CIF) and total 
financial outflows (COD) to GDP, the ratio of the sum of total external assets and 
total external liabilities to GDP  and a de jure  measure that involves the number of 
years and date a country has been financially opened. The ratio of the sum of private 
external assets and liabilities to GDP  as often done in the neoclassical literature, in 
our opinion, does not adequately represent the concept of financial openness, as it 
changes via profits and losses and sales, that are external, even if the country is 
officially closed. The de jure measure does not adequately capture the intensity of 
financial openness, particularly as it changes with time and therefore not very 
suitable for our purpose. Our preferred index is the ratio of the sum of total inflows 
and outflows to GDP, as this captures the years and length of effective financial 
openness, as well as the intensity of financial openness. We expect that the 
parameter estimate has a negative sign. Data were obtained from Broner et al (2013) 
 
7.7 Sample and Data 
The sample countries are the 23 advanced countries of the OECD, for which there 
exist data. These are the US, the UK, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Australia, 
New Zealand, Netherland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Iceland, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, and Austria. 
The data are annual secondary data collected from some databases, mostly from the 
AMECO and UK data Service. The Sample period is from 1970 to 2014, restricted 
by data availability. 
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7.7.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 7.3 presents the summary statistics of the data representing the variables. 17 
variables are presented, including the component variables that constitute  
compound variables such as aggregate capital inflows (CIF), aggregate capital 
Outflows (COD), and financial openness. The mean value of profit shares in  Table 
7.3 is 0.45. The minimum value is 0.27, while the maximum value is 0.74. The 
overall variation is 0.0668 (7%). Profit shares is more variable between the sample 
countries (0.0599), than variation within a country (0.032). To more accurately 
project the degree of variability, we derived the standard variation per unit of mean 
value. For profit shares, this is 0.148 (i.e. 0.0668/0.4513) on average. 
 
Table 7.3: Summary Statistics 
(Source: Author’s estimation from sample data) 
 
The mean value of capacity utilisation is 0.9948 (nearly a hundred percent, and 
implying capacity nearly used to the full during the sample period). The minimum 
value is 65%, and the maximum is 134%, indicating that there were occasions when 
installed capacity were utilised beyond their maximum. An implication of this would 
be that higher level of labour was used, to make this possible. Standard variations 
Mean
s/n Variable Observations Within Between Overall Min Max
1 Profit Share 1,032 0.4513 0.032 0.0599 0.0668 0.274 0.7427
2 Capacity Utilization 1,035 0.9948 0.0502 0.0518 0.0713 0.6484 1.3412
3 Long term Interest rate 1,035 8.1725 4.5622 2.6934 5.2687 0.519 45.95
4 Real Unit Labour Cost 1,035 105.7788 7.8001 4.4687 8.9421 85.7475 156.5226
5 Relative Cost 1,035 0.0767 0.0419 0.026 0.0491 0.0052 0.4407
6 Trade Openness 1,035 0.7115 0.1994 0.4362 0.4711 0.1073 3.7415
7 FDI (Inward) 1,035 1.27E+10 2.60E+10 1.85E+10 3.17E+10 -3.17E+10 3.14E+11
8 FDI (Outward) 1,035 1.77E+10 3.52E+10 2.36E+10 4.21E+10 -5.96E+10 3.97E+11
9 Portfolio (Inward) 935 4.03E+10 8.85E+10 6.67E+10 1.07E+11 -1.28E+11 1.15E+12
10 Portfolio (Outward) 935 2.91E+10 5.95E+10 3.47E+10 6.69E+10 -2.30E+11 5.49E+11
11 Other-Investments (In) 935 2.71E+10 1.07E+11 3.48E+10 1.13E+11 -1.41E+12 1.44E+12
12 Other-Investments (Out) 935 2.57E+10 1.04E+11 4.34E+10 1.09E+11 -1.00E+12 1.48E+12
13 Reserve (Out) 935 2.34E+09 1.32E+10 6.54E+09 1.46E+10 -3.83E+10 1.87E+11
14 COD 935 7.67E+10 1.51E+11 9.17E+10 1.71E+11 -1.01E+12 1.99E+12
15 CIF 935 8.14E+10 1.73E+11 1.14E+11 2.04E+11 -9.56E+11 2.07E+12
16 Financial Openness 892 0.476024 1.2366 3.593357 2.380326 -3.733802 32.00176
17 Capital Accumulation 1,031 0.026602 0.013454 0.005839 0.014619 -0.015786 0.0901064
Descriptive Statistics
Standard Deviation
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between the sample countries (0.0518) and within each country (0.0502) are more or 
less the same. The overall standard variation is just 0.0713, while the standard 
deviation per unit of mean is just 0.072 (i.e. 0.0713/0.9948). The standard deviation 
per unit of mean suggests that over the sample period, capacity utilisation was less 
variable on a relative term than profit share. 
 
Long-term interest rates has an overall standard deviation of 5.27(%). Within 
standard deviation is 4.5622% compared to between standard deviation of 2.69% . 
These indicate that real long-term interest rates are, more variable within each 
country than between sample countries. The overall mean interest rate is 8.17%. The 
minimum value is 0.52%, and the maximum is 46%. The standard deviation per unit 
of mean is 0.64, suggesting that on a relative term, long-term interest rates were 
more variable than both profit shares and rates of capacity utilisation, over the 
sample period. Real unit labour costs has an overall mean value of 105.77 monetary 
units, and this variable fluctuated between the highest value of 156.52 and a low of 
85.74. The standard deviation within a country is about twice the standard deviation 
of between the sample countries. With an overall standard deviation of 8.94, the 
average standard deviation per unit of mean is very small at 0.08, particularly when 
compared to the mean value of 105.78. 
 
Relative cost, defined as the ratio of the costs of capital (long term interest rates) to 
real unit labour cost, exhibited almost the least mean value among the included 
variables, at 0.077. This variable fluctuated between a very low of 0.0052 and a high 
of 0.4407. The fluctuation in relative cost within a country in the sample country is 
0.0419 and is nearly twice the standard fluctuations between the sample countries. 
The overall standard deviation/fluctuation is 0.0491, and this implies that the 
standard deviation per unit of mean is 0.64. This value puts relative cost nearly at 
par with long-term interest rate, in terms of relative fluctuation, and far ahead of real 
unit labour cost.  
 
Trade openness has a mean value  higher than the mean value of relative costs, profit 
shares, long-term interest rates, but lower than the mean value of capacity 
utilisation. The foregoing notwithstanding, trade openness has a far higher overall 
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standard deviation (0.4711) than all four of the aforementioned variables (including 
capacity utilisation). The relative standard deviation per unit of mean of trade 
openness is 0.66, and this would suggest a higher level of activeness of trade 
openness, relative to the rest aforementioned control variables. The standard 
fluctuation in trade openness between the countries is more than double the standard 
fluctuation within each country in the sample. The minimum value of trade openness 
is 0.1073, and the highest is 3.7415. The next nine variables jointly define financial 
openness, the variable that represents the argument of this empirical chapter. With 
reference to foreign direct investment, the average annual value that  flew into the 
advanced capitalist economies in the sample in each year from 1970 till 2014 was 
US$12.7bn. Over this period, FDI inwards  fluctuated very significantly, with the 
overall standard deviation of US$31.7bn and this is about two and half times the 
value of the mean annual inflows. 
 
The annual mean value of outward foreign direct investments at US$17.7bn is 
greater than the mean annual inward FDI, by US$5bn. The overall standard 
deviation is about 2.4 times greater than the mean, implying that outward FDIs was 
steadier than inward flows. If we (rightly) assume that FDI is most associated with 
fixed capital accumulation, then a steadier relocation of net US$5bn worth of fixed 
capital outside advanced capitalist economies would have had significant downward 
pressure on  rates of accumulation of fixed capital, in these advanced economies. 
 
The summary statistics suggest that portfolio flows exhibited a pattern about 
opposite to that of FDI flows. The mean is US$40.3bn, about twice the 
corresponding value of portfolio outflows of US$29.1bn. Portfolio inflows were 
more robust than outflows. The standard deviation  per unit mean annual portfolio 
inflow is mere 0.27, compared to portfolio outflows, with a corresponding value of 
2.3. These huge portfolio influxes chased financial market assets, thus progressively 
driving up their market prices and returns, over these years. Firms might, therefore, 
be tempted to include more financial assets in their asset portfolios, to enhance their 
rates of returns. Such financial assets acquisition would tend to slow down  rates of 
fixed capital accumulation. For other investments, the mean annual inflows and 
outflows are similar, as well as their overall standard variations. Capital outflows 
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were boosted by reserves, which were outward flows, only. The COD represents the 
sum of outward financial outflows, while CIF is the sum of financial inflows. The 
mean CIF is US$81.4bn. The mean COD is US$76.7bn. The US$76.7bn outflow is a 
rough value of annual fixed capital accumulation that constitutes the opportunity 
cost of these outflows. Of the mean annual inflow of US$81.4 billion, the proportion 
likely to finance fixed capital accumulation is just 15.6% (inward FDI/ CIF). 
Financial openness has a mean of 0.476 and an overall standard fluctuation of 2.38. 
The standard deviation per unit of mean is 5.000433, indicating that the standard 
deviation of financial openness is over five times the size of its mean. This relative 
measure of fluctuation implies that financial openness exhibited more fluctuations or 
volatility than the other variables over the sample period. The average annual inflow 
of US$12.7bn (inward FDI) compared to the fixed capital representing the 
opportunity cost of mean annual US$76.7bn outward capital flow would readily 
suggests that the financial openness subsequent to the liberalisation of capital 
account in advanced capitalist economies most likely contributed to the observed 
declining rates of capital accumulation observed in these economies in post Fordism. 
Whether this was actually the case, is the subject of the econometric investigation in 
the subsequent part of this chapter. 
 
7.7.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 7.5 below, presents a correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
model. One of the major issues in this estimation is the unbalanced panel caused by 
missing data for a few countries. This is the cost of including as many years and 
advanced countries as possible, in the investigation. Because correlation method 
may not efficiently deal with missing data, the correlation matrix below is for 8 
countries, for which the panel are strongly balanced.   
 
Table 7.4: Correlation Matrix of Main Variables 
 (Source: Author’s computation from sample data)            
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Capital Accumulation 1
2 Profit Share -0.1513 1
3 Capacity Utilization 0.0399 0.1575 1
4 Long term interest rate 0.2346 -0.1124 -0.054 1
5 Real Unit Labour Cost 0.4514 -0.3456 0.056 0.553 1
6 Relative Cost 0.1921 -0.0837 -0.0689 0.9906 0.4433 1
7 Trade Openness -0.2954 0.0446 -0.0099 -0.3503 -0.2358 -0.3464 1
8 Financial Openness -0.1229 0.0341 0.1239 -0.1456 -0.3196 -0.1096 0.1987 1
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The table suggests negative correlations between capital accumulation and profit 
share, trade openness, as well as financial openness. Profit share in turn has its 
highest absolute value of correlation coefficient with real unit labour cost (negative 
coefficient). In line with the expectation from the argument presented here, financial 
openness has the highest and inverse correlation with wage or real unit labour cost 
while real unit labour cost has the highest correlation with capital accumulation. 
This also strongly supports the theoretical proposition of the Regulation School, that 
labour remuneration is critical to capital accumulation and that international 
integration matters. Table 7.4 also suggests positive correlations between capital 
accumulation and capacity utilisation, long-term interest rate and unexpectedly, 
relative cost. However, trade openness is apparently more negatively correlated with 
the rate of capital accumulation, than financial openness. This may be due to the fact 
that trade integration has been active for a greater period than financial openness. 
and that trade integration is more homogenous, in that it is simply a conglomeration 
of imports and exports of goods and services while financial openness is a 
conglomerate of FDI, portfolio flows, other investments, and reserves, which are far 
more heterogeneous in nature. Table 7.5 below presents correlation coefficients 
between capital accumulation and the components of financial openness. 
 
Table 7.5: Correlation - Capital Accumulation and Parts of Financial Openness 
 
 (Source: Author’s estimation from sample data)  
 
The table suggests negative correlations between  all of the components of financial  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Capital Accumulation 1
2 FDI-In/Gross Capital In 0.0786 1
3 Portfolio-In/Gross Capital In -0.0145 0.6869 1
4 Other Investment-In/Gross Capital In -0.0404 -0.9359 -0.8989 1
5 FDI-Out/Gross Capital Out 0.0568 -0.0341 -0.0838 0.0612 1
6 Portfolio-Out/Gross Capital Out -0.0739 0.0187 0.0371 -0.0293 -0.248 1
7 Other Investment-Out/Gross Capital Out -0.0088 0.0099 0.0362 -0.0235 -0.5553 -0.5464 1
8 Reserve/Gross Capital Out 0.0432 0.0058 0.002 -0.0044 -0.0644 0.0238 -0.4083 1
9 FDI-In/GDP -0.1019 -0.0216 -0.0514 0.0379 -0.0698 0.0416 0.0155 0.0174 1
10 Portfolio-In/GDP -0.1291 -0.0083 -0.066 0.037 0.0323 0.0056 -0.0259 -0.0063 0.4996 1
11 Other Investment-In/GDP -0.0398 0.0401 0.08 -0.0629 0.0003 0.0397 -0.0315 0.0056 0.3877 0.2103 1
12 FDI-Out/GDP -0.2463 -0.053 -0.1348 0.0973 -0.0043 -0.0007 0.0079 -0.0093 0.73 0.6385 0.3564 1
13 Portfolio-Out/GDP -0.212 0.0023 0.0188 -0.0105 -0.037 0.0868 -0.0191 -0.0354 0.554 0.5896 0.4739 0.4428 1
14 Other Investment-Out/GDP -0.0606 0.0184 0.0425 -0.0317 0.0061 0.0183 -0.0209 0.0067 0.442 0.3242 0.9525 0.4214 0.4098 1
15 Reserve/GDP 0.0611 0.0008 -0.0019 0.0004 -0.0374 -0.0952 0.0002 0.2212 -0.013 -0.0263 -0.0289 -0.0476 -0.1427 -0.0353 1
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openness and capital accumulation, except the ratio of reserve to GDP. The strongest 
correlation is between outward foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP and 
capital accumulation, while FDI outward as a percentage of total capital outflow is 
not significantly correlated with capital accumulation. The next highest is the 
negative correlation coefficient between outward portfolio flow as a proportion of 
GDP to capital accumulation and then FDI inward as a proportion of GDP and 
capital accumulation. Portfolio inward as a proportion of GDP, is negatively 
correlated with capital accumulation. Inward FDI as a percentage of GDP  is also 
negatively correlated with capital accumulation. 
 
7.8  Econometric Investigation 
This section commences an econometric investigation of a causal relationship 
between capital accumulation and financial openness. To facilitate this, we examine 
the stationarity properties of the data, using fisher unit root test, as well as IPS. The 
justification for these over the others is that given the problem of an unbalance 
panel, the above two are the most feasible and efficient. We further consider  issues 
involved in the estimation methodology and the potential resolution of these issues, 
estimates of the model and post-estimation tests. 
 
7.8.1 Test of Stationarity 
Table 7.3 below presents the Fisher test of stationarity. With drifts, lags of 2 and 
demeaning, it shows that at least one panel is stationary, as we reject the null that all 
panels contain unit roots, at the 1% significant level, as could be inferred from the 
probability value. Contrary to the fisher test of stationarity however, the IPS test 
with similar provision for demeaning, trend and 2 lags, it is not possible to reject the 
null that all panel contains unit root for trade openness at the 10% significant level, 
let alone at 1% significant level. For all the other variables including financial 
openness, the null is rejected. This goes further to draw a clear dividing line between 
trade openness and financial openness as two distinct phenomena, to be investigated 
separately.  Furthermore, while for the other variables both tests suggest that at least 
one panel is stationary, such conclusive inference could not be made for trade 
openness.                  
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Table 7.6:Fisher Test of Stationarity 
    (Source: Author’s estimation from sample data) 
                              
           
Table 7.7: IPS Test of Stationarity 
 
(Source: Author’s estimation from sample data) 
 
7.8.2. Methodology 
This study employs dynamic panel data estimations. The rationale for this choice is 
that panel data method rises above some shortcomings of times series as well as 
cross-section methods, because variations across the cross-section units as well as 
across time are included. These facilitate more robust inferences. However, the 
dynamic panel more clearly captures the dynamics of the causal relationship that is a 
focus of our study, aside from the general ability to account for individual 
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Inverse chi-squared(44)   P 141.2368 0 90.763 0.0001 172.551 0 166.7105 0 169.9714 0 215.4709 0 184.397 0 194.095 0
 Inverse normal            Z -7.9163 0 -3.769 0.0001 -9.3872 0 -8.9555 0 -9.2779 0 -10.2242 0 -9.6786 0 -9.934 0
Inverse logit t(114)      L* -8.1039 0 -3.846 0.0001 -9.8674 0 -9.4656 0 -9.7157 0 -12.0557 0 -10.526 0 -11.061 0
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 10.3655 0 4.6668 0 13.1939 0 12.5849 0 12.9249 0 17.6686 0 14.4289 0 15.4399 0
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: At least one panel is stationary
xtunitroot fisher Relatcost , dfuller drift lags(2) demean
Fisher-type unit-root test for Relatcost
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Capital
Accumulation










Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
 W-t-bar -4.6309 0 0.2159 0.5855 -2.0929 0.0182 -2.6477 0.0041 -2.2684 0.0117 -3.8247 0.0001 -3.0184 0.0013 -2.5192 0.0059
xtunitroot IPS FinOpeness , trend demean lag (2)
Ho: All panels contain unit roots 
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heterogeneity associated with panel data method.  There are issues to be addressed, 
if the panel data estimates and inferences from them have to be robust and 
consistent.  
 
7.8.3 Treatment of Issues involved in Estimation: Dynamic Panel Bias 
and Endogeneity; Heteroscedasticity; Serial Correlation; Poolability; 
Cross-Sectional Dependence  
A dynamic panel data specification includes lag(s) of the dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable, potentially generating the dynamic panel bias. Furthermore, 
cross-sectional dependence is a particular issue commonly associated with panel 
data method and could have grave consequences for the inferences made. Potential 
sources of biased inferences from estimates include endogeneity, serial correlations 
in the error term, heterogeneity, poolability, as well as heteroscedasticity.  These are 
of particular interest in this study, as in terms of financial flows, heteroscedasticity 
and cross-sectional dependence are likely to be present to significant degrees. 
Drastic steps to minimise their impacts if present, and facilitate  more consistent and 
robust estimations and inferences are essential.  
 
The problem of heteroscedasticity is reduced by using standard errors that are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and serial correlations in the errors. This could be the use of 
cluster robust standard errors (see Arellano, 1987).  The foregoing robust standard 
errors are however not robust to cross-sectional dependence in panel data. The 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are however robust to all of heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation in the error terms as well as the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence (see Driscoll-Kraay, 1998). Unobserved heterogeneity associated with 
the panel units may interfere with estimated results and inferences, but panel data 
method normally deals with this. We provide for possible time-specific unobserved 
heterogeneities, by introducing time dummies in the estimations. 
 
The potential problem of dynamic panel bias introduced by adopting  dynamic panel 
data estimations, is of no least importance. The specification of the dynamic panel 
data estimator includes lag(s) of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable. 
A significant correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the lagged 
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dependent variable (short panel bias) may generate potentially significant biases in 
the coefficient estimates of a dynamic model (Baltagi, 2005; Nickell, 1981; Nerlove, 
1967). Fortunately, this bias reduces as the time dimension (T) increases (Flannery 
and Hankins, 2013), even though it could still be significant when T is as large as 30 
(Judson and Owen, 1999).  The bias in estimation resulting from the short panel bias 
may affect not only the included lagged dependent variable, but the rest of the 
estimated coefficients. If not treated, non-robust and inconsistent estimates may 
result. 
 
 A number of estimators have been developed with different characteristics, to deal 
with this biases: GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator, IV 
(Instrumental Variables), and bias correcting formulae, in the form of ‘system 
GMM’ (Blundell and Bond, 1998), ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and Bond, 1991), 
‘Least Squares Dependent Variable Corrected’ (corrected least squares; Kiviets, 
1995), and ‘long differencing’ (Huang and Ritter, 2009; Hahn et al, 2007). These 
listed estimators rely on some form of differencing to remove the fixed effects. Thus 
they apparently solve the problem of correlation between the fixed effects and 
lagged dependent variable. But with the exception of the LDVC, they introduce 
another form of bias: ‘Nickell Bias’, that may render some regressors endogenous, 
in that it introduces a new relationship between the differenced lagged dependent 
variable, and the differenced error terms or the demeaned variables, where the 
method of differencing is by demeaning (Nickell, 1981).  
 
 The systems GMM, difference GMM and Long Differencing have their specific 
assumptions and distinct ways of correcting this (Nickell) bias.  The LSDVC 
estimator assumes strict exogenous explanatory variables, system GMM and 
difference GMM assume the absence of a second-order serial correlation in the error 
terms. Long-term differencing assumes strictly balanced data (for more details, see 
Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Zhou et al., 2014). Given that data on this type of 
research could be potentially unbalanced, endogenous, have autocorrelated error 
terms, even if not contemporarily apparent, the estimation strategy of using multiple 
estimators, for a robust inference on the relationship is adopted. Poolability is a 
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cardinal requirement that underpins panel data estimators, and in this research, 
poolability is assumed. 
 
7.8.4 Estimation of the Model and Discussion of the Parameter Estimates 
The estimation commenced with testing for the presence of fixed effects versus 
random effect. An F-test for fixed effects returns   F (21, 771) = 2.550   and a 
probability value of 0.000. We therefore reject a null of no fixed effects. A Breusch-
Pagan LM test for random effects, returns chibar2 (01) = 0.00 and Probability > 
chibar2 =   1.0000. We therefore strongly fail to reject a null of zero random effects. 
Consistent with the foregoing tests, we employ econometric estimators that assume 
fixed individual heterogeneities. The difference between them, being how they deal 
with the issues of short panel bias, as well as Nickell bias. The estimated models are 
presented in the Table 7.8 below, with the 23 advanced capitalist countries in the 
panel. The justification for this is that while it makes the study more robust, 
econometric estimates may have the capacity to deal with the issue of missing data, 
depending on the estimator. 
 
Across the six estimators, the Pooled OLS is expected to be biased, so is used as a 
baseline estimator. The DFE and DFE with Driscoll Kraay may contain some biases, 
but since the mean is subtracted in estimation, the correlation constituting the source 
of bias is differenced away. With regards to the Arellano bond model, it is essential 
that there be no second-order serial correlation in the error term. The test however in 
the above model with a null of a second-order serial correlation could not be rejected 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% level of significance, but at the 20% level of significance. 
To see if this was due to the problem of unbalanced panel, we re-estimated the 
model for 8 countries panel, where the panel is strongly balanced, and all test 
statistics were very satisfactory. Furthermore, there were  marked improvements in 
the estimates, with the coefficient of financial openness tripling and that of trade 
openness, about doubling. Because the aim is to explain the observed decline in 
rates of capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies, we prefer the 23- 
country panel over the 8-country panel. One reason is that a 23-country panel would 
be more representative of advanced capitalist economics, than an 8-country panel 
would.  
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Table 7.8: Estimates; Dependent Variables: Capital Accumulation (1970-2014) 
 
 
The fundamental thesis of this chapter is that financial openness sequel to Fordism 
contributed to the observed declining fixed in capital accumulation. We index 
financial openness by the de facto measure of the ratio of the sum of financial 
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inflows and outflows, to GDP. The parameter estimates for the included lag(s) of the 
dependent variable (fixed capital accumulation) turns out to be significant at the 1% 
significant level across all six model estimates. These suggest that there is a partial 
adjustment, in that the value of fixed capital accumulation in the contemporary 
period ( time t) is a function of what the value was in the immediately preceding 
period (time t-1).  This also implies that there are both short-run parameters and 
long-run parameters.  
 
 In spite of their differences, the six panel data estimators unanimously present 
strong empirical supports for the main argument of this chapter, in that the 
parameter estimates for financial openness are negative and significant at 1% 
significant level. We therefore infer or conclude that there is a significant inverse 
relationship between financial openness and fixed capital accumulation, for  
advanced capitalist economies. The magnitude of the parameter estimate appears 
uniform among all six of the estimators, unlike the other control variables. However, 
the size of the parameter estimate appears rather small; it suggests that a unit (1%) 
change in financial openness would induce a change of 0.0003% change in the rate 
of fixed capital accumulation, in the opposite direction, contemporarily. Financial 
openness is the result of public policy so that the possibility of reverse causality is 
highly untenable.  
 
The parameter estimates of financial openness appear so small relative to the other 
variables. We, however, highlight the significant impacts of financial openness on 
rates of fixed capital accumulation, particularly relative to the control variables,  by 
recourse to the summary statistics. We refer to the summary statistic that indicates 
that the standard fluctuation of financial openness is well over 5 times the mean 
value, suggesting that while the marginal impact of financial openness may be 
relatively small compared to other variables, the considerable fluctuations in 
financial openness may cause it to exert  considerable effects on rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, that dominate the total impacts of any other control variable. 
This is obvious from the observation of the pattern of the various series. 
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Profit share has a net positive impact on the rate of fixed capital accumulation.  
Moreover, the introduction of financial openness has also significantly increased the 
parameter estimates of trade openness. Regarding the structure of the series of profit 
share, profit share series bottomed out around 1975 and thereafter started a 
persistent upward trend on the average, across the 23 sample countries . This is 
about consistent with the observations of  some scholars in the literature (Glyn et al., 
1992). The net positive parameter estimate for profit share suggests that when other 
variables and sources of profit have been provided for, increases in profit shares 
incentivise firms to increase fixed capital accumulation. This positive parameter sign 
is consistent with the Cambridge model and the other theories presented in chapter 
2. But the upward trend of profit share indicate that profit share could not be the 
main driving force behind the downward trending capital accumulation. 
 
Capacity utilisation increased in statistical significant, consistently across all six 
model estimates compared to the omission of financial openness in the model. It has 
also increased in terms of the absolute size of its contemporary parameter estimates. 
The net sign of the parameter estimate is negative. The positive sign of the 
contemporary parameter estimates indicates that higher capacity utilisation in a 
given year generates higher capital accumulation in the year, but reduces capital 
accumulation in subsequent two lags, so that the net result is negative. With regards 
to the structure of the series, it is highly varied from country to country. In some 
country, there exist clear co-movement with capital accumulation, while in others, as 
one is increasing, the other is decreasing. This may, therefore, imply the 
unlikelihood of capacity utilisation as the primary driver of the dynamics of capital 
accumulation across the sample countries, in the years under consideration. 
 
Long-term interest rate is on the average positive across all model estimates. One 
way of rationalising the positive sign of the estimates of long-term interest rate 
parameters, is that higher long-term interest rate reduces the present value and 
returns of all assets but more so for financial assets, whose value and returns depend 
on both the present values of the underlying cash flows, and the market demand 
which in turn depends on the level of availability of liquidity in the economy. The 
lower rate of return on alternative (financial) assets to fixed capital accumulation 
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thus induces adjustment of firms’ assets portfolio in favour of fixed capital, thus 
increasing the rates of fixed capital accumulation, once the financial openness and 
relative cost of fixed capital are accounted for. However, because the size of the 
significant coefficient estimates of long-term interest rates across the six estimators 
were not significantly different to zero, we infer or conclude that changes in long 
term interest rates would not on their own, cause meaningful changes in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Next, we look at what happened by comparing the actual series of long-term interest 
rate with fixed capital accumulation. For the generality (18/23) of the sample 
countries, the series displayed  rising trends from 1960 and peaking in about 1982; 
then generally declining thereafter. But capital accumulation exhibited generally 
increasing trends in most part of the 1960s, before a general and rather persistent 
decline after that period. The nonsynchronous movements in rates of capital 
accumulation vis a vis long-term interest rates, suggest that interest rates could not 
be the main driver of observed trends in capital accumulation.  For example in the 
case of Austria, capital accumulation rose rapidly till 1970 and declined rapidly 
thereafter. Interest rate, however, rose from 1960 and peaked in 1982 before 
declining thereafter. For Australia, over the period of the 1960s when capital 
accumulation was rather flat, interest rate was rising. But when capital accumulation 
was trending upward, interest rate was trending downward.   
 
Germany and Switzerland, have interest rates that peaked in about 1974; while 
capital accumulation started  declining earlier in the late 1960s. Particularly 
noteworthy is the case of Greece where, while interest rates were rising and falling 
very rapidly, capital accumulation maintained a persistently downward trend. 
Therefore, while both series exhibit very weakly similar patterns, we repeat that the 
lack of significant synchronism between both series, as apparent from the visual 
inspection, suggests ipso facto, that real long-term interest rate could hardly be the 
major driver of fixed capital accumulation over the sample period. 
 
An interesting observation is that even with the inclusion of financial openness, real 
unit labour cost  continues to significantly  granger cause capital accumulation, with 
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a net positive sign of its parameter estimates. Recall from the correlation analysis 
section that real unit labour cost has by far the highest (positive) correlation with 
capital accumulation, compared to the other included variables. It could also be 
observed from the series that for all countries in the sample except for Iceland, the 
real unit labour cost series has a relatively close pattern with the capital 
accumulation series. For virtually all of them, real unit labour cost rose in the early 
1960s when capital accumulation was upward trending and started decline before or 
about 1973. 
 
Except for Iceland, the levels of real unit labour cost post 1970, as at 2014 remained 
lower than the least value of the same variable in the 1960s. Nonetheless, the 
parameter estimates of real unit labour cost has been minimal in size. A correlation 
coefficient represents the parameter estimate in a simple regression (when there are 
no control variables), which changes with the subsequent addition of other variables. 
In the case of real unit labour cost, real unit labour cost parameter estimates might 
have been reduced by the inclusion of economic openness and relative cost. Another 
interesting finding, was the statistical and economic significance of relative cost. 
The estimated models suggest that relative cost has by far the largest marginal 
impact on rates of fixed capital accumulation. Out of the six estimated model, five: 
the Arellano-Bond, LSDVC, the two Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE), Pooled OLS 
yield  net negative parameter estimates for relative cost. Furthermore, in five out of 
the six estimated models, relative cost exact significant impact on rates of fixed 
capital accumulation up to the second lag. We therefore conclude that the relative 
cost of capital does significantly cause inverse change fixed capital accumulation. 
 
The negative sign of the parameter estimates suggests that relative cost is causally 
related to fixed capital accumulation in the opposite direction: as the cost of capital 
increases relative to the cost of labour, the rate of fixed capital accumulation 
diminishes. This may imply that firms could be biasing the intensity of production 
method toward labour or increasing the acquisition of alternative forms of assets, as 
the higher cost of capital may reduce the  returns to capital. On the other hand, as the 
real unit cost of labour increases relative to the cost of capital, the expectation is that 
firms would bias the method of production toward capital. This is particularly so if 
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firms are constrained in their ability to downsize (right size) their labour force. This 
is consistent with the observation in the literature, of plant sizes (ratio of capital to 
labour) increasing during Fordism (Glyn et al., 1992) when the strong bargaining 
power of labour constrained firms in downsizing labour force. This theoretical 
analysis was well covered in chapter 6.  
 
Trade openness was found to be very significant in all the six estimators. It was also 
found that its impact on capital accumulation was significant up to the second lag of 
trade openness. In all of the six estimators, the net signs of trade openness parameter 
estimates were found to be negative. This negativity suggests that as trade openness 
increases, the rate of capital accumulation decreases. Ceteris paribus, trade may be 
active on capital accumulation if it causes decreases in  home production of capital-
intensive products via the importation of these products. Moreover, if  
corresponding exports are less intensive in capital, then trade may directly reduce  
rates of fixed capital accumulation in the home country. A visual observation of the 
series of trade openness and capital accumulation indicates a strong synchronism 
between the two. From the early to the late 1960s when capital accumulation was 
trending upward, trade openness was either trending downward or rather constant 
and low. However following the early 1970s when trade openness became very 
significant and persistently upward trending, capital accumulation assumed 
persistently downward trend, across advanced capitalist economies.  It is however 
remarkable that trade openness can maintain its ability to significantly explain the 
declining trend fixed capital accumulation for the sample country, despite the 
presence of financial openness. 
 
The six estimators, while they have produced important findings have also presented 
some puzzles that justify further investigation.  A Comparison of the parameter 
estimates of the six estimators in Table 7.8 with the correlation coefficients in Table 
7.4, indicates that some variables have parameter estimates far lower than their 
estimated correlation coefficients, while some have estimates higher than their 
correlation coefficients. Real unit labour cost, real long-term interest rate, trade 
openness, relative cost, financial openness belong to the former, while capacity 
utilisation and profit share belong to the latter. A likely explanation is that some of 
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the variables may be operative in the capacity of mediators and moderators, in that 
some may be operating through others. Furthermore, the analyses so far have been 
of short-run analyses. The short-run estimates only indicate the marginal impacts of 
the included explanatory variables on fixed capital accumulation in the short-run.  
More in-depth  analyses, such as the interaction of the variables and long-run 
estimates, may increase insights into these relationships. 
 
7.8.5 Investigating the Interactive Effects of International Financial 
Openness 
A comparison of the correlation coefficients of the variables and the parameter 
estimates raises some puzzles that suggest possible interaction effects. An 
interaction occurs where a dependent (response) variable Y, is expressed not only as 
a function of some independent variables X and Z (𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑋 + 𝑏2𝑍 + ), 
but also as a function of product(s) of the independent variables ( e.g. 𝑌 = 𝑎 +
𝑏1𝑋 + 𝑏2𝑍 + 𝑏3𝑋 ∗ 𝑍 + ); where X and Z are the main terms and X*Z is the 
interaction term. There may be more than a single interaction term.  
 
The presence of  significant interacting term(s) affect(s) quite significantly, the value 
and interpretation of all the estimated coefficients. For example where 𝑏1  in the 
above example without an interaction term indicates the marginal impact of X on Y; 
it now becomes the marginal impact of X on Y, where Z is zero. Thus the presence  
of interaction renders the relationship between Y and X conditional upon Z. 
Furthermore, the presence of a significant interaction term suggests that a model 
may not be additive and thus may provide for omitted non-linearity in the model 
(Wooldridge 2008). In the model with an interaction term, 
𝛿𝑌
𝛿𝑋
= 𝑏1 + 𝑏3𝑍; so that 
the marginal effect of X on Y depends on the value of Z. The positive sign in +𝑏3 
indicates that Z interact with X to increase Y; and the negative sign in −𝑏3  indicates 
that Z interact with X to reduce  Y (See Rajan and Zingales, 1998).   
 
Significant interaction term(s) indicate that several explanatory variables represent a 
particular regressor. The argument that the said regressor has no significant impact 
on the dependent variable (Y) is only valid, if the parameter estimates of the main 
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term (𝑏1) and the relevant interaction term (𝑏3 ) are jointly zero (Kmenta, 1971)( see 
also, Bramber et al., 2006). Against this background, we, therefore, further our 
understanding of the variables involved and their relationships, in our study, by 
investigating their interaction terms. Table 7.9 below presents the estimated model 
for the full sample country and period. 
  
Table 7.9: Estimates with Interacted Terms; Dependent Variable: Capital 
Accumulation (1970-2014) 
Variables  Coefficient Drisc/Kraay - SE 
L1 Capital Accumulation  0.847**** 0.0338 
L1 Profit Share  -0.0160 0.0241 
L2 Profit Share  0.0572*** 0.0266 
L0 Capacity Utilization  0.0946**** 0.0126 
L1 Capacity Utilization  -0.0781**** 0.0142 
L2 Capacity Utilization  -0.0277**** 0.0079 
L0 Long Term Interest Rate  0.0002 0.0002 
L1 Long Term Interest Rate  -0.0016** 0.0009 
L2 Long Term Interest Rate  0.0019**** 0.0006 
L0 Real Unit Labour Cost  0.0002 0.0002 
L1 Real Unit Labour Cost  -0.0002 0.0002 
L2 Real Unit Labour Cost  0.0001 0.0001 
L1 Relative Cost  0.0910 0.0996 
L2 Relative Cost  -0.1397*** 0.0634 
L0 Trade Openness  -0.0156**** 0.0061 
L1 Trade Openness  0.0039* 0.0027 
L2 Trade Openness  0.0060*** 0.0029 
L0 Financial Openness  0.0006 0.0061 
L1 Financial Openness  -0.0192*** 0.0083 
L2 Financial Openness  0.0123*** 0.0057 
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L0 (Financial Openness)*(Relative Cost)  0.1005 0.1420 
L1 (Financial Openness)*(Relative Cost)  -0.3438*** 0.1706 
L2 (Financial Openness)*(Relative Cost)  0.1959 0.1668 
Trade Openness Squared  0.0028** 0.0015 
L0 (Trade Openness)*(Relative Cost)  -0.0481* 0.0350 
L1 (Trade Openness)*(Relative Cost)  0.0703*** 0.0363 
L2 (Trade Openness)*(Relative Cost)  -0.0468** 0.0242 
L0 (Financial Openness)*(Profit Share)  0.0044 0.0093 
L1 (Financial Openness)*(Profit Share)  0.0231** 0.0125 
L2 (Financial Openness)*(Profit Share)  -0.0239**** 0.0067 
L0 (Financial Openness)*(Capacity Utilizn)  -0.0030 0.0035 
L1 (Financial Openness)*(Capacity Utilization)  0.0086* 0.0057 
L2 (Financial Openness)*(Capacity Utilization)  -0.0026 0.0041 
L0 (Financial Openness)*(Long Term Interest rate)  -0.00097 0.0014 
L1(Financial Openness)*(Long Term Interest rate)  0.0036*** 0.0017 
L2 (Financial Openness)*(Long Term Interest)  -0.0018 0.0017 
     Note: *; **; ***; **** represents 20%; 10%; 5% and 1% significant level respectively. 
 
The presence of the interaction terms have yielded rather exciting findings. It shows 
that when financial openness is zero, a percentage increase/(decrease) in profit share 
causes an increase/(decrease) of 0.057% in fixed capital accumulation, at the 5% 
significant level. However, financial openness reduces the ability of profit share to 
explain capital accumulation, as suggested by the net of the parameter estimates of 
the interaction terms of financial openness and profit share (0.0231 + -0.0239= -
0.0008). If therefore financial openness increases/(decreases) by 1% and profit share 
increases/(decreases) by 1%, then capital accumulation increases/(decreases) by 
(0.057+0.0231-0.0239) = 0.056% at the 1% significant level, instead of the previous 
increase/(decrease) of 0.057%.  An interpretation is that as financial openness 
increasingly accounts for increases in the profit share of a firm, the proportion of 
total profit share that is attributable to capital accumulation and the incentive to 
accumulate capital fall. The following functional form yields the marginal impact of 
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profit share on capital accumulation (
𝛿𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
), in the presence of 
financial openness: 
              (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝑃𝑆 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝑃𝑆∗𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
            Substituting the respective significant parameter estimates implies 
                       (0.0572) + (0.0231 + -0.0239)*Financial Openness 
                              (0.0572) – 0.0008*Financial Openness 
                   Estimating at the mean of financial openness implies  
                                (0.0572) – (0.0008*0.4760) = 0.056819 
Whereas a percentage increase in profit share increases capital accumulation by 
0.0572 units in the absence of financial openness, the negativity of the net 
coefficient of the interaction terms between financial openness and profit share 
implies in the presence of financial openness, a unit increase in profit share at best 
increases capital accumulation by less than 0.0572. Thus the effect of profit share on 
fixed capital accumulation is dependent on the value of financial openness. As 
financial openness increases, it reduces the classical positive relationship between 
the profit share of the firm and capital accumulation. That is as firms increasingly 
meet their profit targets through financial openness more than fixed capital 
accumulation, the lower the needed and actual rate of fixed capital accumulation. 
 
In the absence of financial openness, 1% increase/(decrease) in capacity utilisation 
increases(decreases) capital accumulation by 0.095% in the current period at the 1% 
significant level, but decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 0.078% at the 
1% significant level in the second period, and a further 0.028% decrease/(increase) 
in capital accumulation at the 1% significant level, in the third period. This is a net 
decrease/(increase) of 0.011% in capital accumulation. But financial openness 
reduces the ability of capacity utilisation to reduce the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation. Capacity utilisation in the absence of financial openness has a net 
marginal impact of a -0.0112% on fixed capital accumulation. This is however 
moderated to a net of just -0.0071%, when financial openness increases from zero to 
its mean value. The significant interaction term increases the complexity of the 
- 233 - 
marginal impact of capacity utilisation on capital accumulation, as suggested by the 
following function. 
    (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐶𝑈 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐹𝑂∗𝐶𝑈 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
    (0.0946 + -0.0781 + -0.0277) + (0.0086)*0.4760 = -0.00711 if evaluated at the  
      mean value of financial openness. 
 
Therefore, the impact of a change in capacity utilisation on the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation is dependent on the value of financial openness. For relative cost 
(RC), the marginal impact thereof on capital accumulation is derivable from the 
function below: 
     (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝑅𝐶 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝑅𝐶∗𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 +
                 𝐿2)𝑅𝐶∗𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
           Substituting the relevant significant estimates implies 
    (-0.1397)+ (-0.0481+0.0703+-0.0468)*Trade Openness +  
                              (-0.3438)*Financial Openness 
       (-0.1397) + (-0.0246)*Trade Openness + (-0.3438)*Financial Openness 
(-0.1397) + (-0.0246)*0.7115 + (-0.3438)*0.4760 = -0.32085 (estimated at        
means of trade and financial openness) 
              (-0.1397) + (-0.0175) + (-0.16365) = -0.32085 
 
When trade openness and financial openness are both zero, a percentage 
increase/(decrease) in relative cost decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 
0.14% at the 5% significant level, in the third period only. 1% increase/(decrease) in 
financial openness all other factors being constant decreases/(increases) capital 
accumulation by 0.34% at the 5% significant level through induced changes in the 
relative cost of capital, in the second period of the initial change in financial 
openness. Furthermore, 1% increase/(decrease) in trade openness, assuming all other 
factors including financial openness remain constant, decreases/(increases) capital 
accumulation by 0.05% at the 20% significant level in the current period, 
increases/(decreases) it by 0.07% at the 5% significant level in the second period   
and decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 0.05% at the 10% significant 
level, in the third period, all through induced changes in the relative cost of capital. 
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The marginal impact of relative cost on capital accumulation is an inverse 0.14%, 
when both openness are zero. This is larger than the -0.097% marginal impact 
suggested when there are no interaction terms. When trade openness 
increases/(decreases) by 1%, the marginal impact of relative cost changes from an 
inverse 0.14% to an inverse 0.165%. when trade openness remains constant but 
financial openness increases by 1%, the marginal impact of the relative cost of 
capital on capital accumulation changes from an inverse 0.14% to an inverse 0.48%. 
When trade and financial openness each increases by 1% simultaneously, then the 
marginal impact of the relative cost of capital on capital accumulation changes from 
an inverse of 0.14% to an inverse of 0.51%. Out of this 0.51% marginal impact of 
the relative cost of capital on capital accumulation, about 68% is attributable to the 
1%  change in financial openness; about 5% of it is attributable to the 1% change in 
trade openness, and the balance 27% attributable to neither trade nor financial 
openness. 
 
When trade openness changes from zero to its mean value while financial openness 
remains constant, the marginal impact of the relative cost of capital on capital 
accumulation increases by 0.0175%. However when financial openness increases 
from zero to its mean value, assuming trade openness is constant, the marginal 
impact of the relative cost of capital on capital accumulation increases by 0.16365%. 
The percentage composition of the marginal impact of relative cost at the means are: 
financial openness – 51%, trade openness – 5.5%, and non-interaction term – 44%. 
The cumulative impact of both types of openness increasing from zero to their 
respective mean value on the marginal effect of relative cost on capital accumulation 
is an increase of 0.18%, which is by far more than a 100% increase in the partial 
marginal impact of relative cost on fixed capital accumulation without the 
interactive terms. Thus while the relative cost of capital to all reasoning affects 
capital accumulation, trade and financial openness severally and jointly reinforce 
this impact. Trade openness and more particularly financial openness are, therefore, 
moderators of the impact of  the relative cost of capital, on rates of capital 
accumulation (albeit being partial moderations). Moreover, our argument that over 
the period, capitalist firms tend to increase  capital to labour ratio in production 
during Fordism and increase labour to capital ratio during post-Fordism as 
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determined by the cost of capital relative to labour, therefore, receives strong 
empirical support, once again.  
 
Regarding real unit labour cost, all the parameter estimates are not statistically 
significant, with the introduction of the interaction terms. A likely explanation is that 
its impact on fixed capital accumulation has been entirely mediated/subsumed by 
relative cost. Although not shown in the above table, the interaction of financial 
openness with unit real labour cost as well as that of trade openness with real unit 
labour cost turned out statistically insignificant, in their lags. This may apparently be 
puzzling in light of the political economy argument that openness depresses real 
wages. But an apparent rationalisation is that such significant interaction may have 
been exhaustively subsumed by the interaction of relative cost with either form of 
economic openness. This is a strong indication that the relative cost of capital may 
be a total mediator of real unit labour cost or wage. 
 
The high correlation coefficient between long-term interest rate and relative cost 
would suggest that the rather low parameter estimates of long-term interest rate are 
caused by partial subsumption of the effect of long-term interest rates on capital 
accumulation,  by the relative cost of capital. When financial openness is zero, a 
percentage increase in real long-term interest rate increases fixed capital 
accumulation by 0.0003%. This may suggest that in a closed economy, the bulk of 
the explanatory power of interest rate on capital accumulation is virtually subsumed 
by the powerful effects of the relative cost of capital on fixed capital accumulation. 
In spite of the low economic significance of the parameter estimate of real long-term 
interest rate, its positivity offers empirical support to the argument in the post-
Keynesian literature that higher interest rates may cause increases in rates of fixed 
capital accumulation.  
 
This positive marginal impact of long-term interest rate on fixed capital is however 
positively reinforced by financial openness. An increase in financial openness from 
zero to its mean value increases the positive marginal impact of long-term interest 
rate on fixed capital by 0.0036*0.476024 = 0.0017%. Therefore, the relative cost of 
capital is only a partial mediator of the impact of long-term interest rates on rates of 
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fixed capital accumulation. The impact of long-term interest rates on rates of fixed 
capital accumulation therefore is dependent on the level of financial openness. 
 
The marginal impact of trade openness on capital accumulation rates from Table 7.9 
is both direct and through the relative cost of capital. With financial openness 
accounted for in the model estimate, a percentage increase/(decrease) in trade 
openness decreases/(Increases) the rate of capital accumulation by 0.01% (i.e. 0.02% 
- 2*0.0028) at the 1% significant level, in the current period; increases/(decreases) 
capital accumulation by 0.004% at the 20% significant level in the second period, 
increases/(decreases) accumulation by 0.006% in the third period of the initial 
change in trade openness, all other factors remaining constant. This is a net inverse 
direct change of 0.001% in capital accumulation. But the estimates in Table 7.9 
indicates that when trade openness changes, it necessarily induces changes in capital 
accumulation, through interaction with the relative cost of capital. From the 




 ), is the result of the following function: 
 (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝑇/𝑂𝑝 + 2𝐿0𝑇/𝑂𝑝𝑠𝑞 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝑙2)𝑇𝑂∗𝑅𝐶 ∗
                      𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
                Substituting the respective significant estimates implies 
(-0.0156 + 0.0039 + 0.0060) + 2*0.0028*trade openness + (-0.0481+ 0.0703 –
0.0468)*relative cost, 
            (-0.0057) + (2*0.0028*trade openness) + (-0.0246*relative cost).  
                  Evaluating these variables at their means implies:   
                   (-0.0057) + (2*0.0028*0.7115) + (-0.0246*0.0767) 
                        -0.0057 + 0.003984 + -0.00189 = -0.00361 
 
Where T/Op, T/Opsq, and TO*RC stand for trade openness; trade openness squared; 
and the interaction of trade openness and relative cost respectively. The positive 
coefficient of trade openness squared implies that as trade openness increases, its 
adverse impact on capital accumulation is reduced, all things being equal. The 
marginal effect of trade openness on capital accumulation is a function of trade 
openness itself, but it also depends on the value of relative cost. To enable the 
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assessment of trade openness over the sample period, we estimated at the mean 
values of trade openness and relative cost, as above. Thus on the average, a 
percentage change in trade openness causes an inverse change in capital 
accumulation by a net of 0.004%. We therefore infer or conclude that a change in 
trade openness causes a significant inverse change in the rate of capital 
accumulation, but the size of this induced change in the rate of capital accumulation 
depends on the value assumed by the relative cost of capital, and the value of the 
change in trade openness. 
    
The marginal impact of financial openness on capital accumulation is also both 
direct and through other variables. For the direct impact, assuming all other 
variables constant, a percentage increase/(decrease) in financial openness 
decreases/(increases) capital accumulation by 0.02% at the 5% significant level in 
the second period, but increases/(decreases) it by 0.01% in the third period. 
However, the impact of financial openness on capital accumulation also acts through 
the relative cost of capital, profit share, capacity utilisation and long-term interest 
rate. The total marginal impact (
𝛿𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢;𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝛿𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑎 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
), is thus complex, and given 
by the following  function from the model estimate in Table 7.9 as follow: 
     (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐹/𝑂𝑝 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐹𝑂∗𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 +
       𝐿2)𝐹𝑂∗𝐶𝑈 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐹𝑂∗𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 +
      (𝐿0 + 𝐿1 + 𝐿2)𝐹𝑂∗𝐼𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
                  Substituting the respective significant estimates implies: 
(-0.0192+0.0123) + (0.0231+ -0.0239)*Profit Share + 0.0086*Capacity Utilisation + 
(-0.3438)*Relative cost + 0.0036*Interest rate. 
(-0.0069) + (-0.0008)*Profit share + 0.0086*Capacity Utilisation) + (-
0.3438)*Relative Cost + 0.0036* Interest rate. 
                        Evaluating these variables at their means implies:  
 -0.0069 + (-0.0008)*0.4513 + 0.0086*0.9948 + (-0.3438)*0.0767 + 0.0036* 
0.08173) 
 (-0.0069) + (-0.00036) + 0.008555 + (-0.02637) + 0.000294 = -0.02478 
 
F/Op and int rate above means financial openness and long-term interest rate. 𝐹𝑂 ∗
𝑃𝑆 , 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝑈, 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝑅𝐶, and 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝐼𝑅 are the interaction of financial openness with 
profit share, capacity utilisation, relative cost, and long-term interest rate 
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respectively. It has a sub-net negative impact on capital accumulation through profit 
share and relative cost, but sub-net positive impact through capacity utilisation and 
interest rate. But having provided for the interaction of financial openness and 
respectively with profit share, capacity utilisation, and relative cost, financial 
openness still significantly inversely impact on capital accumulation (the direct 
effect). The overall net marginal effect of financial openness (direct and indirect) 
estimated at the mean, is a significantly inverse of 0.0248%. We therefore infer or 
conclude that a marginal impact of financial openness on the rate of fixed capital 
accumulation is inverse, but the size of this inverse effect is dependent on the value 
assumed by profit share, capacity utilisation, the relative cost of capital and long-
term interest rate. 
 
Balli and Sørensen (2013) have argued that the marginal effect (partial derivative) of 
an explanatory variable in an interacted regression is approximately the difference 
between the first partial of the self-same explanatory variable in a non-interacted 
regression and all the relevant interaction terms in the interacted regression 
estimated at the mean (i.e. given: 
          𝐺 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻1 + 𝛾2𝐻2 + 𝜖; and 𝐺 = 𝐶0 + 𝐶1𝐻1 + 𝐶2𝐻2 + 𝐶3𝐻1𝐻2 +   
                                                            and  
                                     ?̂?1 ≅ 𝛾1 − ?̂?3?̅?2  or 𝛾1 ≅ ?̂?1 + ?̂?3?̅?2 
 
Assuming the credibility of this assertion by Balli and Sørensen (2013), then -0.0069 
(we call it the direct effect) represents the aggregate marginal impact of financial 
openness on capital accumulation apart from its effects through profit share, 
capacity utilisation, relative cost, and interest rate. A comparative analysis suggests 
that the percentage contributions of the terms in financial openness marginal impact 
function are: direct effect – (0.0069/0.042479) =16%, profit share effect – (0.00036/ 
0.042479) = 0.85%, capacity utilisation effect – (0.008555/0.042479) =20%, 
Relative cost effect– (0.02637/0.042479) = 62%, and interest rate – 
(0.000294/0.042479)= 0.69%. The foregoing implies that the most important single 
channel through which financial openness exerts its inverse impact on rates of 
capital accumulation in the short-run is the  relative cost of capital. In a further 
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comparative analysis, the impact of trade openness on fixed capital accumulation 
through the relative cost of capital is just 16%, compared to 62% in the case of 
financial openness, while the direct effect of trade is higher than 49%. This 
differences in impacts, indicate that financial openness even though a fraction of 
economic openness, is a distinct concept from trade openness and thus the separate 
investigation of their respective impacts on  rates of fixed capital accumulation is 
justified. The foregoing estimates and analyses are however related to the short-run 
period. The parameter estimates are expected to be different in the long-run. 
 
7.8.6 Long-run Econometric Analyses  
The statistical significance of the included lag of the dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable indicates that a long-run analysis is very feasible. In this 
subsection,  the focus is on long-run estimates and their analyses. Where the lag of 
the dependent variable included as an explanatory variable is significant, the long 
run value of a parameter estimate, is the estimated short-run parameter divided by 
unity minus the parameter estimate of the included lag of the dependent variable. 
Using the estimated model with the interaction terms in Table 7.9 above, the long 
run estimates are presented in the Table 7.10  below.  
 
Table 7.10: Long-run Estimates; Dependent Variable: Capital Accumulation 
(1970-2014) 
Variable                                     Long-run Coefficient Value at the 
Mean 
Profit Share 0.373856 + - 0.005229*financial openness 
 0.376345 
Capacity Utilisation 
-0.0732 + 0.056209*financial openness 
-0.04645 
Long- term interest  
rate 
0.001961+0.023529*financial openness 0.013161 
Relative Cost -0.91307  + -0.16078Relative*trade openness + -
2.24706Relative*financial openness 
-2.09712 
Trade openness -0.03725 + 2* 0.018301*trade openness + -0.16078*relative cost -0.0235 
Financial Openness -0.0451+-0.00523financial openness*profit share 
+0.056209*capacity utilization +-2.24706*relative cost 
+0.023529*long term interest rate 
-0.16197 
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The long-run parameter estimates of an explanatory variable, indicate the long-term 
impact of a unit change in that explanatory variable. The presence of variables in the 
respective long-term marginal impacts presented in Table 7.10, indicate that these 
marginal impacts are also complex. The estimates indicate that relative cost has the 
highest long-run marginal effect on capital accumulation, estimated at the mean 
level. However, -1.06953 (i.e. 51% of it) is attributable to financial openness. Table 
7.10 shows that in the long-run, the impact of a unit change in each of the other 
variables depends on economic openness. The marginal impacts of  long-term 
interest rate, real unit labour cost or wage, the relative cost of capital on capital 
accumulation in the long-run, are dominated by changes in economic openness. The 
table also shows that in the long-run, the dominant channel through which economic 
openness impacts on rates of capital accumulation is the relative cost of capital.  
 
Although not presented, the result of a comprehensive dominance analyses tends to 
suggest the principality of real unit labour cost in that real labour unit cost was 
consistently returned as completely dominating virtually every other independent 
variable (except the 1st lag of the dependent variable) in every specification in 
explaining the data on fixed capital accumulation. This has been followed by 
financial openness; long-term interest rate; relative cost; and trade openness; 
depending on the specification. Although we are aware of the shortcomings of 
dominance analyses: for example in this case the selection criteria was simple R-
squared. Yet the correlation analysis and interaction regression have both strongly 
indicated these very same variables as the key variables. These tools of analyses  
suggest a powerful economic openness → real-wages →long-term real interest rate 
→relative cost of capital→ capital accumulation axis of causes and effects. With the 
econometrics estimators that are robust to many sources of biased inferences, it has 
been possible to investigate in greater detail, causality and mediation/moderation 
effects with great confidence.  
 
Once again, do increases in financial openness cause decreases in business fixed 
capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies? With the strong evidence 
from the robust econometric analyses as well as the correlation analyses, an 
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affirmative answer is supported for both the short-run and the long-run. But did the 
rise in financial openness in the wake of the capital account liberalisation from the 
mid-1980s contribute to the decline in fixed capital accumulation observed in 
advanced capitalist economies after Fordism? This cannot be answered exclusively 
from the marginal impacts or estimated coefficients analysed so far, as these only 
indicate the nature of the relationship with fixed capital accumulation. To answer 
this latter question, we have recourse to both the results of the marginal analyses and 
levels of volatilities of the variables (see Stockhammer, 2004). 
  
The marginal analyses with the relevant parameter estimates have shown clearly that 
financial openness did not just reinforce trade openness, but actually dominated 
every other variable and operated through nearly all the other variables at the 
margin. To evaluate total impact over the sample period requires assessing the 
respective volatility of these theoretical explanatory variables in the sample period. 
Because the variables are in different units, we standardise the volatilities or 
standard deviations, by dividing through by the means of the variables respectively, 
as done in the section on summary statistics. To compare, we divide the standardised 
volatility of each variable into that of financial openness.  
 
The results of this process indicate that financial openness was 34 times as volatile 
as profit share, 69 times as volatile as capacity utilisation, 8 times as volatile as 
long-term interest rate, 63 times as volatile as real unit cost of labour, 8 times as 
volatile as the relative cost of capital and, 8 times as volatile as trade openness. 
Combining the cumulative evidence from marginal effects and relative total 
volatility analyses, correlation analyses, cointegration analysis, and dominance 
analyses, we therefore conclude that empirical evidence strongly support the 
argument that the rise in financial openness in the wake of the capital account 
liberalisation of the mid-1980s to early 1990s, in the advanced capitalist economies 
strongly contributed to the decline in business fixed capital accumulation observed 
in these countries, after the period of Fordism. 
 
Next, we reconcile the findings that the dominant channel of the impacts of financial 
openness is relative cost with our modelling of the impact of financial openness 
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through financial assets acquisition. Recall that all the channels  including increased 
competition, have been logically explained to make financial assets acquisition more 
profitable than fixed capital accumulation either through more superior cash flows 
or less corporate risk as represented by the equity beta. We then argued how the 
increases in financial assets acquisitions caused by  financial openness have direct 
effects on capital accumulation through corporate assets substitution. We argued 
further, that the increases in financial assets holding also have indirect impacts, 
through changes in relative factor cost and factor substitution, before proceeding to 
the empirics. Therefore our arguments are consistent with the findings. Further 
supports for our arguments, include the arguments that the increased earnings from 
greater financial assets progressively depressed growths in real wages or real cost of 
labour, as labour bargaining power waned, in light of their less relevance in the 
generation of corporate income (Alvarez, 2015). With progressively cheaper wage-
labour cost, profit maximising firms biased their production methods towards labour 
intensity (Fiebiger, 2016). 
 
While the availability of data allowed the inclusion of relative cost and the 
interaction thereof with financial openness, regrettably, there are no macro data on 
financial assets ownership. However, after providing for relative cost and its 
interaction with financial openness, and controlled for other variable, there were also 
economically and statistically significant residual (direct) parameter estimates for 
financial openness. To the extent that the argument of Balli (2013) presented in 
subsection 7.8.2.5 is valid, we exercise the belief that the potential parameter 
estimates regarding the direct impact of  financial assets acquisition on fixed capital 
accumulation through assets substitution were captured in the direct or residual 
parameter estimates of financial openness presented in this chapter.  
 
7.9  Comparison with the Literature 
We re-echo the lamentation of Blanchard (1986) through Heye (1995) of the wide 
chasm between theoretical prescriptions and empirical studies, regarding 
investments and capital accumulation. While many empirical studies tend to limit 
their explanations to conventional theoretical variables and ignore neo-theoretical 
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variables like the international regime, this thesis suggests that the nature of 
international regime as espoused in the Regulation School literature should not be 
neglected in such empirical endeavours. We particularly refer critically to the 
strands of arguments that explicitly assume closed economy, in their analyses of the 
determinants of  rates of fixed capital accumulation. The findings have interesting 
implication and connection with a number of arguments in the political economy 
literature and even in mainstream literature. First, it lends support to the inquisition 
of whether there has been emerging disconnection between profits rates and rates of 
fixed capital accumulation (Bhaskar and Glyn, 1995). It underlines the limitation of 
the strand of argument that corporate profit shares/rates have been the chief drivers 
of capital accumulation and their decline explained the observed declining rates of 
accumulation in the advanced capital economies (Glyn et al, 1992; Epstein and 
Gintis, 1995). The relevant profit variable in this case should not be corporate profit, 
but expected from fixed capital accumulation. The literature is very versed in the 
argument of how the post-Fordist era has been overly profit-oriented. In support of 
this, line plot of profit shares has indicated consistent upward trends over the period 
and countries, when and where rates of  capital accumulation have been declining. 
 
The strand of argument that proposes higher dividend pay-out as the cause of the 
decline would realise that financial openness matters. The assumption of a closed 
economy is consequently not tenable. If the efficacy of greater profit pay-outs is 
contingent on the state of economic openness, then economic openness is the 
ultimate explanatory variable. This is more so, given that profits pay-outs effects are 
nestled in financial openness, and that financial openness has proven to be a 
significant explanatory variable for capital accumulation across  advanced capitalist 
countries. The same logic applies to share buy-backs, which is a kind of partial 
corporate equity liquidation, just like dividend.  
 
While many of the empirical studies, similar and relevant to this research underline 
financial constraints from higher profit pay-outs, managers remunerations or 
financial assets acquisitions as the cause of decline of  fixed capital accumulation by 
capitalist firms, we critically analyse these strands of argument and rather extend the 
viewpoint in Boyer (2000) that financial markets set required returns for 
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corporations, which then revise down wages growth that affects capital 
accumulation from fall in demand. We highlight the relation between these set 
targets on the one hand and assets and factors substitution on the other hand, in the 
determination of capital accumulation .  We point out that the mechanism elucidated 
in this chapter is facilitated through the incentive pay of managers as explained in 
Boyer (2005) or enforced through the market for corporate control as explained in 
Aglietta and Breton (2001), either of which incentivised managers to reconstitute 
production methods with labour intensive bias, as well as firm portfolio restructuring 
with preferences for financial assets, whose returns dominated fixed assets returns of 
their firms. 
 
This paper has a very close link with Stockhammer (2004), who argued that  the 
financial assets of non-financial firms have been on the increase, while rates of fixed 
capital accumulation have been decreasing. However, under closed economy, as 
assumed by Stockhammer, his argument exhibits serious explanatory weaknesses, as 
could have been foreseen in Tobin (1997). Orhangazi (2008) found an inverse 
relationship between financial asset acquisitions and real investments of non-
financial corporations but the focus was the US.  We highlight this limitations but 
introduce the impact of opened economies, in the form of financial openness. 
Onaran et al. (2013) is a closely related literature, but the focus is the relationship 
between FDI and business investments in Germany. Germany is just a subsect of our 
sample countries, and FDI is not the same as financial openness.  
 
The principality of wages (as real labour) as seen from the analyses accord valuable 
credence to the argument in the political economy literature particularly the 
Regulation School literature, the post-Keynesian School literature and Marxist 
literature that argue that growth tend to be wage-led. It offers  empirical content to 
the argument of wage-driven versus profit-driven growth (or the stagnationist versus 
the exhilarating case of capital accumulation) as argued by Lavoie and others. 
However, the mechanism elucidated here is how increases in real wages drive 
growth not just through demand but also through factors substitution, motivated by 
profit motives of capitalist firms. Increases in institution-based constraints to 
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rationalising (wages and) labour employment, encourage increases in capital 
accumulation, as the former increase relative to (cost of fixed) capital and vice-versa 
7.10 Summary 
This chapter sets out to investigate the contributions of  increases in financial 
openness on declining rates of fixed capital accumulation observed for advanced 
capitalist economies since circa 1970. Virtually all the explanations advanced in the 
literature revolved around how  increases in profit pay-outs, share buybacks and, 
financial assets accumulation posed financial constraints to fixed capital 
accumulation. This thesis took rather critical views of these explanations. This is 
because the distribution of profits to shareholders are forms of capital/equity 
liquidations that could only be sustained by robust underlying cash yielding fixed 
capital assets, or some credible substitutes. These underlying assets must be seen as 
robust cash yielders by informed analysts and institutional investors, that have 
dominated financial markets in the post-Fordist period, if pay-outs are to increase 
shareholder value. Increasing the rate of equity-capital liquidation irrespective of the 
detrimental effects on underlying sources of free cash flows and shareholder value, 
would jeopardise the going concern status of a firm and make its equities worthless 
rather than increasing shareholder value. 
 
Financial assets acquisitions  increased, because managers deliberately substituted 
them for fixed capital accumulation. Financial assets are credible alternative 
underlying sources of cash flows that facilitate shareholder value. Why have 
financial assets become superior substitutes to fixed capital in terms of returns to 
shareholders’ fund? It is because of progressive increase in market liquidity, 
dominated by financial openness arising from capital account liberalisation. The 
cause of increases in values of financial assets, financial, should therefore, be the 
ultimate cause of the decline in fixed capital accumulation. Potential adverse 
funding squeeze of systematic equity liquidations such as dividends and share 
buybacks on capital accumulation by some microeconomic entities may unlikely 
transform into sustained macroeconomic decreases in fixed capital accumulation. 
This is based on some interpretations of  shareholder value and economic theories. 
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We argue in this chapter, that increases in financial openness progressively 
increased financial asset prices, returns, and market premium, which in turn, 
progressively increased required returns set by financial markets for capitalist firms. 
Firms are consequently incentivised to substitute financial assets for fixed capital 
and increase labour to fixed capital ratio in production, in light of decreasing ability 
of returns from fixed capital to adequately enhance shareholder value. While 
increases in competition from greater financial openness increased the risk of fixed 
capital accumulation, increase in financial assets returns progressively increased the 
volume and value of financial assets in firms’ balance sheets, in the forms of foreign 
direct investments, foreign portfolio and other investments holding, as well as 
holdings of domestic financial assets. While financial markets progressively 
increased target returns for firms, they offered shareholders the means to enforce 
such set targets. Firms resort to the same markets for help, by holding financial 
assets. Reduction in the relevance of wage-labour in generating corporate income 
and increased competition in labour market depressed real wage growth. Real wage 
growth and the rate of fixed capital accumulation became the ultimate victims of 
increases in financial openness.  
 
Six dynamic panel data estimators with robust standard errors were used, and other 
control variables included to minimise biased inferences. These were augmented 
with correlation and dominance analyses. Estimates of the six estimators support an 
inverse relationship between financial openness and fixed capital accumulation. It 
was found that financial openness acts through profit shares, long-term interest rates 
and the relative cost of capital and independently of these in affecting rates of capital 
accumulation. The dominant channel however, is the relative cost of capital. Trade 
openness apart from a direct inverse impact also acts through the relative cost of 
capital, to affect rates of capital accumulation. Financial openness decreases fixed 
capital accumulation through profit share and relative cost, but tend to increase it 
through capacity utilisation and long-interest rates. The argument here is 
underpinned by the French Regulation School that proposes that institutions, 
including an international regime part of which is financial openness matters in 
capital accumulation. Apart from the finding in this chapter, of the likelihood that  
financial openness complemented trade openness in explaining the decline in fixed 
capital accumulation, observed in the advanced capitalist economies. The evidence 
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that the way every other variable affects fixed capital accumulation depends on 
financial openness, indicates that financial openness matters; that institutions indeed 
matters, in fixed capital accumulation. 
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Chapter 8 International Economic Openness: An Institutional 
Hegemon? A Post-Fordist Regime of Development? 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter starts by highlighting the findings of the previous two chapters and then 
goes on to consider whether the extended period of declining fixed capital 
accumulation and rising profit rates together with the findings of  the previous two 
chapters were characteristics of a post-Fordist mode of development.  Empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis robustly supports the argument that for advanced 
capitalist economies, increases in international economic openness whether through 
trade openness or financial openness, cause decreases in rates of business fixed 
capital accumulation. This body of evidence further substantiates the claim that  
increases in economic openness since the end of Fordism, robustly explain the 
observed slowdown in rates of capital accumulation across advanced capitalist 
economies in the post-Fordist period, since circa 1970. Inferences regarding the 
inverse relationship between economic openness and capital accumulation, as well 
as the contributions of  increased economic openness to the prolonged decline in 
fixed capital accumulation are underpinned by econometric and statistical studies of 
a sample of 23 advanced capitalist economies, which are members of the OECD. 
The sample period is from 1960 to 2014. Panel data method involving six different 
estimators with their characteristic assumptions, weaknesses and strengths were 
used, to limit estimator bias on drawn inferences. To reinforce the robustness of 
these findings, these estimators were applied to segments of the sample period and, 
augmented with dominance, cointegration as well as structural break analyses. 
Economic openness was analysed into its two principal components of trade and 
financial openness and both proved to be independently significant.  
 
An exemplary case of the inverse relationship between trade openness and capital 
accumulation and the role played by increases in trade openness in observed 
downward trends in fixed capital accumulation, is that of Luxemburg. As was 
pointed out in an earlier chapter, while the other countries in the sample had  very 
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low levels of economic openness in the 1960s, Luxembourg stood out from the 
pack, as having the highest and high levels of trade openness. It is therefore not 
surprising that among the 23 countries in the sample, Luxembourg had the least rate 
of fixed capital accumulation, the least index of fixed capital formation, but the 
highest index of profit share and the third highest profit rate, in 1960. However, this 
level of openness remained more or less the same for a long time, over which 
business fixed capital accumulation remained more or less the same. A dramatic 
downturn that progressed into a downward  trend in fixed capital accumulation was 
not observed, until just after the start of a dramatic upturn and progressive increases 
in trade openness (Figures A3 &A4 in Appendix A.2). 
 
The primary theoretical framework that underpins this empirical study is the French 
Regulation School theory. There exist at least three channels through which 
economic openness could impede fixed capital accumulation rates, in advanced 
capitalist economies. Empirical evidence indicates that by far the most potent 
channel, is the relative cost of capital. Empirical evidence further indicates that 
international economic openness, in both forms of trade openness and financial 
openness, offers capitalists the means of increasing profit shares/rates. The channels 
through which economic openness enhance profit rates and straitjacket rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, also include increases in imports and exports, in the case of 
trade openness, and greater acquisition of domestic and foreign financial assets, by 
local corporations due to higher financial openness. Even when the channel of 
relative cost (factor substitution) has been accounted for, both forms of economic 
openness also wound up with significant residual negative coefficient estimates, 
which go a long way to suggest the complexity of the processes through which 
economic openness exact inverse movements on rates of fixed capital accumulation, 
in  advanced capitalist economies.  
 
The experience of the golden age of Fordism has apparently informed an orthodox 
view of a  ‘profit – capital accumulation nexus’. However, this thesis argues, and 
supported by the data, that over the post-Fordist decades, economic openness 
increasingly undermined the strength of this positive relationship. This nexus was 
apparently superseded by an emerged economic openness - profit accumulation 
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nexus, based on the globalisation of profit accumulation processes. The Regulation 
School theory suggests that prolonged economic patterns such as the aforementioned 
‘profit-capital accumulation nexus’, ‘economic openness - profit accumulation 
nexus, declining capital accumulation rates in the face of increasing rates of profits, 
likely tend to take place within the context of an accumulation regime, sustained by 
a mode of regulation. But mainstream economists have argued a continuous and 
unbroken process of accumulation. Even within the Regulation School literature, 
there exists a hot debate over the emergence of a post-Fordist mode of development 
since the demise of Fordism, inspite of the apparent emergence of prolonged post-
Fordist economic patterns. Therefore, did the foregoing observed trends and 
relationships happen in the context of a new post-Fordist mode of development?  
 
A mode of development consists of a regime of accumulation and the associated 
mode of régulation. An identification of a post-Fordist mode of development entails 
the tough task of identifying a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. A major reason 
for the intensive disagreement over the emergence of a post-Fordist mode of 
development relates to a lacuna in a standard method of establishing the emergence 
of a regime of accumulation. In light of the foregoing, this chapter reviews the 
debate, with the intent of mining out an objective way to assess the emergence of a 
posts-Fordist regime of accumulation. It then proceeds to identify the 
complementary mode of régulation and the hegemonic institution, as robust 
evidence of an emergent post-Fordist mode of development. The final part of the 
investigative effort in this chapter, is to find empirical evidence that the observed 
trends and findings presented in the earlier chapters of this thesis are characteristics 
of the post-Fordist mode of development. The structure of the chapter is as follows: 
Section 8.2 reviews the debate on an emergence of a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation and endeavours to identify a regime of accumulation. Section 8.3 
Identifies the complementary mode of régulation. Section 8.4 assesses the hegemony 
of the international regime. Section 8.5 assesses the hegemonic class that have 
emerged out of the struggles, by comparing relative class benefits during the 
identified regime of accumulation. Section 8.6 is a summary to the chapter. 
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8.2   Is there Evidence of a Post-Fordist Regime of Accumulation?  
What really is a regime of accumulation? The theoretical concept of a regime of 
accumulation refers to a prolonged and prevailing pattern of economic activities, 
through which profit-motivated capitalists/firms enjoy sustained wealth creation, 
through the initial outlay of some level of value/wealth. It encompasses the 
prevailing patterns of production, consumption, circulation, and distribution that 
organise and expand the wealth of profit-motivated owners of investable funds 
(capitalists), in a way that stabilises the national economy over a period. This 
prevailing pattern may involve extended rapid accumulation of private non-
residential fixed assets to facilitate mass production, investment or initial outlay on 
financial (paper) assets that yield interest income, royalties, capital gains, fees, 
royalties, rents and profits (see Wikipedia on capital accumulation).  
 
 If a regime of accumulation involves mass production, then there should be an 
equivalent mass demand/consumption, to clear the mass of outputs. If it involves 
increasing financial gains through acquisitions of financial and non-productive 
assets, then an equivalent demand for such financial/non-productive assets to 
generate such increases in financial gains should be in place. A regime of 
accumulation may bring about genuine increments to existing wealth or a mere 
redistribution of existing wealth, or both. Because of inherent contradictions in 
capitalist wealth production, long waves of wealth creation are argued to require 
more than mere market mediation to needing extra-economic institutions and norms 
(juridico-political structure) (see Jessop, 2013)). As argued by Jessop (2013), the 
resolution of contradictions that would otherwise prevent the reproduction of wealth 
accumulation that could potentially form a long wave process, is by institutional fix 
and spatio-temporal fix, and such fixes emerge through a processes of contests and 
trial by error. 
 
 Such fixes would bring about some compromise between the contesting classes, in 
the production-power configuration, that leaves one class or the other worse off, or 
both relatively well off, to permit another extended period that brings in a new stage 
of capitalism, in a manner complimentary to the concept of Kondratiev wave. In 
spite of the controversy over the emergence of a new regime, some post-Fordist 
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regimes of accumulation have however, been highlighted in the literature. The last 
regime of accumulation identified with a considerable consensus in the Régulation 
School literature, is Fordism. In a characterisation of Fordism, Lipietz (1992) 
highlighted intensive business fixed investments or fixed capital accumulation, mass 
production, complementary mass consumption arising dominantly from equitable 
distribution of value added between owners of profit and wage labour, full 
employment, full capacity utilisation, stable corporate profitability, and historically 
low economic openness (see Jessop, 2013). How and exactly when this regime of 
Fordism ended, remain controversial subjects. But Wallerstein (2010), and Castree 
et al (2013) put the period of Fordism between 1945 and 1973. 
 
Some have argued that there are triple aspects to the ending of Fordism: a technical 
side that include an eventual exhaustion of the underpinning productivity growth, an  
economic aspect that include the concept of profit squeeze arising from organic 
composition of capital and increasing real wages, as productivity decline sets in, and 
a social aspect that include pressure on profitability, changes in prerogatives of 
managers and, pressure from demand on public finance. But as the curtains were 
drawn on Fordism, a new method of accumulation has to replace it, as capitalists 
endeavour to find new ways of increasing sagging profit rates (Clarke, 1990). Clark 
(1990) proposition suggest conscious effort or tendency by receivers of profits to 
find a new way of making profits,-a new regime of accumulation. But Has there 
been an emergence of a post-Fordist accumulation regime since the demise of 
Fordism? As hinted in an earlier section, this is about the most sensitive controversy 
in the Regulation School literature, and therefore calls for a methodical approach, as 
a simple affirmative or negative answer provides no logical reasoning regarding the 
emergence of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. 
 
The experience of golden years of  Fordism has informed an enduring perception 
among some scholars, of a regime of accumulation as a stereotypical virtuous circle 
involving wealth accumulation (circuit of capital) through intensive fixed capital 
accumulation, lamented Kotz (2002, 2003) (See also, Gordon et al., 1982). A regime 
of accumulation should be both historical and institutional and not a-historic and a-
institutional. Therefore if there exist criteria that collectively qualify a temporal 
- 253 - 
stretch as a period of a regime of accumulation, it should be irrelevant whether it is a 
virtuous circle between expenditure to the benefits of domestic labour and the profit 
of capitalists or a vicious circle. Yet the narrow perception that stereotyped a regime 
of accumulation as a virtuous circle still persists. Consequently, the non-emergence 
of another prolonged period of a discernible virtuous relationship between labour 
and capital, (a reciprocal higher expenditures in benefit of wage-labour class that 
would bring about increases in benefits accruing to the capitalists’ class) since 
Fordism has on the one hand, generated a crop of scepticism regarding the 
emergence of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation, among some scholars. But the 
expectation that a regime of accumulation should have emerged after such a long 
time since Fordism, on the other hand, has created a crop of proponents of an 
emerged post-Fordist regime of accumulation. There is, therefore, this divide, 
fundamentally responsible for the lack of a consensus on the emergence of a post-
Fordist regime of accumulation, so many decades after the demise of Fordism.  
 
Proponents of an emerged post-Fordist regime have ventured ambitiously to identify 
some post-Fordist regimes of accumulation, albeit with some undertone of caution 
(Jessop, 1992b, p.32; 1994, p.27). However, among these proponents, the identities 
or characteristics of these regimes are themselves sources of further controversies.  
The list is quite long and includes: Toyotism, Service-led, 
Information/Communication Technology (ICT)-led, Knowledge-based accumulation 
regime, Competition-led regime, export-led and  finance-led regimes (see Boyer, 
2000; 2004). Although there have apparently been periods since the demise of 
Fordism, when features that typified each of the aforementioned post-Fordist 
regimes were discernible, the realities of these post-Fordist regimes of accumulation 
would imply about seven regimes of accumulation in less than three decades! If 
regimes of accumulation occur in sequence with intervening structural crises, then 
these would average about just four years per regime of accumulation. This implied 
brevity contrasts sharply with the concept of a regime of accumulation as a long 
wave or prolonged period of accumulation and the experience of Fordism which 
spanned nearly three decades. Alternatively, if these regimes are assumed to have 
overlapped, then this assumption would be inconsistent with the argued trajectory of 
a regime of accumulation: that it must wind up in a structural crisis, before another 
growth regime emerges. To make the matter more complex, it is often the case that 
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features respectively typifying Toyotism, competition-le growth, ICT-led growth, 
knowledge-led growth and the others so identified, are embodied simultaneously in 
the observed activities of a single firm. Do we then have two or more regimes of 
accumulation in a single firm at the same time? The overlap of  regimes of 
accumulation within the spatial setting of a firm is virtually impossible, on the one 
hand. Structural crises of Toyotism, competition-led growth and of the others, have 
not however, been very much public knowledge or well documented in the 
literature, on the other hand.  
 
This controversial scenario has attracted critical views from the likes of Leborgne 
and Lipietz (1992, p.333), who cautioned that most proponents of emerged post-
Fordist regime, might have inadvertently downgraded it to some kind of new 
production systems. Sceptics of an emerged post-Fordist regime of accumulation, 
who attach higher weights to the emergence of a virtuous circle more than the 
supposition of the emergence of a regime of accumulation, have so far refrain from 
acceding to the birth of a post Fordist regime. These regime sceptics have argued 
that many instances of identified post-Fordist regimes eventually turned up as 
undoubtedly cases of premature visions of regimes of accumulation (Tickell and 
Peck, 1995). However, on a more objective note, should or shouldn’t there have 
been a post-Fordist regime of accumulation, in the course of over four decades since 
the demise of Fordism? Alternatively, in an extreme case that raises the spectre of a 
never emergent post-Fordist accumulation regime, do we have to wait till around 
2050 as suggested by Wallerstein (2010) for the next post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation? 
 
There exist some bases to argue that a post-Fordist regime of accumulation by logic, 
should have emerged. The description of a regime of accumulation given in the 
literature suggests that a regime of accumulation may involve more than the virtuous 
circle of wage growth, rapid growth through fixed capital accumulation and profit 
rates, and  more scholars have come to accept this reality. Although the SSA variant 
of the Regulation School has posited that there is an alternation of extended period 
of accumulation regime followed by an extended period of relative economic 
stagnation, historical analysis of past regimes readily suggest that these periods of 
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stagnation were rather short (often less than 10 years) compared to the time span of 
the accumulation regimes. The more than four decades since the end of Fordism 
would, therefore, unlikely be the stretch of a single structural crisis. But the end of a 
structural crisis presupposes the beginning of a new regime of accumulation. 
 
The supposed fundamental and permanent class conflicts between the two dominant 
classes of capitalism regarding the distribution of output of a society would imply 
that either class is well informed about its socio-economic entitlements. Such 
conflicts also imply that either class is well informed about conditions that could 
facilitate greater shares of created values/income to accrue to them over their life 
time, given the constraints and opportunities facing them. A structural crisis of 
capitalism is not supposed to be one of such contexts that facilitate greater shares of 
outputs to labour or capitalists. Structural crisis with stagnant profit growth or 
falling profit rates, unemployment and real wage stagnation will be an ill wind that 
will hardly blow any of the classes of capitalism any good. This applies to the 
capitalist class, wage-labour class, managers or even the state in lost tax revenue. As 
such, crisis would be undesirable to wage-labour class or owners of investable funds 
(capitalists), even though it may be the result of their actions, for both classes are 
desirous of the reproduction of their respective benefits (Clarke, 1990) and crisis 
generally reduces the present value of their respective cumulative incomes (see 
Amable et al., 2005). But a regime of accumulation is expected to be favourable to 
at least a class of capitalism, who will exercise efforts to maintain the status quo. 
 
Given the common dislike for crisis, before long, a stabilising institutional 
configuration that forges a form of compromise between labour and capital emerges 
and midwife another long wave of a regime of accumulation. Under these premises, 
therefore, a long wave or regime of accumulation should expectedly be longer than a 
period of crisis, and there should have occurred a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation. So what post-Fordist regime(s) of accumulation has so far  emerged, 
that is comparable to Fordism in in terms of time span and meet the expected 
trajectory of a regime of accumulation as theorised in the literature, and could be 
adjudged to be such under the Regulation School paradigm, in the spirit of Tickell 
and Peck (1995)? If there was a clearly laid-down criteria for identifying a regime of 
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accumulation, then there would have hardly been any controversy over its 
emergence, in the first place. 
 
One consequence of the desire for such a regime of accumulation that is comparable 
to Fordism was the proposition of neoliberalism as an alternative post-Fordist 
regime of accumulation, by some scholars. Some have argued, however, that 
neoliberalism does not qualify as a regime of accumulation (see Tickell and Peck, 
1995). Moreover, neoliberalism simply describes the regulatory stance of the state 
and hardly describes the economic activities of capitalists and labour. Kotz (2003) 
has identified a post-Fordist regulatory structure or mode of regulation for the 
United States: a liberal structure that regulates an accumulation regime, that started 
somewhere between  1979 and 1981. But the corresponding regime of accumulation 
was not identified. This proposed regulatory structure does not support rapid fixed 
capital accumulation and economic growth, according to Kotz (2003). This is a 
further basis to argue that a regime of accumulation may not involve rapid fixed 
capital accumulation or virtuous circle.    
 
While a consensus regarding the emergence of  a post-Fordist regime remains 
elusive, there has been a greater consensus on some of the economic features and 
pattern that typified the era from the mid-1970s to the global financial crisis. These 
features include a general  decline in rates of growth of GDP, downward trending 
rates of inflation, increases in rates of unemployment, progressive income 
inequalities,  neoliberal states, rapid increases in household debts, increases in profit 
rates co-existing with declining fixed capital accumulation and increases in 
economic openness (See Stockhammer, 2007). These are features that have been 
enduring but systematically antithetic to those of Fordism. How do we therefore 
identify a regime of accumulation? 
 
8.2.1 A Method and Methodological Foundation for the Identification of 
A Post-Fordist Accumulation Regime. 
A heuristic approach for the identification of a historical regime of accumulation is 
feasible. The perspective here is based on the Regulation School theory of 
accumulation. The heuristic approach relies on inductive inferences from the theory 
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of accumulation. What really is capitalism and accumulation? According to a 
definition of capitalism by the Webster dictionary, capitalism is an economic 
system, whose most typical feature is the private ownership of capital goods 
(wealth) arguably for the accumulation of wealth. This definition implies that 
capitalism is a social system that allows private accumulation of wealth through 
profits (Wallerstein, 2010). The search for increases in existing wealth of  capitalists 
through higher profits, inter-firm rivalry and compulsive innovation have been 
described as the raison d’être of capitalism. In Marxism, capitalism is depicted as 
moving in alternating periods of growth and crisis. During growth, excessive profits 
are made. Wealth accumulates at higher rates (increasing profit rates). During crisis, 
a capitalist economy shrinks, and tends towards dis-accumulation of wealth.  
 
Crisis persist until opportunities for growth in the old activities resurface, or new 
economic activities are discovered. Because either may take some time to happen, 
crisis would have the tendency to be period of really deep, acute, or marked decline 
in rates of growth of wealth (or profit rates). Therefore we could picture the 
movement of capitalism through time, in terms of the movement of wealth 
accumulation through time, which in turn would be reflected in the movement of 
aggregate profit rate, through time. The period of growth is not only a period of 
excessive wealth accumulation (excessive profits), but a period of wealth 
accumulating at higher rates (progressive growth/increase in profit rates). Crisis, as a 
period of capitalist economy/wealth shrinking, implies a period of loses or acute 
decline in wealth accumulation (acute falls in capitalist profit rates). These acute 
falls in profit rate persist until a new opportunity for growth comes around. If 
capitalism moves through time in alternation of growth (higher profit rates) and 
crisis (acute falls in profit rates) and the contour of capitalism could be seen in terms 
of movement in wealth accumulation through time, in turn reflected by movement in 
collective profit rates through time, then we could induce that the temporal 
movement of capitalism in terms of alternating growth and crisis is reflected in the 
temporal movement of aggregate profit rates, as a series of alternating period of 
progressively rising profit rates (growth or wealth increasing at higher rates, i.e. 
growth) and acute decline in profit rates (shrinking economy or wealth, i.e. crisis) 
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Castree et al (2013) opines that capitalist wealth accumulation, entails the 
undertaking of economic activities, which may involve the production, distribution, 
and realisation/disposal of myriad commodities, with the singular objective of 
increasing wealth laid out by capitalists at the start, through the generation of profits, 
at the end of the process. It is further opined that the unceasing quest for new and 
higher profitability, makes capitalists more than willing to switch or deploy their 
funds to new economic ventures or locations (perhaps overseas), often in 
conjunction with the financial markets (ibid). Historical observation of events before 
the 2007 financial crisis (the great recession) suggests that these myriad 
commodities may have evolved to include financial market products. Thus the 
specific forms assumed by the dominant economic activities for wealth 
accumulation or profits in a particular country may change with time. There is also  
a significant consensus in the literature that the myriad of commodities may vary 
from country to country. Thus the mode of wealth accumulation and therefore 
capitalism vary with time and location. 
 
Given the temporal-spatial variation in wealth accumulation and capitalism, the 
common denominator across all wealth accumulation and capitalism from the 
foregoing definitions, is the commitment of initial wealth, with the view to reaping 
some increments to this initially committed wealth at the end of a period, otherwise 
known as profit generation (see Wallerstein, 2010). Underpinning accumulation, is 
the singular expectation of profits or wealth increases. Therefore, increment in 
wealth (profit) and the rates of wealth increment (profit rates) become the core 
variables present in all wealth accumulation, and  capitalism. Because profit rate 
indicates how well wealth accumulation is progressing, profit rate should be an 
effective single variable that indicates, captures or reflects how wealth accumulation 
and capitalism progress through time. Most scholars of the Regulation School and 
many scholars of the post-Keynesian literature, have agreed that capitalism within a 
country proceeds through time, in alternation of a regime of accumulation and a 
structural crisis. If these crises are the crises in the Marxist rendition of the dynamics 
of capitalism as the alternation of growths and crises, then by the principle of 
equivalence, regimes of accumulation are the periods of growth in the Marxist 
dynamics  of capitalism.    
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Castree et al (2013), proposed that a regime of accumulation is a historically specific 
but relatively long-lived means by which wealth accumulation (profit) is sustained 
or ensured and these means may be a dominant collection of industries, whose 
products and markets have characteristics in common (ibid). If wealth accumulation 
involves the growing of wealth (through profits) from the beginning of a period or 
process to the end thereof, and a regime of accumulation is a relatively long-lived 
means or processes of wealth accumulation as well as a period of (Marxist) growth, 
then a regime of accumulation is a series of sustained, ensured, long-lived repeated 
process or periods of growth in profit rates. This is consistent with the argument in 
the literature that profit rates pattern (and by implication wage pattern) is a 
fundamental feature of a regime of accumulation (Wallerstein, 2010). The inductive 
inference of a regime of accumulation as a relatively long period of repeated growth 
or increases in aggregate profit rates is also consistent with the argument of Bowles 
et al (1986, p.134), that if the system whereby there exists an institutional 
configuration or mode of regulation which sustains or ensures a regime of 
accumulation has any merit, then such boom or regime of accumulation regulated by 
a social mode of regulation should be characterised by rising and relatively high 
profit rates.  
 
A regime of accumulation ends in a structural crisis, when the mode of regulation 
burns out. In the Regulation School literature, a configuration of institution that 
sustains or ensures a long-lived repeated process of growth in profit rates burns out, 
causing a structural crisis. There are different kind of crises in the Regulation School 
literature. Exogenic crises are of external causes, and the mode of regulation remains 
operational, with temporary or slight lull in wealth accumulation (profit rates). 
Endogenic crises are similar to exogenic crises in effects, but are of endogenous or 
internal causes. In the theory, exogenic and endogenic crises don’t fundamentally 
change the general upward trends of rates of wealth accumulation  or profit rates. 
Structural crises are crises of mode of regulation or mode of accumulation. The 
remedies therefore involve the search for a new mode of regulation (starting the 
same activities when they becomes profitable again because of new social 
institutions) or a new mode of accumulation (new profit generating activities). Thus 
periods of acute, deep decline in profit rates are periods of structural crises. The 
alternation of a regime of accumulation with structural crisis in the dynamics of 
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capitalism means a regime of accumulation is flanked by structural crises and the 
reflection in profit rates movement is extended upward trending profit rates, flanked 
on both sides by significant and acute descents in the series of profit rates.  
 
But at any one time there is bound to be, at least a capitalist involved in wealth dis-
accumulation through losses or wealth accumulation through profits. To get around 
this complexity, we rely on insights from Brown (2007) and statistically represent a 
regime of accumulation as a system-wide social process: A sustained period of 
repeated growth in collective (not individual) profit rates. A period of crisis is a 
period of acute repeated falls in collective profit rates that effectively change the 
trend of collective wealth accumulation or growth in collective profit rates. 
Theoretically wealth is accumulated if profit exceeds zero, or profit rate is greater 
than zero. Therefore in an extreme theoretical case, a regime of accumulation may 
not be upward trending. We make the assumption of non-ergodicity of a regime of 
accumulation. The assumption of non-ergodicity ensures that a regime of 
accumulation in terms of profit rates tend to be a sustain repeated process of rising 
profit rates, or upward trending series of profit rates, in in reality and don’t assume 
alternative theoretical forms. Non-ergodicity of a regime of accumulation implies 
that an upward trending series of profit rates, is the representation of the statistical 
properties of underlying wealth generating economic activities of all regimes of 
accumulation.  
 
Profit rate is indexed as the ratio of net profit to net fixed capital stock. Net profit 
objectively represents the increment in wealth, during a period. If wealth is 
accumulated through fixed capital accumulation falling profit rates indicate crisis in 
the underlying productive activities. If wealth is dominantly accumulated through 
alternative assets like financial assets, falling profit rates indicate the crisis of profits 
from this alternative method of wealth generation. The temporal stretch representing 
a regime of accumulation could be discerned, as an extended upward trending series 
of profit rates bounded by extended inflections or deep breaks representing 
structural breaks, by visual inspection or statistical tests of structural/regime breaks. 
A statistical structural or regime break indicates an abrupt change in a data series 
and the point in time of the change. It   facilitates the determination of whether and 
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when there is a significant change in the data or the underlying mechanism that 
generates the data. Therefore, we could determine whether the underlying process 
sustaining wealth accumulation has ended, due to a structural crisis.  
 
The methodological foundation of the approach used here for discerning/identifying 
the period of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation from both theory and the 
econometric analysis, is logical induction. Here, the statistical representations of a 
regime of accumulation and a crisis are induced from definitions in the theory of 
accumulation. In inductive reasoning, inferences are made from some given 
premises. However the truth of such premises or limited observed evidence do not 
guarantee the truth of such inferences or conclusion but make them probable. 
Unceasing quest for higher profit rates by capitalists and struggles for the emergence 
of an enabling or sustaining mode of regulation increase the probability of our 
induced statistical representation of a regime of accumulation as non-ergodically 
upward trending profit rates bounded by acute falling profit rates (structural crises).  
 
Figure 8.1 is a series of collective net profit rates averaged across the 23 advanced 
capitalist economies in the sample, that are members of the OECD. A reproduction 
of the series with smaller country samples leaves the series more or less the same, 
suggesting the robustness and extensive nature of the reflected accumulation 
regimes. The shape of the series reveals two explicit locations of deep structural 
breaks. The breaks represent periods of abrupt/acute and deep decline in profit rates. 
The first was between 1971 and 1973 and the second between 2007 and 2008. 
Statistical tests of structural breaks, identify the years of structural breaks 
representing the structural crises as approximately 1971 and 2008 respectively. The 
period of the first break of between 1971 and 1973 has been well documented as the 
time of the structural crisis of Fordism, while between 2007 and 2008 is well 
documented as the time of the global financial crisis or the Great Recession. The 
length of time between these two periods is a long period induced to be representing 
a regime of accumulation.  
 
The upward trending section of  collective profit rates before the structural 
break/crisis of the early 1970s, arguably represents a part of the regime of  Fordism.  
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Further to the crisis of Fordism evidenced by the deep and acute decline in profit 
rates in Figure 8.1, the Figure indicates that by 1975, profit rates have on the 
average, bottomed out, stabilised and, within a couple of years started its upward 
trend till about 2007 when there was a structural crisis (the global financial crisis).  
The long stretch of up-trending  profit rates of nearly three decades in Figure 8.1, 
apparently evidenced an underlying profit rates momentum from some specific 
wealth generating activities by profit-minded owners of investable fund, and is long 
enough to qualify as a long wave of an accumulation regime. 
 
Figure 8.1: Average Profit Rate: Advanced Capitalist Countries 
 
(Source: Author’s estimation from sample data) 
 
This long stretch is apparently a post- Fordist regime of accumulation. Thus we have 
a first phase of evidence that supports the emergence of a post-Fordist regime as 
well as the time thereof. However, the accumulation of aggregate wealth/profit in 
this emergent Post Fordist regime is not based on mass production or fixed capital 
accumulation within national space, unlike in Fordism. The dents of 1981 and 1992 
could be interpreted as periods of minor (exogenic/endogenic) crises as is typical of 
a regime of accumulation, which accommodate minor crises that do not exhaust its 
mode of regulation. The upward trending section marking the end of the structural 
break/crisis of  2007/2008 arguably suggests an evolving regime of accumulation. 
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2007/2008 structural crisis of capitalism or that of the post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation. However, it is still far below profit rates enjoyed before the crisis of 
2007/2008. The figure may suggest that a long wave of accumulation has almost 
passed by unidentified, and the emerging regime would be a post-global financial 
crisis accumulation regime. Yet the length of the data precludes any credible 
proposition regarding the emerging post-global financial crisis accumulation regime. 
Moreover, in the Regulation School Approach, the tradition is that a regime of 
accumulation is not predicted, but historically/retrospectively identified (see Tickell 
and Peck, 1995). Having identified the period of the post-Fordist regime, how do we 
identify the regime (by name)?  
 
To identify the regime from the econometric test and analyses, we adopt a method 
that has grounded theory as the methodological foundation. We use this method to 
identify the regime induced from the econometric results. There is a tendency to 
adopt empiricism by positivist neoclassicals. But a tendency towards retroduction 
and grounded theory methods seem to be typical of critical realist post-Keynesians 
(Lee, 2002). Structuralism, retroduction and grounded theory are common with  
critical realist Regulation School scholars (see Jessop, 2003). An apparently more 
sophisticated and more modern methodological foundation of system-wide dialectic 
has been explicated in the literature (see Brown, 2007). The theoretical underpinning 
of this thesis however, is that of a critical realist Regulation School. We therefore 
adopt a method consistent with this philosophical foundation. We adopt grounded 
theory based method. A grounded theory based approach reaches theoretical 
conclusion through the rigorous combination and direct analyses of data, theoretical, 
empirical and historical literature simultaneously. Data collection, theoretical 
analysis and theoretical conclusion take place at the same time. Existing literature 
guides data analysis while the result of data analysis shape existing propositions, 
until new theoretical finding is achieved.  Researchers are thus neither unduly 
influenced by exiting literature nor data, but produce theoretical propositions that 
describe the data, and do not go beyond the data (see Lee, 2002). 
 
The theoretical literature argues that institutional configurations cause regimes of 
accumulation. The literature further proposed that in the regime of Fordism, wage 
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relation was the dominant social structure and, together with rapid fixed capital 
accumulation and capacity utilisation, underpinned that regime of accumulation 
(Glyn et al, 1992; Aglietta, 1998; Boyer, 2013). Wage-relations underpinned the 
mass consumption, mass production during Fordism. In response to mass 
consumption, the corporate strategy for sustaining high profit rates during Fordism 
involves greater emphases on fixed capital accumulation and greater capacity 
utilisation, to enable mass production. Wage relations, thus, came to underpin higher 
profit rates, higher real wages, fixed capital accumulation and the (equitable) 
distribution of income. If these theoretical arguments are true, the expectation is that 
these variables should correlate very significantly with (real) wages. It is not 
surprising that this regime of accumulation was named after the prevailing wage-
relations introduced by Henry Ford in the US, and copied by other advanced 
capitalist economies.  
 
The dramatic increases in internationalism helped to bring about the end of Fordism, 
by destabilising the regulatory structural forms of Fordism. These increases 
continued, explosively, in the subsequent years, to offer many more scopes for profit 
generation, that kept profit share continuously rising until about 2007/2008 (Figure 
2.3). With this change in international regime, came strategy shift, with reference to 
the components of profit rates. Capitalists increased emphasis on profit shares, and a 
terrifying scaling down in rates of capacity utilisation. Furthermore, profit rates 
received significant boost from stupendous increases in the ratio of potential output 
to capital stock, brought about by decreases in rates of fixed capital accumulation.  
The fall in profit rates consequent upon the structural crisis of 2007/2008 lasted until 
just 2009. The decline in profit rates was brought about by falls in profit shares over 
the same period. Capitalists responded to the fall in profit rates without delay, by a 
ruthless cull of net capital stocks, to yield a near vertical increase in the ratio of 
potential output to capital stock (Figure 2.5). Further analyses of data presented in 
Figures 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 suggested that changes in 
international regime in the forms of increases in trade and financial openness 
underpin the new form of wealth accumulation. 
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The new international regime conditioned not only the dynamics of profit rates, but 
also those of real wages (and wage-relations), and the distribution of income (Glyn 
et al., 1992; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Boyer, 2013). The dramatic changes in  
international regime across advanced capitalist economies, caused the supersession 
of wage-relations by the new international regime of greater economic openness, as 
the institution driving  accumulation of wealth and profit rates. We found that this 
new increases in economic openness even explained observed dynamics of fixed 
capital accumulation in advanced capitalist economies in post-Fordism. Therefore, if 
these theoretical claims are true, indices of economic openness should correlate very 
strongly with the relevant variables, particularly profit rates, in these economies. If 
the correlations turned out to be strong enough, then in parallel with Fordism, the 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation should by analogy, be named after the 
conditioning institution of international regime. Thus the identification of the post-
Fordist regime of accumulation modifies the theory of regime of accumulation in the 
Regulation School literature, as consistent with the grounded theory approach. 
  
Table 8.1 presents the correlation coefficients between an index of international 
regime of economic openness and the relevant macroeconomic variables associated 
with a regime of accumulation, as aforementioned. The table identifies three 
potential regime of accumulation, as suggested by Figure 8.1. The figures in italic 
are coefficients of determination. A coefficient of determination, given as the square 
of a correlation coefficient, is the proportion of  variation in a variable predicted or 
explained by changes in another variable. The 5th row of the table indicates how 
corporate profit rates correlate with economic openness, under the three distinct 
sections identified in Figure 8.1. During Fordism (to the extent that 1960-1969 
represents Fordism), the correlation between profit rates and economic openness 
was just 0.08 (not significantly different from zero). The coefficient of 
determination of 0.7% means that only 0.7% of corporate profit rates during 
Fordism could be explained by the state of the international regime or economic 
openness. However, during the period of corporate internationalism, the correlation 
coefficient was 0.88. The coefficient of determination indicates that during this 
regime, the new international regime explained 77% of the growth in corporate 
profit rates, on average, across the sample countries. After the global financial crisis 
of 2007/2008, the correlation coefficient and coefficient of determination fell  to 
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about 0.4 and 17% respectively. In the 6th row, regarding the correlation between 
fixed capital accumulation and profit rates, it was 0.57 during Fordism. This implies 
 
Table 8.1: Regimes of Accumulation: Correlation Coefficients 
 Accumulation Regimes 
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that over 32% of changes in profit rates was explained by fixed capital accumulation 
in Fordism. During Corporate Internationalism, the correlation coefficient was a 
negative 0.39, implying that 15% of falls in fixed capital accumulation was 
explained by increases in profit rates, during corporate internationalism. After the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008, the correlation coefficient is 0.67 and the coefficient of 
determination is 45%. Regarding the observation that  fixed capital accumulation 
rates have been trending downward, while rates of profit have been trending upward 
in advanced capitalist economies, Table 8.1 shows that the correlation coefficient 
between this divergence in rates and the international regime  was 0.08 in Fordism. 
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Then, only 0.7% of the divergence in rates could be explained by the international 
regime. However, the new international regime during corporate internationalism 
explained 78% of the differential between rates of capital accumulation and profit 
rates. In Fordism, the international regime or economic openness explained just 4% 
of changes in real wages, with a correlation coefficient of 0.21. But the correlation 
coefficient is a negative 0.824 during the identified post-Fordist regime. The 
coefficient of determination of 68% shows that about 68% of the changes in real 
wages during the identified post-Fordist regime is explained by the new 
international regime of economic openness.  
 
The post-Fordist profit accumulation regime was a regime whose foundation was a 
new wave of economic/corporate internationalism, which best characterises this new 
post-Fordist regime. This new corporate internationalism not only sustained profit 
rates but triggered economic structural changes, as increased specialisation away 
from industries to services ensued. We therefore more confidently identify the post-
Fordist accumulation regime discerned in Figure 8.1,  as Corporate Internationalism. 
Corporate internationalism, apart from rivalling Fordism in temporal as well                                                                                                                         
as spatial spans, seem to have quite some features that paralleled those of Fordism. 
In Fordism, the scope for profit generation was dominantly investment in fixed 
capital, which facilitated mass production. The closed economies in terms of trade 
and capital account restrictions (see Jessop, 2013) helped to limit the exploitable 
scope for profit generation by the capitalist class, and making profit generation 
dependent on fixed capital accumulation within national boundaries. However, the 
empirical findings in the previous chapters indicate that the greater economic 
openness after the late 1960s or from early 1970s made profit generation less 
dependent on the national accumulation of fixed capital, during corporate 
internationalism. Greater internationalisation offered capitalists the prospect of mass 
importation at a considerably lower prices; production for exports, that relied more 
on labour intensification; and the opportunity and pressure to acquire more financial 
market assets at the expense of fixed capital accumulation within the home country, 
as identified in chapters 6 and 7. The regime of Corporate Internationalism was  
therefore, a new era of fixed capital efficiency by businesses that also kept profit 
rates rising until about 2007/2008.  
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Corporate Internationalism increased in scope with financial and capital account 
liberalisation, as capitalists were able to increase profit accumulation not only 
through export and importation of goods and services, but also the export and import 
of financial resources, consistent with greater profit accumulation. This latter 
version of corporate internationalism increased foreign investments of domestic 
firms and increased foreign ownership of domestic assets, thus increasing cross-
country interlocking ownership of assets. The increases in foreign ownership 
increased prices of domestic assets, financial market liquidity, and financial targets 
for domestic capitalist firms, significantly above what the underlying fixed capital 
assets could justify, thus pressuring firms to increase profit accumulation through 
greater export-import of goods/services and financial capital. It is remarkable that 
this is some form of vicious circle, where greater corporate internationalism 
generates greater corporate internationalism, with apparently grim prospects for 
labour, unlike the virtuous circle of Fordism where greater wages underpinned 
greater fixed capital and profit accumulation. Corporate internationalism was made 
possible by the neoliberal state forms. Thus a major role played by neoliberalism in 
corporate internationalism, was the removal of barriers to internationalism. 
 
Once internationalism has offered capitalists the means of bringing labour under its 
control and fulfilling the imperative of profitability, capitalists became exposed to 
increasing competition from other firms at the international level, which introduced 
further dimension to the threat to profitability of capital. Moreover capitalists 
exposed not only themselves, fixed capital, but also wage labour to international 
competition. Capitalists have been able to adopted strategies to earn competitive 
advantages, to help sustain or increase the  generation of profits.  Wage-labour has 
rather been more docile, accepting real wage rates decided by the international 
labour market, with the consequence that real wages  are either decreasing/stagnant/ 
or growing at slower rates. For capitalist firms, the strategies have been more varied. 
Some features of these strategies, include just-in-time inventory system, that 
involves painstakingly sourcing for market/order before production, in order to 
reduce the cost associated with input and output inventories. They also include 
increases in expenditure on research and development as well as knowledge 
acquisition, to facilitate competitive advantage in the internationalised environment. 
There has been the introduction of greater computer-based system or information 
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communication technologies to increase information advantage, reduce information 
processing time/cost and reduce the cost of production, through computer-aided 
production systems.  
 
 Most of the products of research and development expenditure are normally 
associated with international production and investment, to undercut foreign 
competitions. More features of the strategies include sectoral changes, with shifting 
of economic activities from real/secondary production to services/tertiary production 
(service-led growth), as a way of exploiting new areas of competitive advantage and 
escaping the rat race which global competition in secondary production has become. 
These evolving competitive strategies to enhance profit accumulation and survival 
of capitalists and their firms have been identified as distinct post-Fordist regimes in 
the literature, as earlier itemised. But it could be argued that they are prevailing 
strategic phases within a more encompassing corporate internationalism, 
underpinned by the prevailing international regime of excessive post-Fordist 
international liberalism, and the consequent competition form.  
 
The struggles and strategies adopted have had wide-reaching distributive effects for 
the classes of capitalism, with greater distribution in favour of capital and to the 
disfavour of wage labour. The characteristic distribution presented a fundamental 
contradiction in capitalist profit generation efforts. The sustained reduction in 
distribution in favour of wage labour would imply a fall in both growth rates of total 
output and the demand for output. At the national level, this contradiction is deferred 
through spacio fixes, whereby domestic consumers are replaced or augmented by 
foreign consumers. Because this approach to capitalism diffuses across national 
boundaries, so is the reality of the contradiction mentioned above, which is, in turn, 
deferred temporally by huge household debts. Capitalists promote consumerism 
through promotions and advertisements with psychological persuasion (persuasive 
advertising), and facilitate it through the advancement of credits to households 
(Wallerstein, 2010). Risk management strategies in light of the increasing household 
debts, include the securitisation of these debts, through special purpose vehicles that 
produced very profitable assets back securities, that attracted vast flows of profit-
seeking funds from domestic and foreign firms. But this unstable equilibrium 
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experienced a structural crisis in the global financial crisis, when (indices of) the 
new and sustaining economic openness exhausted itself or crashed (see Figure 8.2).  
 
However, while it lasted, capitalists could increase their profit rates, through 
increasing profit shares from distributing less to wage labour, increasing profits 
through greater automation,  greater product differentiation/innovations, increases in 
financial market assets, increases in profit rates by less capacity utilisation and 
higher  ratios of potential output to fixed capital asset. In short increasing profit rates 
through less fixed capital accumulation. Apart from the distributive effect, 
productivity growth and employment rates changed with the advent of corporate 
internationalism. Thus we characterised the post–Fordist regime of accumulation 
and reconcile it with alternative post-Fordist regimes identified in the literature. 
However, in the spirit of the Régulation theory, if we have identified a post-Fordist 
accumulation regime, it is necessary to identify the regulating social structure or 
mode of accumulation, and to identify the hegemonic institution. The next two 
sections seek to identify the mode of regulation of corporate internationalism and 
assess that economic openness is indeed hegemonic. 
 
8.3 A Complementary Institutional Configuration (Mode of 
Regulation) 
This section identifies the mode of régulation that regularised Corporate 
Internationalism. According to the theory of institutional complementarity, such 
extended and sustained economic pattern of Corporate Internationalism would not 
be possible, in the absence of a regulatory institutional configuration (see Boyer, 
2004; Amable et al., 2005). The complementary mode of regulation refers to the 
peculiar combination of the wage relations, international regime, money form, state 
form, and form of competition that supported the enduring regime of accumulation. 
A retroductive analysis involved in identifying the institutional forms that sustained 
for a time, the new accumulation regime is also highlighted. 
 
A post-Fordist regime of accumulation has been discerned and identified as 
Corporate Internationalism. But why did this identified regime of accumulation 
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occur at that specific time?  Citing the philosophical foundation of Critical Realism, 
we state that the real world is complex and the actual events we observe, instantiated 
for example by the identified post-Fordist regime of accumulation, are contingently 
realised. In social relations, there are tendencies and counter-tendencies, which in 
conjunction, make up their laws of motion (Jessop, 1990a). Mechanisms, which are 
channels through which tendencies and counter-tendencies operate, are transfactual. 
Social institutions/structures, which could exert power/tendencies/counter-
tendencies through transfactual mechanisms to produce observed/empirical/actual 
events, do change (Lee, 2002). As changes in social institutions exist simultaneously 
and exert tendencies and counter-tendencies on themselves and potential actions of 
human-agents through mechanisms, some tendencies  are overwhelm by others, 
while some are complemented by others. The combination of these multiple 
determination or tendencies produce the contingently realised or observed real 
world. It is an argument in the Regulation School, that modes of regulation sustain 
and define regimes of accumulation. The former contains social structures and the 
latter constitute contingently realised events/effects. The core five social institutions 
that jointly exert power to bring about and sustain a regime of accumulation have 
been given emphasis in this research. As each institution varies, it exerts tendencies, 
through human agents, to bring about some macroeconomic conditions. As all 
relevant social institutions or structures change simultaneously, tendencies and 
counter-tendencies from them are overwhelmed or reinforced, to produce a net 
macroeconomic set of condition with specific features, depending on the dominant 
institution, that last as  long as the specific configuration of these social institutions 
lasts. This resultant, sustained, net macroeconomic set of conditions becomes a 
regime of accumulation and the institutional configuration is its mode of regulation. 
In this section we walk through some typical mechanisms of the core five 
institutions and the changes that have occurred in them since the demise of Fordism, 
and how these changes through the mechanisms, could have worked-out to enthrone 
the identified regime of Corporate Internationalism. 
 
8.3.1     The State Form 
The concept of ‘state form’ has been the most problematic, relative to the other four 
core institutions, in the Regulation School literature. We start with some 
perspectives on the nature of a state form. According to the state derivation theory, 
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the state is seen as a structural component of the capitalist relations of production 
itself, its specific political form. The capitalist classes and relations of exploitation 
are set up so that the economically ruling class do not rule directly but their rule can 
only be realised by means of a body that is relatively separate, the state. At the same 
time, the structural and functional logic of capitalism remains in control. The state 
does not stand outside and independent of capital. The bourgeois state is therefore a 
class-state without being the direct instrument of a class and this particularisation or 
relative autonomy of the state, is the basis of the state illusion (Bonefeld, 1991; 
Hirsch, 1991)(see also, Wikipedia on State).   
 
A second perspective argues that capitalism may be viewed as an interrelated 
processes of capital’s penetration of society. Of these processes, the first is the 
capacity possessed by capital to establish its rule and commodify the reproduction of 
labour power, to form a highly woven reproduction of both labour and capital, 
leading to the universalisation of wage-relation as the primary source of 
reproduction and to the tendency to destroy traditional support systems for young 
and old, sick and lonely people. This extensive destruction of previous patterns of 
reproduction is described as ‘social disintegration’. The state therefore intervenes or 
moves into society, in response to the penetration of society by capital, so that the 
state could recompense social disintegration of society in the interest of capital 
production. The state is therefore seen as the primary force of reproduction 
(Bonefeld, 1991, p.42) 
 
Another perspective is that a coherent/compatible organisation of the proper 
measure of labour disorganisation as well the corresponding organisation include 
repressive, ideological and mass-integrative forms of regulation. Their compatible 
and corresponding operation facilitates the historical reproduction of a specific 
social form of class relations. Furthermore, it is within the purview of the state, that 
the regulative forms are condensed, homogenised and their operations achieved 
(Aglietta, 1979). The state carries through or executes the proper form of 
disorganisation of the activity of labour, which enhances the direction or funnelling 
of class struggles into suitable forms of capitalist production (Bonefeld, 1991).  
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From these propositions in the literature, we can simplify the problematic of the 
concept of a state form, by assuming that a state form depends on the interventionist 
tendencies of the state. We assume further, that state interventionism is usually for 
the distribution of income in favour of wage labour, and constraining capitalists’ 
exploitive tendencies. When the state form is more intervening, wage relations 
strengthen, so that the macroeconomic tendencies would be increases in real wages, 
increases in consumer demand, increases in rates of fixed capital accumulation and 
more modest but stable increases in corporate profit rates. When the state form tends 
towards non-interventionism, wage-labour is at the mercy of capitalists, depending 
on the strength of labour union. It is however worse, if the state form starts by 
weakening the labour union. The tendency therefore of a non-interventionist state 
form is fall in real wage growth rates, fall in demand growth and output, as well as 
decreases in fixed capital growth rates. How then, have state forms changed 
historically, in the advanced capitalist economies, since the demise of Fordism? 
 
The complementary state forms were those of social democratic compromise or 
Keynesian welfare states during Fordism. In the words of Wallerstein (2010), the 
Old Left political ideology reached its zenith between 1945 to about 1970, and this 
political ideology underpinned the activities of state forms across about two third of 
the world, including pan Europe. Across advanced capitalist economies, this 
political ideology promoted unprecedented state-backed social and economic 
egalitarianism that sent jitters down the spine of the rather more wealthy and 
conservative capitalist class. Under the watch of the Old Left between 1945-circa 
1970, state-sponsored egalitarianism, was an unprecedented moment of long wave 
economic expansion and this was not fortuitous (ibid). The demise of Fordism 
brought about the demise of the effective political representation of the working 
class. It was replaced by a neo-liberal state form in the next long wave of 
accumulation. This state form that embodies the ideologies of the political new right, 
was not fortuitous but, arose from the class struggle and represents a reinforcement 
of the despotism of the capitalist class. The mission of this state form is the social 
restructuring of the state, that put both powers of the state and capitalists ultimately 
from the purview of any form of democratic review (Clarke, 1990). The primary 
motivation of the architects of the new political right is to undo the economic and 
social gains that accrued to the lower economic classes of capitalism during the 
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height of the reign of the Old Left, by facilitating higher profit rates through the 
suppression of real wages and cost of production, and commit the welfare system to 
its grave (Wallerstein, 2010). It is therefore obvious that behind the rise of the New 
Right, are the capitalists (see Nilsson, 1996).   
 
The capitalists, by being the architect of and dominating the state form after 
Fordism, made themselves and wealth increasingly beyond the regulatory reach of 
the state. They have also made themselves, their resources and the state, beyond the 
influence and control of the working class. Meanwhile, the capitalists have pulled 
down the state provisions that ameliorated the sufferings of the poor. Through the 
influence of capitalists, state/public economic outfits were wantonly privatised, to 
the dramatic enrichment of the capitalist class. While neoliberalism has captured the 
heart of even many political left, with its purported principles of decentralisation, 
decentralisation is actually a hegemonic project, used as a vehicle for putting power 
centrally in the hands of multinational conglomerates (both industrial and financial), 
independent judiciary, central banks, supranational organisations as well as 
executive agencies, that are biased in favour of the capitalists and leave the state 
almost with virtually no independent power to respond to the cries of the working 
class of labour protesting of the wider adverse social-economic effects or negative 
externalities of capitalists’ repressions. The wealth of capitalists have subjected not 
only the working class but also the state, to its logic. State forms across the 
advanced capitalist economies in general emerged under the aegis of capitalist class 
political activism, as neoliberal states. In their ultra-liberal stance, they are more or 
less permissive puppets installed to facilitate higher profits generation and, unable to 
hold the capitalists class accountable for their actions. This permissiveness found a 
perfect expression in the Greenspan put (see Varoufakis, 2011).  
 
At the moment, the only effective adversary of capitalists is neither the state nor the 
working class, but apparently capitalists themselves (see Boyer, 2013). When the 
working class faces economic distress, the capitalists class and its apologists 
highlights the economic irrationalities of a state-funded intervention. However, they 
have severally benefitted from state transfer payments intended to bail out the 
capitalists class from its own recklessness (e.g. the Greenspan put).  A more recent 
- 275 - 
development more associated with the post-global financial crisis, and likely as a 
positive reinforcement from Greenspan put, is the capitalist class dumping of its 
excess finished goods inventories on the laps of the state. Thus from domestic 
markets to international markets and now to states’ markets. Conclusively, the 
prevailing state form after Fordism is a non-interventionist, non-regulatory state 
form that liberalised obstacles out of the way of higher profit generation. All things 
being equal, the macroeconomic tendencies of this prolong non-interventionist state 
form, would be weak wage relations, the distribution of income in favour of 
capitalists, fall in real wage growth rates/shares, decline in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation, as already analysed. As this state form persists, these macroeconomic 
tendencies prevail. 
 
8.3.2 The Form of Competition 
Corporations have hardly been subjected to such fierce competition as they faced 
during the period of Corporate Internationalism, relative to Fordism. During 
Fordism, the inter-firm competition was rather low, with few large firms in an 
industry organised in the form of various and large departments.  The demands for 
their outputs were expected to be stable, revenues and the increase thereof could be 
predicted with greater certainty. By contrast, after Fordism, the inter-firm 
competition became fierce almost to the extent of a rat race. The idea of certainty in 
expected inward and outward cash flows in project evaluation became luxuries 
relative to the period of Fordism. Firms are therefore more cautious concerning 
fixed capital investments, with increases in write-down or depreciation of existing 
capital stocks, probably unless in instances where there are greater assurance of 
protection of cash inflows by patent laws. Corporations have to enlist all the tricks in 
the books, to satisfy the imperative of corporate profitability in the face of stiff 
competition and risk therefrom, including: intense research and development effort, 
knowledge acquisition, human capital accumulation and, use of information 
technology. Firms have been driven by competition and risks to develop a penchant 
for cost advantage, which motivates them to relocate to peripheral countries where 
wage cost is very low (Wallerstein, 2007).  
 
If there are equivalent increases in labour market competition, firms could reduce 
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the risk of falls in profit rates, from higher competition, by depressing real wage 
shares and rates, as wage-relations would be weakened. Moreover, firms could 
relocate productive facilities to poorer countries, suppress real wage growth at 
home, outsource services department to less developed countries where the cost of 
labour is rather low and, encourage mass immigration of low cost labour. All things 
been equal higher competition among firms and wage-labourers would tend towards 
an accumulation regime with lower growth in output and fixed capital accumulation, 
but modest increases in  profit or wealth accumulation rates. 
 
8.3.3 The Money Form 
Money form changed from the national currencies of Fordist period of international 
convertibility and robust relative value under Bretton Wood System, to national 
currencies with very unstable values and the advent of financial market instruments 
that are highly liquid across nations. Firms where very zealous to hold increasing 
number of highly liquid instruments both for (speculative) profitability and liquidity 
enhancement. Firms were also able to more easily raise funds by way of short-term 
debts as money market instruments. Money in the form of debit/credit cards and 
households’ loans became easily accessible and these were often relied upon to fund 
personal consumption, as real wage growth lagged behind. The result became 
unsurmountable household debts that partly accounted for the global financial crisis 
of 2007. As money form increases general liquidity, the tendencies would be for 
prices to increase. Capitalists may increase wealth through capital gains, beside 
profits from operations. The tendencies to increase profit from substituting financial 
assets for fixed capital by non-financial corporation also increased. The increases in 
wealth independently of labour, deteriorated wage relations and real wage growth. 
Therefore increases in money form and liquidity tends toward increases in profits 
rates, increases in income inequality, increasing (financial) asset prices, and falls in 
growth of real/industrial production and fixed capital accumulation. Like 
competition, increases in money form may weaken wage relations. 
 
8.3.4 The Wage-Relations 
Wage relations define the wage-paying employment relations between capitalists 
and wage-earning labourers. They are associated with class struggles, relating to  
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appropriation of the creative power of labour by capitalists.  The crisis of capitalism 
in the 1970s stems from class struggles, with profitability threatened by the demand 
and bargaining powers of mass workers. Capitalists, therefore, desirous of  changing 
the social relations to that in which labour is broken, weak and fragmented, pursued 
the restructuring of social relations of production, with capitalists endeavouring to 
decompose the working class by fragmenting and dividing workers, from one 
another. The collective bargaining of wage relations during Fordism eventually gave 
way to private and individual negotiation between a wage-labourer and an employer. 
 
The increase in internationalism brought increased competition in the labour market. 
The labour market was made loose. The diversification of capital ensures the near 
impossibility of wage-labour to form a critical mass that could challenge both  
capitalists and states. Organised labour unions became broken reed, in terms of 
helping to negotiate labour advantages, in relationship with the capitalists class. The 
labour class, highly fragmented, became rather subservient to capitalists. Weak 
wage-relations imply weaker real-wage growth and higher profit shares and rates.  
Weak growth in real wages will in turn cause weaker growth in demand, 
consumption and fixed capital accumulation. Therefore all things being equal, 
strengthening wage-relations would tend towards a regime of accumulation 
characterised by higher growth rates of real (industrial) outputs, fixed capital 
accumulation but fall in income inequality. Fall in income inequality would tend to 
cause modest growth in profit rates. Weakening of wage relations would bring about 
the opposites, including facilitating a regime with higher profit shares and rates.  
 
8.3.5 The International Regime 
The International regime has as its principal components, trade openness and 
financial openness. In a world of multiple exertion of power, changes in 
international regime exert tendencies on the other core regulating institutions. 
Increases in international relations or economic openness may have the tendency to 
weaken wage relations, increase both inter-firm and labour competitions, affect 
liquidity (money form) and, may enhance capitalists ability to evade state regulation. 
There may be counter tendencies or feedbacks on the international regime, from 
these four institutions. Weakening of wage relations and wages condition may lead 
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to political activism by wage labour to decrease international relations (See Chapter 
4 and 5). But an international regime of increasing economic openness imply feeble 
or unsuccessful counter-tendencies or feedbacks from wage-relations on the new 
international regime. Firms facing higher competition have the options of fighting  
to reduce economic openness, ignore or exploit the opportunities it bring.  Too much 
liquidity may generate the tendency for a state to intervene, to reduce inflation. 
Increasing economic openness is, therefore, evidence of overwhelming tendencies of 
an emergent  international regime. 
 
There are therefore net tendencies from a persistent change in international regime, 
which become the net law of motion driving the dynamics of the contingently realise 
macroeconomic set of conditions or regime of accumulation. A new regime of 
greater economic openness implies increasing rates of wealth accumulation through 
direct means such as globalisation of production or trade, or assets substitutions 
enhanced by higher liquidity from increases in economic openness. Higher 
economic openness will reduce fixed capital accumulation as found in chapters 6 
and 7. It will reduce growth rates of aggregate output, because of the cointegration 
between fixed capital accumulation and GDP growth rates, as found in Chapter 2. It 
increases profit rates and  promotes income inequalities as seen in chapters 6 and 7. 
Moreover, it may have effects on wealth and fixed capital accumulation through the 
other four core institutions. Therefore a prolonged period of increases in economic 
openness as seen from the end of Fordism to 2007 would mean net macroeconomic 
tendencies where these features are prevalent.  
 
Changes in international regime operated through mechanisms such as profit shares, 
capacity utilisation, relative costs of capital and directly through import and exports, 
and financial assets acquisition, to bring about a new regime of  sustained wealth 
accumulation/expansion, where compared to Fordism, production is more biased 
from industries in favour of services, and distribution is geared toward greater 
inequality, circulation and liquidity are fuelled by increases in consumer debts and 
international flow of funds. These tendencies and counter tendencies as well as their 
implications for a regime of accumulation are presented in the Table 8.2. 
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      Table 8.2  Post-Fordist Mode of Regulation                                                        
Institution Historical 
Change 
Counter tendency on 
international regime 
Impacts/Characteristics of Historical Cahnge 




Wage Relations  
-ve 
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Competition form +ve Weak counter 
tendency 
































(Source: Author derived) 
 
In Table 8.2, a +ve sign indicates an increase or increasing impact, while a –ve sign 
indicates a decrease or decreasing impact. Using profit rates, income inequality and 
fixed capital accumulation as representative features of a regime of accumulation, 
the table shows tendencies of the respective five core institutions on this features 
and the net outcomes. The direction of change in all five imply sustained 
macroeconomic tendencies towards increasing profit rates, decreasing fixed capital 
accumulation rates and, increasing income inequality. Consequently we have a 
prevailing net macroeconomic condition or regime of accumulation where profit 
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rates are increasing and fixed capital accumulation rates declining. The net force 
driving the macroeconomic condition is the new international regime of increasing 
economic openness or internationalism, and hence the name Corporate 
Internationalism. 
 
8.4   The Institutional Hegemony of International Economic 
Openness 
This section evaluates the possibility of the hegemony of the new international 
regime during Corporate Internationalism. Theoretically, increasing economic 
openness is expected to intensify competition among capitalist firms. There is the 
possibility that higher domestic competition may increase the pressure for greater 
economic openness, as firms struggle to increase the market-base for their outputs. 
But as soon as economic openness increases, firms become more exposed to stiffer 
competition from external firms (see Neo-Chamberlinian models; Neo-Hotelling 
models; Brander-Krugman model, in Krugman, 1992). Firms in turn are motivated 
to adopt greater competitive behaviour either for survival, maintain or increase 
profits. Logically, when the international regime becomes liberalised, it should be 
expected to dominate and influence the pattern of contemporary form of 
competition.  
 
Even more vulnerable to international regime or economic openness is the wage 
relation. Greater international openness increases competition and rivalry between 
local and foreign labour, as the labour market becomes globalised. Consequently, 
wage-labour bargaining power relative to the firms’ or capitalists class is 
undermined. The desperation of labour from possible loss of employment makes 
labour rather docile in the hands of firms and capitalists. Under the non-artisanal 
method of production and economic structure in modern capitalism, capitalists 
increase profit and wealth by investments. The absence of an external alternative 
and the quest for greater wealth, motivate increases in local investments, 
employment and thus tight labour market, which in turn increases labour bargaining 
power. But under such a closed economy, wage labour makes a higher percentage of 
the customer base of firms, so that a weak bargaining power of labour feeds back on 
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firms as weak financial performance. Weak financial performance would lead to 
lower capital investment. Under a regime of increasing economic openness, wealth 
creating ability of capitalist firms becomes less dependent on wage labour. 
Therefore, under greater economic openness, wages growth and how wage labour 
relates with the capitalists class are conditioned or dominated by economic openness 
or international regime.  
 
In a liberalised international regime, the state form and the money form are also 
dominated by international regime. The state liberalises the international regime, yet 
once it is liberalised, the options open to the state for controlling the capitalists class 
fade. Because the state depends on the capitalists class for fund (either through tax 
or loans), a liberalised international regime and the dependence of the state on the 
capitalists class gives the latter more leverage over the former. Money in the form of 
debts and other monetary instruments seem to increase with a more liberal 
international regime. This is at least supported by historical experiences. Expansion 
in economic activities or loanable funds of foreign source increases the volume and 
varieties of liquidity. Therefore, a liberalised international regime dominates the 
money form. On the merit of the argument in this subsection, we conclude that 
changes in the international regime, through its principal components of trade 
openness and financial openness evidenced by their increases, have indeed been 
hegemonic or dominant over money form, the state form, the form of competition 
and wage relations, thus dictating the dynamics of the regime of Corporate 
Internationalism. 
 
8.5 Greater International Economic Openness: The Benefactors and 
the Beneficiaries  
If capitalism is fundamentally associated with conflicts between wage labour and 
capitalists over the distribution of created values, then which class has been the 
primary beneficiary and which is the loser or benefactor in the post-Fordist regime 
of Corporate Internationalism? The mainstream view is that greater trade and 
financial openness are beneficial for all countries involved, in that they increase the 
total pies of output and income to be distributed in all countries involved. Assuming 
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efficient redistribution of income, mainstream view is that economic openness is 
beneficial for all individuals in these countries. But empirical evidence has 
suggested otherwise.  While the data suggest possible shrinking in rates of growth of 
the pie of income to be distributed among all individuals, internationalism tends to 
facilitate a sustained redistribution of the pie from one class to another class of 
capitalism. But which class benefits/loses? The apprehensive view by the wage 
labour class, of greater economic openness is apparent, as early as the 19th century, 
from the following abstract from the Leicester framework knitters in 1817, quoted in 
Thompson (1963) and Marglin and Bhaduri (1992). Comparing its welfare under 
international economic closeness and openness, the quote goes as follows: 
“That in proportion as the reduction of wages makes the great body of 
the poor and wretched, in the same proportion must the consumption 
of our manufactures be Lessened. That if liberal wages were given 
to the mechanics in the general throughout the  Country, the home 
consumption of our manufacturers, would be immediately more than 
doubled, and consequently every hand would soon find full employment. 
That to reduce the wage of the mechanic of this country so low that he 
cannot live by his labour, in order to undersell foreign manufacturers in 
a foreign market, is to gain one customer abroad, and lose two at home” 
 (Home Office Papers 42.160, Quoted in Thompson, 1963, p.206; and Marglin and 
Bhaduri, 1992) 
 
Kotz (2003) has described the regime which embeds greater economic openness as 
that, which exclusively benefits the capitalists class, drives down real wage growth 
and, increases wealth and income inequality. Evaluating the relative benefits of 
capital and labour arising from increases in economic openness, Figure 8.2 
juxtaposes ratios of profit rate to real unit cost of labour (wage) with indices of 
economic openness. The series of the ratio of profit rate to real wage clearly displays 
three different regimes, consistent with Figure 8.1. Between 1960 till about 1971, 
economic openness was low and remained more or less the same. The ratio of profit 
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rate to real wage stayed more or less the same. The benefits ratio declined briefly in 
the early 1970s, due to the crisis of Fordism.  
 
Figure 8.2: Profit Rate to Real Unit Cost of Labour Ratio and Economic 
Openness: Advanced Capitalist Economies Average 
(Source: Author Computed from sample data)   
 
As capitalists mastered the exploitation of the opportunities that the emerging 
international regime offered, returns increased, and real wages fell. Consequently, 
the benefits ratios rose with increases in trade openness. The ratios of profit rate to 
real unit labour cost rose faster, as capital accounts were liberalised in the mid-
1980s. With the crisis of 2007/2008, de facto economic openness declined and the 
benefits ratios also fell, but later buoyed by trade openness, as de facto financial 
openness crashed out of the scene. The relationship captured in Figure 8.2 suggests 
that the capitalists class tend to be the favoured class, when economic openness 
increases. 
 
In further investigation of this relationship, an econometric estimation of the 
relationship is undertaken. Table 8.3 presents the relevant summary statistics of the 
variables. The data covers the period of 1974 to 2007, to capture Corporate Interna-
nationalism as exclusively as possible. Of particular note, is the rise in the ratio of 
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(Source: Author computed from sample data)    
 
onset of Corporate Internationalism in the mid-1970s, to more than the double of 
that value, at a ratio of 1.156, by the time of the structural crisis of 2007/2008. 
Financial openness, rising from nearly zero at 0.075 by more than 1230% to 1.0035, 
controlled the pattern of economic openness as soon as it became active in the mid-
1980s. This is obvious by the proximity of the interaction of trade and financial 
openness to financial openness in terms of averages, minimum/maximum values and 
volatilities. Table 8.4 presents the correlation coefficient among the series. The 
highest correlation  of the ratio of profit rate to real wage is with trade openness. 
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Table 8.5: Model Estimates; Dependent Variable: Profit Rate to Real Unit Cost 
of Labour (1970-2014) 




























Adjusted R-square 0.8243   
F(3, 30) 126.40  [0.000] 
Root MSE               
 
0.08015   
 
 
Table 8.5 above, presents estimates of the regression of the ratio of profit rate to real 
unit labour cost (real wage), on trade and financial openness, using ordinary least 
squares estimator with robust standard errors. According to the estimates, 1% 
increase(decrease) in trade openness will cause a 2.13% increase(decrease) in profit 
rate to real wage ratio, at the 0.1% significant level. 1% increase(decrease) in 
financial openness will cause a 2.5% increase(decrease) in profit rates to real wage 
ratio, at the 0.1% significant level. The negative sign of the parameter estimate of 
the interaction of financial and trade openness, indicates that the 
combined/cumulative effect of both types of openness on the ratio of profit rate to 
real wage, would be less than the sum of the individual effects.  
 
To understand the impact of economic openness on how relatively well-off 
capitalists have been at the expense of labour, during the regime of Corporate 
Internationalism, the impact is assessed at the standard deviation level (see Table 
8.6). Over the period of Corporate Internationalism before the global financial crisis, 
economic openness explained or caused 90% of the increases in profit rates over real 
- 286 - 
wages. Therefore, the capitalists are the beneficiaries, while the wage labour class is 
the benefactor of the post-Fordist regime of Corporate Internationalism. 
 




The implications of the findings that changes in economic openness cause inverse 
changes in business fixed capital accumulation, that observed decline in fixed capital 
accumulation since circa 1970 in advanced capitalist economies was chiefly 
explained by the increase in economic openness, and that over the sample period 
economic openness has interacted with profit shares to the detriment of fixed capital 
accumulation are relied upon to strengthen the proposition that  a post-Fordist mode 
of development has emerged. A mode of development consists of a regime of 
accumulation and its complementary  mode of regulation.  
 
Bowles et al (1986) have proposed that a boom or a regime of accumulation is 
characterised by rising profit rates, while a crisis is expectedly marked by declining 
and low profit rates. Using a process of inductive inference, and grounded theory, a 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation was identified as Corporate Internationalism, 
having statistical features that are consistent with the aforementioned proposition of 
Bowles et al (1986). Using  a process of retroductive analysis, historical changes in 
and macroeconomic tendencies of the core institutions of money form, wage-
relations, form of competition, state form and, international regime, the 
complementary mode of regulation was identified. To characterise this regime of 
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with economic openness, with the region within the regime breaks displaying the 
highest correlation.  
 
At a correlation of 0.88, the positive relationship between economic openness and 
profit rates over the identified regime of accumulation is statistically significant, 
with a p < 0.001. The probability of the relationship occurring by chance is less than 
1 in 1000. Furthermore, at 0.88, the coefficient of determination (0.88 squared) is 
0.77, which implies 77% of the growth in corporate profit rates is explained by 
increases in economic openness. By contrast, in the period before this regime of 
accumulation, the correlation coefficient was just 0.081 with a coefficient of 
determination of 0.0066 implying that then, economic openness explained only 
0.66% of corporate profit growth. On the basis of this predominance of de facto 
international economic openness in the determination of profit accumulation during 
the period of the discerned post-Fordist accumulation regime, we characterised the 
discerned regime of accumulation as Corporate Internationalism.  
 
Furthermore, during Corporate Internationalism, economic openness explained 
about 67% of the decrease in rates of growth in real wages. While in the previous 
era, corporate profit rates varied positively and significantly with business fixed 
capital accumulation, during Corporate Internationalism, it was a significant 
negative variation. In our previous studies, we find that the ratio of the cost of 
capital to real wage is the dominant channel through which economic openness 
inversely affects business fixed capital accumulation, and that changes in economic 
openness explain about 70% of the variations in real wage rates during this regime. 
We therefore infer that in this regime of profit accumulation, with its regulating 
institutional configuration, increases in economic openness, dominantly explain the 
downward trends in business fixed capital accumulation observed in advanced 
capitalist economies. Furthermore, the corresponding regulating institutional 
configuration is identified, to establish the mode of régulation, with apparent  
hegemony of the changes in international regime. With reference to the power 
struggle between the capitalists class and wage labour class, we observed that over 
the period of Corporate Internationalism, the ratio of profit rate to real unit wage that 
was about 0.57 at the outset of the regime rose to about 1.16 at the end of the 
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regime, an increase of over 100%, with economic openness accounting for about 
90% of these variations (the redistribution of value created or income) in favour of 
capitalists class. 
 
This thesis identified and filled the gaps in the role played by increases in economic 
openness in observed decreases in rates of corporate fixed capital accumulation in 
the face of rising profit rates in advanced capitalist economies, and the fundamental 
lack of consensus in the emergence of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. By 
filling these gaps, this thesis consequently made some original contributions. Three 
original contributions of this thesis to the literature are: first, in advanced capitalist 
economies, changes in economic openness tend to cause inverse changes in business 
fixed capital accumulation. Second, the provision of robust evidence in support of 
the claim that institutional configuration matters. And third, the identification of an 
alternative post Fordist regime of accumulation, Corporate Internationalism. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The topical controversy that motivated this research is the problematic of finding 
alternative explanations for observed decline in rates of business fixed capital 
accumulation across the advanced capitalist economies since circa 1970, at a time 
when corporate profit rates are upward trending. This is despite the theoretical 
orthodoxy in the literature that over the long-run, there exist a positive relationship 
between profit rates and business fixed capital accumulation. The debate on the 
cause of the decline has been long-standing. Independent studies have been 
conducted in the context of one or a few of the advanced capitalist economies. Three 
broad strands of argument have been put forward to explain these downward trends 
in rates of fixed capital accumulation. These are the increasing dividend and interest 
pay-outs argument; the share buybacks argument; and increased financial assets 
holdings by non-financial firms. Although proponents of these strands of 
explanation continue to simultaneously make claims to the support of empirical 
evidence, it is somewhat difficult to see how these strands could justify the sustained 
rising trends in profit rates, even if they have robust explanatory power with regards 
to the downward trends in fixed capital accumulation. 
 
Another problematic of these extant strands of argument are the temporal 
inconsistencies between the explanans and the explanandum. The three strands of 
explanation are based on the extensive financial liberalisation across advanced 
capitalist economies. However, the aforementioned financial liberalisation 
commenced in  significant measure only from the mid-1980s (see Sawyer, 2013), 
while the declining trends extend back to circa 1970, implying the explanandum 
precedes the explanans. There is strong logic in the argument that  microeconomic 
slowdowns in rates of fixed capital accumulation from the indulgence of 
corporations in higher dividend pay-outs, interest pay-outs, share buybacks, and 
higher financial assets acquisition may unlikely transform into extended 
macroeconomic downturns in rates of fixed capital accumulation, because resultant 
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economic rents from a seller’s market  may attract new entrants with compensating 
rates of fixed capital accumulation. This, together with other shortcomings of these 
strands of arguments, in light of the importance of fixed capital, suggests that further 
research to unravel the underlying cause is still of the essence. Ideally, the theorised 
cause should simultaneously give some insights into the up-trending of profit rates, 
as it provides a robust explanation for declining capital accumulation.  
 
There exists a theoretical proposition in the French Regulation School Literature that 
capital accumulation is a function of the configuration of five key institutions or 
social structures: a money form, wage relations, a form of competition, a state form; 
and an international regime. Capital accumulation is proposed to take place in the 
context of a regime of accumulation, sustained or regulated by the aforementioned 
institutional configuration (the mode of régulation). The regime of accumulation and 
mode of régulation collectively form the mode of development. In the institutional 
configuration, there is supposed to be a leading or hegemonic institution. The two 
primary constituents of an international regime are trade openness and financial 
openness. With the observation that there have been  dramatic increases in trade 
openness and later financial openness across advanced capitalist economies since 
circa 1970, together with historical insights, we invoke the Régulation school 
proposition and argue that: the increases in trade openness offer initial explanation  
to the observed decline in fixed capital accumulation and that trade openness was 
later reinforced by financial openness, in reducing rates of fixed capital 
accumulation. In order to assess if this posited economic openness – fixed capital 
accumulation trade-off happened in the context of a regime of accumulation, this 
research proceeded to the identification of a potential post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation and, the enabling institutional configuration (mode of régulation). This 
concluding chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.2 presents a summary of the 
methodology. Section 9.3 presents summaries of the findings. Section 9.4 highlights 
the contributions of this research to the literature. Section  9.5 presents some policy 
implications. Section 9.6 presents some potential future research areas. 
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9.2 Summary of methodology 
Three key chapters were dedicated to empirical investigations, in this thesis. The 
methodology involved applying panel data econometrics to secondary data, 
spanning the years from 1960 to 2014, of 23 advanced OECD countries, for which 
data are more readily available. We augmented the panel data econometric 
estimators with structural break analysis, dominance analysis, as well as 
cointegration analysis. Models were estimated for different segments of the sample 
period, where different estimators with different assumptions including slope 
homogeneity and heterogeneity were used. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence were used. 
Control variables were included in our estimates and provision made for time, using 
time dummies, to facilitate robust findings.  
 
9.3 The findings of this Study 
It was found that once other potential sources of corporate profits such as 
international trade and financial assets investments have been controlled for, profit 
share is statistically and economically significant, in the determination of fixed 
capital accumulation, in a positive way. This is consistent with the Cambridge and 
other models, which posit that expected profits from fixed capital accumulation 
govern the dynamics of fixed capital accumulation. The interactions of other sources 
of profits such as economic openness with profit share, have  negative parameter 
estimates, with regards to fixed capital accumulation. This implies that as superior 
alternative sources of profits increase corporate profits share, the higher is the 
tendency for profit-oriented firms to decrease the rates of accumulating fixed capital.  
 
Once trade and financial openness have been accounted for, capacity utilisation on a 
net basis reduces the rate of fixed capital accumulation. Suggesting that capacity 
utilisation reduces the need for fresh capital accumulation rather than as an incentive 
to accumulate. Long-term interest rates and real unit labour cost have hardly any 
economically significant residual explanatory powers with respect to rates of fixed 
capital accumulation, once the relative cost of capital has been controlled for. This is 
because their effects on capital accumulation are virtually subsumed by relative cost. 
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The sizes of parameter estimates suggest that the key variables determining rates of 
capital accumulation are profit share, the costs of capital relative to real wage, and 
economic openness. Once these have been accounted for, other parameter estimates 
tend towards economic insignificance, even if statistically significant.  
 
9.3.1 Trade Openness and Business Fixed Capital Accumulation 
In the econometric analysis in chapter six, it was found that increases in trade 
openness cause decreases in rates of business fixed capital accumulation, in 
advanced capitalist economies. Economically and statistically significant residual 
parameters (explanatory powers) estimates exist with trade openness, after 
interacting trade openness with other variables. Furthermore, combined evidence 
from the estimated parameters, the relative volatility of the explanatory variables, 
dominance analyses, and structural break analysis facilitated the conclusion that 
trade openness dominated in the determination of the dynamics of business fixed 
capital accumulation, in the absence of financial openness, in advanced capitalist 
economies since circa 1970. The correlation analyses of the constituents of trade 
openness and fixed capital accumulation indicate that over the sample period, trade 
openness in terms of goods exports and imports had the highest correlation with 
fixed capital accumulation. Goods exports as proportions of GDP correlated with 
capital accumulation, more than did goods imports as proportions of GDP.  
 
These findings are also antithetical to and suggest some lacks of empirical evidence  
supporting the predictions of key mainstream trade theories that increases in trade 
openness increase rates of fixed capital accumulation in advanced capitalist 
economies. These key mainstream trade theories include absolute and comparative 
advantages trade theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo respectively. They also 
include subsequent theories:  the Heckscher-Ohlin two factor model, the imitation-
gap theories of trade (see Posner, 1961), the Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin Model (see 
Falvey, 1981; Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987), the Neo-Chamberlinian Models (see 
Krugman, 1979, 1992; Venables, 1984; Lawrence and Spiller, 1986), the Neo-
Hotelling models (see Lancaster, 1980) (see Krugman, 1992, for the new trade 
theories) and Rybczynski Theorem (see Rybczynski, 1955).  
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9.3.2 Financial Openness and Capital Accumulation 
It was also found in this thesis that for the advanced capitalist economies, increases 
in financial openness bring about decreases in business fixed capital accumulation. 
To evaluate if financial openness influences rates of business fixed capital 
accumulation through sundry Mechanisms (channels), interaction terms of financial 
openness and other variables were included in the model estimates. The model 
parameter (marginal) estimates in conjunction with the relative volatility analysis of 
the included explanatory variables, and dominance analysis, facilitated the 
conclusion that increases in financial openness, following the capital account 
liberalisation contributed significantly to explaining observed decreases in rates of 
fixed capital accumulation of advanced capitalist economies, in post-Fordism  
 
Among the constituents of financial openness, openness in terms of outward foreign 
direct investments have the highest negative and absolute correlation  with fixed 
capital accumulation over the sample period. The next highest negative and absolute 
correlation with fixed capital accumulation was financial openness in terms of 
outward portfolio flows, and then inward portfolio flows and inward foreign direct 
investments flows, in that order. Although the correlation analysis indicated that the 
respective correlation between fixed capital accumulation and financial openness in 
terms of other investments inwards and other investments outwards were relatively 
low, these might be higher when combined. The correlation between the ratio of 
reserves (inward) to GDP and fixed capital accumulation was insignificant. 
 
9.3.3 Relative Factor Cost through labour-capital substitution is a 
dominant Channel 
The study found that the profit optimising tendency of capitalist firms incline them 
to substitute labour for capital, as labour becomes relatively cheaper than fixed 
capital and substitute fixed capital for labour if capital becomes cheaper than wage-
labour. This medium is a dominant mechanism through which both trade and 
financial openness exert their growth retardation impact on fixed capital 
accumulation. This mechanism was found to be the dominant mechanism through 
which economic openness explained the observed decline in rates of fixed capital 
accumulation after Fordism. These findings highlight real-wage of labour as a 
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cardinal nexus through which institutions exert their effect on fixed capital 
accumulation whether favourable or adverse, consistent with arguments of the 
French regulation School. During Fordism, increasing wages underpinned  
unprecedented rates of fixed capital accumulation and growth, either from a demand 
side perspective as implied by Boyer (2013) or a supply-side perspective as 
explicated in this thesis. During the post-Fordist era, real wages once again was the 
dominant route through which fixed capital accumulation is reduced, and by 
implication, growth rates of output, because of the cointegration between fixed 
capital accumulation and output growth.  This has far-reaching implications for the 
probabilities of recently theorised wage-led growth (the stagnationist case) and 
profit-led growth (the exhilarationist case): that higher rates of fixed capital 
accumulation and output growth in advanced capitalist economies may be non-
ergodically wage-led. 
 
9.3.4 Institutions Matter for Fixed Capital Accumulation 
To the extent that financial openness and trade openness as components of 
international regime represent institutions or social structures, this study furnishes 
strong evidence that institutions matter in rates of fixed capital accumulation. The 
study also gives further support to the theoretical proposition that the characteristics 
of  economic accumulation are a function of the institutional configuration, as 
argued in the Régulation School literature. 
 
9.3.5 Evidence of a Post-Fordist Mode of Development 
The study relied on the proposition in Bowles et al (1986:134) that a boom and 
regime of accumulation is characterised by rising profit rates and comparatively 
high profit rates, while a crisis is expectedly marked by declining and low-profit 
rates, as well as the theory of wealth accumulation to inductively abstract a 
statistical representation of the dynamics of wealth accumulation in advanced 
countries’ capitalism and, together with the tool of structural break analysis, identify 
a period of post-Fordist regime of accumulation. This analysis suggested that there 
was a post-Fordist regime of accumulation between 1975 and 2007, flanked by the 
structural crisis of the regime of Fordism and the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008. We were able to identify the features of the regime of accumulation, 
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using further statistical analyses and a retroductive analyses of recent institutional 
changes, as a regime of Corporate Internationalism.  
 
During this identified regime of accumulation, it was found that profit rates across 
the advanced capitalist economies on the average had a positive correlation 
coefficient of about 0.9 with the newly prevailing international regime of economic 
openness, in the form of trade openness alone. However, in the regime of Fordism 
that preceded this post-Fordist regime of accumulation, this correlation coefficient 
was just 0.08. It was found that the coefficient of determination between trade 
openness and profit rates in this new-found regime, was 0.77, implying that the new 
economic openness explained about 77% of growth in corporate profit rates during 
this regime. This statistics (0.77) indicates that the probability that the high 
correlation between profit rates and the newly prevailing economic openness was a 
chance occurrence was less than one in a thousand. We consequently described this 
pattern/regime of accumulation as Corporate Internationalism. It was found that 
while the correlation coefficient between profit rates and business fixed capital 
accumulation, averaged across the sample countries, was about a positive 0.6 during 
the previous regime of accumulation (Fordism), it was a negative 0.4 during 
Corporate Internationalism. Because the Cambridge model and other key investment 
theories suggest that rates of fixed capital accumulation are positively dependent on 
the profit rates expected to be generated from such capital accumulation, the 
negative 0.4 correlation coefficient suggest that during Corporate Internationalism, 
profit opportunities alternative to fixed capital accumulation, offered by the new 
international regime obviated the need for higher fixed capital accumulation to 
generate higher returns to capitalists’  invested wealth.  
 
Regarding power relations, the correlation between real wages and trade openness 
alone was a negative 0.824. We found that the ratio of profit rate to real unit labour 
cost (real unit wages) which was 0.57 at the onset of Corporate Internationalism, 
was about 1.2 at the end of the regime and, the correlation between this ratio and 
trade openness was found to be 0.89. Econometric analysis estimated that the 
increases in trade openness and financial openness jointly explained 90% of the 
increases in profit rates over real unit labour cost, during Corporate Internationalism. 
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This is consistent with the argument of Wallerstein (2010) that the primary 
motivation of the architects of the new institutional structure is to undo the 
economic and social gains that accrued to the lower economic classes of capitalism 
during the height of the rain of the Old Left (in Fordism), by facilitating higher 
profit rates through the suppression of real wages and cost of production, and 
commit the welfare system of Fordism to its grave. We have found that the new 
configuration is indeed favourable to the growth of profit rates but detrimental to 
fixed capital accumulation and real wage growth, and thus able to sustained 
Corporate Internationalism. 
 
The findings in this study, therefore, not only evidenced that increases in economic 
openness underpinned the observed decline in fixed capital accumulation, in post-
Fordist advanced capitalist economies, but that this among other observed 
macroeconomic trends like the falling trend of real wages, were characteristics of a 
post-Fordist mode of development that include the regime of Corporate 
Internationalism and the complementary ultra-liberal mode of régulation, a new era 
of business capital efficiency. 
9.4  Contributions  to the Literature 
This thesis lays claim to quite a number of original contributions to the French 
Regulation School literature. One of the contributions is the provision of empirical 
evidence that the prevailing institutional configuration matters in capital 
accumulation, by the empirical verification of the broad theoretical proposition of 
the relationship between capital accumulation and the prevailing institutional 
configuration. This was achieved by the introduction and empirical testing of the 
effects of the institution of economic openness on business fixed capital 
accumulation.  
 
Previous empirical investigations have initially included monetary; operations; and 
then financialisation variables to the model of fixed capital accumulation 
determination. This thesis has provided empirical evidence of the need to augment 
the fixed capital accumulation model specification with institutional variable(s). 
This contribution has proved to be very useful, not only in explaining the declining 
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trend of business fixed capital accumulation, but also why it started the decline in as 
far back as circa 1970.  While the findings have resolved the paradox of the 
observed co-extensive declining rates  of fixed capital accumulation and up-trending 
of profit rates, they have also unintentionally furnished a potential resolution to the 
age-long Leontief Paradox 
 
A second contribution, are the findings that, for advanced capitalist economies, 
increases in de facto trade and financial openness could slow down the rates at 
which capitalist (profit-seeking) firms accumulate fixed capital in the long run at 
least, given the significant net negative signs of the relevant parameter estimates of 
economic openness in a capital accumulation model. This is important, because the 
mainstream orthodoxy is the implication of trade theories that greater trade and 
financial openness would generate higher rates of fixed capital accumulation in 
advanced capitalist economies. This contribution would also be of particular interest 
to renowned scholars who have contributed to the debate in this literature. Arguing 
under one of the broad strands of financialisation-based argument; they have 
assumed a closed economy. They have however highlighted the knowledge gap 
under the context of an open economy (see Bowls and Boyer, 1995; Aglietta, 2002; 
van Treeck, 2008). This thesis fill this crucial knowledge gap, by providing some 
insight into the impact of economic openness on both business fixed capital 
accumulation and the emergent divergence in the orthodox investment-profit nexus. 
Furthermore, this is a new understanding, as arguably the most prevalent view 
(informed by mainstream orthodoxy) is that increases in trade and financial 
openness increase rates of business fixed capital accumulation. 
 
The findings in chapter 8 make further contributions to the debate on the emergence 
of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation and its characteristics, by the identification 
of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation that is underpinned by greater corporate 
internationalism.  Further contributions in this regards are the attempt to characterise 
this never before identified alternative post-Fordist regime of accumulation, to 
identify evidence of power struggles and skewed income distribution. This regime of 
accumulation is then linked to the observed dynamics of profit and fixed capital 
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accumulation after the demise of Fordism. Importantly, it sets an empirical 
precedent in the identification of a regime of accumulation.  
 
Further contribution in our opinion, is the strategic shift in profit rates generation, 
highlighted in chapter two. There we pointed out that capitalism changed from the 
accumulate to make profit tendency of the post-war years, to a new era of higher 
profit rates through capital efficiency and the factors that underpin this neo-capital 
efficiency. The chapter shows that while during the golden age, the prevailing 
strategy was focused on increasing capacity utilisation and labour productivity 
through increases in capital/labour ratio under the constraints of wage-employment 
rigidity and  closed economies, profit rate growing strategy changed to the ruthless 
downsizing of per capita fixed capital and increases in profit share, under the 
flexibility offered by new economic openness and wage determination. 
 
9.5 Policy Implication 
The findings of this research have extensive implications for public policy. While a 
policy tendency in neoliberalist advanced capitalist economies is  to subdue the 
growth of wages and increase the profit-generating ability of capitalist firms, under 
the perception that higher profit and lower wages generate greater fixed capital 
accumulation and employment, this research suggests that the reverse is the case. 
This research furnishes support for the theoretical argument of many heterodox 
scholars that higher growth rates in advanced capitalist economies tend to be non-
ergodically wages-led. Public policy makers should therefore be warned of the 
caveat in real-wage growth supressing policies, if the policy objective is growth. It 
highlights the weakness in the drive for greater  trade and financial openness as a 
driver of fixed capital accumulation and economic growth. We argue that even if 
higher openness increases growth, it reduces the growth rate. Policies that increase 
economic openness exploitable by the capitalist groups, may be counter-productive 
in that it fosters greater inequality in distribution. The efficient re-distribution of the 
benefits from higher economic openness taken for granted in mainstream theories of  
trade is hardly enforceable, let alone automatic.  
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What then are the policy options consistent with this findings? An increase in real 
wages is particularly crucial for higher rates of capital accumulation and growth. A 
tight labour market may be more beneficial to accumulation, than a loose labour 
market. The argument by Boyer (2013)  that “the efforts of some interest groups to 
reinstate the golden era of Fordism would be unfruitful because of some irreversible 
institutional changes”, implies how difficult if not impossible to revert to relative 
economic autarky. Reverting to the very low economic openness of Fordism may be 
difficult and even run up against some social sentiments and resistance. Luckily  
such reversion to relative autarky is not necessarily the only policy prescription 
consistent with our findings. High global growth rates, global fixed capital 
accumulation rates, global employment and global productivity rates that reflect 
those in the advanced capitalist economies in the  golden age of Fordism could 
emerge, if the institutional configuration of Fordism is globalised. Harmonising 
global strong wage relations, global efforts geared towards a more global equitable 
distribution of income between capitalist and wage labour, would be helpful. Global 
wages that grow with labour productivity would facilitate a more equitable 
distribution of income. It would also augur well for a more regulatory state form that 
constrains the excesses of the capitalist class. If the Fordist institutional 
configuration could not be achieved at a global scale, or economic openness 
constrained, then the state should be more prepared to enforce greater  equitable 
redistribute of the benefits from economic openness that have the skewed tendency 
to automatically accrue in favour of capitalists. 
9.6 Potential and Related Areas for Future Research 
1.    The focus of this research is the advanced capitalist economies. An important 
investigation would be to assess the relationship between international openness and 
fixed capital accumulation in the emerging states that have been classified to be 
between the underdeveloped economies and developed economies. These include 
the new members of OECD and the European Union. Many of them had been part of 
communist state forms, in the past. 
 
2.   It would also be relevant to research whether these hypotheses hold for the 
underdeveloped economies. 
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3.  It would be useful to keep an eye on the emerging regime after the global 
financial crisis with the view to identify its characteristics particularly its implication 
for capital-labour relations 
- 301 - 
List of References 
 
Acemoglu, D., and Zilibotti, F. 1997. Was Prometheus Unbounded by Chance? 
Risk, Diversification, and Growth. The Journal of Political Economy. 105 (4), pp.  
709-751 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Lelarge, C. Reenen, V. J. and Zilibotti, F. 2006. 
Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm. May, 2006. CEP 
Discussion Paper No 722. [Online]. [26/10/2016]. Available from: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0722.pdf  
Aglietta, M. 1974. Accumulation et regulation du capitalisme en longue period. 
Exemple des Etats-Unis (1870-197). Paris: INSEE. 
Aglietta Michel (1976), Régulation et crises du capitalisme. L’expérience des États-
Unis. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 
Aglietta, M. 1978. Phases of US Capitalist Expansion. New Left Review. 1/110 
(July-August), pp. 17-28 
Aglietta, M. 1979. A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the U.S. Experience. London: 
NLB (first published in French 1976) 
Aglietta, M. 1998. Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: regulation Theory and the 
Challenge of Social Change. New left Review. 1/232, (November-December), pp.41-
90. Also  available from http://newleftreview.org/I/232/michel-aglietta-capitalism-
at-the-turn-of-the-century-regulation-theory-and-the-challenge-of-social-change 
 
Aglietta, M. 2000. Shareholder value and corporate governance: some tricky questions. 
Economy and Society, 29 (1), pp146 – 159. 
 
Aglietta, M. 2008. Into A New Growth Regime, New Left Review 54(Nov-Dec, 2008) 
 
Aglietta, M. and Breton, R.  2001. Financial Systems, Corporate Control and Capital 
Accumulation. Economy and Society 30 (4), pp. 433-466 
Aglietta, M. and Breton, R.  2001. Financial Systems, Corporate Control and Capital 
Accumulation. Economy and Society. 30 (4), pp 433-466. 
Alvarez, I. 2015. Financialization, non-financial corporations and income inequality: 
the case of France, Social Economic Review. 13 (3), pp. 449-475. 
 
Amable, B. 2003. The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
- 302 - 
Amable, B. and Palombarini, S. 2005. L’ économie N’ est pas Une Science Morale. 
Parise: Raisons d’ Agir. 
Amable, B., Barre, R. and Boyer, R. 1997. Les Systémes d’Innovation à l’ére de la 
Globalisation. Paris: Economica 
Amable, B., Ernst, E. and Palombarini, S. 2005. How do Financial Markets Affect 
Industrial Relations: An Institutional Complementarity Approach. Socio-Economic 
Review. 3 (2), pp.  311-330. 
 
Amable, B., Guillaud, E. and Palombarini, S. 2012. L’ économie Politique du 
Néolibéralisme. Les Cas de la France et de l’ Italie. Paris: Editions rue d’ Ulm. 
Anderson K. and Baldwin R.E. 1987. The Political Market for Protection in 
Industrial Countries. In: El-Agraa A.M. ed. Protection, Cooperation, Integration 
and Development. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Andrew, D. W. K. 1993. Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with 
Unknown Change Point. Econometrica. 61 (4), pp. 821-856 
Andrew, D. W. K. 1999. Estimation When A Parameter is on the Boundary. 
Econometrica. 67 (6), pp.1341–1383 
Andrew, D. W. K. and Lu, B. 2001. Consistent model and moment selection 
procedures for GMM estimation with application to dynamic panel data models. 
Journal of Econometrics, 101 (1), pp. 123-164 
Andrew, D. W. K. and Ploberger, W. 1994. Optimal Tests When A Nuisance 
Parameter is Present Only under the Alternative. Econometrica. 62 (6), pp. 1383-
1414 
Arellano, M. 2003. Panel Data Econometrics. Advanced Texts in Econometrics. 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic 
Studies. 58, (2), pp. 277-297 
Atkinson, A. B. 2009. Factor Shares: The Principal Problem of Political Economy? 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 25 (1), pp. 3-16. 
Atkins, P., Arps, S.,  Meagher, S. and Flom LLP. 2013.  Questions Surrounding 
Share Repurchases. www.corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/14/questions-
surrounding-share-repurchases 
Baddeley, M. 2003. Investment Theories and Analysis. New York: PALGRAVE 
MACMILLAN. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. 1998. Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple 
Structural Changes. Econometrica, 66 (1), pp. 47-78 
- 303 - 
Bai, J. 1997. Estimating Multiple Break, One at a Time. Econometric Theory. 13 (3), 
pp. 315-352 
 
Bain, J. 1956. Barrier to New Competition, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Baldwin, R.E. 1976. Trade and Employment Effects in the US of a Multilateral 
Tariff Reduction. American Economic Review, 66 (2), pp. 142-148. 
 
Baldwin, R.E. 1986. The Political Of Us Import Policy. Cambridge, MA. MIT 
PRESS. 
Balli, H. O., and Sørensen, B. E. 2013. Interaction Effects in Econometrics. 
Empirical Economics. 45 (1), pp. 583–603. Also Available from:  
link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-012-0604-2 
Baltagi, B. H. 2005. Econometric Analysis Of Panel Data. Chichester, England: 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Baltagi, B. H., Demetriades, P. O., and Law, S. H. 2009. Financial Development and 
Openness: Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Development Economics 89 (2), 
pp. 285-296 
Baltagi, B. H., Feng, Q. and Kao, C. 2016. Estimation of Heterogeneous Panels with 
Structural Breaks. Journal of Econometrics, 191 (1), pp. 176-195 
Beck, T., Levine, R.  and Loayza, N. 2000.  Finance and the Sources of 
Growth.  Journal of Financial Economics. 58 (1-2), pp. 261-300. 
Bhaduri, A. and Marglin, S. 1990. Unemployment and the Real wage: the Economic 
Basis for Contesting Political Ideologies. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 14 (4), 
p. 375-393 
Benassy, J.P., Boyer, R., Gelpi, R. M., Lipietz, A. and Mistral, J. 1977. Approaches 
de l’inflation: L’Example francais, rapport au CORDES, Paris: CEPREMAP, 
mimeo, 1977. 
Benko, G. and Lipietz, A. 1994. De la Régulation des espaces aux espaves de 
Régulation.  In: Boyer, R. and Saillard, Y. eds. La TR. L’état des Savoirs. Paris: La 
Découverte, pp. 293-303  
Bergin, P. 2011. Asset Price Booms and Current Account Deficits. FRBSF 
Economic Letter, 37 (December 5), pp. 1- 4. 
Bhaduri, A. and Marglin, S. 1990. Unemployment and the Real Wage: The 
Economic Basis for Contesting Political Ideologies. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics. 14 (4) 375-393 
Bhasker, V. and Glyn, A. 1995. Investment and Profitability: The Evidence from the 
Advanced Capitalist Countries. In:  Epstein, G.A. and Gintis, H. eds. 
- 304 - 
Macroeconomic Policy after the Conservative Era. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp 175-196  
Blanchard, O. J. 1986. “Comment on paper, ‘Investment, Output and the Cost of 
Capital’,” by Mathew Shapiro in Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 0 (1): 153-
8 
Blundell, R., and Bond, S. 1998. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Model. Journal of Econometrics. 87 (1), pp. 115 – 143. 
Bonfiglioli, A. 2008. Financial Integration, Productivity and Capital Accumulation. 
Journal of International Economics 76 (2), pp. 337-355  
Bowles, S. and Boyer, R. 1988. Labour Discipline and Aggregate Demand: A 
Macroeconomic Model. American Economic Review. 78 (2), pp. 395-400  
Bowles, S. and Boyer, R. 1989. A Wage-Led Employment Regime: Income 
Distribution, Labour Discipline, and Aggregate Demand in Welfare Capitalism. In: 
Marglin, S. ed The Golden Age of Capitalism 1989. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bowles, S. and Boyer, R. 1995. Wages, Aggregate Demand, and Employment. In:  
Epstein, G.A. and Gintis, H. eds. Macroeconomic Policy after the Conservative Era. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 143-171.  
Bowles, S., Gordon, D., and Weisskopf, T. 1986. Power and Profits: The Social 
Structure of Accumulation and the Profitability of the Postwar U.S. Economy. 
Review of radical Political Economics. 18(1 & 2), pp. 132-167 
Bowles, S., Gordon, D. M. and Weisskopf, T. 1989. Business Ascendancy and 
Economic Impasse: A Structural Retrospective on Conservative Economics, 1979-
87. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 3 (1), pp.107-134. 
Boyer, R. 1982. Origine, originalité et enjeux de la crise actuelle en. France: une 
comparaison avec les années trente. In: La crise économique et sa gestion. Montreal: 
Boréal Express. 
Boyer, R. 1987. Technical Change and the Theory of Regulation. CEPREMAP-
CNRS-E.H.E.S.S. N0. 8707. Second Draft prepared for the IFIAS book Technical 
Change and Economic Theory: The Global Process of Development, co-ordinated 
by the Science policy Research Unit (SPRU) University of Sussex 
Boyer, R. 1990.  The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Boyer, R. 1993 Labor Institutions and Economic Growth: a Survey and a 
Regulationist Approach.  Review of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations. 7 
(1), pp. 25-72  
 
- 305 - 
Boyer, R. 2000. Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? 
A Preliminary Analysis. Economy and Society. 29 (1), pp. 111-145. 
Boyer, R. 2004. New Growth Regimes, but still Institutional Diversity. Socio-
Economic Review (2004) 2, 1-32 
 
Boyer, R. 2005. From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: the Paradox of the 1990s. 
Competition & Change.  9 (1), pp.7-47 
Boyer, R. 2007. Capitalism Strikes back: Why and What Consequences for Social 
Sciences? Revue de la Régulation, [Online]. 1 (June). [25/05/2015] 
http://regulation.revues.org/document1369.html.  
Boyer, R. 2008.  History Repeating for Economists. An Anticipated Financial Crisis. 
Prisme N°13, (November). Cournot Centre for Economic Research, Paris. Also 
available from www.centrecournot.org/prismepdf/Prisme_13_EN.pdf 
Boyer, R. 2010. The Collapse of Finance but Labour Remains Weak. In Discussion 
Forum I, Labour and Global Financial Crisis, Socio-Economic Review 8 (2), pp. 
341-376. 
Boyer, R. 2013. The Present Crisis: A trump for a Renewed Political Economy. 
Review of Political Economy. 25 (1), pp. 1-38. 
Boyer, R. and Saillard, Y. (Hg.) 2002. Regulation Theory: The State of the Art.  
London: Routledge 
Bramber, T., Clark, W. R., and Golder, M. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis, 14 (1), pp. 63 - 82  
Breitung, J. 2000. The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. In:  
Baltagi, B. H. ed.  Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels. 
Amsterdam: JAY Press, pp. 161–178. 
 
Brender, A.1996. L’impératif de solidarité: La France face `la mondialisation. Paris  
Brenner, R., and Glick, M. 1991. The Regulation Approach: Theory and History. 
New Left Review 1/188 (July – August). 
Broadberry, S. and O’Rourke, K. 2010. The Cambridge Economic History of 
Modern Europe  Volume 2, 1870 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. 
Broner, F., Didier, T., Erce, T. and Schmukler, S. 2013. Gross Capital Flows: 
Dynamics and Crises. Journal Monetary Economics, 60(1), pp. 113-133 
Brown, A.2007. Reorienting Critical Realism: A System-Wide Perspective on the 
Capitalist Economy, Journal of  Economic Methodology, 14(4), pp.499-519 
Castree, N., Kitchin, R. and Rogers, A. 2013. Oxford Dictionary Of Human 
Geography. Oxford University Press: [online] (April 30) 
- 306 - 
Caves, R.E. 1976. Economic Models of political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure. 
Canadian Journal of Economics. 9 (2), pp. 278-300 
 
Chan, F., Manchini-Grifolli, T. and Pauwels, L. 2008. Testing structural stability in 
heterogeneous panel Data, Working paper, Curtin University of Technology, Paris-
Jourdan Sciences Economiques and Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Graduate 
Institute of International Studies. URL: 
http://www.mssanz.org.au/MODSIM07/papers/16 s9/TestingStructura s9 Chan .pdf  
 
Chandler, A. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Cheh, J. 1974. United States Concession in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run 
Labour Adjustment Costs. Journal of International Economics. 4 (4), pp. 323-340 
 
Chinn, M.D. and Ito, H. 2008. A New Measure of Financial Openness. Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis. 10 , pp. 309–22. 
 
Chisholm, J. 2016. Limit of Buyback Financial Engineering. Financial Times 
[online], (March 2). https://www.ft.com/content/8abe5156-e051-11e5-8d9b-
e88a2a889797  
 
Choi, I. 2001. Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of International Money and 
Finance. 20 (2), pp.  249–272.  
Hadri, K. 2000. 
 
Chong, T.T.L. 1995. Partial Parameter Consistency in a Misspecified Structural 
Change Model. Economics Letters 49 (4), pp. 351-357. 
 
Chow, G.C. 1960. Test for Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions. Econometrica.  28 (3), pp.  591-605. 
Clarke, S. 1990. Crisis of Fordism and Capitalism. Telos, New York, 83, spring, pp. 
71 – 98 
Clemente, J., Montañés, A. and Reyes, M. 1998. Testing for a Unit Root in 
Variables with a Double Change in the Mean. Economics Letters 59 (2), pp. 175–
182. 
Cordonnier, L. 2006. Profit without Accumulation: the Recipe of Capitalism Ruled 
by Finance. Innovations 2001/1 (No. 23), pp. 79-1-8 
Cowling, K. and Sugden, R. 1987. Transnational Monopoly Capitalism. Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf 
Crotty, J. 1993. Rethinking Marxian Investment Theory: Keynesian-Minsky 
Instability, Competitive Regime Shifts and Coerced Investment. Review of Radical 
Political Economics, 25 (1), pp. 1-26 
- 307 - 
Crotty, J. 2000. Slow Growth, Destructive Competition, and Low Road Labour 
Relations: A Keynes-Marx-Schumpeter Analysis of Neoliberal Globalization. 
Korean Journal of Economic Development, 6 (2), pp. 1-74. 
Crotty, J. 2002. The Effects of Financialization and Increased Competition on the 
Performance of Nonfinancial Corporations in the Neoliberal Era. In: Epstein, G. ed. 
The Neoliberal Era. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Crotty, J. 2003. The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market 
Competition and Impatient Finance on Non-Financial Corporations in the Neoliberal 
Era. Review of Radical Political Economics. 35 (3), pp.271-279  
Crotty, J. 2005. The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market 
Competition and Modern Financial Market on Nonfinancial Corporation 
Performance. In: Epstein, G. The Neoliberal Era. Cheltenham and Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 17-45. 
Dallery, T. and Van Treeck, T. 2008. Conflicting Claims and Equilibrium 
Macroeconomic Adjustment Processes in a Stock-Flow Consistent Macromodel. 
IMK Working Paper, 9:31 
Dallery, T. 2009. Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization. 
Review of Radical Political Economics. 41 (2), pp. 492-515. 
Dallery, T. and Van Treeck, T. 2009. Firms’ Objectives, Macroeconomic Growth 
Regimes and Finance. Ekonomiaz. 72(03), pp. 140-161. 
De Long, J.B. and Summers, L. 1991. Equipment Investment and Economic 
Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106 (2), pp. 445-502  
 
De Wachter, S. and Tzavalis, E. 2004.  Detection of Structural Breaks in Linear 
Dynamic Panel Data Models. Working Papers 505, Queen Mary University of 
London, School of Economics and Finance 
Dooley. M.  P. 1996. A Survey of Literature on Controls over International Capital 
Transactions. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 43(4), pp. 639-687 
Driscoll, J. and Kraay, A. 1998. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with 
spatially dependent panel data, Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (4), pp. 549-
560. 
 
Duarte, M. and Restuccia, D. 2010. The Role of the Structural Transformation in 
Aggregate Productivity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 2010. 
 
Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. 2004. Capital Resurgence: Roots of the Neoliberal 
Revolution. (Translated by Derek Jeffers). Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
- 308 - 
Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. 2005. Cost and Benefits of Neoliberalism. In: Epstein, G. 
A. ed. Financialization and the World Economy. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Duménil, G., and Lévy, D. 2011. The Crisis of Neoliberalism. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Dymski, G. A.2010. Why the Subprime Crisis is Different: a Minskyian Approach, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 34 (2), pp. 239-255. 
Eichengreen, B. and Irwin, D.A. 2010. The Slide to Protectionism in the Great 
Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? Journal of Economic History. 70 (4), pp. 
871-897. 
 
Eichner, A. S. 1976. The Megacorp and Oligopoly: Microfoundations of 
Macrodynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ellis, L. and Smith, K. 2007. The Global Upward Trend in the Profit Share. BIS 
Working Papers No. 231 
 
Ellsworth, R. R. 1985. Capital Market and Competitive Decline. Harvard Business 
Review. 2 (1), pp. 28-42 
 
Emerson, J. and Kao, C. 2006. Testing for Structural Change in Panel Data: GDP 
Growth, Consumption Growth, and Productivity Growth. Economics Bulletin. 3 
(14), pp.1-12 
Epstein, G. A. 2005. Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy. In: 
Epstein, G. ed. Financialization and the World economy. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, pp. 17-45. 
Epstein, G. A., and Gintis, H. 1995. Macroeconomic Policies for Sustainable 
Growth.  In:  Epstein, G. A. and Gintis, H. M.  eds. Macroeconomic Policy after the 
Conservative Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-17. 
Falvey, R. 1981. Commercial Policy and Intra-Industry Trade. Journal of 
International Economics. 11 (4), pp. 495-511 
Falvey, R.E., and Kierzkowski, H. 1987. Product Quality, Intra-Industry Trade, and 
(Im)perfect Competition. In: Kierzkowski, H. ed.  Protection and Competition in 
International Trade:Essays in Honor of W.M. Corden. Basil: Blackwell, pp. 143-
161. 
 
Fillat, J. and Garetto, S. 2015. Risk, Returns, and Multinational Production. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 130 (4), pp. 2027-2073 
- 309 - 
 Fiebiger, B. 2016. Rethinking the Financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations: 
A Reappraisal of US Empirical Data. Review of Political Economy. 28 (3), pp.354-
379 
Fine, B. 2012. Financialization on the Rebound? Actuel Marx. 51(1), pp. 73-85 
Finger, J.M. 1981. Policy Research. Journal of Political Economy. 89(6), pp. 1270-
1271 
 
Flannery, M. J., Hankins, K. W. 2013.  Estimating Dynamic panel Models in 
Corporate Finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 19 (C), pp. 1-19 
Fischer, S. 1998. Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of IMF. In: Fischer, 
S., Cooper, R. N., Dornbusch, R., Garber, P. M., Massad, C., Polak, J. J., Rodrik, D. 
and  Tarapore, S. S. Should the IMF Pursue Capital Account Convertibility? Essays 
in International Finance, No. 207. Princeton NJ: Princeton University, pp. 1-10 
Fischer, S. 2003. Globalization and its challenges. American Economic Review. 93 
(2), pp. 1-30. 
Fligstein, N. 2001. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-
First Capitalist Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
Fontana, G. and Sawyer, M. 2013. Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian thoughts on 
Ecological Macroeconomics. European Journal of Economics and Economic 
Policies: Intervention. 10 (2), pp. 256-267 
 
Frey, B. 1985. The Political Economy of Protection. In: Greenaway, D. ed.  Current 
Issues in International Trade: Theory and Policy. London: Macmillan. 
 
Frieden, J. and Lake, D. A. 2000. International Political Economy: Perspectives On 
Global Power And Wealth. (4ed). London: ROUTLEDGE, LONDON 
 
Froud, J. Haslam, C., Johal, S., and William, K. 2000a. Shareholder Value and 
Financialization: Consultancy Promises, Management Moves. Economy and Society, 
29 (1), pp. 80-110.  DOI: 10.1080/030851400360578  
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S., and William, K .2000b. Restructuring for 
Shareholder Value and its Implications for Labour. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics. 24 (6), pp. 771-797. 
Galbraith, J. K. 1969. The New Industrial State. Harmonsworth, Middlesex: Pelican 
Books 
Gehringer, A. 2013. Growth, Productivity and Capital Accumulation: The Effects of 
Financial Liberalization in the case of European Integration.  International Review 
of Economics and Finance. 25, pp. 291-309 
- 310 - 
Glyn, A. 1995. Stability, Inegalitarianism, and Stagnation. In Epstein, G. and Gintis, 
H. M. eds. Macroeconomic Policy after the Conservative Era. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 18-53 
Glyn, A., Hughes, A., Lipietz, A. and Singh, A. 1992. The Rise and Fall of the 
Golden Age. In: Marglin, S.A. and Schor, J. B. eds. The Golden Age of Capitalism: 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Gordon, D. M. 1995. Growth, Distribution and the Rules of the Game: Social 
Structuralist Macro Foundations for a Democratic Economic Policy. In: Epstein, G. 
A. and Gintis, H. M. 1995. Macroeconomic Policy after the Conservative Era. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 335-383 
Gordon, D. M., Edwards, R., and Reich, M. 1982. Segmented Work, Divided 
Workers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gordon, D. M., Weisskopf, T. and Bowles, S. 1987. Power, Accumulation and 
Crisis: The Rise and Demise of the Postwar Social Structure of Accumulation. In: 
Robert Cherry et al. (eds.) The Imperilled Economy: Macroeconomics from a Left 
perspective (Book I). New York: The Union for Radical Political Economics. 
 
Gordon, D., Weisskopf, T. and Bowles, S. 1988. A Conflict Model of investment: 
The Social Determinants of U. S. capital Accumulation. Working Paper No. 2, 
Department of Economics, New School for Social Research, 1988.  
 
Grilli, V. and Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. 1995. Economic Effects and Structural 
Determinants of Capital Controls. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 
42(3), pp. 517-551. 
 




Guttmann, R. 2015. The Heterodox Notion of Structural Crisis. Review of 
Keynesian Economics 3 (2), pp. 194-212. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/roke.2015.02.04 
 
Hahn, J., Hausman, J. and Kuersteiner, G. 2007.  Long Difference Instrumental 
Variables Estimation for Dynamic Panel Models with Fixed Effects. Journal of 
Econometrics. 140 (2), pp. 574-617 
Hansen, B. 1997. Approximate Asymptotic P Values for Structural Change Tests. 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 15 (1), pp. 60-67 
Hansen, B. 2001. The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in 
U.S. Labour Productivity. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 15 (4), pp. 117–128 
- 311 - 
Hauner, D. and Prati, A. 2008. Openness and Domestic Financial Liberalization: 
Which Comes First? On the Causes and Consequence of Structural Reforms (IMF), 
February 28, 2008. 
 
Hay, Colin. 1995.  Rethinking Crisis: Narrative of the New Right and Construction 
of Crisis.  Rethinking Marxism. 8 (2), pp. 60-76 
 
Hein, E. 2006. Interest, Debt and Capital Accumulation- A Kaleckian Approach. 
International Review of Applied Economics. 20 (3), pp. 337-352. 
Hein, E. 2007. Interest Rates, Debt, Distribution and Capital Accumulation In A 
Post-Kaleckian Model. Metroeconomica. 58 (2), pp. 310-339. 
Hein, E. and van Treeck, T. 2007. Financialisation in Kaleckian? Post-Kaleckian 
Models of Distribution and Growth. IMK Working paper, 7/2007 (Duesseldorf: 
Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at Hans Boeckler Foundation)  
Hein, E., and Treeck, V. 2010. Financialisation and Rising Shareholder Power 
in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian Models of Distribution and Growth.  Review of 
Political Economy. 22, (2) pp. 205-233. 
Henry, P. B. 1997. Do Stock Market Liberalizations Cause Investment Booms? 
Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1504. 
Henry, P. B. 2007. Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and 
Speculation. Journal of Economic Literature. 45 (4) pp. 887-935. 
Herranz, N., Krasa, S., and Villamil, A. Entrepreneurs, Risk Aversion, and Dynamic 
Firms. Journal of Political Economy 123, (5), PP. 1133-1176. 
Heye, C. 1995. Expectations and Investment: An Econometric Defense of Animal 
Spirits. In: Epstein, G. A. and Gintis, H. M. 1995. Macroeconomic Policy after the 
Conservative Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-223 
Hicks, J. 1963. Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan. 
 
Holmström, B. and Tirole, J. 1998 Private and Public Supply of Liquidity. Journal 
of Political Economy. 106 (1): 1–40.  
 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H. 1988. Estimating Vector 
Autoregressions with Panel Data. Econometrica. 56 (6), pp.1371-1395. 
 
Hsiao, C. 2007. Panel Data Analysis Advantages and Challenges. Test. 16 (1), pp. 1-
22 
- 312 - 
Huang, R., and Ritter, J. R. 2009.  Testing theories of capital structure and 
estimating the speed of adjustment. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
44 (2), pp. 237-271. 
 
Ietto-Gillies, G. 1992. International Production: Trends, Theories, Effects. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Im, K., Pesaran, H., and Shin, Y. 2003. Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels. Journal of Econometrics. 115 (1), pp.  53-74. 
 
International Monetary Fund Research Department. 1997. World Economic  
Outlook, May 1997: Globalisation: Opportunities and Challenges.  International 
Monetary Fund. P. 113. 
 
IMF.2006. World Economic Outlook, Globalization and Inflation, Ch. 4, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Irwin, D.A. 2012. Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s. Dartmouth 
College. https://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/Ohlin-Preface.pdf  
Jayadev A. and Epstein G. 2007. The Correlates of Rentier Returns in OECD 
Countries, Working Papers Series No. 123, Political Economy Research Institute, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
Jessop, B. 1990a. Regulation Theories in Retrospect and Prospect. [Online]. 
[25/05/2015]. Available from www.eprints.lancs.ac.uk/222/2/Microsoft_Word_-
_489B39B.pdf   
Jessop, B. 1990b. State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Jessop, B. 1992a. Regulation and Politik: Integrale Ökonomie under integraler 
Staat. In: Demirovic, A. Krebs, H.-P. and Sablowski, T. eds.  Hegemonie und 
Staat. Münster: Westfalisches 
Jessop, B. 1992b/2013. Fordism and Post-Fordism: A Critical Reformulation. 
In: Scott, A.J. and Storoer, M.J. eds.  Pathways to Regionalism and Industrial 
Development. London: Routledge, pp.43-65.   
Jessop, B. 1992c. Regulation and Politics: the Integral Economy and the 
Integral State  Mimeo. University of Lancaster. (Available from the author at 
Department of Sociology, Lancaster, LA1 4YL) 
- 313 - 
Jessop, B. 1994. The Transition to Post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian 
Workfare State. In: Burrows, R. and Loader, B. eds. Towards a Post-Fordist 
Welfare State. London: Routledge 
Jessop, B. 1997. Survey Article: the Regulation Approach. The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 5 (3), pp. 287-326 
Jessop, B. 2013. Revisiting the Regulation Approach: Critical Reflections on 
the Contradictions, Dilemmas, Fixes and Crisis Dynamics of Growth Regimes. 
Capital and Class. 37(1), pp. 5-24 
Judson, R. A., and Owen, A. L. 1999. Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A 
Guide for Macroeconomists. Economic Letter. 65, (1), pp. 9-15 
Kaldor, N. 1956. Alternative Theories of Distribution. The Review of Economic 
Studies. 23 (2), pp. 83 – 100. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-
6527%281955%2F1956%2923%3A2%3C83%3AATOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P  
 
Kaldor, N. 1957. A Model of Economic Growth. The Economic Journal, 67 (268), 
pp.591-624 
 
Kaldor, N. 1961. Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth. In: Lutz, F. and 
Hague, D. eds. The Theory of Capital. London: Macmillan 
 
Kalecki, M. 1954. Theory of Economic Dynamics: An Essay on Cyclical and Long-
Run Changes in Capitalist Economy. London: Unwin Brothers LTD 
 
Kaplan Financial. 2016. Association of Certified Chartered Accountants: Advanced 
Financial Management. Wokingham, Berkshire: Kaplan Publishing.  
 
Kaplan, C., Özmen, E and Yalҫin, C. 2006. The Determinants and Implications of 
Financial Asset Holdings of Non-Financial Firms in Turkey: An Empirical 
Investigation. Research and Monetary Policy Department Working Paper No: 06/06. 
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
 
Karlsson, S. and Löthgren, M.  2000.  On the power and interpretation of panel unit 
root tests. Economics Letters. 66 (3), pp. 249-255. 
 
Kmenta, J. 1971. Elements of Econometrics. London: Macmillan 
 
King, R. G., and Levine, R. 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 108 (3), pp. 717-737 
- 314 - 
Kiviet, J. F. 1995. On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of various Estimators in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journals of Econometrics 68 (1), pp. 53 – 78 
 
Klein, M. and Olivei, G. 1999. Capital Account Liberalization, Financial Deepening, 
and Economic Growth.  NBER Working Paper W7384, October 1999. 
 
Kose, A. and Prasad, E. 2012. Capital Accounts Liberalize or Not? International 
Monetary Fund Finance and Development. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/capital.htm  
 
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S and Terrones, M. 2009. Does Openness to International 
Financial Flows Raise Productivity Growth? Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 28 (4), pp.554-580 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2002. Globalization and Neoliberalism. Rethinking Marxism 14(2), 
pp.64-79 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2003. Neoliberalism and the Social Structure of Accumulation 
Theory of Long-Run Capital Accumulation. Review of Radical Political 
Economics. 35 (3), pp.  263-270 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2008a. Neoliberalism and Financialization. Conference in honour of 
Jane D'Arista, May 2-3, 2008, the Political Economy Research Institute, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2008b. Contradictions of Economic Growth in the Neoliberal Era: 
Accumulation and Crisis in the Contemporary U.S. Economy. Review of Radical 
Political Economics 40 (2), pp.174-188 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2009. Economic Crises and Institutional Structures: A Comparison 
of Regulated and Neoliberal Capitalism in the U.S. In: Goldstein, J. and Hillard, 
M. eds. Heterodox Macroeconomics: Keynes, Marx and Globalization. London 
and New York: Routledge, pp. 176-188 
 
Kotz, D. M. 2011. Social Structures of Accumulation, the Rate of Profit, and 
Economic Crises. Paper written in honour of Thomas E. Weisskopf, September 
30 to October 1, 2011, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts 
Amherst.   
 
Koutsoyiannis, A. 1979. Modern Microeconomics. (2nd ed). London: Macmillan 
Press LTD 
- 315 - 
Kraay, A. 1998. In Search of the Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Account 
Liberalization. The World Bank, unpublished paper, October 1998. 
 
Krippner, G. R. 2005. The Financialization of the US Economy. Socio-Economic 
Review. 3 (2), pp. 173-208 
 
Krugman, P. R. 1979. Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition and 
International Trade. Journal of International Economics. 4 (9), pp. 469-479. 
Krugman, P. R. 1992. Does the New Trade Theory Require a New Trade Policy? 
The World Economy. 15 (4), pp. 423-441 
 
Lancaster, K. 1980. Intra-industry Trade Under Perfect Monopolistic 
Competition. Journal of International Economics. 10 (2), pp. 151-175 
Lavoie, M. 1992. Foundation of Post-Keynesian Econometric Analysis. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
Lavoie, M. 1995a. Interest Rates in Post-Keynesian Models of Growth and 
Distribution. Metroeconomica. 46 (2), pp. 146-177 
Lavoie, M. 1995b. The Kaleckian Model of Growth and Distribution and Its Neo-
Ricardian and Neo-Marxian Critiques.  Cambridge Journal of Economics. 19(6), pp. 
789-818. 
Lavoie, M. 1997. Real Wages, Employment Structure and the Aggregate 
Demand Curve in Kaleckian Short-Run Model. Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics. 19 (2), pp. 275-288 
Lavoie,  M. 2003. Real Wages and Unemployment with Effective and Notional 
Demand for Labour. Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical 
Political Economics. 35 (2), pp, 166-182. 
 
Lavoie, M. 2009. Cadrisme within a Post-Keynesian Model of Growth and 
Distribution. Review of Political Economy. 21 (3), pp. 369-391 
 
Lavoie, M. 2014. Post Keynesian Economics: New Foundations. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Lawrence, C. and Spiller, P. T. 1986. Product Diversity, Economics of Scale and 
International Trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98 (1), pp. 61-83 
 
Lazonick, W. 2014. Profit without Prosperity. Harvard Business Review, September 
2014 issue.  
 
- 316 - 
Lazonick, W. and O’ Sullivan, M. 2000. Maximizing Shareholders Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance. Economy and Society. 29 (1), pp. 13-35. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/030851400360541  
 
Leborgne, D. and Lipietz, A. 1992.  Conceptual Fallacies and Open Questions on 
Post Fordism. In: Storper, M. and Scott, A. J. eds. Pathways to Industrialization and 
Regional Development. London: Routledge, pp. 332-348 
Lee, F.2002. Theory Creation and the Methodological Foundation of Post Keynesian 
Economics, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 789-804 
Levine, R. 2001. International Financial liberalization and Economic Growth. 
Review of International Economics. 9 (4), 688 – 702. 
Lin K. and Tomaskovic-Devey D. 2013. Financialization and U.S. Income 
Inequality, 1970–2008, American Journal of Sociology. 118 (4), pp. 1284–1329 
Lind, M. 2003. Free Trade Fallacy. Prospect, January 1, 2003. 
 
Lipietz, A. 1977.  Le capital et son espace. Paris: Maspero 
Lipietz, A. 1979.  Crise et inflation, pourquoi? Paris: Maspero 
Lipietz, A. 1986. Behind the Crisis: The Exhaustion of a Regime of Accumulation. 
A “Regulation School” Perspective on Some French Empirical Works. Review of 
Radical Political Economics. 18 (1&2), pp. 13-32. 
 
Lipietz, A. 1987. Mirages and Miracles. London: New Left Books 
Lipietz, A. 1992. Toward A New Economic Order: Post Fordism, Democracy and 
Ecology. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lipietz, A. 1993. The Local and Global: Regional Individuality or 
Interregionalism? Transactions of the Institute of British Geographer. 18(1), pp. 
8-18 
Lipietz, A., and Vale, M. 1988. Accumulation, Crises, and Ways Out: Some 
Methodological Reflections on the Concept of “Regulation”. International 
Journal of Political Economy. 18, issue (2), pp. 10-43 
Maddison, A. 1982. Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Maddison, A. 1989. The World Economy in the 20th Century, Paris: OECD 
- 317 - 
Maizels, A. 1963. Industrial Growth and World Trade. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
 
Marglin, S. A. and Bhaduri, A. 1992.  Profit Squeeze and Keynesian Theory. In: 
Marglin, S. A. and Schor, J. B. eds. The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting 
the Postwar Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Masten, A. B., Coricelli, F. and Masten, I. 2008. Non-Linear Growth Effects 
of Financial Development: Does Financial Integration Matter? Journal of 
International Money and Finance. 27(2), pp. 295-313. 
 
Mathis, J, and Sand-Zantman, W.2014. Competition and Investment: What do We 
Know from the Literature? INSTITUT D’ ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLIE 
 
Mazier, J., Basle, M. and Vidal, J. 1999. When Economic Crises Endure. London: 
M. E. Sharpe.  
 
Minsky, H. 1975. John Maynard Keynes. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Monroe, W.F. 1975. International Trade Policy In Transition. MASSACHUSETTS: 
D.C. Heath And Company.  
 
Nerlove, M. 1967. Experimental Evidence on the estimation of Dynamic 
Economic Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections. Economic Studies 
Quarterly. 18, 42-74. 
 
Nickell, S. 1981. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed effects. Econometrica 49 
(6), pp. 1417 – 1426 
 
Nilsson, E. A. 1996. The Breakdown of the U.S Postwar System of Labour 
Relations: An Econometric Study. Review of Radical Political Economics, 28 (1), 
pp. 20 – 50 
 
Obstfeld, M. 1998. The global capital market: benefactor or menace? Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 12(4), pp. 9-30. 
 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. CAMBRIDGE, MA: Harvard 
University Press 
 
Onaran, Ö. Stockhammer, E., and ZwicKl, K. 2013. FDI and Domestic Investment 
in Germany: Crowding In or Out? International Review of Applied Economics, 27:4, 
429-448. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2012.752444  
- 318 - 
Orhangazi, Ö. 2008. Financialization and Capital Accumulation in the Non-
Financial Corporate Sector: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on the US 
Economy: 1973-2003. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 32 (6), pp. 836-886. 
 
Orhangazi, Ö.2014. Financial Deregulation and the 2007-08 US Financial Crisis. In 
Financialization, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development, FESSUD Working 
Paper No 49, 2014. 
 
Ortiz-Ospina, E. and Roser, M. 2017. International Trade. Published online at 
OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/international-trade 
[Online Resource] 
 
Palombarini, S. 2001. La Rupture du Compromis Social Italien. Paris: CHRS 
Editions. 
 
Pasinetti, L. L. 1974. Growth and Income Distribution: Essays in Economic Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Perron, P. 1989. The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis. Econometrica, 57(6), pp. 1361-1401 
 
Persyn, D. and Westerlund, J. 2008. Error-Correction-Based Cointegration Tests for 
Panel Data. The Stata Journal, 8 (2), pp.232-241 
 
Pesaran, M. H. and Smith, R. 1995. Estimating Long-run Relationships from 
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel. Journal of Econometrics. 68 (1), pp. 79-113 
 
Petit, P. 1999. Structural Forms and Growth Regimes of the Post-Fordist Era. 
Review of Social Economy. 57 (2), pp. 220-243 
 
Petit, P. 2010. The Systemic Nature of the Rise in Inequality in Developed 
Economies. International Review of Applied Economics. 24 (3), pp. 251-267. 
 
Pincus, J. 1975. Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs. Journal of Political 
Economy. 83 (4), pp. 757-778 
 
Pivetti, M. 1985. On the Monetary Explanation of Distribution.  Political Economy 
1 (2), pp. 73–103. 
 
Porter, M. 1992. Capital Disadvantage: American’s Failing Capital Investment 
System. Harvard Business Review, September-October issue, 1992. 
- 319 - 
 
Posner, M. V. 1961. International Trade and Technological Change. Oxford 
Economic Papers. 13 (3), pp. 323-341 
Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, S. and Kose, A. 2003. Effects of Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence. International Monetary Fund, 
March 17, 2003  
 
Quandt, R.E. 1960. Tests of the Hypothesis That a Linear Regression System Obeys 
Two Separate Regimes. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 55 (290), 
pp. 324-330 
 
Quinn, D. 1997. The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation. 
American Political Science Review. 91(3), pp. 531-551. 
 
Rajan, R. G., and Zingales, L. 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. 
American Economic Review. 88 (3), pp. 559-589 
 
Rajan, R. G., and Zingales, L. 2003. The Great Reversals: the Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century. Journal of Financial Economics, 69 (2), 5 – 
50 
 
Ray, E.J. 1981. Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade in the United States and 
Abroad. Review of Economics and Statistics. 63 (2), pp. 161-168 
 
Robinson, J. 1956. The Accumulation of Capital. Illinois: Irwin, Homewood. 
 
Robinson, J. 1962. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. London: Macmillan. 
 
Rodrik, D. 1998. Who needs capital account convertibility? Princeton Essays in 
International Finance. 207, pp. 55-65. 
 
Rogoff, K. 1999.International institutions for reducing global financial instability. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 13(4), pp. 21-42. 
 
Romer, P. 1987. Crazy Explanations for the Productivity Slowdown. NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, 2, pp. 163-202 
 
Rowthorn, R. 1995. Capital Formation and Unemployment. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy. 11(1), pp. 26-39 
 
- 320 - 
Rybczynski, T.M. 1955. Factor endowments and relative commodity prices. 
Economica 22 (88), pp. 336–341. 
 
Ryner, M. 2012. The [I]PE of Falling Wage-Shares: Situating Working Class 
Agency. Inaugural Conference of the Sheffield Political Economy Research 
Institute: “The British Growth Crisis: The Search for a New Model”, 17 July, 
Sheffield. 
 
Sawyer, M. 2014. What is Financialization? International Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 42 (4), pp.5-18 
 
Schor, J. B. 1987. Does Work Intensity Respond to Macroeconomic Variables?  
Unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1987. 
 
Schor, J. B. and Bowles, S. 1987. Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes. 
Review of Economics and Statistics.  LXIX (4), pp. 584-592 
 
Schumpeter, J. A.1939. Business Cycles: a Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical 
Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
 
Schumpeter, J. 1976. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 4th edition. London: 
George Allen and Unwin. 
 
Södersten, B. and Reed, G. 1994. International Economics. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1974. Free Riders and Collective Action. Bell Journal of Economics. 5 
(2), pp. 359-365 
 
Stiglitz, J. 2000. Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability. 
World Development.  28 (6), pp. 1075-1086 
 
Stockhammer, E. 2004. Financialization and the Slowdown of Accumulation. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 28 (5), pp. 719-41 
 
Stockhammer, E. 2005-6. Shareholder Value Orientation and the Investment-
Profit Puzzle. Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics. 28 (2), pp. 193-215 
 
Stockhammer, E. 2007. Some Stylized Facts on the Finance-Dominated 
Accumulation Regime. Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series, 
No. 142 
 
Stockhammer, E. and Grafl, L. 2010. Financial Uncertainty and Business 
Investment. Review of Political Economy, 22.4, 551-568. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2010.510317  
- 321 - 
 
Summers, L. 2000. International financial crises: Causes, prevention, and cures. 
American Economic Review. 90(2), pp. 1-16. 
Terborgh, A.G. 2003. The Post-War Rise of World Trade: Does the Bretton Woods 
System Deserve Credit? Working Paper No. 78/03. Department of Economic 
History, London School of Economics. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/pdf/wp7803.pdf  
 
Tickell, A. and Peck, A. 1995. Social regulation after Fordism: Regulation 
Theory, Neo-liberalism and the Global-local Nexus. Economy and Society 
24(3), pp. 357-386  
 
Tobin, J. 1997. Comment.  In:  Pollin, R. ed. The Macroeconomics of Savings, 
Finance and Investment. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 
 
van Treeck, T. 2008. Reconsidering the Investment-Profit Nexus in Finance-
Led Economies: An ARDL-Based Approach. Metroeconomica. 59 (3) (2008), 
pp. 371-404 
 
van Treeck, T. 2009. The Political Economy Debate on Financialization - A 
Macroeconomic Perspective. Review of International Political Economy. 16 (5), pp. 
907 – 944 
 
Varoufakis, Y. 2011. The Global Minotaur: America, the True Causes of the 
Financial Crisis and Future of the Wold Economy. London and New York: Zed 
Books 
 
Venables, A. J. 1984. Multiple Equilibria in the Theory of International Trade with 
Monopolistically Competitive Industries. Journal of International Economics. 16 
(1-2), pp. 103–121. 
 
Vickers, D. 1987. Money Capital in the Theory of the Firm: A Preliminary Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, I. 2007. Precipitate Decline: The Advent of Multipolarity. Harvard 
International Review. Spring, 2007 
 
Wallerstein, I. 2010. Structural Crises. New Left Review 62, March-April, 2010 
 
Warnecke, S. J. 1978. International Trade and Industrial Policies: Government 
Intervention and an Open World Economy. 
 
- 322 - 
Weisskopf, T. E. 1987. The Effect of Unemployment on Labour Productivity: An 
International Comparative Analysis. International Review of Applied Economics, 1 
(2), pp. 127-151 
Weisskopf, T., Bowles, S. and Gordon, D. M. 1983. Hearts and Minds: A Social 
Model of U.S. Productivity Growth. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
1983:2, 381-441. 
 
Wood, A. 1975.  A Theory of Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Woodford, M. 1990. Public Debt as Private Liquidity.” American Economic Review, 
80 (2), pp. 382–388. 
 
Wooldridge, J. 2008. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (4th ed), 
United Sates, Mason, OH: Cengage Learning Inc. 
 
World Trade Organization. 2013. Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade. World 
Trade Report, 2013. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr13-2b_e.pdf 
 




Zhou, Q., Faff, R., and Alpert, K. 2014. Bias Correction in the Estimation of 
Dynamic Panel Models in Corporate Finance. Journal of Corporate Finance. 25, pp. 












- 323 - 
Appendix A 
 
A.1 Convergence in Labour- Fixed Capital Ratio Across the 
Advanced Capitalist Economies. 




Figure A 2 
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Notes: 
 Figures A1 and A2 present the average series of the rate of substitution of labour for 
fixed capital, or labour to fixed capital ratio, for the 23 advanced capitalist 
economies in the sample, in this thesis. The averaging is to summarise, for ease of 
presentation. The ‘total average’ series refers to the series averaged across the 23 
countries. ‘North European average’ refers to the series, averaged across the North 
European countries of: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,  Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom (UK). ‘South European average’ refers to the series averaged 
across the countries of: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. ‘North America average’ 
refers to the series averaged across the United States and Canada. The ‘Pacific 
average’ refers to the series averaged across Australia and New Zealand. Japan 
refers to the series for Japan.  
 
The two figures indicate that during the 1960s, as part of Fordism, the ratios or 
series varies to a greater extent across the countries, or country blocs. This is in spite 
of the claim that production methods underpinned by Fordism diffused from the 
United States to other advanced capitalist economies. After Fordism, specifically 
during the mid-1970s to about 2008, there appeared to be the greatest overlap among 
the averages, implying the greatest convergence of the series, compared to Fordism 
and the post-global financial crisis period.  The period of the mid-1970s till about 
2008, is the period identified in this thesis as Corporate Capitalism, characterised by 
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A.2 Trade Openness and Rates of Private Non-residential Fixed 
Capital Accumulation: An Exemplar Case-Luxembourg 
Figure A 3 
 




Figures A3 and A4 in appendix A.2 respectively present the series on trade openness 
and fixed capital accumulation in Luxembourg. From the 1960 till about 1996 when 
trade openness was relative horizontal in the country, fixed capital accumulation 
seemed to be slightly upward trending. Further to the dramatic uprising of trade 
openness after about 1996, fixed capital accumulation commenced an extended 
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